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FOREWORD
Inspiration for the preparation of this volume came from
reading two sections of Volume I of the four-volumes published
in 1942 entitled, The University of Michigan-An Encyclopedic
Survey. One section by E. Blythe Stason, Dean Emeritus of the
University's Law School, is captioned "The Constitutional Status of the University of Michigan." The other section captioned
"The Organization, Powers and Personnel of the Board of
Regents" was prepared by the Dean and the late Wilfred B.
Shaw, long connected with the University in important administrative capacities and intimately acquainted with its history.
The material here presented duplicates in part that contained in these two sections. It is intended to be more specific
and, in some respects, it is much more expansive. Moreover, it
speaks of developments since the year 1942 when the survey
was published.
If occasionally it has value to those charged with administering the affairs of the University and educational institutions
of similar constitutional posture, the efforts in publishing this
volume will be well rewarded.
Subjects not treated in this volume are as follows:
(a) Federal laws, such as those granting financial aid and
other assistance, under which the federal government assists universities and colleges alone or in connection with other governmental units, and state aid and assistance laws.
(b) Statutes of Michigan appropriating funds for the support and maintenance of the University.
(c) Statutes known as "millage tax laws," the first of which
was enacted in 1867. This form of financial support for the University is no longer employed. When used there was imposed on
property in the State, subject to ad valorem taxes, a millage tax
in varying amounts based on assessed valuation.
(d) General laws of the State of Michigan applicable to all
citizens.
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(e) Proceedings involving the University of Michigan before
state and local boards and commissions, and before municipal
and justices courts.
The legislative history of the University is extremely interesting. It begins with the territorial laws enacted in 181 7 and continues to date. Michigan was admitted to the Union in 1837 and
thereafter a legislature as constituted by the Constitution of the
State, adopted in 183 5 and re-adopted in 183 7, enacted the laws.
There was a revision of the State statutes in 183 7 and
1846. Since then pursuant to law, from time to time compilations of statutes have been prepared. The generally recognized
compilations were made in the years 1857, 1871, 1882, 1890,
1897, 1912, 1915, 1929 and 1948.
In this volume the general history of significant laws
enacted by the Territorial Council and by the State Legislature
for each year from 1817 are considered and sufficiently treated
in the Stason and Price articles contained in this volume (Chapters I & V) and in Chapter III which discusses current statutes
pertaining to the University and their history.
It appears that no significant statutes enacted since 1817
have been enacted and then repealed, save perhaps the "millage"
tax laws. Inconsequential laws were passed and repealed. A summary of all important statutes in force at this time is set forth.
A university has many gleaming facets: governing board,
administrative officers, faculty, students, alumni and, yes, many
friends. The story of great institutions can be revealed in diverse
ways, through the means of various media such as histories, articles and other writings. Surprisingly, perhaps, given antiquity of
a sort, such institutions sooner or later are bound to become enmeshed in law for one reason or another. This is particularly
true of entities which are public institutions, such as the University of Michigan. Given this age, these laws, whether expressed
in decisions or statutes, often tell much of interest as to the history, traditions, growth, rights and responsibilities of such
bodies. The history and drama is slowly and haphazardly unfolded, but for the reader it is there.
WILLIAM B. CUDLIP
June, 1969

CAPSULE HISTORY OF UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
With the thought that some perspective concerning the
University's general history may be useful to one examining this
volume, it seems desirable to mention in chronological order
some of the main happenings in the one and one-half centuries
of the life of this great educational institution.
Year

Event

1787

Congress adopted the Ordinance of 1787 providing for the government of the Northwest territories and the implanting of educational facilities
therein.

1805

Territory of Michigan was organized and lands
granted for educational purposes.

1817

Organization of a supervisory body known as the
Catholepistemiad of Michigania in Detroit, Michigan. Initiation of Fort Meigs treaty by Territorial Governor Cass with Indians providing,
among other things, for three sections of land
for support of a territorial institution of higher
learning.

1821

Congressional act setting aside two townships for
use and support of a University within the Territory of Michigan. Creation of "University of
Michigan" with changes in 1817 law. The new
act provided for state-wide branches of the University.

1835

State Constitution adopted with recognition of
the University and means for its support.
ix
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Year

Event

1836

Opening of building on Bates Street, Detroit, for
admission of first students.

1837

Michigan admitted to Union as a State. University moved from Detroit to Ann Arbor.
Forty-eight thousand acres of land given by
United States to State of Michigan in trust for
support of schools.
Enactment by legislature of organic act of the
University.

1841

Opening of University at Ann Arbor. Completion
of first buildings. The first class held in Mason
Hall consisted of seven students. There were two
facu1ty members.

1850

Effective date of new state Constitution which
created new and independent status for the University. Opening of Department of Medicine and
Surgery.

1852

Appointment of President Henry Philip Tappan.

1860

Opening of Law Department.

1861-65

Interruptive Civil War and thereafter vigorous
growth of institution.

1863

Appointment of President Erastus Otis Haven.

1867

Inauguration by legislature of the novel device of
a millage tax for University support.

1869

Appointment of Henry Simmons Frieze as Acting President.
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Year

Event

1869-70

Beginning of Douglas-Rose controversy

1871

Appointment of James Burrill Angell as President. Beginning of stable growth of the University.

1908

Effective date of new state Constitution which
retained 1850 constitutional posture of University.

1909

Appointment of Harry Bums Hutchins as President.

1917-18

World War I, again followed by period of stimulus to all aspects of University life.

1920

Appointment of Marion LeRoy Burton as President.
Huge and much-needed building program was
commenced.

1925

Appointment of Clarence Cook Little as President.

1929

Appointment of Alexander Grant Ruthven as
President.
Beginning of additional building program of large
dimensions.

1941-45

World War II, followed by marked growth in
student body and research and educational efforts.

1951

Appointment of Harlan Henthorn Hatcher as
President.
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Year

Event

1951

Vast increase in student body and continued ex~
pansion of facilities for educational and research
purposes.

1964

Effective date of new state Constitution which
retains 1850 and 1908 constitutional posture of
University.

1968

Appointment of Robben W. Fleming as
dent.

Presi~
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"For the University of Michigan
Law School, Class of 1926."

"For while freedom is the corner stone of our political fabric,
intelligence is the cement that holds its several parts together."
-Justice Manning. The Regents of The University of Michigan
vs. The Detroit Young Men's Society, 12 Mich. 138, 164 (1863).

Part One
The Legal History of the University of Michigan;
Development of the Autonomous Constitutional
Corporation.

CHAPTER I
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY
AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGES MADE BY
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
1. INTRODUCTION

Dean Stason's article on the Constitutional Status of the
University of Michigan is-as stated in the Foreword-the inspiration for this book. This first chapter contains generous excerpts from that article and its appendices which review the
early legal history of the University and the constitutional provisions under which it is governed. These excerpts are followed
by a brief comment describing the changes brought forth since
the Stason article by the new constitution adopted in 1963. The
essence of the case of the Regents v. Board of Education of City
of Detroit is included in this chapter for its definitive review of
the early legal history of the University.
E. Blythe Stason, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
1 The University of Michigan-An Encyclopedic Survey 116
(1942), University of Michigan Press.
·
The foundations of the constitutional status of the University
of Michigan were laid long prior to the writing of specific provisions
into the constitution of the state. The roots of those provisions are
to be found in the early history of the Northwest Territory and in
the early efforts to establish education as one of the necessary functions of government ....
On May 20, 1785, the Congress adopted "an ordinance for
ascertaining the mode of disposing oflands in the western country,"
establishing a system of rectangular land surveys for the new country. The ordinance contained the forward looking provision that
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"there shall be reserved the lot No. 16 of every township for the
maintenance of public schools within the said township." The significance of this early provision can scarcely be overestimated. It
gives evidence of a recognition by the central government of its obligation and duty to provide at government expense for education
within the Northwest Territory-this in a day when public schools
were almost an unknown phenomenon, even in the states already
established.
Two years later, on July 13, 1787, the Congress adopted the
measure, known as the Ordinance of 1787, entitled "An Ordinance
for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest
of the River Ohio," and on July 23 of the same year a supplementary measure was adopted, entitled "Powers to the Board of Treasury to Contract for the Sale of Western Territory." These two enactments were a part of the same general plan, and each of them contained important provisions concerning education. The earlier of the
two, i.e., the ordinance, contained the often quoted general declaration: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged" (Northwest Ordinance,
Art. 3).
The supplementary measure of July 23 was more specific. It
reiterated the grant of 1785 allocating lot No. 16 in each township
"to be given perpetually for the purpose of maintenance of the public
schools within the township," and, more importantly so far as the
University is concerned, it added:
[Not more than two complete townships] shall be given perpetually for the purpose of a university, to be laid off by the purchaser or purchasers as near the centre as may be, so that the same
shall be of good land, to be applied to the intended object by the
legislature of the state.
These three measures, adopted by the Congress of the Confederation and, in effect, made a part of the fundamental law of the
Northwest Territory, established a unique and valuable policy with
respect to the encouragement and support of both elementary and
higher education. Furthermore, it was a policy of remarkable vitality,
as is amply attested by the fact that it has ever since been reflected
to a greater or less extent in the fundamental law of the part of the
Territory carved out in 1837 to form the state of Michigan.
In 181 7 the predecessor of the University, the Ca tholepistemiad, was established by a territorial act (II Terr. Laws, 1817, p.
104), and in 1821, by a new enactment, the University itself was
created as a "body politic and corporate" (I Terr. Laws, 1821, p.
879).
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In pursuance of the policy established by the ordinances of
1785 and 1787, the Congress on May 20, 1826, passed the following
measure:

[The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized] to set
apart and reserve from sale out of any of the public lands within the
Territory of Michigan to which the Indian title has been extinguished
a quantity of land not exceeding two entire townships for the use
and support of a university. (4 U.S. Stat. L. 180.)
The grant was early accepted by the state (Laws, 1835-36, p.
149), and the Congress confirmed the selection oflands (5 U.S. Stat.
L. 59). The superintendent of public instruction was directed to sell
not to exceed five hundred thousand dollars' worth of these lands
and to deposit the proceeds to the credit of a University interest fund
(Laws, 1837, p. 209). The fund thus established, together with income in the form of fees and miscellaneous gifts, constituted the
principal source of fmancial support of the University of Michigan
until1867. In that ;Year additional financial aid was sought and obtained from the state legislature. The interest fund even today
amounts to a considerable sum-about $38,000 per year....
This federal territorial policy of providing both encouragement
and continuing fiscal support for the University was subsequently
carried on by the state in a wise and generous way. On the fiscal
side, after the interest fund became insufficient to care for the needs
of the growing institution, the "mill-tax" laws were passed to provide the necessary funds. The first of these laws, passed in 1867, consisted of an appropriation for the support of the University of a sum
equal to one-twentieth of a mill on each dollar of taxable property
in the state. Perhaps the most valuable and certainly the unique feature of this measure and its successors was their continuing nature,
i.e., instead of being biennial appropriations, they were in reality permanent laws continuing from year to year until changed by subsequent affirmative legislative enactment. They thus approximated the
permanence of the federal land endowment for the University. They
gave the institution the stability enjoyed by the large privately endowed schools of the East. With some variations the policy of this
mill-tax law of 1867 has been continued until the present day, and,
although it is a statutory rather than a constitutional device, it has
become so thoroughly a part of the accepted legislative practice and
of the tradition of the state as virtually to share the permanent status
of fundamental law. (See Appendix A, ... for a list of the mill-tax
acts.) It constitutes one of the major reasons for the fact that the
University of Michigan has attained a first place among the state universities of the country.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF 1835.-When Michigan adopted its
first constitution, in 1835, two express provisions were written into
the fundamental law concerning higher education. (See Appendix B,
... for full text of provisions for University and public-school support in the Constitution of 1835.) One of these, section 2 of Article
X, was general and followed the style set by the similar declaration
in the Ordinance of 1787. It stipulated that "the legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
and agricultural improvement." The other provision was more specific. In section 5 of Article X was the requirement:
.... the legislature shall take measures for the protection and
improvement or other disposition of such lands as have been or may
hereafter be reserved or granted by the United States to this state for
the support of a university; and the funds accruing from the rents or
sale of such lands or from any other source for the purpose aforesaid
shall be and remain a permanent fund for the support of said university.
These provisions were written into the constitution in an effort to pursue the policy established by the national government
during territorial days. They were good so far as they went; however, they left full power in the legislature to manage the affairs of
the University, to regulate the appointment of the Regents, to establish or abolish departments, to regulate the appointment of professors, and to control expenditures from the University funds. In
short, they left the internal administration of the University fully
subject to the changing desires of the political arena at the state
Capitol, then in Detroit.
In spite of early efforts to build the University into a strong
institution, success and prosperity were not achieved in the period
between 1835 and the revision of the constitution in 1850. The
more thoughtful public men of the time felt that one of the reasons
for the failure of the University to develop rapidly was the fact that
its functioning was dependent upon and subject to the changing policies of the legislature. They felt that under such conditions the University could not attain the degree of stability, permanence, independence, and strength enjoyed by the denominational and endowed
colleges of the East. The shortcomings were functional rather than
fiscal.
In 1840 a select committee was appointed by the legislature to
inquire into the condition of the University. A part of the report of
the committee indicates clearly the consensus of contemporary opinion concerning higher education in the state.
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"No State institution in America has prospered as well as independent colleges with equal, and often with less, means. Why they
have not may be ascribed, in part, to the following causes: They
have not been guided by that oneness of purpose and singleness of
aim (essential to their prosperity) that others have whose trustees
are a permanent body,-men chosen for their supposed fitness for
that very office, and who, having become acquainted with their
duties, can and are disposed to pursue a steady course, which inspires confidence and insures success, to the extent of their limited
means. State institutions, on the contrary, have fallen into the hands
of the several legislatures, fluctuating bodies of men, chosen with
reference to their supposed qualifications for other duties than
cherishing literary institutions. When legislatures have legislated directly for colleges, their measures have been as fluctuating as the
changing materials of which the legislatures were composed. When
they have acted through a board of trustees, under the show of giving
a representation to all, they have appointed men of such dissimilar
and discordant characters and views that they never could act in
concert; so that, whilst supposed to act for and represent everybody,
they, in fact, have not and could not act for anybody.
Again, legislatures, wishing to retain all the power of the State
in their own hands, as if they alone were competent or disposed to
act for the general good, have not been willing to appoint trustees for
a length of time sufficient for them to become acquainted with their
duties, to become interested in the cause which they were appointed
to watch over, and feel the deep responsibility of the trust committed
to them. A new board of trustees, like a legislature of new members,
not knowing well what to do, generally begins by undoing and disorganizing all that has been done before. At first they dig up the seed
a few times, to see that it is going to come up; and, after it appears
above the surface, they must pull it up, to see that the roots are
sound; and they must pull it up again, to see if there is sufficient root
to support so vigorous branches; then lop off the branches, for fear
they will exhaust the root; and then pull it up again, to see why it
looks so sickly and pining, and finally to see if they can discover
what made it die. And, as these several operations are performed by
successive hands, no one can be charged with the guilt of destroying
the valuable tree. Whilst State institutions have been, through the
jealousy of State legislatures, thus sacrificed to the impatience and
petulance of a heterogeneous and changeable board of trustees,
whose term of office is so short that they have not time to discover
their mistakes, retrace their steps, and correct their errors, it is not
surprising that State universities have hitherto, almost without exception, failed to accomplish, in proportion to their means, the amount
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of good that was expected from them, and much less than colleges in
their neighborhood, patronized by the religious public, watched over
by a board of trustees of similar qualifications for duty, and holding
the office permanently, that they may profit by experience.
The argument by which legislatures have hitherto convinced
themselves that it was their duty to legislate universities to death is
this: "It is a State institution, and we are the direct representatives
of the people, and therefore it is expected of us; it is our right. The
people have an interest in this thing, and we must attend to it." As
if, because a university belongs to the people, that were reason why
it should be dosed to death for fear it would be sick, if left to be
nursed, like other institutions, by its immediate guardians. Thus has
State after State, in this American Union, endowed universities, and
then, by repeated contradictory and over legislation, torn them to
pieces with the same facility as they do the statute book, and for the
same reason, because they have the right." (2H. Doc., 1840, p. 470.)
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1850.-Such was the condition of
affairs when the constitutional convention of 1850 met. Any reader
of the debates of that convention will be impressed with the attitude
of the delegates toward higher education. They recognized the need
of removing the University from changing political influences and yet
keeping it directly responsible and amenable to the people (Debates,
pp. 782-85,804, 846).
As a result of the work of the convention, provisions were
therefore written into the Constitution of 1850 (Art. XIII) to establish the University as an independent constitutional corporation
under the control of a Board of Regents elected directly by the people. The Board was made a body corporate, to be known by the
name and title of "The Regents of the University of Michigan." Then
followed the all-important clause: "The Board of Regents shall have
the general supervision of the University and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University interest fund." By virtue
of these provisions a quasi-independent constitutional corporation
was substituted for the prior dependent statutory agency, and a
permanent and stable educational plan for the University of Michigan
was brought into being. Responsibility directly to the people of the
state was substituted for responsibility to the state legislature. (For
the full text of University provisions in the amended Constitution of
1850, see Appendix C.... )

***
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THE CONSTITUTION OF 1908.-... The provisions of [the
Constitution of 1908] were similar to those of the Constitution of
1850 insofar as the University was concerned. Section 5 of Article XI
stipulated that "the Board of Regents shall have the general supervision of the University and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University funds." (The full text of University provisions in the Constitution of 1908 is given in Appendix D ... ) The
word "interest," which had followed the word "University" in the
Constitution of 1850, was omitted, and the word "fund" was changed
to "funds," thus placing all University funds-the University interest
fund, legislative appropriations, and funds from other sources-under
the exclusive control of the Board of Regents.

***
By the Constitution of 1908 the State Board of Agriculture
[was] vested with the power of government of the Michigan Agricultural College, and the constitutional convention was so well satisfied with the functioning of the University under the provisions of
the Constitution of 1850 that a similar constitutional status was conferred upon the college. In Article XI, section 8, the new constitution stipulated that "the Board [State Board of Agriculture] shall
have general supervision of the College and the direction and control of all Agricultural College funds" -a clause practically identical
with the corresponding University clause.

APPENDIX A*
MILL-TAX ACTS.-The various mill-tax acts of the state of Michigan
are as follows:

Laws, 1867, No. 59, p. 86: 1/20 of a mill.
Laws, 1869, No. 14, p. 19: $15,000.
Laws, 1873, No. 32, p. 32: 1/20 of a mill.
P.A.,
P.A.,
P.A.,
P.A.,
P.A.,

1893, No. 19, p. 19: 1/6 of a mill.
1893, No. 53, p. 56: 1/6 of a mill.
1899, No. 102, p. 146: 1/4 of a mill.
1907, No. 303, p. 398: 3/8 of a mill.
1921, No. 247, p. 46: 6/10 of a mill.

*Information on more recent state support for the University is found in
Chapter V.
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P.A., 1923, No. 252, p. 400: 6/10 of a mill.
P.A., 1925, No. 324, p. 476: 6/10 of a mill; total not to exceed

$3,700,000.
P.A., 1927, No. 404, p. 953: 6/10 of a mill.
P.A., 1931, No. 319, p. 545: 6/10 of a mill; total not to exceed

$4,928,852.55.
P.A., 1935, No. 11, p. 23: repeal of act of 1873.
P.A., 1935, No. 112, p. 180: appropriation of a sum equal to 73/100

of a mill.
P.A., 1937, No. 147, p. 230: appropriation of a sum equal to 83/100

of a mill but not to exceed $4,673,253.58.

APPENDIXB
SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1835.-The full text of sections 2 and 5 of Article X of the Constitution of 1835 is as follows:
Perpetual fund for support of schools. 2. The legislature shall encourage. by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientifical and
agricultural improvement. The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to this state, for the support of
schools, which shall hereafter be sold or disposed of, shall be and remain a
perpetual fund; the interest of which, together with the rents of all such
unsold lands, shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of schools
throughout the state ....
University fund. 5. The legislature shall take measures for the protection, improvement or other disposition of such lands as have been or may
hereafter be reserved or granted by the United States to this state for the
support of a university; and the funds accruing from the rents or sale of
such lands, or from any other source for the purpose aforesaid, shall be
and remain a permanent fund for the support of said university, with such
branches as the public convenience may hereafter demand for the promotion of literature, the arts and sciences, and as may be authorized by the
terms of such grant; and it shall be the duty of the legislature, as soon as
may be, to provide effectual means for the improvement and permanent
security of the funds of said university.

APPENDIXC
UNIVERSITY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1850.As amended in 1862, the full text ofthe provisions of the Constitution of
1850 relating to the University is as follows:
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School fund. Sec. 2. The proceeds from the sales of all lands that
have been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to the state
for educational purposes, and the proceeds of all lands or other property
given by individuals or appropriated by the state for like purposes, shall
be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income of which, together with the rents of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall be inviolably appropriated and annually applied to the specific objects of the
original gift, grant, or appropriation ....
Regents of university; election. Sec. 6. There shall be elected in the
year eighteen hundred and sixty-three, at the time of the election of a
justice of the supreme court, eight regents of the university, two of whom
shall hold their office for two years, two for four years, two for six years,
and two for eight years. They shall enter upon the duties of their office on
the first of January next succeeding their election. At every regular election of a justice of the supreme court thereafter there shall be elected two
regents whose term of office shall be eight years. When a vacancy shall occur in the office of regent, it shall be filled by appointment of the governor. The regents thus elected shall constitute the board of regents of the
University of Michigan.
Same; body corporate. Sec. 7. The regents of the university and their
successors in office shall continue to constitute the body corporate,
known by the name and title of "The Regents of the University of Michigan."
President of university; supervision by regents. Sec. 8. The regents of
the university shall, at their first annual meeting, or as soon thereafter as
may be, elect a president of the university, who shall be ex officio a member of their board, with the privilege of speaking but not of voting. He
shall preside at the meetings of the regents and be the principal executive
officer of the university. The board of regents shall have the general supervision of the university, and the direction and control of all expenditures
from the university interest fund ....
Agricultural school; appropriation; transfer to university. Sec. 11.
The legislature shall encourage the promotion of intellectual scientific and
agricultural improvement; and shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the
establishment of an agricultural school. The legislature may appropriate
the twenty-two sections of salt spring lands now unappropriated, or the
money arising from the sale of the same, where such lands have been already sold, .and any land which may hereafter be granted or appropriated
for such purpose for the support and maintenance of such school, and may
make the same a branch of the university, for instruction in agriculture and
the natural sciences connected therewith, and place the same under the supervision of the regents of the university.
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UNIVERSITY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1908.The full text of the provisions of the Constitution of 1908 which relate to
the University is as follows:
ARTICLE XI
Encouragement of education. Section 1. Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.
Regents of university; election, term, vacancy. Sec. 3. There shall be
a board of regents of the university, consisting of eight members, who shall
hold the office for eight years. There shall be elected at each regular biennial
spring election two members of such board. When a vacancy shall occur in
the office of the regent it shall be filled by appointment of the governor.
Same; name. Sec. 4. The regents of the university and their successors
in office shall continue to constitute the body corporate known as "The
Regents of the University of Michigan."
University; president; supervision. Sec. 5. The regents of the university shall, as often as necessary, elect a president of the university. The
president of the university and the superintendent of public instruction
shall be ex officio members of the board of regents, with the privilege of
speaking but not of voting. The president shall preside at the meetings of
the board and be the principal executive officer of the university. The
board of regents shall have the general supervision of the university and
the direction and control of all expenditures from the university funds.
Educational institutions; maintenance. Sec. 10. The legislature shall
maintain the university, the college of mines, the state agricultural college,
the state normal college and such state normal schools and other educational institutions as may be established by law.
Proceeds of school land. Sec. 11. The proceeds from the sales of all
lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to
the state for educational purposes and the proceeds of all lands or other
property given by individuals or appropriated by the state for like purposes shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income of
which, together with the rents of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall
be inviolably appropriated and annually applied to the specific objects of
the original gift, grant or appropriation.
ARTICLE XIII
Regents of university; power of eminent domain. Sec. 4. The regents
of the university of Michigan shall have power to take private property for
the use of the university in the manner prescribed by law.
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2. CHANGES MADE BY THE CONSTITUTION OF 1963

The constitution adopted in 1963 (for text see pp. 14)
reconfirmed the constitutional status of the University of Michigan. The changes which the constitutional convention did make
in the provisions for state-supported institutions of higher education demonstrated the convention's high regard for the form
of government previously established for the University of Michigan.
The major change made in the Education Article of the
constitution was the extension of the constitutional status formerly enjoyed only by the University of Michigan, Michigan
State University, and Wayne State University, ail created by
constitution, to other state-assisted institutions created by statute. The University of Michigan was a creature of statute until
the adoption of the Constitution of 1850.
The new constitution uses the same language for each of
the state's "Big Three" universities-the University of Michigan,
Michigan State University, and Wayne State University. AU other
state institutions which may grant bachelor's degrees have been
given a substantially equivalent form of government. Their governing boards have the same rights and powers as the boards of
the Big Three except that instead of being elected by the people
of the state, their members are appointed by the Governor
with the consent of the senate. Practically speaking, popular
election of such a large number of officials is not a possible
alternative.
The new constitution also creates a new eight-member state
board of education. The old four-member board which had controlled four state universities created by legislative acts and formerly known as Normal schools was abolished. Along with other
duties, the new board is made "the general planning and coorclinating body for all public education, including higher education." (Article 8, Section 3.) The board is also instructed to "advise the legislature as to the financial requirements" of public
education. However, the last sentence of the section makes clear
that the functions of the new board were not meant to restrict
the indep.endence of the autonomous universities. "The power
of the boards of institutions of higher education provided in
this constitution to supervise their respective institutions and
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direct the expenditure of the institutions' funds shall not be
limited by this section."
Three other significant, though relatively minor, changes
were made in the new constitution which affect the universities.
Section 4 of Article 8 requires that formal sessions of the governing boards be open to the public. The same section requires
that an annual accounting of all income and expenditures by
each educational institution be given to the legislature. Finally,
the composition of the governing boards of the major state universities is changed by dropping the Superintendent of Public
Instruction from ex officio membership.
MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION (1963) Article VIII. Education.

***
Sec. 3. Leadership and general supervision over all public education, including adult education and instructional programs in state
institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting
baccalaureate degrees, is vested in a state board of education. It shall
serve as the general planning and coordinating body for all public
education, including higher education, and shall advise the legislature
as to the financial requirements in connection therewith.
The state board of education shall appoint a superintendent of
public instruction whose term of office shall be determined by the
board. He shall be the chairman of the board without the right to
vote, and shall be responsible for the execution of its policies. He
shall be the principal executive officer of a state department of education which shall have powers and duties provided by law.
The state board of education shall consist of eight members
who shall be nominated by party conventions and elected at large for
terms of eight years as prescribed by law. The governor shall fill any
vacancy by appointment for the unexpired term. The governor shall
be ex-officio a member of the state board of education without the
right to vote.
The power of the boards of institutions of higher education
provided in this constitution to supervise their respective institutions
and control and direct the expenditure of the institutions' funds
shall not be limited by this section.
Sec. 4. The legislature shall appropriate moneys to maintain
the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State
University, Eastern Michigan University, Michigan College of Science
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and Technology, Central Michigan University, Northern Michigan
University, Western Michigan University, Ferris Institute, Grand Valley State College, by whatever names such institutions may hereafter
be known, and other institutions of higher education established by
law. The legislature shall be given an annual accounting of all income
and expenditures by each of these educational institutions. Formal
sessions of governing boards of such institutions shall be open to the
public.
Sec. 5. The regents of the University of Michigan and their successors in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the
Regents of the University of Michigan; the trustees of Michigan
State University and their successors in office shall constitute a body
corporate known as the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University; the governors of Wayne State University and their successors
in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the Board of
Governors of Wayne State University. Each board shall have general
supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds. Each board shall, as often as
necessary, elect a president of the institution under its supervision.
He shall be the principal executive officer of the institution, be exofficio a member of the board without the right to vote and preside
at meetings of the board. The board of each institution shall consist
of eight members who shall hold office for terms of eight years and
who shall be elected as provided by law. The governor shall fill board
vacancies by appointment. Each appointee shall hold office until a
successor has been nominated and elected as provided by law.
Sec. 6. Other institutions of higher education established by
law having authority to grant baccalaureate degrees shall each be governed by a board of control which shall be a body corporate. The
board shall have general supervision of the institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds. It
shall, as often as necessary, elect a president of the institution under
its supervision. He shall be the principal executive officer of the insti~tion and be ex-officio a member of the board without the right
to vote. The board may elect one of its members or may designate
the president, to preside at board meetings. Each board of control
shall consist of eight members who shall hold office for terms of
eight years, not more than two of which shall expire in the same
year, and who shall be appointed by the governor by and with the
advice and consent of the senate. Vacancies shall be filled in like
manner.
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3. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN v. THE
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF DETROIT

The Supreme Court of Michigan; 4 Mich. 213, 221-29 (1856)
GREEN,J.

***
[W] e conclude ... that the Governor and Judges had power to
execute the deed. This power was assumed to have existed, and does
not appear to have been questioned, in the case of Scott vs. the Detroit Young Men's Society's Lessee. (1 Doug. Mich. R., 1 i9.)
2. Are the plaintiffs the "successors" of the grantees named in
the deed?
The consideration of this question requires a somewhat extended examination of the Territorial and State legislation in regard
to the University of Michigan. The first Act for the establishment of
such an institution, was made and adopted by the Governor and
Judges of the Territory, on the 26th of August, 1817, and was entitled, "An Act to establish the Catholepistemiad, or University of
Michigan." This law provided for the appointment of a President,
and the creation of thirteen didaxia, or Professorships; and the President and didactors, or Professors, were invested with power to regulate all the concerns of the institution, and to enact laws for that
purpose; to sue, and to be sued; to acquire, hold, and alien property,
real, mixed and personal; to make, use, and alter a seal; to establish
Colleges, Academies, Schools, libraries, Museums, Atheneums, Botanic gardens, Laboratories, and other useful literary and scientific
institutions, consonant to the laws of the United States, and of Michigan; and to appoint officers, instructors, and instructii, in, among
and throughout the various counties, cities, towns, townships, and
other geographical divisions of Michigan. Their name and style as a
corporation, was to be "The Catholepistemiad, or University of
Michigan," and the great institution whose affairs were thus confided to the management of this magnificent legal entity, was to bear
the same classical name. The didactors, or Professors, were to be appointed and commissioned by the Governor, and were to receive
from the public Treasury an annual salary, to be from time to time
ascertained by law. The funds for supporting the University were to
be derived from taxes and other public sources, and the Treasurer
was required to keep a separate account of the University fund.
(Shearman's System of Pub. Inst., p. 4.)
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The principal features of this Act, which demand notice as
connected with the question involved in this case, are its comprehensiveness as indicated by its style, the broad scope of its objects,
and that it was to be supported by a public fund; all showing that it
was intended to be a great public institution, embracing the whole
Territory, and such an one as would not admit of the existence of
any other, similar in its character and purposes. Whether any organization was ever had of the Corporation thus provided for, does not
very distinctly appear, and the Act itself was repealed by a law
adopted April 30, 1821, entitled, "An Act for the establishment of
a University." See Code of Laws compiled in 1827, page 448.
By this latter Act certain persons therein named were created
a body politic and corporate, by the name, style, and title of the
"Trustees of the University of Michigan," and as such they, and their
successors to be appointed by the Legislature, were made capable of
suing and being sued, holding property, real, personal and mixed,
and of buying and selling and otherwise lawfully disposing of property.
They were authorized to establish such Colleges, Academies
and schools, depending upon the said University, as they might think
proper, and as the friends of the Corporation would permit; and to
apply such parts of their estate and funds in such a manner as they
might think most conducive to the promotion of literature, and the
advancement of useful knowledge within the Territory; and to elect
a President of the University, who should be, ex officio, a member
of such Corporation. This institution was to be established in the
City of Detroit, and to this Corporation was committed the control
and management of the township of land which had been granted to
Michigan by Congress, for the use of a Seminary of learning, and the
three sections granted to the College of Detroit, by the treaty of
Fort Meigs, concluded September 29th, 1817, were vested in the
said Trustees, subject to the uses, trusts and purposes for which the
same were granted. All the property, rights and credits belonging to
the Corporation, established by the Act of the 26th of August, 1817,
were vested in the new Corporation, subject to the uses, trusts and
purposes for which the same property was granted, given, conveyed
or promised.
By Section 9, it is provided that this law or any part thereof
may be repealed or modified by the Legislative power, provided that
such-power of repeal should not extend to divert to any other purpose than those expressed in the grant thereof to the Corporation,
any property granted to them. To this Corporation was the land in
question conveyed by the Governor and Judges "to the use of the
University of Michigan."
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No institution corresponding to the idea of a University, as
contemplated by the Acts above mentioned, having been organized,
the State Legislature in 1837 passed an Act entitled, "An Act to provide for the organization and government of the University of Michigan." (Laws of 1837, p. 102.) This Act provided that there should be
established in this State an institution under the name and style of
"The University of Michigan;" that the objects of the University
should be to provide the inhabitants of the State with the means of
acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various branches of literature, science and the arts; and that its government should be vested
in a Board of Regents, who, with their successors in office, were to
constitute a body corporate, with the name and title of the Regents
of the University of Michigan. This act, without material modification, was incorporated into and re-enacted in the Revised Statutes of
1838 (p. 234, etc.), and also in the Revised Statutes of 1846 (p. 216,
etc.). Under its provisions "The University of Michigan" was established and went into operation; and the same institution, under the
supervision and management of the present Board of Regents, continues to exist, and is successfully accomplishing the great objects of
its creation. The new Constitution, after providing for the election of
Regents and the University, declares that the Regents thus elected
shall constitute the Board of Regents fo. the University of Michigan,
and that they, and their successors in office, shall constitute the
body corporate, known by the name and title of "The Regents of the
University of Michigan," and as such they have committed to them
"the general supervision of the University, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University Interest Fund."
That fund embraces the interest upon all moneys arising from
the sale or disposition of the lands which have been granted by Congress for the support of a University, College or Seminary of learning
in the Territory or State of Michigan, or acquired from any other
source for the like purpose.
That the Corporation having charge of the University, since the
organization of the Board of Regents, under the law of 1837, is a
public Corporation, created for public purposes alone, cannot be
doubted.
The institution was erected and has been supported by a public
fund, and the Corporators have no private interest whatever, connected with their corporate character. (Trustees, etc., vs. Winston, 5
Stew. & Port., !?;Dartmouth Coil vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. R., 629,
660, et seq.) But it is insisted, that "the Trustees of the University of
Michigan," to whom the land in question was granted, was a private
Corporation, and that their charter constituted a contract between
the Legislature and the Corporators, which the Legislature could not
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abrogate without the consent of the Corporation. To this it may be
replied, that the Act of 1821, creating that Corporation, expressly
reserves to the Legislature the power to repeal or modify it. This is a
part of the contract itself, if the Act is to be regarded as a contract,
and this, as well as every other provision of the charters received the
assent of the Corporators when they accepted it. If not strictly a
public Corporation, it partook largely of that character. The Trustees
were to continue in place during the pleasure of the Legislature only,
and all the vacancies were to be supplied by the Legislature. It did
not, therefore, possess within itself the power of perpetuating its
existence. It might at any time have been dissolved by the removal of
the several Trustees, and the omission by the Legislature to appoint
their successors. A large amount of public property was devoted to
the support of the institution; but the Trustees were also made capable of holding property, real, personal and mixed: and of buying
and selling, or otherwise lawfully disposing of property. Assuming,
therefore, that they were a private Corporation in a legal sense, it became necessary to inquire whether their charter was repealed or modified by the Act of 1837, and if so, what was the effect of such repeal
or modification, in reference to the property in controversy in this
suit. In order to determine this question, we must first consider
whether the Legislature of 1837 intended to create another and distinct institution from that contemplated by the Act of 1821, or to
organize and put in operation the same. An examination of all the
legislation relating to a University in Mi9higan, leaves no doubt upon
this question. In every Act it is styled the "University of Michigan,"
and its objects are the same in all, though expressed in different
language. Each of them appropriated all the public property at the
disposal of the Legislature, which had been donated or set apart for
the support of such an institution, to its support. Its name imports
the existence of but one, and it seems clear that the Legislature had
in view the establishment of but one. The Act of 183 7, which created
a Board of Regents for the government of the University, by its own
force removed the then existing Trustees, and substituted in their
place other Trustees by the name of "The Regents of the University,"
as their successors in office.
It is true, that the Act of 1837 makes no express reference to
that of 1821, but it legislates upon the same subject, and the quotation of the words, "University of Michigan," in its title, is not without some significance, if it were otherwise doubtful, as indicating
what institution was intended to be organized in pursuance of its
provisions.
The fact that the location of the University was fixed by the
law of 1821 at Detroit, and that by subsequent legislation it was
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changed to Ann Arbor, affords no ground of argument against this
conclusion. This, and the other changes which were made in the details of its organization, were modifications of the former law of
such a character as the Act itself authorized. No injustice is thereby
done to the original Corporators, or their successors, for, as we have
already seen, they continued in place only during the pleasure of the
Legislature, and were severally subject to removal at any time; and
upon such removal, any rights or interests which they might have
claimed in connection with the Corporation must have terminated.
The Corporation was created for the purpose of administering a great
public trust, and the present plaintiffs are but Trustees for the same
great purpose, and are as truly the lawful successors of the original
Corporation as if they had been appointed by the Legislature under
the Act of 1821.
The lands in controversy are not diverted from the use declared by the grant, but are still devoted to the same identical purpose. They were conveyed for the use, etc., of "The University of
Michigan," and from that use they have not been, and cannot be diverted. The grant must be presumed to have been made with a full
knowledge of the power reserved to the Legislature, either to modify
or repeal the charter by which the Trustees of the University existed,
and it was made in such a manner as to secure the application of the
property to the object for which it was granted, without particular
regard to the person or persons who should execute the trust.
On the argument of this cause, the counsel for the defendants
read a very able and elaborate report from a Committee of the
Regents to the board, in March, 1838, in pursuance of a resolution
adopted in November, 1837, requiring such Committee "to take into
consideration the legal rights of the Trustees of the University of
Michigan, and how far it is practicable to alter, by Legislative enactment, the organization of that board, so as to constitute the Board
of Regents of the University of Michigan the Trustees of the University of Michigan. After discussing the various questions supposed to
be involved, this report brings to our notice an important fact. Mter
showing a non-user of their franchises for a long period, and deducing certain conclusions therefrom, it states that, "so satisfied are
the Trustees of the old board of the absolute dissolution of the Corporation, that, by a Committee of their body, they have placed upon
the journal of the Board of Regents, and the books of the Treasurer
of that board, their surrender of the proceeds of the land mentioned
in the eighth section of their charter; and also yielded up the control
and occupancy of the real estate in the City of Detroit. This shows
that the Trustees practically gave the same construction to the Act
of 1837 which we have given to it. They regarded their own powers
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as ended, and the Regents of the University as their successors, and
as such, entitled to the possession and control of all the effects remaining in their hands for the use of the University. They did not
doubt that the institution which was to be organized under the last
mentioned Act, was the same which was contemplated by the Act
which gave them a corporate existence; and they seem to have acquiesced, without hesitation, in that legislation which modified their
charter, and provided for the appointment of their successors; and it
is not improbable that this view of the legislation referred to was
finally adopted by those who were immediately concerned in the
question involved; for we did not learn that any active measures
were ever taken in pursuance of the recommendations of the Committee, in order to place the Regents in the full and rightful possession of the corporate property.
But it is claimed on behalf of the defendants, that if the old
Corporation has been dissolved by a repeal or modification of its
charter, pursuant to the provisions of the ninth section, the lands reverted to the grantors, and were vested in the Mayor, etc., of the
City of Detroit, by the supplementary Act of Congress of the 29th
of August, 1842. If the views which we have already expressed be
correct, and the plaintiffs are the lawful successors of the grantees,
they are the persons indicated in the grant as Trustees of the property, and there can be no reversion until the cestui que trust, or beneficial object of the grant, shall cease to exist in contemplation of law.
Another point was made by the counsel for the defendants,
which we do not now deem it necessary to discuss at length. It is assumed that the Legislative Council of the late Territory of Michigan
had no power to create such a Corporation, and that the grant to the
Trustees, etc., was void. The decision of this question in the case of
the Bank of Michigan vs. Williams, 5 Wend. R., 478, and 7 lb., 539,
has been affirmed by this Court, and must be regarded as settled.
(Detroit Young Men's Society's Lessee vs. Scott, 1 Doug. Mich R.,
119;Swan vs. Williams, 2 Mich R., 427.)
It must be certified to the Circuit Court for the County of
Wayne, as the opinion of this Court, that the plaintiffs are entitled
to recover the premises in controversy in this suit.
Present and concurring, COPELAND, PRATT, BACON, WING,
JOHNSON and MARTIN, J. J.
DOUGLASS, J., dissented.

CHAPTER II
HOMEOPATHY AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE 1850 CONSTITUTION
1. INTRODUCTION

The Michigan Constitution of 1850 established an independent corporation to govern the University thus protecting
the University from political control by the legislature. Only
five years after the adoption of that new constitution, however,
the legislature enacted a law requiring the Board of Regents to
appoint a professor of homeopathy in the Department of Medicine.
The background of this new statute was as follows: At
that time, the medical profession was divided into two factions.
The smaller group of physicians adhered to the theories of
"homeopathy," which, in general postulated that the sick should
be treated with medicines which, if administered to a normal
healthy person, would produce symptoms similar to those of
the patient being treated. These theories of homeopathy were
somewhat disdainfully rejected by the orthodox doctors of the
day-the "allopaths," and there was much hard feeling between
the two groups.
As it happened, the orthodox allopaths were already fully
established on the faculty of the University's Medical Department, and, since even in that age, the Board of Regents was
highly unlikely to make a new faculty appointment which would
disrupt the present faculty, the homeopaths turned to the legislature for their support. And they obtained it. A long series of
court cases ensued which, finally, resulted in the judicial recognition of the constitutional autonomy of the University.
The first case was an action by a private citizen, one Drake,
in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus. He sought mandamus to compel the Board of Regents to appoint the professor prescribed by statute. The
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court denied the writ, giving two reasons: ( 1) Such an extraordinary remedy as mandamus to the Regents could be sought only
by the Attorney General of the state, not by a private citizen
with no special rights involved in the case. (2) Even if the statute
were valid (and the court seemed to have grave doubts), it had
only been in effect for one year and the Regents were apparently using their best efforts to find a candidate suitably qualified for the professorship. Thus, the action was premature.
Twelve years later the court decided the next case in this
series. Procedurally, this case is the reverse of the Drake case.
This time the Board of Regents applied for mandamus against
the Auditor General. The state legislature had passed its first
appropriation for the University, which formerly was supported
almost solely by the proceeds of a federal land grant; but the
Auditor General had refused to release the money because he
thought that the University had not complied with the conditions contained in the appropriation act-namely, that the Regents obey the provisions of the 1855 legislation and appoint the
professor of homeopathy. The Regents claimed that they had
appointed such a professor, and the facts of the case were that
they had, by resolution, established a School of Homeopathy to
be legally within the Department of Medicine but physically outside Ann Arbor. The exact location not being specified in the
resolution. They then appointed a professor to teach at this
school and drew a warrant on the Auditor General for his salary
under the appropriations act.
With this set of facts, the four-man court was split on the
issue as to whether the Regents had complied with the intent of
the legislature. Two justices said "no," one said "yes," and the
fourth was silent. The result was that the Regents were denied
the writ.
In the next two cases in 1869 and 187 4, the Attorney General applied for mandamus to force the appointment of the professor by the Regents, but, in both cases, the court was still
evenly divided resulting in denial of the writ.
The issues were finally resolved in the Sterling case in which
the authority of the Board of Regents was finally vindicated. By
the time of the Weinberg case the legislature and the University
had accommodated each other so that in return for increasing
state appropriations, a separate Homeopathic Medical College
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had been established on the Ann Arbor campus. This time, however, the legislature changed its mind, and enacted new legislation requiring the relocation of the Homeopathic College in
Detroit. Again a private citizen brought suit, and again the Supreme Court decided that only the Attorney General could institute such an action. Like the Drake case, however, Sterling is
not limited to procedural formalities. The court, without a single dissent, went on to decide that under the constitution, the
legislature had no authority to meddle with the University. The
language of this case is often cited for the proposition that the
Board of Regents, deriving its power from the same constitution
as the three principal branches of government, is a fourth coordinate branch of state government equal in dignity to the legislative, executive, and judicial. Dean Stason in his article quoted
in Chapter I considered talk of the fourth branch of government
to be exaggerated. In any event, the Regents won the Sterling
case.
The history of homeopathy at Michigan was concluded in
1925 when the Regents with the consent of the legislature,
which deleted the requirement of maintaining the Homeopathic
College from the appropriation acts, disbanded the college.

2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The People ex rel. Drake v. The Regents of the University of
Michigan

4 Mich. 98, 99-100, 101-06 (1856)
This was an application by the relator, who was a private citizen of this state, for an alternative mandamus against the regents of
the university of Michigan, founded upon his affidavit, which set
forth that he was a citizen of this state; that there was, at the time of
filing his affidavit, no professor ofhomeopathy in the department of
medicine of the university; that the regents, whose duty it was, had
not only neglected and refused (although often requested thereto) to
elect such professor, but still neglected and refused so to do.
The law, upon which the application was founded (Sess. L.
1856, p. 234), provides "that the regents shall have power to enact
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ordinances, by-laws, and regulations for the government of the university, to elect a president; to ftx, increase and reduce the regular
number of professors, and tutors, and to appoint the same, and to
determine the amount of their salaries; provided there shall always
be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine."
At the time the affidavit was ftl.ed, and the court moved for an
alternative mandamus, doubts were expressed by some of the judges
whether the court was empowered to grant the application upon such
a showing, in such a case. The court, however, yielded to the application, upon the suggestion, to which the counsel for the relator assented, that all questions might be reserved to the coming in of the
answer of the respondents. The alternative writ was thereupon issued,
which was returned with the answer of respondents thereto annexed,
in which, before proceeding to answer the merits of the allegations
contained in the writ and the relator's affidavit, they excepted: 1. To
the right of *the relator to move for the action of the court in the
[ 100] premises; 2. To the sufficiency of the showing of the relator;
and, 3. To the jurisdiction of the court to interfere with the action
of the respondents in the exercise of their constitutional discretion
in the supervision of the university, and in the direction and control
of expenditures from the university interest fund; all which exceptions they claimed and insisted upon in law. The return also sets
forth that, while not admitting the right of the legislature to interfere, the regents, out of respect to their expressed wishes, appointed
a committee in March, 1855, to take the subject into consideration,
and correspond with the various institutions in Europe and America,
to ascertain the feasibility of uniting such a professorship with the
existing college, and how, if feasible, it could best be done, and where
the best man could be found, and that the committee had not concluded their labors; that from the antagonism between the systems
they could not act wisely in the matter, if they were bound to act at
all, without full deliberation. To this return the relator demurred.
* * *
By the court, WING, J.:
The ftrst objection is predicated upon the alleged incapacity of
an individual citizen, who is only interested in common with
all other citizens of the state in the subject matter of *com- [102]
plaint, to institute a proceeding of this kind against a public
corporation, sustaining the relations which the university of Michigan does to this state.
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It is alleged that where there is a cause of complaint against a
public body or corporation, it is the duty of the attorney-general of
the state to move against them, and that it would be peculiarly fit, in
a matter of complaint of so grave a character as that presented by
the affidavit of the relator, that it should be presented by, or be
under the control and sanction of that officer, whose duty is to act
in all such cases. To this it is answered by the counsel of the relator,
in substance, that though true it is, the matter in question is one that
interests the citizens generally, yet the right of every citizen of the
state to move in the proper courts in a matter in which the citizens
at large are concerned, and in respect to which there is ground of
complaint against a public body or officers of this state, that they
have neglected the performance. of some duty imposed upon them
by law, is fully sustained both by principle and authority.
Upon examination of the authorities cited by the counsel of
the respective parties, we find no case decided by the English courts
which sanctions this action of their courts on an application of this
character, upon the sole motion of a private citizen of the realm.
From this it is, we think, to be inferred that the practice was never
sanctioned by their courts.
On looking into the American authorities cited, we find that
the Supreme Court of New York have taken the broad ground, in the
case of The People v. Collier, 19 Wend., 64, and in 1 Denio, 618,
that in all cases requiring redress, and involving a matter in which the
interests of the public at large are concerned, and in respect to which
a mandamus is the proper remedy, it is competent for their courts to
act upon the relation and motion of a private citizen of the state.
The doctrine of those cases was approved and followed by the
[ 103] *Supreme Court of lllinois, in the case of the County of Pike
v. The State, 11 Illinois, Rep., 202*. These are the only cases
to which we have been cited, or which have fallen under our observation, which sanction the right claimed by the relator in this case.
To these authorities, as we have said, are opposed the fact that
the English courts, which have molded and formed the common law,
transmitted it to us, and which governs both them and us, have not
sustained a course of proceeding like this. The courts of Maine,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have maintained a doctrine on this
subject opposed to the New York and illinois cases, and have held
that, to entitle an individual citizen to be heard as a relator and on
his own motion, he must show that he has some individual interest in
the subject matter of complaint which is not common to all the citizens of the state; and whilst we do not intend to say that a case may
not arise in which this court would allow an individual to file such a
complaint, particularly if the attorney-general or prosecuting attorney
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(as the case may be) were absent, or refused to act without good
cause, we nevertheless express our conviction that this is a case in
which the action of the attorney-general would have been proper and
necessary.
The views we have expressed would seem to make it unnecessary to decide the other questions presented, particularly the constitutional question, but we have thought it would be proper to pass
upon the questions presented by the answer and demurrer. We will,
therefore, proceed to an examination of the answer. The facts being
admitted, their sufficiency in law to defeat this proceeding is alone
to be considered.
The respondents state their belief that the law requiring them
to appoint a homeopathic professor in the medical department of the
university is unconstitutional. Yet, being desirous of treating with
proper respect the expression of the legislative will in the section quoted, they did, on the 30th *March last, appoint a [104]
committee to enter into correspondence with other universities in Europe and in this country, to determine the feasibility of establishing such a professorship, and the most eligible person to rill
such a chair when established, and that the committee has been
actually engaged ever since in conducting such correspondence, and
in gathering information from all sources, and are still engaged diligently in the same work.
The respondents are constitutional officers, to whom are confided by the constitution (art. xiii, § 8) "the general supervision of
the university, and the direction and control of all expenditures
from the university interest fund." They are elected by the people.
They come at short intervals fresh from the body of the people, and
cannot be supposed to be influenced by sentiments not common to
those they represent. To their judgment and discretion as a body is
committed the supervision of the fmancial and all other interests of
an institution in which all the people of this state have a very great
interest. In the words of· the law in question, they are required to
enact ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the government of the
university; to reduce and increase the regular number of professors,
and to appoint, the same, and to determine the amount of their
salaries. To this body of men, possessing such powers, and upon
whom such duties are incumbent, this proviso is directed. They had
already provided professors for the medical department under a system which had been in successful operation many years, and they
were required to introduce a new and, as they say, an antagonistic
element into that department, which in their judgment was likely to
clash with the system already established, and produce embarrassment to the board and the institution under their control not easily
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to be surmounted, and which it required time and investigation to
harmonize and adjust. They nevertheless entered upon the proper
investigations, with a view to accomplish the duty devolved
[105] upon *them by the law. They aver that in the month of
March of last year, and before the law took effect, they entered upon the active discharge of duties which must precede the
actual appointment of the new professors; and though we have not
been able to discover in their answer, or in any visible result of their
labors, any clear evidence of their activity and zeal in the prosecution of their duty, neither are we able clearly to perceive, under all
the circumstances of the case, that there has been any unnecessary
delay or lack of good faith in their proceedings. They aver that they
have acted in good faith, but at the same time under the influence of
much uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the law, and we are
compelled to recognize in this question what might well suggest
doubts of the binding force of the law, and occasion some hesitation
in their action.
The relator suggests no pressing necessity for the immediate action of the board, neither does he show that the rights of any individual or class of persons is jeoparded or injuriously affected by the
delay that has occurred in their action. All that is averred, or that
can be inferred from the affidavit of the relator, is, that the board of
regents have hitherto and unnecessarily neglected to obey the behests of the law, which is claimed to be binding upon them, and
which demands a more speedy obedience to its requirements than
has been yielded to it by the respondents. The real question is one
of time. The respondents have not refused to act, but they have
acted tardily, and, as the relator suggests, in bad faith, if at all. We,
however, are of the opinion, upon a full view of all the facts presented for our consideration, and which are admitted by the relator,
that the case made out is not one which would authorize the further
action of this court at this time. We admit that a mandamus, though
a prerogative writ, is demandable of right in a proper case, yet it is
only to be granted by this court in the exercise of a sound legal discretion; and hence ought only to be invoked in cases *of [ 106]
last necessity. This necessity we have been unable clearly to
discover in this case. The board of regents have a sound discretion to exercise, and until it is made apparent that they seek to evade
the law, by unnecessary and willful delays, the exercise of our discretionary power cannot be called into action.
Present, all the judges.
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The People ex rei. The Regents of the University v. The Auditor
General
17 Mich. 161, 165-75, 185-92 (1868)
CHRISTIANCY J.:
The controversy in this case grows out of the conflict between
two hostile schools or theories of medicine, both claiming the public
patronage and the aid of the public funds for their promulgation in
the medical department of the university. The adherents of the allopathic theory, which is the oldest and most generally recognized, having obtained a legal recognition from the regents in the establishment
of the medical department, have continued to keep the exclusive
control of it to the present time; while the adherents of the opposite
or homeopathic school, claiming equal rights in an institution supported alike by the common funds of the whole people, have been
unable to obtain any recognition from the board of regents, or, up
to this time, any aid from the public funds for teaching their theory
of medicine in this public institution. Fortunately, the present case does not call upon us to determine the *merits of the [166]
respective theories or systems about which the "doctors disagree."
But the question whether the homeopathic theory should be
recognized and taught in the medical department of the university as
well as the allopathic, and both thereby be placed upon substantially the same fair grounds of competition, and allowed to test by results their respective claims to popular patronage, has twice been
presented to the legislature and deliberately considered and decided
by them, so far as they have any power over the question, in a manner which can leave no reasonable doubt of their intention.
First, in 185 5, when the act of 1851, for the government of
the university, was amended by adding at the end of the fifth section
the following words: "Provided that there shall always be at least one
professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine;" so that
the section, when amended, should read as follows: "The regents
shall have power to enact ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the
government of the university, to elect a president, to fix, increase
and reduce the regular number of professors and tutors, and to appoint the same, and to determine the amount of their salaries: Provided, that there shall always be at least one professor of homeopathy
in the department of medicine:" Laws 1855, p. 232. This act was
approved February 12, 1855.
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At the January term of the late Supreme Court for 1856, the
regents not having complied with the injunction of this act, to appoint a "professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine,"
one Drake, a private citizen, moved the court for a mandamus to
compel the regents to perform this duty. To this the regents, after
some preliminary objections, answered in substance that, owing to
the antagonism between the two systems of medicine, they could
not act wisely upon the subject without full deliberation; that they
had, in the previous March, appointed a committee to take
[167] the subject into consideration, and correspond *with the
various institutions in Europe and America to ascertain the
feasibility of uniting such a professorship with the existing college,
and how, if possible, it could best be done, and where the best man
could be found, and that this committee had not concluded its
labors.
To this the relator demurred. The majority of the court, after
deciding that the proceedings for a mandamus could not be maintained at the instance of Drake, the relator (who showed no particular interest affected), without the action of the attorney-general or
.the prosecuting attorney-a decision which disposed of the case and
left nothing for adjudication-nevertheless proceeded to give their
opinion upon the question raised by the demurrer; and after intimating that they could not "discover in the answer of the regents, or in
the visible result of their labors, any clear evidence of activity or
zeal in the prosecution of this duty," they declare that they can not,
on the other hand, clearly perceive, under all the circumstances of
the case, that there had been any unnecessary delay or lack of good
faith in their proceedings. They further remark that the regents "aver
that they have acted in good faith, but, at the same time, under the
influence of much uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the
law," "and we are compelled (say the majority of the court) to recognize in this question what might well suggest doubts of the binding
force of the law, and occasion some hesitation in their action."
This remark seems to have been understood, and was probably
intended as the intimation of a doubt of the constitutional power of
the legislature to control the action of the regents in the manner attempted in the act. Owing to the expression of this doubt; or to some
other cause, .we hear nothing more of any attempt on the part of the
regents for more than eleven years to carry the act into effect. Whether their committee ever made a report we are not informed. But
probably the regents would not claim to have been endeavoring in good faith to carry into *effect this statute for the [168]
whole or any part of the eleven years succeeding; believing
their duty to the university required them to disregard the act. After

32

CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
that decision the probability is that no further effort was made to
give it effect. And, owing probably to the same intimation of the
court, no further attempt seems to have been made to compel their
obedience by mandamus.
But during the session of 1867 an application was made to the
legislature for a grant of further pecuniary aid to the university
beyond the income of the university fund. This legislature, like that
of 1855, still determined that students in the medical department
should have the opportunity and the option of studying medicine,
as well upon the homeopathic as the allopathic system, were not
willing to grant the pecuniary aid asked, unless they could at the
same time secure this object. And seeing that the regents had disregarded their wishes as expressed in the act of 1855, and perhaps
doubting their power to control the action of the regents in this matter by direct legislative injunction, they determined to grant them
further pecuniary aid upon the condition precedent, that the regents
should first carry into effect the act of 1855, before any of the
money to be raised for this purpose should be paid to them; thus
avoiding all question of constitutional power. To accomplish this
purpose, the act of March, 1867, imposing a tax of one-twentieth of
a mill upon the dollar of all taxable property in the state, was made
subject to the express proviso, "that the regents of the university shall
carry into effect the law which provides that there shall always be at
least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine;
and appoint said professor at the same salary as the other professors
in this department; and the state treasurer shall not pay to the treasurer of the board of regents any part or all of the above tax, until the
regents shall have carried into effect this proviso."
[169] *Under this act of 1867 (even admitting the act of 1855
not to have been obligatory upon the regents), it was for the
regents to elect whether they would comply in good faith with the
act of 1855, and this proviso in the act of 1867, according to the
true intent and understanding of the legislature, or forego all advantages of this appropriation, which was only made them on this
express condition.
The regents claim thus to have complied with this condition
by the adoption, on the 25th of March last, of the following resolutions:
"Resolved, That the board of regents accepts the aid proffered
by the legislature of Michigan, by the act approved March 15, 1867,
with the terms 'and conditions thereof.
"Resolved, That in order to comply with the conditions imposed by said act, there be organized in the department of medicine
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a school, to be called the "Michigan school of homeopathy," to be
located at such place (suitable in the opinion of the board of regents),
other than Ann Arbor, in the state of Michigan, as shall pledge to the
board of regents, by June 20th, next, the greatest amount for the
buildings and said endowment of school.
"Resolved, That two professors be appointed for said school,
one at this time, and another prior to the opening of said school, and
others as may be necessary.
"Resolved, That the sum of $3,000 be appropriated, besides
the salaries of the professors, out of the state tax, so donated to the
university, to be expended in establishing said school of homeopathy.
"Resolved, That Dr. Chas. J. Hempel be appointedprofessorof
the theory and practice of homeopathic medicine in the Michigan
school of homeopathy, at the salary of $1,000 per annum, from this
date, to be paid out of said fund so donated."
Claiming that these resolutions constitute a full performance of
the condition of the appropriation, the regents, by their treasurer,
have applied to the auditor-general for his warrant upon the state
treasurer for the money, or a part of it, raised by the act of 1867.
The auditor-general, not satisfied that this action constitutes a performance of the condition, has refused his warrant, and the regents
now move for a mandamus, to compel him to issue it.
*Whether this action of the regents constitutes a full (170]
performance of the condition of the appropriation, is the
only question necessary to the decision of this case.
The power of the regents, independent of these acts of 1855
and 1867, to establish such a professorship in the medical department at Ann Arbor, where that department has from the first been
established, and was in successful operation at the time Qf these acts,
is not denied. On the other hand, the regents do not claim the power
of establishing this, or any other professorship, as a part of the university, at any other place, from either of these acts. But they claim
that, under the general powers of supervision and control of the university, by the constitution and the act of 1851, they have the right
to establish professorships, as a part of any department of the university, as well at any other place as at Ann Arbor; and hence that
they are at liberty, under these acts of 1855 and 1867, to establish
this particular professorship elsewhere, and that this will constitute
performance of the condition upon which this appropriation was
granted.
While I do not concur in this view, but hold that the university
having been located at Ann Arbor by the act of 1837 (Sess. L., p.
1 02), however desirable it may be to establish a department or
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professorship elsewhere, a legislative permission to that effect must
first be obtained (see Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich., 73; People
v. Trustees of Geneva College, 5 Wend, 211; People v. Oakland
County Bank, 1 Doug. Mich., 282; Comp. L., § 2192), though,
doubtless, the regents may perform their functions anywhere in the
state, and all the powers of the several faculties are not necessarily
confmed to that locality, yet I do not, for the purposes of this case,
consider it necessary to discuss this question of power in any way,
and shall, therefore, proceed to consider the question now before us,
upon the assumed hypothesis that the regents, independent of these
acts, had, prior to, and at the time of, their passage, an im[171] plied power to establish *professorships elsewhere than at
Ann Arbor; and I proceed to inquire whether, upon this admission, these resolutions of the regents, looking to the establishment of a Michigan school of homeopathy, at some place not yet determined upon, other than Ann Arbor, constitutes a performance of
the condition which the legislature intended to impose by the adoption of the proviso.
It is essential to the fair understanding of this question to bear
in mind the circumstances under which the acts containing the condition was passed.
It must be recollected that at the time of the passage of both
these acts of 1855 and 1867, the university, with all its departments
and professorships, its buildings, libraries, cabinets, laboratories, apparatus, and all the other conveniences and property of the institution, had been for years existing, in fact, upon the university grounds
at Ann Arbor; where the medical department and that of literature,
science and the arts had already, in 1855, been for years in successful operation, and that these and the law department were all in still
more successful operation at the same place in 1867; that the university as a whole, had been by law located there for thirty years,
and that none of the departments or professorships had, from its first
establishment there, ever been located elsewhere. We must also recollect that large and commodious buildings had for some years been
erected upon the university grounds, at the same place, for the special
use of, and occupied by the department of medicine; that in these
buildings had been provided, at large public expense, such apparatus,
furniture and conveniences as are essential to their use, in the attainment of an education in the medical profession in all its branches.
We must also bear in mind that in the acquisition of the scientific
knowledge necessary alike to the profession under both theories of
practice, the same preliminary studies are required, the same knowledge of all cognate sciences; that in most branches of the science of medicine itself-such as anatomy, *physiology, surgery, [172]
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obstetrics, and even for the most part pathology-the course of instruction is the same, and the books and authorities the same; the
two systems differing mainly in their theories of the principles upon
which medicines are supposed to operate in the cure of diseases; that
in fact four-fifths of the entire course of professional instruction are
the same under both systems; and all the same apparatus, the anatomical demonstrations, and surgical operations, the same material,
collections of specimens and other conveniences for instruction, and
therefore, most of the same professorships and lectures are required
alike by the students of each system.
Giving due weight to these considerations, which we must
naturally suppose would operate upon the minds of legislators endowed with plain common sense; bearing in mind the history of the
conflict between the two systems in the legislature and in court; the
persistence with which the legislature adhered to their determination
to secure instruction in homeopathy in the department of medicineis it not most natural to infer that the legislature when they spoke of
a "professor of homeopathy in the medical department," used the
language in the ordinary popular sense, as intended to designate the
medical department as it was already established and in operation at
Ann Arbor, and that they intended such professorship to have a real
and actual rather than a merely metaphysical and purely nominal
connection with the department of medicine? Is it not reasonable to
infer that they intended to give to the professorship of homeopathy
the same essential advantages growing out of an immediate and real
connection with the department of medicine, as already established,
that were enjoyed by the other professorships in that department;
that they intended to give to the students in that department, if they
should so elect, an equal opportunity of studying the profession upon
the homeopathic system, with the like substantial advantages
[173] to be derived from the other professorships in *the department, and the other advantages incident to a direct and intimate connection with the department and with the university?
Would it not, in fact, border upon absurdity, to undertake to
account for the solicitude and persistency of the legislature in this
manner, if, after all, they only intended to secure the establishment
of a single professorship (for this is all that is required), at some place
other than Ann Arbor, having no real connection with the university
or the department of medicine, and none of the advantages to be
derived from such a connection-no aid from the other professorswhen more than four-fifths of the studies essential even to the homeopathic physician could not be pursued with any advantage in such a
separate school of homeopathy alone?
If this had been their purpose, why call upon the regents of the
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university to help them accomplish it? For, upon this idea, the regents might almost as well be called upon to mingle in the affairs of
a railroad corporation, or any other institution having no real or natural connection with the university.
The homeopathic theory constitutes but a small part of the
study essential to the homeopathic physician. Did the legislature seek
to confine all the students to the study of that theory alone, who
should choose to study it at all? Was the purpose of this apparently
careful and persistent course of legislation intended only as a solemn
mockery-as a dismal practical joke?
It seems to me very evident that the legislature could not
have contemplated a separate school of homeopathy alone; and yet
it is equally clear that if, as the regents seem to suppose, they contemplated a separate school at all, they must have contemplated a
school for the study of homeopathy alone; for they have no provision for giving instruction to such students in any other
branch of *medical science, if the school is to be elsewhere [174]
than in the medical department at Ann Arbor.
It will be conceded that the legislature contemplated a professorship in which students might actually receive instruction; they
must therefore have contemplated a professorship which should have
a potential existence somewhere; so established, at some place, as to
be able to enter upon the practical business of giving instruction to
students. But these resolutions establish no such professorship anywhere. At most they look only to the future and contingent establishment of a "Michigan school of homeopathy," at such place other
than Ann Arbor, as in the opinion of the regents shall be suitable,
and "as shall by the twentieth day of June (then) next, pledge to the
board of regents the greatest amount for buildings and endowments
for said school." Now, it does not appear that any place has yet
pledged any sum for those purposes; and certainly it can not be conclusively presumed that any place will do so. Until this is done, it is
not to be established at any place, or rather, in plain English, it is not
till then to be established at all, even in these paper resolutions. I am
therefore inclined to think the regents are at least premature in this
application; and that, under any view that can be taken, they ought
to have waited until this professorship should be established as a
practical entity, capable of vital action.
Suppose a student wishes to resort to this "Michigan school of
homeopathy" for instruction. Where will he fmd it? It is yet to be
found only in the state at large, as much in one place as another;
onmipresent except at Ann Arbor, but nowhere visible or palpable to
the senses. Will he fmd it any the more readily by being told, in the
language of this resolution, that it is "organized in the department
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of medicine," not where the department is, but at some place not
yet determined, outside of Ann Arbor? Can it be for a moment
seriously contended that this was all that was contemplated by the
legislature?
[175]
*Have the legislature at two separate sessions been making
all this ado about a professorship of homeopathy, for no
other purpose than to enable such professor to draw a salary, without the performance of any duty?
These considerations, with many others which might be urged,
produce upon my mind a very strong conviction that the legislature
intended to require, by this condition, that the professorship of
homeopathy should be established practically, and in fact in the medical department, where that department is already established and in
operation, at Ann Arbor.
Upon the policy or impolicy of attempting to establish it there,
I express no opinion. It is not a question for this court. Of the good
faith of the regents, however, and their desire to act as may be best
for the interest of the university, there can be no reason to doubt.
But I think they have mistaken the true intent of the condition
upon which this appropriation was made, and that they have mistaken in some measure their constitutional powers. The mere power of
"supervision" given by the constitution, whether subject to, or independent of, legislative control, should not, I think, be confounded
with the power to create or establish a university, or to change its location, in whole or in part, as previously fixed by the legislature and
recognized by the constitution.
GRAVESJ.:
* * *
When the application was made to this court, in 1856, to coerce compliance with the act of 1855, it was not intimated by, or on
behalf of, the regents, or supposed by the court, in so far as appears
in the report, that the last named act could be complied with, except
by the establishment of the professorship at Ann Arbor; while, on
the contrary, the regents took the ground which was expressly noticed in the opinion of the court, that the law required the introduction of a new and antagonistic element into the department of medicine likely to clash with the system already established, and produce
embarrassment to the board and the institution not easily to be surmounted, and which it would require time and investigation to harmonize and adjust. Indeed, it is very plain that some of the objections
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were based on the tacit admission that the proviso required the professorship to be at Ann Arbor.
It does not appear to have occurred to the regents or the court,
that the whole difficulty could be surmounted, and the law, at the
same time, complied with, by the simple. expedient of establishing
the new professorship at a distance from Ann Arbor; and it seems
hardly possible to reconcile the views then expressed, with the supposition that those who expressed them did, at that time, imagine
that the law could be thus executed. The court then said, "the real
question is one of time," and no other place than Ann Arbor appears
to have been thought of.
The controversy attracted much attention, and the general
public and the legislature must naturally have inferred, from
the ground of opposition on the part of the regents, *and the [186]
opinion of the court, that the law of 1855 was believed and
understood to require the establishment of the new professorship at
the place where the institution and all its professorships were established, where were accumulated all the instruments of education, and
where alone were to be found the buildings provided for the use of
the college; and that the difficulty in the execution of the statute, in
the view of the regents, consisted in its requiring that there should
be brought together, in the same university, and at the same place,
professors of opposing schools in the same department.
The facts which have been mentioned, and the opinion of the
court, which has been in part quoted, must have been present to the
legislature when the act of 1867 was passed. And when we consider
the nature of these facts, and the tenor of this opinion, is it not
probable that the legislature then supposed the regents understood
the alleged offer as requiring the specified professorship to be at
Ann Arbor?
Is it not probable that those who so persistently insisted upon
the new professorship meant and apprehended that the regents understood that the professorships before established, and that sought to
be established, should be placed on terms of substantial equality, in
respect to all advantages and opportunities depending upon location,
and the instrumentalities of education; and that all students should
have access, at all times, to all the sources of knowledge which either
school should supply? When we consider all the circumstances, including the representation of the regents in 1852, that all the faculties ought to be collected at Ann Arbor, is it clear that the legislature, in 1855, intended, or supposed they were understood as
intending, that the new professorship should be established at a distance from that place, and apart from the facilities there provided,
even though such action should result in giving superior advantages
to the new school?
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*It seems to me that these questions will not admit of
an answer favorable to the views of the petitioners. Notwithstanding that it was urged in 1856 that the new professorship, if introduced, would be an antagonistic element in the university, the
legislature, in 1867, insisted upon compliance with the first act,
without any qualification. The regents at the former time seem to
have understood, and I think that the legislature was authorized to
infer, that they understood that the act of 1855 required the professorship to be at Ann Arbor.
If the thought of another location was not present to the legislative mind, then the legislature could not have intended a location
elsewhere, and if none was intended elsewhere, the design must have
been that the professorship should be where the university, including the department of medicine, was situated, since a location at
some place was inevitably involved in the statutory requirement.
Upon deliberate consideration I can discover nothing in the
laws in question to indicate that any separation of professorships, in
the department of medicine, was designed or thought of, but, on the
contrary, the purpose appears to have been to supply a new element
of instruction for the benefit of all who should attend the college as
situated and established.
Whether the action of the legislature in this regard was wise or
unwise, whether, if consummated, it would be likely to result in injury to the institution, is not our province to determine. The case is
not one in which that question could be properly debated, if in any
case it could be a proper topic for discussion in this court. The laws
in question were enacted in due form; at all events that is not disputed, and the present application is based upon an alleged compliance with them, and not upon an excuse for non-compliance. That
the eminent men to whom the people have confided the supervision
of one of the noblest educational institutions of this or of any
age, have faithfully *endeavored to execute their trust, I have [188]
no doubt. But the question for our determination does not
depend upon this consideration. We are asked by the petitioners to
decide in substance that it is clear that they have accepted and acted
upon the offer contained in the acts referred to in the same sense in
which the legislature apprehended that the regents understood it,
and such decision I can not concur in making.
The legislature required the establishment of the new professorship at some place; and it is not only not clear, but quite unlikely,
that they meant, or that they supposed the regents understood them
as meaning, that it should be at a point distant from the seat of the
university and all its appointments.
I am, therefore, of opinion, upon the grounds stated, that the
writ ought not to issue.
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To avoid misapprehension, it is proper to say, that I am not
prepared to admit that the regents have the power to establish a professorship at a place other than Ann Arbor, but as the disposition of
the present case does not require us to decide that question, I forbear to discuss it.
CAMPBELLJ.:
As a majority of the court have not been able to coincide in
opinion upon the motion before us, I propose to indicate as briefly
as I can the general views on which I think the relators are entitled
to relief.
As the money in dispute is a mere offer to the regents of that
which would not otherwise belong to them, of course the donors
may affix conditions to it. And the condition they have affixed to
this grant is that "there shall be at least one professor of homeopathy
in the department of medicine." This is a plain and simple provision,
and leaves but a single question open to decision, which is whether
any portion of the department of medicine can be established at a
place outside of Ann Arbor.
[189]
*The university is divided into three departments, and
those are extensive enough to include all branches of human
inquiry relating to secular pursuits. There are in the collegiate department, and there may be in either of the others, many entirely
different courses of study, which no student can pursue at the same
time, and which may or may not occupy in part the same ground. In
the various courses of instruction which are now, or which may be
hereafter, devised for the teaching of specific arts or sciences, there
must always be more or less divergence as students fit themselves for
the laboratory, the forge, the mine, the farm, or other branches of
business or professional pursuits. And it must always be left to the
regents, as the only body which can lawfully carry on the administration of the university, to parcel out the studies as in their good judgment seems best. Any student who enters the university, and selects
his course, must confine himself to that course as they have arranged
it, and they must decide what pursuits can profitably be allowed to
go on together.
If they should see fit to include in the medical department instruction in the theories and practice of any number of conflicting
schools, or to provide courses for different special branches, as for
dentistry, for diseases of the eye and ear, for nervous diseases, or for
the treatment of insanity, it must be obvious that whether these
should call for discordant teachings, or should merely require students
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to follow select but harmonious courses, there must be some rule
which would exclude one student from attempting to learn all at
once. If he should attend one course, he must absent himself from
others, and this must be regulated by the regents.
Whether students of one system could profitably attend at the
same time the teachings of two conflicting schools, or whether the
professors could be wisely or harmoniously amalgamated into one
body, is not a judicial question, but one of administration, to
be settled by the authorities of *the university; and if stu- [190]
dents of homeopathy were to pursue their studies at Ann
Arbor, we have, as a court, no means of knowing whether they
could or would profitably avail themselves of the teachings now established there. Upon many branches of medical teaching it is very
obvious that a lecturer must of necessity inculcate his views upon
treatment and curative systems on which there would be radical differences. To what extent these differences would separate students
under the various professorships, it is not for us to determine. But it
is at least quite possible that there should be a general, if not an entire divergence. In other words, it is impossible for a court to assume
that the location of a homeopathic professorship at Ann Arbor would
be more desirable or profitable than elsewhere, or that the system
could be introduced without an entire division of courses of lectures
and other instruction. Such seems to be the conclusion of the regents, who upon this subject have all the responsibility of determination.
It can not be doubted that, where courses of study are different, there is no necessity for conducting them in the same place. And
unless there is some rule of law which confines the entire operations
of the university to a single place, there can be no objection to the
course taken by the regents in this case.
The only reason given anywhere for denying their power is that
under the law the university is located at Ann Arbor, and that any
removal of its place, or any transaction of business away from its
place, is unauthorized.
It is beyond dispute that where, by its charter, the business of
a corporation is localized, it must be done in the place prescribed.
Our own decisions are full on this subject. But it is just as well settled
that where the business is not localized no such rule exists.
Thus, for example, we have many corporations where nothing
is localized but the business offices. We have several mining
[191] charters of this kind. Navigation companies *furnish another
familiar instance. Insurance companies, companies for scientific and exploring purposes, and many others, might be readily suggested.
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I think that the purposes expressed in the various provisions
concerning the university, preclude the idea that all of its operations
must be local. In its origin in 1817, it had no locality prescribed, and
its functions were expected to be performed in many places. So when
the modifying law of 1821 was passed, it was located in Detroit, but
its functions were ubiquitous. While thus established, and after it had
been directly recognized both by congress and the treaty-making
power, its perpetuity was required by congress and stipulated for by
the state upon its admission into the Union, and also fixed by the
first state constitution.
When a new law was passed, in 1837, which provided for its
location in Ann Arbor, the language used was no_ broader than that
which had before located it in Detroit. And, while some of its functions were narrowed, it was expressly designed to cover the whole
field of science, art and learning. Many branches of knowledge can
be profitably taught only in favorable localities. It is not supposable
that it was designed to prevent such teaching as should be profitable.
Mining, surveying, geology and engineering require for their mastery
some attendance, either temporary or permanent, at places where
such work is being carried on. Medical teaching in its completeness
avails itself of hospitals, and must in that case be partially given
where hospitals are to be found. And when we consider that the university is expected to furnish complete teachings, we must read all
the charter provisions together, and assume that the reference to locality is not designed to localize all its doings.
If the law of 1837 means any such thing, then it differs from
the ordinary charters of which we have any account in the law books.
It is the first law that ever fell under my own notice which
confined a corporation not to a *municipality, but to a sin- [192)
gle parcel of land, as it directs the buildings to be placed on a
forty-acre lot, to be thereafter designated, and contains no other establishment of locality. If this law operates at all to confine the corporation, it can never carry on its operations off of the quadrangle.
The observatory lot, and any other premises which its growing
needs might require, would all be outside of its legally ordained
locality.
It seems to me that the laws locating the university upon a
specified tract of land, were not designed to localize all of its educational operations, but simply to make that the great center, as state
buildings and county buildings, or corporation offices, are made centers for public or corporate purposes, while many functions may be
performed elsewhere. Where the purposes of the university are so extensive as to require wider facilities for their complete fulfillment, I
do not think such provisions require a construction which would
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hamper them. And I think the regents in this case have not gone
beyond the fair intent of the scheme of the university.
I think the writ should issue.
COOLEY CH. J. gave no opinion.

The People v. The Regents of the University
18 Mich. 469, 482-83 (1869)
GRAVESJ.:
The attorney-general having applied for a mandamus to require
the regents to appoint a professor of homeopathy in the department
of medicine in the university, pursuant to section 2187 of the Complied Laws, and the usual order for showing cause against the motion
having been made, the regents at the last January term made answer
to the order, and alleged for cause against the application that the
part of the section referred to, which provided there should always
be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine, was repugnant to the provisions of article 13 of the constitution, which confers upon the regents the power of general supervision of the university. The question thus presented was ably
argued by counsel, and we have considered it with an *earnest [483]
desire to reach a decisive result. But in this we are disappointed by an equal division of opinion among the members of the
court. As this circumstance would deprive our opinion of all force as
judicial authority, we do not deem it expedient to superadd our
reasonings to the elaborate arguments from the bar. It is seen that
since the application cannot obtain the sanction of a majority of the
court, the motion must fail.
The other justices concurred.

The People (on the relation of the Attorney-General) v. The
Regents of the University
30 Mich. 473 (1874)
Application for mandamus.
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This application was to require the respondents to appoint, install and maintain two professors of homeopathy in the department
of medicine of the university, as provided by the act of 1873.-Sess.
L. 1873, p. 73.
PER CURIAM.
The very able argument in this case has not brought any member of the court to any different views from those heretofore sufficiently expressed, and we therefore make no order.

Sterling v. The Regents of the University of Michigan
110 Mich. 369, 370-73, 374-76, 377-78, 379-84; 68 N.W. 253
(1896)
Mandamus by Charles F. Sterling to compel the Regents of
the University of Michigan to comply with Act No. 257, Pub. Acts
1895, providing for the removal of the homeopathic medical college
from Ann Arbor to Detroit. Submitted May 5, 1896. Denied July
28, 1896.
In 1895 the legislature passed Act No. 257, Pub. Acts 1895,
the material part of which reads as follows:
"That the board of regents of the University of Michigan are
hereby authorized and directed to establish a homeopathic medical
college as a branch or department of said University, which shall be
located in the city of Detroit, and the said board of regents are hereby authorized and directed to discontinue the existing homeopathic
medical college now maintained in the city of Ann Arbor as a branch
of said University, and-to transfer the same to the city of Detroit."
The title of the act is "An act to amend section one of an act
entitled 'An act for the establishment of a homeopathic medical department of the University of Michigan,' approved April 27, 1875,
being section 4932 of Howell's Annotated Statutes." The regents of
the University declined to comply with said act. The relator thereupon
presented this petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the regents to comply with the act. The ground for such refusal is (1) that
it was not, in their judgment, for the best interests of the University;
(2) that the legislature has no constitutional right to interfere with
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or dictate the management of the University. Among other things in
their answer, they say:
"A large part of the course of instruction required to be given
in the other medical department of the University, and in the homeopathic medical college, is common to the two schools. This fact has
anabled the regents to provide for such common instruction at the
expense, to that extent, of the support and maintenance of a single
department; thus saving to the benefit of the University and to the
people of the State a large sum of money annually, which otherwise
would be required for the continuous support of two medical departments, which would be wholly separate throughout their several
courses of instruction in case both departments of medicine were not
located at the city of Ann Arbor. It appears to the regents that great
advantage arises to the University as a whole, and to the students in
the various departments of the University, that all the branches of
the University are located and maintained at the proper seat of the
University, at Ann Arbor. It appears also to the regents that whatever suggestions may be made of the advantages to be derived to the
homeopathic medical college, as a department of the University, by
the removal of such department to a larger city, or to any other locality than the city of Ann Arbor, are suggestions which may, perhaps, be used for the removal of the other medical department of the
University and other departments of the University to some other
locality than the city of Ann Arbor, by parties or interests desiring
to secure such removal. It further appears to the regents that the removal of one of the established departments of the University suggests a movement for an entire change in that policy of concentration
of the departments of the University at the proper seat of the University which has hitherto promoted the growth and advancement of
the University to its present place among the great schools of the
world.
"The claim which is made under the application of the relator,
that the provisions of Act No. 257 command the discontinuance and
removal of the homeopathic medical department of the University
by the regents, without any reference to their power of supervision
of the University, suggests to the regents the question whether such
provisions do not curtail and impair the power of supervision and
control of the University which has been vested in the regents by the
Constitution of the State. It is the purpose, as well as the plain duty,
of the regents, to exercise, according to their best judgment, the supervision and control of the University, which has been vested in
them by the State Constitution, to promote both the interests of the
University and the interests of the people of the State, which are
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involved in the welfare of the University. The regents have not undertaken to decide for themselves upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the
purpose of the provisions of said Act No. 257, under which the relator's application is made. They have been advised that grave doubts
exist in respect to the validity of said act. They have also been advised that to the extent that the provisions of the act are a foundation for the application for a writ to compel action on the part of the
regents, denying their right to exercise judgment, supervision, or
control in relation to the subject of the discontinuance of an existing
department of the University, there are grave doubts in respect to the
validity of the act."
GRANT, J. (after stating the facts). 1. The petitioner does not
in his petition show any interest in the matter, or the right to question the action of the board of regents. The attorney general is the
proper party to move in such a case, and a private citizen does not
possess the right, without permission of the court, to apply for this
writ to compel a public board to perform an omitted duty. People
v. Regents of University ofMichigan, 4 Mich. 98. The petition in this
case does not set forth that the petitioner is a citizen of the State, or
that he is in any manner injured by the action of the board. This
point is not raised in the ~riefs of counsel, probably because it is de~
sired to obtain a decision upon the merits. We think that such proceedings should be instituted by proper parties, and that relators
should show themselves competent to bring them into court. Inasmuch, however, as the question has not been raised, we shall do as
we have sometimes done before,-dispose of the case upon the main
issue.

* * *
Under the Constitution of 1835, the legislature had the entire
control and management of the University and the University fund.
They could appoint regents and professors, and establish departments. The University was not a success under this supervision by the
legislature, and, as some of the members of the constitutional convention of 1850 said in their debates, "some of the denominational
colleges had more students than did the University." Such was the
condition of affairs when that convention met. It is apparent to any
reader of the debates in this convention in regard to the constitutional provision for the University that they had in mind the idea of
permanency of location, to place it beyond mere political influence,
and to intrust it to those who should be directly responsible and
amenable to the people. After these constitutional provisions,
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substantially in their present form, had been presented to the convention, and the question arose as to how they should be selected,
whether by election or appointment, Mr. Whipple said:
"If we select eight (and I should prefer twelve), your regents
will be distributed over every part of the State, and the public will
thus obtain a knowledge of this institution;for the convention will
observe that the concerns of this University are to be placed in the
hands of the regents. They will obtain very important knowledge in
regard to this establishment, and the people among whom they live
will become informed as to the nature of this institution, and will
become interested in it." Convention Debates, 782.
The public men of those times were greatly interested in the
University. Methods for its management were discussed by governors
in their messages, by reports of the board of regents to the legislature, and by committees of the legislature. The general consensus of
opinion was that it should be under the control and management of
a permanent board, who should be responsible for its management.
The regents, in March, 1840, in obedience to a joint resolution of the
legislature, reported that"The first change in the organic law deemed essential is the
proper restriction of responsibility to the board of regents. At present the responsibility is divided, and the board would be greatly
facilitated in their action were such amendments made as would
throw entire responsibility on them."
In the same report they also urged that the trust and management of the funds of the University should be placed in the regents.
A select committee was appointed by the legislature in 1840
to inquire into the condition of the University. No more forcible argument could well be made than is found in that report for placing
the entire control of the University in the hands of a permanent
board, and taking it away from the legislature. 2 House Documents
1840, p. 470. I quote from that report as follows:

[See pp. 6-8 for text of the report.]

* * *
All these reports and discussions were undoubtedly known to
the members of the convention, and their action should be construed in the light of such knowledge. I am unable to find a single
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utterance by any member of that convention from which it could be
inferred that the members believed or supposed that they were leaving the control of that institution to the legislature. The result has
proved their wisdom, for the University, which was before practically
a failure, under the guidance of this constitutional body, known as
the "Board of Regents," has grown to be one of the most successful,
the most complete, and the best-known institutions of learning in
the world. That such was the understanding of the meaning of the
Constitution of 1850 is shown by the report of the superintendent
of public instruction, published in 1852; in which he refers to "the
additional and general interest created by a change of the organic
law in 1850, in placing the University under the control of regents
elected by the people." Report, Pub. Ins. 1852, p. 26.
The provisions of the Constitution of 1850 in regard to the
University are these (article 13):
[See pp. 10-11 for text of these constitutional provisions.]

***
The board of regents, elected under the new Constitution, im-.
mediately took control of the University, interpreted the Constitution in accordance with its plain provisions, denied the power of the
legislature to interfere with its management or control, and for 46
years have declined obedience to any and every act of the legislature
which they, upon mature reflection and consideration, have deemed
against the best interests of the institution. This court has sustained
them in that position, and has on every occasion when asked denied
its writ to interfere with their action. In January, 1856, in the case
of People v. Regents of University of Michigan, 4 Mich. 98, this
court, in denying the writ of mandamus to compel the regents to establish a professorship authorized by the legislature, said:
"They [the regents] aver that they have acted in good faith,
but at the same time under the influence of much uncertainty as to
the constitutionality of the law, and we are compelled to recognize
in this question what might well suggest doubt of the binding force
of the law, and occasion some hesitation in their action."
Obviously, it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to take away from the people the government of this institution. On the contrary, they designed to, and did, provide for its
management and control of a body of eight men elected by the people at large. They recognized the necessity that it should be in charge
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of men elected for long terms, and whose sole official duty it should
be to look after its interests, and who should have the opportunity
to investigate its needs, and carefully deliberate and determine what
things would best promote its usefulness for the benefit of the people. Some of the members of the convention of 1850 referred in the
debates to two colleges (one in Virginia and the other in Massachusetts) which had been failures under the management by the State. It
is obvious to every intelligent and reflecting mind that such an institution would be safer and more certain of permanent success in the
control of such a body than in that o( the legislature, composed of
132 members, elected every two years, many of whom would, of
necessity, know but little of its needs, and would have little or no
time to intelligently investigate and determine the policy essential
for the success of a great university.
Now, in the face of the facts that the regents have for 46
years exercised such control, and openly asserted their exclusive
right to do so; that the courts have refused to compel them to comply with the acts of the legislature; that this court held in Weinberg
v. Regents, 97 Mich. 246, that they were a constitutional body,
upon whom was conferred this exclusive control; and in the face of
this plain constitutional provision,-this court is now asked to hold
that the regents are mere ministerial officers, endowed with the sole
powers to register the will of the legislature, and to supervise such
branches and departments as any legislature may see fit to provide
for. By the power claimed, the legislature may completely dismember the University, and remove every vestige of it from the city of
Ann Arbor. It is no argument to say that there is no danger of such a
result. The question is one of power, and who shall say that such a
result may not follow? The legislature did once enact that there
should be a branch of the University in every judicial circuit. If the
regents comply with the present act, the next legislature may repeal
it, and restore that department to the University at Ann Arbor, or
place it elsewhere. Some legislatures have attached conditions-and
they have the undoubted right to do so-to appropriations for the
support of the University, and a subsequent legislature has removed
the conditions. Some legislatures have attached to appropriations the
condition for the establishment of a homeopathic professorship in
the old medical department. Other legislatures have refused to attach
any such condition. What permanency would there be in an institution thus subject to the caprice and will of every legislature? Under
this power, the legislature could remove the law department from
the University at Ann Arbor to Detroit, and provide that the law library, to which one citizen of Michigan has donated $20,000, should
also be removed. It might scatter its great library (to the collection of
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which private citizens have contributed nearly or quite one-half), and
also its great museums, laboratories, and mechanical appliances.
Other results will readily suggest themselves. It appears to us impossible that such a power was contemplated.
Furthermore, it renders nugatory the express provision of the
Constitution that "the regents shall have the direction and control
of all expenditures from the University interest fund." It is significant
that, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, this fund constituted the sole support of the University, aside from fees which
might be received from students. The State had made no appropriations for its support, and there is nothing to indicate that any such
appropriations were contemplated. It is unnecessary to argue that
the above provision means what it says, and that it takes away from
the legislature all control over the income from that fund. The power therein conferred would be without force or effect if the legislature could controlthese expenditures by dictating what departments
of learning the regents shall establish, and in what places they shall
be located. Neither does it need any argument to show that the power contended for would take away from the regents the control and
direction of the expenditures from the fund. The power to control
these expenditures cannot be exercised directly or indirectly by the
legislature. It is vested in the board of regents in absolute and unqualified terms. This act, in express terms, prohibits the regents from
using any of this fund to support a homeopathic department at the
University at Ann Arbor, since it prohibits them from maintaining
such a department there.
This power cannot be sustained without overruling the case of
Weinberg v. Regents. The basis of the majority opinion in that case
is that the board of regents is a constitutional body, charged by the
Constitution with the entire control of that institution. The result
could not have been reached upon any other basis. It was held not
to be a State institution under the control and management of the
legislature, as were the other corporations enumerated in the statute
then under discussion. We there said: "Under the Constitution, the
State cannot control the action of the regents. It cannot add to or
take away from its property without the consent of the regents." We
might with propriety rest our decision upon that case, and should be
disposed to do so were it not for the urgent contention of the counsel on the part of the relator that that case does not apply. We are
therefore constrained to state some further reasons to show that the
legislature has no control over the University or the board of regents.
(1) The board of regents and the legislature derive their power
from the same supreme authority, namely, the Constitution. In so
far as the powers of each are defined by that instrument, limitations
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are imposed, and a direct power conferred upon one necessarily excludes its existence in the other, in the absence of language showing
the contrary intent. Neither the University nor the board of regents
is mentioned in article 4, which defmes the powers and duties of the
legislature; nor in the article relating to the University and the board
of regents is there any language which can be construed into conferring upon or reserving any control over that institution in the legislature. They are separate and distinct constitutional bodies, with the
powers of the regents defined. By no rule of construction can it be
held that either can encroach upon or exercise the powers conferred
upon the other.
(2) The board of regents is the only corporation provided for
in the Constitution whose powers are defmed therein. In every other
corporation provided for in the Constitution it is expressly provided
that its powers shall be such as the legislature shall give. In the case
of townships (article 11, § 2), and in counties (article 10. § 1), and
boards of supervisors (article 10, § 6), it is expressly provided that
each corporation shall have such powers and immunities as shall be
prescribed by law. The same is true of other officers, aside from the
regents, provided for in the Constitution. Justices of the peace (article 6, § 18), the sheriff, the county clerk, the county treasurer, the
register of deeds, and prosecuting attorney (article 10, § 3), and
township officers (article 11, § 1), can exercise such powers as shall
be prescribed by law.
(3) Let us apply another test. It is a rule of construction that
where a general power over one subject is conferred upon one body
in one clause of an instrument, without any restricting or qualifying
language, and the like power over another subject is conferred upon
another body in another clause of the same instrument, with restricting or qualifying language, the restrictions or qualifications of the
second clause cannot be read into the first clause. On the contrary,
they must be excluded. By article 13 § 1, the superintendent of
public instruction is clothed with "the general supervision of public
instruction;" but it is added, "His duties shall be prescribed by law."
By article 13, § 9, the board of education is given "the general supervision of the State Normal School;" but it is added, "Their duties
shall be prescribed by law."
Thus, in every case except that of the regents, the Constitution carefully and expressly reposes in the legislature the power to
legislate and to control and define the duties of those corporations
and officers. Can it be held that the framers of the Constitution, and
the people, in adopting it, had no purpose in conferring this power,
viz., the "general supervision," upon the regents in the one instance,
and in restricting it in the others? No other conclusion, in my
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judgment, is possible than that the intention was to place this institution in the direct and exclusive control of the people themselves,
through a constitutional body elected by them. As already shown,
the maintenance of this power in the legislature would give to it the
sole control and general supervision of the institution, and make the
regents merely ministerial officers, with no other power than to carry
into effect the general supervision which the legislature may see fit
to exercise, or, in other words, to register its will. We do not think
the Constitution can bear that construction.
The writ is denied.
LONG, C. J., MONTGOMERY and HOOKER, JJ., concurred
with GRANT, J. MOORE, J., concurred in the result.

CHAPTER III
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE UNIVERSITY
SINCE THE HOMEOPATHIC CASES
1. CASES INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF

UNIVERSITY AND STATE

The University's autonomy is based upon a clause of the
state constitution granting the Board of Regents the "general
supervision" of the University. Since 1908 and 1956 respectively, the governing boards of Michigan State University and Wayne
State University have enjoyed a similar franchise. In the present
state constitution, equal rights were given to all governing boards
of state-assisted four-year institutions of higher learning granting
baccalaureate degrees.
Judicial interpretation of the "general supervision" clause
could not end with the homeopathic cases, for clearly there are
limits to the independence of universities 1 from the rest of state
government. While the "general supervision" clause grants the
governing boards plenary power over all of the internal management and affairs of the universities, no one would argue that the
universities are completely exempt from all the general legislation affecting the rest of the state. The universities are not independent city-states. There have, therefore, been recurring cases
in which the courts are called upon to decide whether, in a particular situation, a statute applicable by its terms to a much
larger group than the constitutional universities, is actually an
unconstitutional interference in the internal affairs of the universities.
The other recurring problem is the validity of particular
conditions on appropriations the legislature makes to the state
universities. On the one hand, the constitution makes it the duty
of the legislature to support certain named institutions (Article
8, Section 4), and, in general, the legislature has traditionally adhered to the spirit of the constitution by making lump-sum
53
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appropriations to the universities which may be used in any way
at the discretion of the governing board (See Chapter V). However, the power of the legislature to appropriate money has been
generally thought to include the power to prescribe reasonable
conditions for the use of the appropriations provided they do
not interfere with the constitutional mandates to the governing
boards of the universities. Such a doctrine is implicit in the
homeopathic case of the Regents v. Auditor General in which
the University did not receive its first appropriation because it
could not satisfy either the Auditor General, or a majority of
the Supreme Court, that it had appointed a homeopathic professor as required. Needless to say, it would be easy for the legislature to defeat completely the intent of the constitution by
attaching sweeping conditions to appropriations which are very
necessary for the proper support of the universities. In the cases
in this chapter, the court has, therefore, limited the permissible
scope of these conditions on appropriations.
The earliest case discussed in this chapter, Weinberg, was
decided before the Sterling case. In Weinberg, subcontractors
for the building of University Hospital sought to hold the University liable for failure to require the main contractors to post
a bond to pay their subcontractors. A statute required all state
agencies to obtain such bonds from their building contractors.
In this case, the court was not required to decide the question
of whether the statute could constitutionally be applied to the
University. The more immediate issues were whether the statute
should be interpreted as including the University, and, even if it
did, whether the violation of the statute by a state officer was
intended to give subcontractors a right to damages from the
state agency. Since the court actually decided both these prior
issues against the plaintiff, its ruling that the law was unconstitutional as applied to the University is, technically, only dicta.
This dicta, however, took on new significance when the court
itself, in later cases, cites it as authority.
A much more serious threat to University autonomy was
presented in the next case in this series. The procedural framework of this case, mandamus, was becoming familiar-Board of
Regents v. Auditor General. This time, the Auditor General had
inquired into the uses of University funds and had decided that
it was not proper to spend such money for field trips by students,
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for President Angell's traveling expenses in attending the inaugurations of presidents of other universities, or for certain
other purposes. This time the court had no trouble in unanimously voting to grant mandamus. The court ruled that "as
against the discretion of the regents," the Auditor's function in
this case is purely ministerial, that his judgment on the wisdom
of University expenditures is irrelevant.
The power of the legislature to control the curriculum at
the "agricultural college" (now Michigan State University) was
decided in the first case of the State Board of Agriculture v.
Auditor General. The legislature had tried to force the school to
abandon its Engineering Department by limiting expenditure in
that department to $35,000. This limitation on the use of funds
was part of an increasing state appropriations to the school, but
it applied to funds from all sources. At that time the agricultural
college was largely supported from the proceeds of federal land
grants.
In this case, the court ruled that "legislature exceeded its
powers in attempting to deprive [the governing board] of its
constitutional control of agricultural funds derived from the
federal government." Since the whole act was declared void by
the court, the former act which provided less state support for
the college was declared to be still in effect.
The conditional appropriation was the issue in the next
case, which was brought by the State Board of Agriculture
against the Auditor General. The condition attached to an appropriation for the agricultural extension service of the then college had been interpreted by the Auditor General and the State
Administrative Board, an agency of the executive branch of
state government, to require the college's board to surrender
complete control of the service to the State Administrative
Board. The majority of the court ruled that such conditions
were not constitutional. Since, in the majority's judgment, the
legislature intended the appropriation itself to remain effective
even though an unconstitutional condition were struck down,
the court ordered the Auditor General to pay the full amount of
the appropriation to the college. Three justices vigorously dissented.
The scope of the powers of the Board of Regents includes
the power to sell or to lease land, even if the legislature has not
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enacted specific enabling legislation. This was recognized in the
1863 case of Regents v. Detroit Young Men's Society and the
relatively recent 1911 case ofBauer v. State Board of Agriculture. In effect, these cases hold that the constitutional provisions themselves have empowered the boards to act, and that
they need not be supplemented by statute. Statutes, nevertheless, purport to delegate certain powers to these constitutional
boards. 2
Two workmen's compensation cases are included in this
chapter because they raised constitutional questions. Both cases
involve Michigan State University which resisted the application
of workmen's compensation laws. The University of Michigan
seems to have chosen to be covered because in two cases involving its employees3 the University argued only the merits of
each claim and did not claim exemption from the statute. In the
first Michigan State case, Agler, the court interpreted the statute
as then written not to cover the college without its consent. In
Peters, decided in 1948, the court was equally divided. The
amended statute now clearly included the college, and the deadlock in the high court resulted in sustaining an award in favor of
an employee.
In the Jackson Broadcasting and Television case, the court
refused to interfere with an arrangement between Michigan State
University and a private company to share facilities of a shared
time television channel. This case is particularly interesting because it is so recent, and because of the delicate treatment
afforded one of the presently heated issues of university autonomy-whether a condition in an appropriations bill is valid which
requires that the universities must surrender to the central state
government the right to plan and design new university buildings
in order to qualify for appropriations to erect the buildings. 4
At the present time, an unresolved question concerning
constitutional autonomy is the validity of the amended Hutchinson Act as applied to the universities. The text of this legislation
is included at the end of this chapter. Whether the broad authority this statute invests in the State Labor Mediation Board,
which extends far beyond traditional "mediation," encroaches
on the constitutional prerogative of the Board of Regents to
conduct its own internal affairs must be answered by the state's
highest court. 5
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Weinberg v. The Regents of the University of Michigan
97 Mich. 246, 247-52, 252-53, 254-55; 56 N.W. 605 (1893)
MONTGOMERY, J. The plaintiff brought suit against theRegents of the University of Michigan, James B. Angell, James H. Wade,
and Charles R. Whitman to recover the value of materials furnished
to one Lucas, a subcontractor in the building of the University hospital. The right of action is claimed under Act No. 94, Laws of
1883, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885 (3 How. Stat. §
8411a). The declaration avers:
"That the Regents of the University of Michigan is a public
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Michigan, created for the government of the University of Michigan,
which said institution belongs to and is the property of the State of
Michigan, and is maintained at the expense of this State; that the defendant James B. Angell is the president of the Regents of the University of Michigan, and the executive head of the University of
Michigan; that the defendant James H. Wade is the secretary; that
the defendant Charles R. Whitman is a member of the Regents of the
University of Michigan; that on or about the months of July and
August, A.D. 1890, the Regents of the University of Michigan advertised for proposals for the erection and completion of a hospital
building for the University of Michigan, which said hospital building,
so to be erected and completed, was to be and has been built at the
expense of this State; that afterwards, to wit, on the first day of
October, A.D. 1890, in pursuance to said advertisement and proposals received, the bid of one William Biggs, of the city of Ann
Arbor, was accepted, and on or about the date aforesaid the Regents
of the University of Michigan entered into a contract with said William Biggs for the erection and completion of said hospital, in consideration of the sum of, to wit, $78,556, which said contract was
signed by the defendants James B. Angell, James H. Wade, president
and secretary as aforesaid, and by said William Biggs; that the defendant Charles R. Whitman was a member of the committee on
buildings and grounds appointed by the Regents of the University of
Michigan, which building committee was given full authority to act
for the said Regents of the University of Michigan until otherwise
ordered; that said Charles R. Whitman, as a member of said committee, was principally in charge of said undertaking of building said
hospital; that afterwards the said William Biggs, by contract with one
John Lucas, sublet a portion of the job for the building and erection
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of said hospital; that the plaintiff, Julius Weinberg, is a laborer and
material-man, engaged in the business of buying, selling, and furnishing stone, sand, and other material to contractors and other persons
engaged in building, and other business in which such materials are
used; that after the contract so made as aforesaid by the Regents to
said Biggs, and by Biggs with said John Lucas, said Lucas, subcontractor as aforesaid, applied to the plaintiff to furnish stone for use
in said hospital building, for which said Lucas agreed to pay plaintiff
85 cents for every 16 feet in length by one foot thick and one foot
high, as the same was laid in the wall of said building.
"And the plaintiff further says that the defendants, the Regents of the University of Michigan, James B. Angell, James H. Wade,
and Charles R. Whitman, were the board, officers, and agents of the
State of Michigan, and made and entered into the contract for the
erection of said hospital for and on behalf of the State of Michigan,
and had the same built at the expense of this State; that it was the
duty of said defendants as aforesaid, under section 8411a, as amended
by Act No. 45, Public Acts of 1885, and sections 8411b and 8411c,
Howell's Annotated Statutes, to require sufficient security by bond
for the payment by the contractor and all subcontractors for all labor
performed and materials furnished in the erection, repairing, or ornamenting of said hospital building."
The declaration further avers that plaintiff furnished the material in question, relying on such bond, and also avers that he has
not received his pay, and concludes:
"And plaintiff further says that said defendants, in disregard of
their duty aforesaid, negligently and carelessly, and in disregard of
the rights of the plaintiff, neglected to require of said contractor the
bond aforesaid, and permitted the said contractor to enter into said
contract for the erection of said hospital building, and to enter upon
the performance thereof, without giving security, by bond or otherwise, for the payment by said contractor and all subcontractors for
the labor and materials furnished him or any subcontractor, as required by said statute."
To this declaration the defendants demurred, and the plaintiff
joined in demurrer. The demurrer was sustained as to the individual
defendants, and overruled as to the Regents of the University, and
the plaintiff was permitted to amend as to the individual defendants.
The defendant the Regents of the University of Michigan brings error.
The plaintiff has, however, amended his declaration as against both
defendants, and it is requested by both parties that the question of
liability be here determined.
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It is contended on behalf of the defendant that the statute
does not apply to the Regents of the University of Michigan; that the
University buildings are not built at the expense of the State, nor are
they contracted for on behalf of the State, within the meaning of
this statute; that they are constructed by a constitutional corporation, which may sue and be sued, and has power to take and hold
real estate for any purpose which is calculated to promote the interests of the University.
The section, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885, provides:
"That when public buildings or other public works or improvements are about to be built, repaired, or ornamented under contract,
at the expense of this State, or of any county, city, village, township,
or school-district thereof, it shall be the duty of the board of officers, or agents, contracting on behalf of the State, county, city, village, township, or school-district, to require sufficient security by
bond for the payment by the contractor and all subcontractors for
all labor performed or materials furnished in the erection, repairing,
or ornamenting of such building, works, 9r improvements."
We think the statute sufficiently broad to cover the contract in
question. Act No. 145, Laws of 1889, appropriated"For the purchase of a site for and the erection of a hospital,
for the year 1889, the sum of $25,000, and for the year 1890 the sum
of $25,000: Provided, however, that no part of the above-named appropriations for the purchase of a site for and the erection of a hospital shall be paid out of the treasury until the city of Ann Arbor
shall have bound itself to contribute the sum of $25,000 for the
same purpose."
Section 2 provides for the assessment of taxes to pay this appropriation. Certainly, then, the undertaking was at the expense of
the State and of the city of Ann Arbor, the contribution of the city
of Ann Arbor, however, becoming State property upon its appropriation. We think it clear, also, that the Regents who acted in the matter were agents contracting on behalf of the State. They are officers
elected by the voters of the State, whose duties relate to the control
of public property. It is altogether too technical to say that the Regents were contracting on behalf of the University; for, while this is
in a sense true, it is also true that they, by the very contract in question, provided for the expenditure of State money, and for the construction of a building which it would, I think, be news to most
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residents of Michigan to learn is not State property. This is as much
so as in the case of a school-district. Auditor General v. Regents, 83
Mich. 467.
It is contended by the defendant that the liability for neglect
to require this bond attaches to the individuals who represented the
State, county, city, village, township, or school-district in the letting
of the contract, and not to the State or county or corporation of
which they are directly the officers or agents. We think the defendant is right in this contention. In Owen v. Hill, 67 Mich. 43, and
Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 ld. 295, the action was brought against the
individuals composing the board. In Wells v. Board of Education, 78
Mich. 260, it was held that the officers were personally liable for materials on failure to take the required bond. Our attention has not
been called to any case in which the municipality, in the case of a
township or school-district, or a public or quasi public corporation,
has been held liable as such, and it seems to us that there are insuperable objections to so holding. The duty rests upon the officers of the
State, as well as cities, counties, and school-districts. Can it be intended that the State, which must act through its public officers, is
to be held liable as for a tort for a mere neglect to take the bond required by this statute? It is true that it is urged that the Board of
Regents is an agent of the State. This may be true in a certain sense,
but we think the board, as a board, is not the agent contemplated by
this statute, but that the officers who act directly are the ones who,
as individuals, fall within the purview of the act. It may be doubtful
to what extent the board of managers of a hospital which is a public
institution, like the one in question, can be made liable for negligence; as to which see McDonald v. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; Glavin
v. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411. We do not deem it necessary to decide
whether, under such circumstances as are involved in those two cases,
the board of managers of the hospital, as a corporation, may not be
liable. In such a case it might well be contended that it has undertaken to perform certain duties, and established relations towards
the patients which impose upon the body in control certain duties.
But the ground of the plaintiffs right to recover at all in this case is
that this property is State property, and, further, that the building is
being constructed at the expense of the State, and that the members
of the board were acting for and on behalf of the State in making the
contract. It could not be contemplated that the State or the public
corporation is to be made liable. The individual guilty of the wrong
or neglect of duty is the one against whom the action should be directed. Cooley, Torts, 621. The wrong is in the nature of a tort consisting of neglect of duty owing to the public generally, for which
the public corporation as such is not liable, unless made so by statute.
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It follows from the views expressed that the judgment should
be reversed, and the case remanded, that the plaintiff may proceed
against the individuals named in the amended declaration.

McGRATH, J., concurred with MONTGOMERY, J.
GRANT, J. I concur in the opinion of my Brother Montgomery
that under Act No. 94, Laws of 1883, as amended by Act No. 45,
Laws of 1885, the public corporation cannot be made liable, but
only those officers or agents of such corporation to whom is committed the duty of letting contracts for the erection of public buildings or making public improvements. But I cannot concur in holding
that the statute applies to the corporation known as "the Regents of
the University of Michigan." The grounds, buildings, and other property of all the other State institutions, penal, reformatory, charitable,
and educational, belong to the State. These institutions are the creations of the Legislature. They are under the exclusive control and
management of the State. The State, which created them, may at any
time repeal the laws by which they were established, and sell the
property. The public buildings, public works, and public improvements mentioned in this statute mean those over which the State has
control. This is evident from the language of the statute, which says:
"It shall be the duty of the board of officers, or agents, contracting on behalf of the State, * * * to require sufficient security
by bond," etc.
The Regents make no contracts on behalf of the State, but
solely on behalf of and for the benefit of the University. All the
other public corporations mentioned in the Constitution, which have
occasion to erect public buildings or to make public improvements,
are expressly included in this statute. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. It expressly enumerates the State, counties, cities, villages,
townships, and school-districts. If the University were under the control and management of the Legislature it would undoubtedly come
within this statute, as do the Agricultural College, Normal School,
State Public School, asylums, prisons, reform schools, houses of correction, etc. But the general supervision of the University is, by the
Constitution, vested in the Regents. Const. art. 13, §§ 7, 8.

***
Under the Constitution, the State cannot control the action of
the Regents. It cannot add to or take away from its property without

62

CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
the consent of the Regents. In making appropriations for its support,
the Legislature may attach any conditions it may deem expedient
and wise, and the Regents cannot receive the appropriation without
complying with the conditions. This has been done in several instances.
Property aggregating in value nearly or quite half a million of
dollars has been donated to the University by private individuals.
Such property is the property of the University. It is not under the
control of the State when it acts through its executive or legislative
departments, but of the Regents, who are directly responsible to the
people for the execution of their trust. So, when the State appropriates money to the University it passes to the Regents, and becomes
the property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive
direction of the Regents, and passes beyond the control of the State
through its legislative department.
The University and the school-district are both provided for in
the same article of the Constitution. Why should the Legislature mention the school-district in this statute, and leave out the University, if
it was its intention to include the latter? The University is the property of the people of the State, and in this sense is State property, so
as to be exempt from taxation. Auditor General v. Regents, 83 Mich.
467. But the people, who are the corporators of this institution of
learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred the entire control
and management of its affairs and property upon the corporation designated as "the Regents of the University of Michigan," and have
thereby excluded all departments of the State government from any
interference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not
bring the Regents within the purview of the statute. The people may,
by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or property beyond the control of the Legislature.
This Court has refused to compel the Regents to comply with
certain provisions of acts of the Legislature against their judgment
that they were not for the best interests of the University. People v.
Regents, 4 Mich. 104; People v. Regents, 18 Id. 469; People v. Regents, 30 Id. 473. The Legislature was undoubtedly cognizant of the
above decisions, for the questions involved were of considerable
public interest.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the Re~
gents are not included in this act, and that the judgment should be
reversed, and judgment entered in this Court for the defendants.
Judgment entered accordingly.
HOOKER, C. J., and LONG, J., concurred with GRANT, J.
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Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General
167 Mich. 444, 445-52; 132 N. W. 1037 (1911)
STEERE, J. In this proceeding the court is asked to decide
whether the judgment of the auditor general or that of the board of
regents shall prevail respecting the expenditure of moneys appropriated for the use and maintenance of the University by Act No. 102,
Pub. Acts 1899. On April 30, 1906, the treasurer of the University
made requisition upon the respondent for monthly expenditures
from the appropriation of the so-called quarter-mill tax, amounting
to $39,452.50, for the payment of current expenses. In making this
requisition he followed the usual practice, which was in harmony
with the methods prescribed by the accounting laws. The auditor
general refused to draw his warrant upon the State treasurer for the
amount of such requisition, for the reason that certain vouchers
made by the regents for prior expenditures, which in his opinion
were unlawful, had not been audited and allowed by him. These prior
expenditures, amounting to $557.54, were for traveling expenses of
Dr. Angell, president of the University, in attending alumni meetings
and inaugurations of presidents of other universities, and for traveling
expenses of other members of the faculty and officers, acting under
the authority of the president and tegents, in attending intercollegiate meetings and conferences as delegates or representatives of the
University, and for the expenses of instructors in accompanying students in inspecting mechanical engineering plants, the same being a
part of the prescribed course for certain engineering students. It was
the opinion of the auditor general that such expenditures were not
for the use and maintenance of the University, as contemplated by
Act No. 102, Pub. Acts 1899, and consequently not for lawful purposes under the accounting laws of this State. The petitioner claims
it has exclusive direction and control of all University expenditures,
and asks for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to draw his
warrant on the State treasurer for the amount of the requisition
above mentioned.
On behalf of the respondent it is urged that the writ should be
denied for the following reasons:

"First. Because the quarter-mill tax appropriation must be dispersed in accordance with the accounting and appropriation laws of
this State, and in refusing to comply with the conditions therein expressed the board of regents has violated the conditions upon which
the appropriation was made.
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"Second. Because it is the judgment of the auditor general,
whose determination is fmal and conclusive, that the disbursements
represented by the vouchers in question are for unlawful purposes.
·~Third. Because the auditor general is prohibited by law from
drawing his warrant upon the State treasurer for future requisitions
until the amounts represented by the vouchers in question are returned to the institution treasury."

The moneys available for support and maintenance of the University consist of, first, interest on the University fund so called,
being a fund derived from the sale of lands donated by the general
government; second, fees received from students; third, appropriations made from time to time by the legislature of the State.
The funds in question are of the latter class, being appropriated by Act No. 102, Pub. Acts 1899, providing for a tax of onequarter mill upon the taxable property of the State. This act, which
is an amendment of a former act of similar import, consists of but
one section, and reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. There shall be assessed upon the taxable property of the State as fixed by the State board of equalization, in the
year 1899 and in each year thereafter, for the use and maintenance
of the University of Michigan, the sum of one-fourth of a mill on
each dollar of said taxable property to be assessed and paid into the
State treasury of the State in like manner as other State taxes are by
law levied, assessed and paid; which tax, when collected, shall be paid
by the State treasurer to the board of regents of the University in
like manner as the interest on the university fund is paid to the treasurer of said board; and the regents of the University shall make an
annual report to the governor of the State of all the receipts and expenditures of the University: Provided, that the board of regents
shall not authorize the building or the commencement of any additional building or buildings or other extraordinary repairs until the
accumulation of savings from this fund shall be sufflcien t to complete such building or other extraordinary expense. Also provided,
that the board of regents of the University shall maintain at all times
a sufficient corps of instructors in all the departments of said University as at present constituted, shall afford proper means and facilities
for instruction and graduation in each department of said University,
and shall make a fair and equitable division of the funds provided for
the support of the University in accord with the wants and needs of
said departments as they shall become apparent; said departments
being known as the departments of literature, science and art, department of medicine and surgery, department of law, school of
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pharmacy, homeopathic medical college and the department of dental surgery. Should the board of regents fail to maintain any of said
departments herein provided, then at such time shall only onetwentieth of a mill be so assessed: Provided, further, that the State
treasurer be and is hereby authorized and directed to pay to the regents of the University, in the year 1899 and each year thereafter, in
such manner as is now provided by law, upon the warrant of the
auditor general, the amount of the mill tax provided for by this act;
and that the State treasury be reimbursed out of the taxes annually
received from said mill tax when collected; and said auditor general
shall issue his warrants therefor as in the case of special appropriations."
Manifestly there cannot be a strict compliance with the two
somewhat contradictory provisions as to time and manner of payment. In the enacting clause of the statute under consideration, the
legislature provides for a quarter-mill tax, appropriates it to the use
and maintenance of the University, and specifies that, when collected,
it shall be paid to the regents in like manner as interest on the University fund is paid. It further requires that the regents shall annually
make report of receipts and expenditures to the governor. Following
this, in separate provisos, are two distinct conditions as to expenditure of this appropriation. First, it prohibits the use of savings, accumulated from the appropriation, for any new buildings or extraordinary repairs or expenses until such accumulations are sufficient
to complete the same; second, the departments of the University are
to be maintained in a certain manner, and by a fmal proviso the State
treasurer is directed to each year advance from the State treasury the
amount of the mill tax provided by the act, to be reimbursed from
said tax when collected, and he is to pay the same "in such manner
as is now provided by law." The respondent and his predecessors
have construed this proviso as requiring payments to be made under
the general accounting laws of the State, and have followed the procedure there pointed out, which course has been acquiesced in by
the regents until this controversy arose over the authority of the
auditor general to reject vouchers for expenditures authorized by the
board when in his judgment they were not for lawful purposes.
He claims such authority under sections 3 and 5 of the accounting laws, being sections 1207 and 1209, 1 Comp. Laws; the material
portions reading as follows:
"SEC. 3. Such account current, abstract, vouchers, and receipts, when received by the auditor general, shall be examined by
him, and if found correct shall be so endorsed by him; and all
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vouchers for expenditures, so far as the amount thereof shall appear
to be for lawful purposes, he shall audit. * * *
"SEC. 5. Money appropriated by any act of the legislature for
the use or benefit of any State educational, charitable, reformatory
or penal institution, or to be disbursed by any officer, may be drawn
from the State treasury upon the warrant of the auditor general, as
follows, viz.: Under appropriations for current expenses monthly for
pro rata amounts: * * *Provided, that when appropriations are made
for current expenses, or general purposes, where no itemized estimates were furnished as a basis therefor, then the class of disbursements shall be determined by the officer, or board of the institution
making them, and if the same shall appear to the auditor general to
be within the range of reasonable purposes he shall approve the
account. * * * "
In passing upon statutory provisions which are obscure or conflicting, the practical construction which State officials, with a duty
to perform thereunder, have, during a long period adopted and followed with reference to their meaning, and which has been acquiesced
in all parties in interest, is entitled to weight, and has been favored by
the courts when not manifestly in conflict with the intent and spirit
of the act. In harmony with that rule of construction, we are disposed to accept the interpretation of the law adopted and acted upon
by respondent and relator as to the time and manner of payment;
but, in the light of constitutional provisions, legislation, and decisions
of this court touching the authority of the board of regents to control the affairs of the University, cannot hold that the judgment of
the regents as to the legality and expendiency of expenditures for
the use and maintenance of the institution is subordinate to that of
the auditor general.
The leading thought and clearly expressed object of the final
proviso under consideration is the advancement during each year of
this appropriation from the State treasury for current expenses, to be
later replaced when the tax is collected. To that extent it clearly
modifies the enacting clause, but words found in the body of the act,
following the phraseology of previous acts of like nature, paralleling
the appropriations made, with the University interest fund, have a
significant bearing on the intent of the legislature. It is an elementary rule of construction that all words found in the act are presumed
to be made use of for some purpose, and, so far as possible, effect
must be given to every clause and sentence.
The proper function of a proviso is to restrain, or in some manner modify, the general provisions of an enacting clause. It is not to
be extended or enlarged by inference, but strictly construed and
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limited to the object plainly within its terms.
By the provisions of the Constitution of 1850, repeated in the
new Constitution of 1909, the board of regents is made the highest
form of juristic person known to the law, a constitutional corporation of independent authority, which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the legislature. By the
old Constitution it is given "direction and control of all expenditures
from the University interest fund" (section 8, art. 13); and by the
new Constitution "general supervision of the University, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University funds."
Section 5, art. 11. That the board of regents has independent control
of the affairs of the University by authority of these constitutional
provisions is well settled by former decisions of this court. People v.
Regents, 4 Mich. 98; Weinberg v. Regents, 97 Mich. 254 (56 N. W.
605); Sterling v. Regents, 110 Mich. 382 (68 N. W. 253, 34 L. R. A.
150); Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415 (129 N. W.
713). Strong and unequivocal language is used in these decisions.
"The respondents are constitutional officers to whom are confided by the Constitution 'the general supervision of the University,
and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University
interest fund.' * * * To their judgment and discretion as a body is
committed the supervision of the financial and all other interests of
an institution in which all the people of this State have a very great
interest." People v. Regents, supra.
"But the general supervision of the University is by Constitution vested in the regents. * * * So, when the State appropriates
money to the University it passes to the regents and becomes the
property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive direction of the regents, and passes beyond the control of the State
through its legislative department. * * * Under the Constitution, the
State cannot control the action of the regents. * * * It cannot add to
or take away from its property without the consent of the regents.
In making appropriations for its support the legislature may attach
any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the regents cannot receive the appropriation without complying with the conditions.
This has been done in several instances." Weinberg v. Regents, supra.
The able and exhaustive opinion by Justice GRANT in Sterling
v. Regents, supra, reviews the causes which led up to these former decisions and reaffirms them. In the recent case of Bauer v. State Board
of Agriculture, supra, the Sterling Case is cited with approval.
That conditions may be attached by the legislature to appropriations for the University is well settled. In such case the regents may
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accept or reject such appropriation, as they see fit. If they accept,
the conditions are binding upon them. In this act appropriating the
quarter-mill tax, now three-eighths of a mill (Act No. 303, Pub.
Acts 1907), are specific conditions as to reporting to the governor,
maintaining the departments, and use of accumulations. With these
the regents must comply. For a failure to maintain any of said departments the penalty is a reduction of the tax to one-twentieth of a
mill, but beyond that the money passes to the regents, and becomes
the property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive
direction of the regents.
We cannot construe the language of the fmal proviso of the act
in question as an intent on the part of the legislature to overthrow
the public policy of over half a century, plainly deducible from the
general course of legislation and adjudication relating thereto, or as a
purpose on their part to refuse aid to the University, unless the regents surrender their constitutional right to control the affairs and
fmances of the institution, and submit their judgment as to the wisdom and expediency of detailed expenditures for current expenses
to that of the auditor general. Neither in construing this proviso can
we interpret it as an intent thus by indirection to enlarge the scope
of the enacting clause and ingraft upon this appropriation all conditions and restrictions found in the accounting laws of the State, together with any legislation which may be read in connection therewith.
No money is paid out of the State treasury except on the warrant of the auditor general. In this case, as in many others, his duties
are purely ministerial. As against the discretion of the regents in expenditure of the University funds he exercises no judicial functions.
As to him, in the performance of his official duties, vouchers for expenditures made within the amount of the appropriation, when
authorized by the board of regents and properly authenticated by
the duly constituted officials, are, within the meaning of the law,
"for lawful purposes."
A writ of mandamus will issue as prayed.
OSTRANDER, C. J., and MOORE, McALVAY, BROOKE,
BLAIR, and STONE, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit.
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State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General
180 Mich. 349, 350-61; 147 N. W. 529 (1914)
Under the Constitution and laws of the State, money may be
drawn from the State treasury only upon the warrant of the auditor
general. On the 23d of March last the auditor general declined to
draw warrants for certain sums asked for by the State board of agriculture, basing his action upon the legislative declaration found in
Act No. 324 of the Public Acts of 1913, which appropriates and orders to be levied for the use of the agricultural college, in the year
1913 and thereafter, annually one-sixth of a mill on each dollar of
the taxable property in the State, and concludes as follows:
"SEC. 1 (a). No part of this or any other appropriation shall
be available in case a sum in excess of thirty-five thousand dollars
from any or all sources, shall be expended in any one fiscal year for
all the maintenance of the mechanical and engineering department."
When the warrants were refused, a sum in excess of the requisitions stood credited to the agricultural college fund. Requisitions
previously honored advised the auditor general that a sum in excess
of $35,000 had been expended in maintaining the mechanical and
engineering department of the college since June 30, 1913.
The State board of agriculture flled its petition for an order requiring the auditor general to draw the refused warrants and such
others as it might be entitled to. The auditor general made answer,
and, upon the petition and answer, there being no disputed facts, the
matter has proceeded to a hearing. It is asserted, in concluding the
petition, that, if the auditor general's construction of the act of
1913 is the correct one, it prevents relator's performing duties imposed by the Federal statutes and those imposed upon it by the Constitution of the State; that the appropriation, in view of the condition, is not one which it is free to accept or reject. It cannot reject
the appropriation without disobeying constitutional mandates; it
cannot accept it and perform the condition without denying itself
the exercise of constitutional powers. The condition is not within
the title of the act. The act may be construed to limit the expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and appropriated by the act, in
which case it has been complied with. If it may not be so construed,
the condition is altogether unconstitutional, and relator is entitled
to receive the appropriation.
In behalf of the respondent auditor general the attorney general contends that:
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"An examination of the conditions found in section 1 (a) of
the act under consideration demonstrates that the provisions are in
no wise ambiguous, and there can be no serious question as to the
purpose of the legislature in attaching this condition. Undoubtedly
i1 was the same purpose that prompted the condition attached in the
regents' case involving the homeopathy department. It is not a question for this Court, we respectfully submit, nor is it a question for
the administrative officers of the State, whether the agricultural college shall continue as a competitor against another institution maintained at State expense of over $200,000 per year; nor is it a question for this Court or the administrative officers of the State whether
this legislation is wise in policy or not; nor is it a question, we respectfully submit, for relator board to determine. The money in the
treasury of the State was the property of the State; none of it was
the property of the agricultural college until appropriated by the
legislative branch of the State government. That branch of the State
government has the exclusive control of appropriations to State institutions, and may prescribe the amount and condition upon which
any of the public institutions of the State can withdraw the same. If,
in the wisdom of the legislature, it is inadvisable to continue two appropriations to two institutions which are duplicating work in the
State, neither the courts, the administrative officers, or administrative boards can set aside such action.
"Relator understood clearly the conditions under which this
appropriation was made; it understood clearly that, if the act was
valid, its engineering department must be curtailed; and, while protesting against the power of the legislature to attack such conditions,
it continued to make its requisitions upon the auditor general and to
receive the money appropriated to it under this and other acts, and
to use such money contrary to the conditions found in this act. The
people, by the Constitution of 1908, gave to relator powers never
before possessed by the controlling board of the agricultural college,
the same powers exercised by the regents of the university, but they
still reserved to their representatives chosen each two years the right
to determine the appropriations to be made, not only to the other
State institutions, but also to the university and the agricultural college. The respondent is but carrying out the conditions imposed under the act in question. Relator's present position, if unfortunate,
arises from its failure to recognize that the legislature, and the legislature alone, holds the purse strings of the State."

To understand and to dispose of the contention presented, it is
necessary to refer to facts appearing in the pleadings of evidence by
the Constitution of the State and Federal and State statutes. By the
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Constitution of 1909 the State board of agriculture is made, what before it was not, a constitutional board and body corporate. It is given
general supervision of the college and direction and control of "all
agricultural college funds." Article 11, § 8. Sections 10 and 11 of
article 11 read, respectively, as follows:
"SEC. 10. The legislature shall maintain the university, the
college of mines, the State agricultural college, the State normal college, and such State normal schools and other educational institutions as may be established by law.
"SEC. 11. The proceeds from the sales of all lands that have
been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to the State
for educational purposes and the proceeds of all lands or other property given by individuals or appropriated by the State for like purposes shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income
of which, together with the rents of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall be inviolably appropriated and annually applied to the
specific objects of the original gift, grant or appropriation."
Agricultural college funds, when the Constitution was adopted,
consisted of sums paid for tuition, receipts from sales of products of
the institution, a grant of money by the Federal government, the interest paid by the State upon money received from sales of land
granted by the Federal government (the proceeds of the sales having
been covered into the State treasury), and, lastly, the proceeds of a
tax of one-tenth of a mill levied annually upon the valuation of taxable property of the State pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 232
of the Public Acts of 1901 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 9808). The condition attached to the Federal grant oflands was:
"That all moneys derived from the sale of the lands aforesaid
by the States to which the lands are apportioned, and from the sales
of land scrip hereinbefore provided for, shall be invested in stocks of
the United States or of the States, or some other safe stocks, yielding
not less than five per centum upon the par value of said stocks; and
that the moneys so invested shall constitute a perpetual fund, the
capital of which shall remain forever undiminished (except so far as
may be provided in section fifth of this act), and the interest of
which shall be inviolably appropriated, by each State which may
take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment, support,
and maintenance of at least one college, where the leading object
shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and
including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are
related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the
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legislature of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in
the several pursuits and professions in life."
And the Federal grants of money were made to the State for
the more complete endowment and maintenance of such agricultural
college as had been or might be established in accordance with the
original land grant act. Formal acceptances of the Federal bounty
were made by the legislature (Acts Nos. 46 and 140, Session of 1863;
Act No. 80, Session of 1891), and it was formally devoted to the
maintenance of the agricultural college. Including the interest paid
by the State, the proceeds of Federal bounty amount to more than
$120,000 annually. Although one purpose of the Federal grants was
the teaching of mechanic arts, and instruction was in some degree
afforded in mechanic arts, it was more than 20 years after the first
grant was made before a mechanical department was established at
the college. Act No. 42, Public Acts 1885. Since it was established,
the State board of agriculture has been repeatedly expressly charged
with the maintenance of the department. Section 15 of Act No. 188,
Public Acts of 1861, an act which reorganized the college, provides
a course of instruction as follows:
"The course of instruction shall embrace the English language
and literature, mathematics, civil engineering, agricultural chemistry,
animal and vegetable anatomy and physiology, the veterinary art,
entomology, geology, and such other natural sciences as may be prescribed, technology, political, rural and household economy, horticulture, moral philosophy, history, bookkeeping, and especially the
application of science and the mechanic arts to practical agriculture
in the field."
To refer to no other instances, in Act No. 232, Public Acts of
1901, is found the following condition:
"The Michigan State board of agriculture shall maintain at all
times a sufficient corps of instructors in all the courses of study of
the agricultural college as at present constituted, * * * the same being
known as the agricultural department, the mechanical department
and the woman's department; * * * and shall make a fair and equitable division of the funds provided by this act in accord with the
wants and needs of said courses of study. * * * "
And the concluding language of the section is:
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"Should the State board of agriculture fail at any time to maintain any of said departments as herein provided, the terms of this act
shall be suspended until further action by the legislature."
The mechanical department has grown in importance until it
now represents an investment of more than $227,000. To maintain it
during the year ending June 30, 1913, there was expanded $27,000
for supplies, machinery, and maintenance of buildings, and about
$34,000 for salaries of professors and instructors.
Following the enactment of the law in question here and before any money had been drawn under it, the State board of agriculture made a statement in writing, copies of which were sent to the
State officers, in which statement, after reviewing the history of the
mechanical and engineering department of the college and the Federal and State legislation pertaining thereto, the following conclusions are set forth:
"The board is advised by reputable legal counsel, and it believes, that under the Constitution of the State, the legislature has no
authority to enact the limiting provision hereinbefore first referred
to, and especially that it had no power to limit or determine the use
of the Federal funds. However, without in any manner accepting the
provisions of said limitation, and without waiving our right to insist
upon its invalidity, we respectfully make the following declaration
of our intention in reference to said mechanical and engineering department:

"(a) We shall continue that department as now conducted and
as it may legitimately grow and develop.
"(b) We shall limit the annual expenditure of State funds in
this department to $35,000.00.
"(c) For the remainder of the necessary expenditure we shall
use a sufficient portion of the funds of the Federal government.
"(d) The secretary is instructed to mail certified copies of this
statement, and the action of the board in reference thereto, to the
governor, the auditor general, the State treasurer, the attorney general and to the president of the senate and the speaker of the house."
As matter of bookkeeping, the auditor general credits the agricultural college fund with all moneys belonging to it. During the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1913, and until the month of March, 1914,
requisitions upon the fund were honored until a sum in excess of
$400,000 had been paid upon the requests of the State board of
agriculture, there remaining in the fund in March, 1914, when further
demands were refused, a sum in excess of $190,000.

74

CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
OSTRANDER, J. (after stating the facts). In attempting to
fmd the meaning to be given to section 1 (a), it will be assllllled that
the legislature knew that, independent of the immediate appropriation, there was a fund already devoted to the needs of the college
larger than any sum likely to be used to maintain the particular department. If the purpose was to limit the total sum which should be
expended to maintain that department, it could not be accomplished
by limiting the amount which might be taken from the immediate
appropriation. If there was no purpose to limit the total amount
which might be expended, the provision is wholly insensible. In any
event, the words "from any and all sources" may not be disregarded.
Section 1 (a) cannot be held as intended merely to place a limitation
upon the amount to be taken from the immediate appropriation to
be used in maintaining the mechanical and engineering department.
While no reading and no analysis of the language employed
leaves one entirely certain of the meaning of the provision, it seems
most reasonable to say that the purpose was to limit expenditures
for maintaining the particular department to $35,000 annually, and
to make unavailable for the use of the college all of its funds in case
the maximum thus fixed was exceeded. I do not overlook the language, "No part of this or any other appropriation shall be available,"
nor the actual occurrence of a result which was inevitable; namely,
that unless the declaration of the relator board was to be accepted
for the fact some part of the immediate and of other appropriations
would of necessity be available, if the college was to continue to
exist, since it could not be known before the fact whether relator
would or would not expend more than $35,000 in maintaining the
particular department. Some question might be raised also about the
meaning of the words "or any other appropriation." The reference
might be to an unexpended appropriation or the term "appropriation" used to designate, and not improperly, the earlier legislation
which devoted the Federal gifts to the maintenance of the college.
But I think we must say that the legislative purpose expressed in this
statute is the one to which the respondent has given effect, and, assuming the law to be valid, respondent cannot be required to issue
to relator further warrants for money.
We must either say this, or else conclude that section 1 (a) was
added to the act as an admonition, and not a command, or a condition; that it expresses the opinion of the legislature with respect to
the manner in which the agricultural college funds shall be employed.
If it was an admonition merely, the act could, of course, stand without it. Because of the language employed in section 1 (a) I do not
feel warranted in concluding that it is admonitory only. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the legislature has, as it is
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claimed, exceeded its constitutional powers, and, if it has, then the
state of the applicable law.
If section 1 (a) be held to be valid, its effect would be legislative supervision of the college. To determine that a department of
the college which has been maintained at a cost of $60,000 annually
for instructors and supplies shall be from a given date maintained at
a cost of $35,000 annually for instructors and supplies is to determine that it shall have fewer supplies, or fewer, or less capable, instructors, or both. It is something more than reducing a general appropriation so that the expenses in some or in all departments of the
college must be reduced, leaving the proper supervisors to determine
how efficiency can be best maintained under new conditions. The
Constitution has given to the relator the general supervision of the
college and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds.
So long as the relator employs them for the purposes intended by the
grant, it is beyond the power of the legislature to control the relator's
use of the funds received from the Federal government and long ago
appropriated to the agricultural college. Undoubtedly the grant of
funds was to the State, and the disposition of them wholly within
the power of the State, acting through its legislature, in accordance
with the conditions of the trust imposed. Montana, ex rel Haire, v.
Rice, 204 U.S. 291 (27 Sup. Ct. 281); Wyoming, ex rei. Wyoming
Agricultural College, v. Irvine, 206 U.S. 278 (27 Sup. Ct. 613). See,
also, Massachusetts Agricultural College v. Marden, 156 Mass. 150
(30 N. E. 555). I am called upon to neither affirm nor deny the
proposition that the legislature may now appropriate the Federal
fund, in whole or in part, to some other institution, withdrawing it,
or some of it, from the agricultural college, so long as it keeps faith
with the congress. The legislature has not withdrawn it from the college nor appropriated it, or any part of it, to another institution. It
remains an agricultural college fund, within the meaning of the Constitution, devoted, under the supervision and direction of the relator,
to the college and to the purposes expressed in the grant, in State
legislation, and, finally, in the Constitution of the State. It is required to be "annually applied to the specific objects of the original
gift, grant or appropriation." Necessarily it must be so applied, cnder
existing conditions, by the constitutional supervisors of the fund,
and of the college, and not by the legislature. It follows that the
legislature exceeded its powers in attempting to deprive the relator
of its constitutional control of agricultural college funds derived
from the Federal government. The constitutional powers of the State
board of agriculture with respect to the college and its funds are the
same as those of the board of regents of the university with respect
to the university and its funds, and authority for the conclusion
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stated may be found in Sterling v. Regents of the University, 110
Mich. 369 (68 N. W. 253, 34 L. R. A. 150); Board of Regents v.
Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444 (132 N. W. 1037), as well as in
Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415 (129 N. W. 713).
I assume that the legislature, in amending the original bill by
adding section 1 (a) thereto, acted in good faith and with the highest
motives. I am obliged to fmd that in doing so constitutional powers
were exceeded. I am obliged to fmd, further, that the legislative intent was to deprive the college of all funds, however derived, upon
the contingency expressed in the act. This being so, the question is
whether it can be said that the act would have passed without the
condition.
In deciding this question, we are not concerned with, do not
inquire into, and cannot know the purpose and intent of legislators.
We must look at the law itself and judicially ascertain the intent of
the legislature.
"If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and
is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid
as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object
only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail unless
sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the invalid
portion. And if they are so mutually connected with and dependent
on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant the belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, and if all could not be carried into effect the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then if some parts
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them." Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.), p. 211.
There are some facts which we may and do know which aid us
in this inquiry. We know that in the year 1901, and until the year
1913, the State appropriation for the agricultural college was onetenth of a mill. In 1913, by the act in question here, this appropriation was increased, upon condition, to one-sixth of a mill. The appropriation made in 1901 does not fail if the act of 1913 is held invalid.
The college will still receive the proceeds of a tax of one-tenth of a
mill upon the taxable property of the State, and it appears that upon
this basis something remains in the treasury. It is contended that the
decision of this court in Moreland v. Millen, 126 Mich. 381 (85 N. W.
882), supports the ruling that the act may stand, notwithstanding the
invalid condition, and that to hold otherwise is to overrule the decision in. that case. I have read the opinions delivered in that case with
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care and with no disinclination to sustain the relator in this controversy. The cases seem to me to be wholly unlike. For the purposes of
the decision in that case, it was assumed in the majority opinion that
the legislature, in the act there in question, sought to improve the
method of administering public works in the city of Detroit. The act
made radical changes in the existing law. It provided finally that a
superintendent of public works should be appointed, for a designated, but short, period of time, by the governor of the State, and
thereafter by the mayor of the city. It was held that the legislature
exceeded its powers in providing for the provisional appointment,
but that the whole law was not thereby made invalid. It was held
further that, an office having been created by the act, the mayor
might proceed at once to fill it by appointment. In that case the invalid portion of the act provided for a mere detail; in this case it is
the condition upon which an increased appropriation is made. It is
as though the legislature, in 1913, had for that year, and each succeeding year, provided a fund for the college, and for a further sum
to be given it upon condition.
The whole act must fail, and, this being so, the respondent
should be advised (it is unlikely that a writ will be necessary) that the
act of 1913 is void; that the act of 1901 is in force; that the fund derived from the Federal government and a fund equal to the one
created by that act are within the control of the relator.
McALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, BIRD,
MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General
226 Mich. 417, 418-36; 197 N. W. 160 (1924)
MOORE, J. The writ of mandamus is sought to compel the
auditor general to issue his warrant on the State treasurer in favor of
the Michigan Agricultural College for $75,000. The State admirl:strative board is made a party defendant for the reason that the auditor
general refuses to issue said warrant because said board has directed
him not to do so.
This proceeding calls for a construction of Act No. 308, Pub.
Acts 1923, which reads:
"For carrying on the co-operative agricultural extension work
under the provisions of an act of congress approved May eight,
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nineteen hundred fourteen, entitled 'An act to provide for co-operative extension work between the agricultural colleges for the several
States receiving the benefits of an act of congress approved July two,
eighteen hundred sixty-two, and acts supplementary thereto, and
the United States department of agriculture,' and such other extension work as the State board of agriculture may designate, the sum
of
For Fiscal
Year
1923-1924
Annual appropriation for extension work . . . . . . . . . $150,000.00
35,000.00
Special fund for research work .
Horticultural building including
green house and equipment . 200,000.00
Extensions and additions to
power house and equipment.
75,000.00
Farm and miscellaneous buildings and incidental additions
50,000.00
to buildings ...........
Hospital ................
50,000.00
~

Totals

............

$560,000.00

For Fiscal
Year
1924-1925
$150,000.00
35,000.00
200,000.00
75,000.00

50,000.00
$510,000.00

"Each of said amounts shall be used solely for the specific purposes herein stated, subject to the general supervisory control of the
State administrative board."
The act of congress mentioned is known as the Smith-Lever act
(38 U.S. Stat. p. 372; 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. [2d Ed.] at page 108). By
this act the Federal government appropriated moneys,"1. To aid in diffusing among the people of the United States
useful and practical information on subjects relating to agriculture
and home economics and to inaugurate in each State agricultural extension work to be carried on by the agricultural or land grant colleges, in co-operation with the United States department of agriculture.***
"2. The contemplated co-operative extension work to consist
of instruction and practical demonstrations in agriculture and home
economics to persons not attending or residing in said colleges. This
work to be carried on in such manner as may be mutually agreed
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upon by the United States secretary of agriculture and the agricultural college receiving the benefit of the act. * * *
"3. Before any college receives its share of the Federal appropriation each year, plans for the work to be carried on under this act
to be submitted by the proper officials of each college and approved
by the secretary of agriculture.
"4. With the exception of the $10,000 preliminary appropriation above referred to, no payment to be made of Federal funds to
any State until an equal sum has been appropriated for such year by
the legislature of such State or until it has been provided by the
State, county, college, local authority or from individual contributions within the State for the maintenance of the co-operative agricultural extension work provided for in the act."
By Act No. 65, Pub. Acts 1915 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 1272),
the Michigan legislature accepted the offer made in the Smith-Lever
act, "under the terms and conditions expressed in said act."
Section 2 of said act provides:
"The moneys derived by authority of said act shall be exclusively used in support of co-operative agricultural extension work, to
be carried on by Michigan Agricultural College, and the secretary of
the State board of agriculture is hereby designated as the officer to
whom such funds should be paid."
An agreement was made between the Agricultural College and
the United States department of agriculture regarding the conduct of
said co-operative extension work. It will not be necessary to quote
the details of this agreement. In it the parties mutually agreed:

"(a) That all co-operative extension work be planned under
the joint supervision of the director of extension work of the college, subject to the approval of the president of the college and the
agriculturist in charge of demonstration work for the United States
department of agriculture, and subject to the approval of the secretary of agriculture or his representative, and that the approved plans
for such extension work in Michigan should be executed through
the extension division of said college in accordance with the terms of
so-called individual projects agreements.
"(b) That all co-operative extension work agents in Michigan,
under this and subsequent agreements, be joint representatives of the
college and the United States department of agriculture, unless otherwise expressly provided, and that such co-operation be plainly set
forth in all literature issued either by the college or said department
of agriculture.
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"(c) That the plans for use of Smith-Lever funds be made by
the extension division of the college, but subject to the approval of
the secretary of agriculture, and when so approved, be executed by
the extension division of the college.
"(d) That headquarters of the Michigan organization shall be
the Michigan Agricultural College."
A director was appointed by the plaintiff as director of extension work and his appointment was approved by the United States
secretary of agriculture and he is now acting in that capacity.
Differences arose between the plaintiff and the State administrative board, which resulted, as before stated, in the auditor general
re,fusing to issue his warrant for any part of the $150,000 appropriated by Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923.
The refusal of the defendant to tum over the money is based
upon the provision of Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, which reads:
"Each of said amounts shall be used solely for the specific purposes herein stated, subject to the general supervisory control of the
State administrative board."
Article 11 of the Constitution of Michigan reads in part:
"SEC. 7. * * * The members thus elected and their successors
in office shall be a body corporate to be known as 'The State Board
of Agriculture.'
"SEC. 8. * * * The buard shall have the general supervision of
the college, and the direction and control of all agricultural college
funds.'' * * *
Act No. 269, Pub: Acts 1909 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 1233 et
seq.), reads in part:
"SEC. 2. The government of the Michigan Agricultural College
shall be vested in the State board of agriculture.
"SEC. 6. * * * The State board of agriculture shall have the
general supervision of the Michigan Agricultural College;** *of all
appropriations made by the State or by congress for the support of
said college, or for the support of the experiment station or any
sub-station, or for any other purpose for which said college is
created. * * *
"SEC. 7. The board shall fix the salary of the president, professors and other employees, and shall prescribe their respective
duties.***
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"SEC. 9. The board shall direct the disposition of any moneys
appropriated by the legislature or by congress for the Agricultural
College." * * *
These provisions of the Constitution and the statute of the
State were in force when Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, was enacted,
and, it may be safely assumed, were known to the legislature.
We deem it unnecessary to go into a discussion of the question
of how far the legislature may go in granting authority to the administrative board to take part in the management of the affairs of the
Agricultural College, in view of the constitutional provision we have
quoted. Nor do we think we are called upon to say just what was
meant by the use of the words "subject to the general supervisory
control of the State administrative board." The legislature made a
definite appropriation to carry out extension work under the provisions of the Smith-Lever act, "and such other extension work as the
State board of agriculture may designate." The language "subject to
the general supervisory control of the State administrative board,"
given in the concluding portion of the act, did not give the board the
right to withhold the appropriation.
The writ will issue as prayed, but without costs.
McDONALD, J. I am in entire disagreement with the conclusions reached by Justice WIEST in reference to the powers and
duties of the State board of agriculture. If his opinion is to prevail
we will have completely overturned the well settled policy of the
State relative to the management and control of the University and
of the Agricultural College. These institutions of learning are very
close to the hearts of the people of Michigan. They have made of
them the most unique organizations known to the law, in this, that
they are constitutional corporations created for the purpose of independently discharging State functions. The people are themselves the
incorporators; the boards that control them are responsible only to
the people who elect them; they are independent of every other department of the State government. Exercising these functions in this
manner, it was quite inevitable that they should come into conflict
with the State administrative board to which the legislature has delegated authority to intervene in the affairs and direct the policy of
every State institution. Thus this controversy has arisen.
As viewed by the plaintiff, the question involved is whether
the State board of agriculture shall continue to exclusively manage
the affairs of the college as provided by the Constitution, or surrender its rights to the State administrative board. As it appears to the
defendant, the question is whether it may not exercise general
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supervisory control over funds received by the college by way of appropriations from the legislature without invading the constitutional
rights of the State board of agriculture.
The State board of agriculture stands on the same constitutional footing as the board of regents of the University. The progress
which our University has made is due in large measure to the fact
that the framers of the Constitution of 1850 wisely provided against
legislative interference by placing its exclusive management in the
hands of a constitutional board elected by the people. The underlying idea was that the best results would be attained by centering the
responsibility in one body independent of the legislature and answerable only to the people. See Sterling v. Regents of University, 110
Mich. 382 (34 L. R. A. 150). For this reason the Constitution gave
the regents the absolute management of the University, and the exclusive control of all funds received for its use. This court has so declared in numerous decisions. People v. Regents of University, 4
Mich. 98; Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich. 254;Sterling
v. Regents of University, supra; Regents of University v. Auditor
General, 167 Mich. 444.
The policy thus consistently upheld by the court has proven
so satisfactory to the people that in the constitutional convention of
1908 similar action was taken with reference to the Agricultural College. The State board of agriculture was made a constitutional body;
it was given the sole management of the affairs of the college and exclusive control of all of its funds. At this time a part of the college
funds was received by way of appropriations from the legislature. In
providing that the State board of agriculture should have control of
the affairs of the college and the funds devoted to its use, the Constitution makes no exception as to funds from any particular source; it
says, "All funds." But the contention of my Brother WIEST that
moneys appropriated by the legislature are not college funds in the
constitutional sense, is answered by Mr. Justice GRANT in Weinberg
v. Regents of University, supra.
"When the State appropriates money to the University it passes
to the regents, and becomes the property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive direction of the regents, and passes beyond the control of the State through its legislative department."
There is, however, a distinction between funds received by
way of appropriations and other college funds. The appropriation
may be upon condition that the money shall be used for a specific
purpose, or upon any other condition that the legislature can lawfully impose. The language used in some previous decisions of this court
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in reference to this question seems to have been misunderstood. For
instance, the following:
"In making appropriations for its support, the legislature may
attach any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the regents cannot receive the appropriation without complying with the
conditions." Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich. 246, 254.
Clearly, in saying that the legislature can attach to an appropriation any condition which it may deem expedient and wise, the
court had in mind only such a condition as the legislature had power
to make. It did not mean that a condition could be imposed that
would be an invasion of the constitutional rights and powers of the
governing board of the college. It did not mean to say that, in order
to avail itself of the money appropriated, the State board of agriculture must turn over to the legislature management and control of the
college, or of any of its activities. This logically leads us to a consideration of the character of the condition attached to the appropriation
involved in the instant case. Is it a condition that the legislature had
power to make? The appropriation (Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923) is
subject to two conditions, first, that the money appropriated shall be
used for the specific purpose of carrying on co-operative agricultural
extension work under the provisions of an act of congress, known as
the "Smith-Lever act {38 U.S. Stat. p. 372)," and second, that it
"shall be used * * * subject to the general supervisory control of the
State administrative board."
It is not an easy matter to separate a supervisory control of the
expenditure of money for extension work from a control of the work
itself. Whatever meaning the legislature intended the term "general
supervisory control" to import, there is no question as to the interpretation given to it by the State administrative board. It appears in
the following resolution adopted on July 10, 1923:
"1. That the general supervision of the extension work of the
Michigan Agricultural College, together with the authority to hire
county agents and all other employees and to prescribe their duties
and ftx their salaries, be placed by the State board of agriculture by
proper resolution, in the hands of the dean of agriculture of the college.
"2. That county agents receive their entire salaries and expenses from the Federal government, the State, or the several counties of the State, but from no other source.
"3. That the dean of agriculture submit to this board immediately a revised budget of salaries and expenses based under the
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Smith-Lever act, the United States department of agriculture, and
the State and county appropriations, and if these funds are insufficient to carry on the work as outlined, the matter be referred to this
board for further attention."
From the above resolutions it will be noted that, exercising its
legislative right to "general supervisory control," the State administrative board proposes to take the extension work entirely out of the
hands of the board of agriculture and give it over to a dean of the college. In this the State administrative board is assuming to exercise
authority vested by the Constitution solely in the board of agriculture. It is not a question as to the wisdom of the method proposed
by the administrative board. The business policy and management of
all of the affairs of the college belongs to the State board of agriculture. The people, speaking through their Constitution, have so decreed. It is also proposed to reject contributions from county farm
bureaus, amounting to $191,489, on the theory that it is not only
unlawful but a bad business policy to allow the bureaus to pay a
part of the salaries of employees engaged in extension work. It may
be so, but the right to accept or reject contributions to carry on any
college activity is a matter to be determined exclusively by the State
board of agriculture. The legislature cannot interfere nor can it delegate any authority to the administrative board which it, itself, does
not possess. My Brother WIEST justifies the delegation of such authority by the legislature on the ground that it is a part of the
present-day legislative policy in carrying out a modern system of
State finance. The efficiency of the present system may well be conceded, but it cannot be applied to the affairs of the University or the
College, because the Constitution forbids it. The legislative enactments quoted by my Brother, as giving the State administrative
board the right to intervene in the affairs of State institutions and
direct their expenditures, all relate to institutions over which the
legislature has control. The Agricultural College and the University
of Michigan are constitutionally immune from such legislation. The
legislature has no control over them.
General supervisory control was not a meaningless term with
the legislature. As Justice WIEST points out, it had been applied in
other appropriation acts of the same session. It was understood to
mean that it conferred the right not only to control the expenditure
of the money, but to direct the work for which the appropriation
was made. It is evident that the legislature intended to confer just
such power on the State administrative board as it assumed to exercise in relation to this appropriation. In doing so, it exceeds its powers. This being true, the question arises, Does the unconstitutional
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provision of the statute nullify the whole act? To hold that it does,
we must assume that the legislature would not have made the appropriation except for the fact that the money was to be expended under the general supervisory control of the State administrative board.
The main purpose of the legislature was to grant an appropriation to
the college to enable it to carry on its extension work in co-operation
with the Federal authorities. A previous legislature had committed
the State to that policy. The appropriation was made to support one
of the most important activities of the college. In making it the legislature was but obeying the mandate of the Constitution that it should
grant appropriations for the support of the college and its various
activities (Art. 11, § 10, Const. 1909). It had become a fixed habit
with this legislature to confer upon the administrative board general
supervisory control over all appropriations. As has been heretofore
pointed out, this appears from the various acts enacted at this same
session. It is not reasonable to assume, therefore, that it intended
the appropriation to fail if for any reason the State administrative
board could not exercise a general supervisory control over its expenditure. As we have indicated, the appropriation was necessary to
carry on the very important work of taking the college to the people.
Its purpose was mainly to benefit those who could not reside at the
college. The legislature did not want this work to fail; it knew that
an appropriation was necessary if it were to be continued. The main
purpose was the appropriation. The supervisory control was but incidental, due to the legislative policy. In these circumstances, we
think that the legislature did not intend the appropriation to fail
and that the attempt to confer unconstitutional authority on the
State administrative board did not nullify the balance of the act.
See State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 180 Mich. 349;
Morelandv.Millen, 126 Mich. 381.
It follows that the State board of agriculture is entitled to the
appropriation subject to the condition that it shall be used for the
purpose specified. It is the undoubted right of the administrative
board to see that the condition is complied with. We understand
that the plaintiff is willing to accept the appropriation on these
terms. If so, the money should be paid.
It has been suggested that only by following the fund into the
hands of the board of agriculture can the administrative board compel a compliance with the condition as to the manner of its expenditure. As we have pointed out, when the money appropriated passes
into the hands of the State board of agriculture, it becomes college
property, and is thereafter under the exclusive control of that board,
but must be used for the purpose for which it was granted. The
proper method of compelling a compliance with the condition that
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the money shall be expended for the purpose specified will readily
suggest itself to the administrative board and its legal advisor.
In view of some statements that have been made, we are led to
say that in the action it has taken with reference to the affairs of the
college, the State administrative board has been but following out the
directions of the legislature in the belief that the greatest efficiency
will follow the supervision by the State of all appropriations. But, as
we have said, the system adopted, which has apparently produced
most satisfactory results when applied to other State institutions,
cannot be followed into the business management of the Agricultural College. The Constitution forbids it. The history of the struggles of the University of Michigan for this constitutional policy,
under which it has attained its present high standing, may be read in
Sterling v. Regents of University, supra, and cases there cited. The
same policy has been adopted for the Agricultural College, and in upholding it we are consistently following the Constitution as interpreted by all of the previous decisions of this court. For these reasons
I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice MOORE.
The writ of mandamus will issue to the auditor general, !but
without costs.
CLARK,. C. J., and SHARPE and STEERE, JJ., concurred with
McDONALD, J.
MOORE, J. I agree with Justice McDONALD in his construction of the constitutional provision he quotes and the limitation it
puts upon the power of the legislature and the administrative board.
WIEST, J. {dissenting). We are not in accord with the opinion
prepared by Mr. Justice MOORE.
The State board of agriculture is a constitutional body corporate. It is the duty of the legislature to maintain the State Agricultural College. Agricultural College funds, designated as such in the
Constitution, are wholly under control of the State board of agriculture. Biennial legislative appropriations are not agricultural funds
designated as such in the Constitution. The constitutional mandate
to the legislature to support the Agricultural College does not mean
that, in the matter of appropriations, the legislature shall have no
voice in the amounts and expenditure thereof. The Constitution
ftxes no sum to be appropriated by the legislature for support of the
Agricultural College, but leaves the subject to the legislature from
session to session in recognition of the fact that the legislature controls the public purse strings. The Constitution, in making the State
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board of agriculture a body corporate, has not raised the board above
the legislative power of the State in the matter of the expenditure of
public funds. There is another mandate in the Constitution:
"No money shall be paid out of the State treasury except in
pursuance of appropriations made by law." Constitution, Art. 10,
§ 16.
Funds vested in the college by the Constitution are beyond
legislative regulation or control. But what the legislature may grant,
by way of an appropriation, goes only as given, may be upon condition, and provide for the intervention of a State supervising fmance
agency with delegated power to be exercised respecting the expenditure. To set aside money in the treasury for a specified purpose does
not eo instante vest the same in any body. The system of State finance, payment of money and accounting therefor by disbursing officers forbids. The right to the money is measured by the terms of
the legislative grant thereof and such terms may impress upon the
grant the condition that it shall be devoted to a specific purpose
and its expenditure made subject to the general supervisory control
of the State administrative board. The right of the legislature to appropriate, with or without condition, beyond general specification
of object, is beyond question. If with condition attached, then the
only question is the extent and nature of the condition.
In the appropriation act the legislature invoked in comprehensive language the powers theretofore granted the State administrative board. This it had an undoubted right to do. The distinction between an appropriation and its disbursement must be kept in mind.
Disbursement of necessity comes after appropriation; official acts
intervene. The State administrative board is under legislative mandate to exercise supervisory control over the disbursement of the
appropriation in question. The legislature always has had power to
ascertain whether an appropriation has been expended by an administrative body for the purpose for which it was made. The legislature
also has power, and manifestly the duty, to fix the purpose for which
an appropriation may be expended. Coupled with this power is the
right to delegate to an administrative body the right of supervision
over the acts of a disbursing body. The power to grant or withhold
carries the power to grant on condition, specification of object, delegation of power of supervisory control in a governmental agency and
accounting for expenditures.
There is come a time in State fmance when a central power,
created for the purpose of exercising supervisory control over the
expenditures of appropriations, is deemed advisable, and the vesting
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of this power in the State administrative board, and the command
that it be exercised, are not meaningless words. The administrative
board was created to stand between appropriations and use thereof,
when so invoked by the legislature.
Act No. 2, Pub. Acts 1921 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1922, § 172
[1-9] ), created the State administrative board to promote the efficiency of the government of the State and vested in that board,
among other things, the power and functions of the State budget
commission created by Act No. 98, Pub. Acts 1919 (Comp. Laws
Supp. 1922, § 277). The condition attached to the appropriation
"subject to the general supervisory control of the State administrative board," is not meaningless if we indulge in a little circumspection. Why designate the State administrative board and invoke its of~
flee between the grant of the appropriation and the expenditure
thereof? The answer is in section 3 of the State administrative board
act:
"The State administrative board shall exercise general supervisory control over the functions and activities of all administrative
departments, boards, commissioners, and officers of the State, and
of all State institutions. Said board may in its discretion intervene in
any matter touching such functions and activities and may by resolution or order, advise or direct the department, board, commission,
officer or institution concerned as to the manner in which the function or other activity shall be performed, and may order an interchange or transfer of employees between departments, boards, commissions and State institutions when necessary. It is hereby made the
duty of each and every official and employee connected with any administrative department, office or institution of the State to follow
the direction or order so given; and to perform such services in the
carrying out of the purposes and intent of this act as may be required by the board. Failure so to do shall be deemed to constitute
malfeasance in office and shall be sufficient cause for removal. In no
case shall any order issue under this act without the written approval
of the governor."
General supervisory control over the expenditure of the appropriation means something more than mere permission to look on
without a frown. It means that the legislature invoked all the applicable powers vested in the State administrative board in supervision
and control of the expenditure of the appropriation, or it means absolutely nothing. It is found in many other appropriation acts of the
same session and indicates a pronounced legislative policy. It is in
line with modern State finance and centers supervision, control and
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responsibility, and notes a departure from the old idea of the sufficiency of legislative disapproval of method of an expenditure of an
appropriation disclosed only in an accounting. This is clearly demonstrated in the act creating the State administrative board and in vesting that board with the power and functions of the State budget
commission.
In creating the State budget commission the legislature declared:
"The term 'budget system,' established by this act, shall be
construed to be a systematic plan of ascertaining and meeting the
fmancial needs of the several departments, institutions, boards, commissions and offices of the State government, and of the controlling
State funds."
The legislature imposed a responsibility upon the administrative board and this cannot be met if my Brother's opinion prevails.
The power under the budget commission act gives the State administrative board recommendatory supervision over appropriations asked
for, and the State administrative board act gives general supervisory
control over the expenditure of the appropriation granted.
The merits of the issue between the State board of agriculture
and the State administrative board carmot be reviewed by this court.
If the law vests in the State administrative board general supervisory
control over the appropriation, and it has exercised such control,
and the State agricultural board feels aggrieved thereby, the remedy
is by appeal to the legislative and not to the judicial power.
We have passed upon the law involved; we find the State administrative board exercising power in the premises granted by the
legislature. We cannot supervise the supervision exercised.
The writ should be denied.
BIRD and FELLOWS, JJ., concurred with WIEST, J.
BIRD, J. (dissenting). I am in full accord with the opinion of
Mr. Justice WIEST in this matter, but desire to say a word on the
constitutional question raised since that opinion was written. I think
every thoughtful man must concede that the legislature could have
refused to make this particular appropriation and, if it had, no legal
complaint could have been made. If, then, the legislature was in the
position where it could give or withhold the appropriation as it saw
fit, it was in no different position than a private donor might be who
chooses to give the college a donation of like amount with the
condition that the Detroit Trust Company should have supervisory

90

CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
control to see that the terms of the donation were complied with.
Had some public-spirited citizen made such a donation under the
condition indicated, could it be said that the condition was unconstitutional? The private citizen and the legislature stand in the same
position, either could give or withhold. If this be so, then either had
a right to annex a condition, and if the gift is accepted by the college
it must take it subject to the condition and comply therewith. The
only way the college could avoid compliance with the condition
would be to refuse the gift. To reach any other conclusion, it must
be said that the legislature was under obligation to make this particular donation without condition.
It is argued that the legislature had a constitutional duty to
support and maintain the college. Granting this to be so, does it follow that, because it is under a constitutional obligation to maintain
the college, it may not make a particular gift upon condition and appoint some agency to see that the condition is complied with? It is
indeed a strange process of reasoning to say that the legislature may
give or withhold but, if it does give upon condition, that the condition is unconstitutional.
This proposition was very sensibly disposed of in Weinberg v.
Regents of University, 97 Mich. 246, 254, where it was said:
"In making appropriations for its support, the legislature may
attach any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the regents cannot receive the appropriation without complying with the
conditions."
Notwithstanding this court made that statement in the year
1893, it is argued in 1924 that it is of no account, that the college
may reach out and lay hold of an appropriation, given upon condition, and ignore the condition on the plea that it is unconstitutional.
If this argument be sound, then it must be assumed that the legislature would have made the appropriation regardless of the condition.
I do not believe this court is in a position to so hold.
It was said in Warren v. Mayor, etc., of Charlestown, 2 Gray
(Mass.), 84, where the question was discussed:
"If they (the parts of the act) are so mutually connected with
and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and
some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional and connected must fall with them."
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"If the void part of the act is the compensation for or the inducement to the valid portion, so that, looking at the whole act, it is
reasonably clear that the legislative body would not have enacted the
valid portion alone, then the whole act will be held inoperative and
void. It is not necessary that the invalid portion of an act of the legislature should have operated as the sole inducement to the passage of
the law to render the same void. It will have that effect if the void
part to any extent influenced the legislature in passing the statute."
1 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), § 303.
See, also, Cooley's Constitutional limitations (6th Ed.), p. 211;
People, ex rei. Attorney General, v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 197
Mich. 532 (L. R. A. 1918A, 797).
If it can be said, by any stretch of the imagination, that the
condition annexed to the appropriation is void because unconstitutional, then, I insist, the whole act must fail.
FELLOWS, J., concurred with BIRD, J.

Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture
164 Mich 415, 416-19; 129 N. W. 713 (1911)
BLAIR, J. Upon the petition of the relator an order to show
cause was made by this court, directed to the respondent, the State
board of agriculture, requiring it to show cause why the writ of
mandamus should not issue to compel it to"Abrogate the contract heretofore made or attempted to be
made with the United States government, whereby it, the said State
board of agriculture, has agreed to furnish quarters for a United
States post office at East Lansing, Mich. (b) That it cease from construction and expending moneys for construction of quarters for a
United States post office at East Lansing, Mich. (c) That it cease from
furnishing quarters for a United States post office at East Lansing,
Mich., within such reasonable time as to this court shall seem reasonable and expedient."
The interest of relator, as disclosed by the record, is that he is
a citizen and a taxpayer of the county of Ingham, doing a mercantile
business in the city of East Lansing in a building of which he has a
lease to and including August 31, 1916; that there was an agreement
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entered into with W. R. Hinman, assistant superintendent of the post
office department at Washington, having charge of buildings and
leases, to locate the post office at East Lansing in relator's leased
building; that this agreement was not executed and delivered by the
post office department because of the intervention of the respondent,
through its secretary, which resulted in a contract between the respondent and the post office department of the United States, whereby the respondent agreed to furnish quarters and equipment for the
said post office, to be located upon the college grounds, for an annual
rental of $600.
Relator contends:
"The law creating the State agricultural college and the State
board of agriculture contains no provision by which it can be inferred that the State board of agriculture is clothed with power to
engage in the business of building for and furnishing quarters to the
United States for a post office any more than to a private individual
for his private business, nor does such right arise by implication from
any of the powers granted said board."
We are of the opinion that this case is ruled by Sterling v. Regents of University, 110 Mich. 369 (68 N. W. 253, 34 L. R. A. 150).
In the Constitution of 1909 two new sections, 7 and 8, relative to the
State board of agriculture, were added to article 11, the effect of
which was to make the State board of agriculture a constitutional
board elected by the people instead of a statutory board appointed
by the governor, as it had existed since 1861, and to define the principal powers and duties of the board in the Constitution itself. It is
apparent from the debates in the constitutional convention, as well
as from the language of sections 7 and 8, that it was the intention to
place the State board of agriculture and the agricultural college upon
the same footing as the board of regents and the university. Among
other expressions of the delegates to the convention, we quote the
following:

"Mr. Gore: Mr. President, the last section of this proposal
which was defeated yesterday, I have been informed, was defeated
under some misapprehension. I know that I was laboring under an
apprehension that there was very little, if any, demand for that portion of the proposal as contained in the last paragraph. I am advised
that the friends of the agricultural college all over this State are very
much interested in that portion of the proposal becoming a part of
the revised Constitution. It is obvious that the requirements of the
agricultural college are on a par with the university so far as its
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management is concerned. There is no doubt that the friends of that
college, the particular friends I now refer to, all over the State, will
take such an interest in its welfare that it can properly be intrusted
to a board of regents in the same manner as the university is now
conducted. I therefore trust that this proposal will meet with the
favorable judgment of the convention."
''Mr. W. E. Brown: The words 'members of the board' were
stricken out of the tentative draft on page 53, line 82, and the words
'State board of agriculture' were substituted in their place. And in the
same line the words 'may be' were stricken out and the words 'often
as' were substituted in their place, so that the section follows the
wording of the section with reference to the regents. In line 86 of
the tentative draft, the word 'State,' and in line 87, the words 'of
agriculture' were stricken out, and at the end of the section these
words were added, 'and shall perform such other duties as may be
prescribed by law.' We ascertained after the section was passed that
there were other duties besides these that the law prescribes to be
performed by the board of agriculture, and we took it that it was
your intention that the entire duties as prescribed by law should
apply to this board until such time as its duties might be changed."
The addition to the last clause of section 8 of the words, "and
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law,'' makes
it clear that the duties to be prescribed by the legislature are other
than "the general supervision of the college and the direction and
control of all agricultural college funds," as to which, as we held in
Sterling v. Regents of University, supra, the State board of agriculture has exclusive supervision and control. We do not intend to hold
that an act of the board might not be so subversive of the purposes
for which the board was created as to warrant the intervention of the
courts, but we do not think this record presents such a case, nor do
we intend to hold that the legislature may not make appropriations
for specific objects or attach conditions which would be binding
upon the State board of agriculture in case they accepted the appropriations; but we do hold that as to the general funds appropriated
for the general purposes of the agricultural college, the board has the
exclusive control and direction, to the same extent that we held
such power was possessed by the board of regents in the Sterling
Case above referred to.
The writ is denied, but without costs.
OSTRANDER, C. J., and McALVAY, J., concurred with
BLAIR,J.
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MOORE, J. I concur in the result, but do not regard mandamus as the proper remedy.
HOOKER, BROOKE, and STONE, JJ., concurred with
MOORE,J.
BIRD, J. I concur in the result on the sole ground that mandamus is not the proper remedy.

Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College

181 Mich. 559, 559-63; 148 N. W. 341 (1914)
The applicant, who is a tinner and roofer by trade, was injured, on April 18, 1913, by falling from a ladder while making repairs on the buildings of the respondent. A claim was presented
against the respondent under the workmen's compensation law of
1912, and the case is brought here by certiorari to the industrial accident board to review an order affirming the award made to the applicant by an arbitration committee, in accordance with the provisions of the act. Neither the Michigan Agricultural College nor the
State board of agriculture, which has general supervision of the college and direction and control of all its funds, elected to come under
the provisions of the workmen's compensation act. No mention is
made in the act of either of the constitutional boards; the board of
regents of the University and the State board of agriculture, and the
question here is, Does the act bring arbitrarily under its provisions
the State board of agriculture, which is a board created by the Constitution (sections 7 and 8, art. 11, Const.)? This involves a consideration of the following sections of the act:
"PART 1.

"SEC. 5. The following shall constitute employers subject to
the provisions of this act:
"1. The State and each county, city, township, incorporated
village and school district therein;
"2. Every person, firm and private corporation, including any
public service corporation, who has any person in service under any
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, and who, at or
prior to the time of the accident to the employee for which compensation under this act may be claimed, shall in the manner provided in
the next section, have elected to become subject to the provisions of
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this act, and who shall not, prior to such accident, have effected a
withdrawal of such election, in the manner provided in the next
section. * * *
"SEC. 7. The term 'employee' as used in this act shall be construed to mean:
"1. Every person in the service of the State, or of any county,
city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, under
any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, except any official of the State, or of any county, city,
township, incorporated village or school district therein: Provided,
that one employed by a contractor who has contracted with a
county, city, township, incorporated village, school district or the
State, through its representatives, shall not be considered an employee of the State, county, city, township, incorporated village or
school district which made the contract;
"2. Every person in the service of another under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and also
including minors who are legally permitted to work under the laws
of the State who, for the purposes of this act, shall be considered the
same and have the same power to contract as adult employees, but
not including any person whose employment is but casual or is not
in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation
of his employer."
In the stipulation filed in this case the following appears:
"It is agreed that the draft of the workmen's compensation act
as prepared by the commission and as presented to the legislature
contained a period after the word 'contract' at the end of the frrst
subdivision of paragraph 7 of part 1."
KUHN, J. (after stating the facts). By virtue of the Constitution of 1909, the State board of agriculture was put on the same
plane with the board of regents of the University of Michigan. It has
been established beyond question by decisions of this court that
neither the legislature nor any officer or board of this State may interfere with the control and management of the affairs and property
of the University, although in making appropriations for its support
the legislature may attach any conditions it may deem expedient
and wise, and the appropriation cannot be received without complying with the conditions. People, ex rel Drake, v. Regents, 4 Mich. 98;
Weinberg v. Regents, 97 Mich. 246 (56 N. W. 605); Sterling v. Regents, 110 Mich. 369 (68 N. W. 253; 34 L. R. A. 150); Bauer v.
State Board of Agriculture, 164Mich.415 (129N. W. 713);Board of

96

CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
Regents v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444 (132 N. W. 1037).
Section 5, part 1, of the workmen's compensation law (2 How.
Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939), expressly enumerates the State and counties,
cities and villages, townships and school districts. Neither of the constitutional boards is mentioned. In the case of Weinberg v. Regents,
supra, there was under consideration an act of the legislature which
provided:
"That when public buildings, or other public works or improvements are to be built, repaired or ornamented under contract,
at the expense of this State, or of any county, city, village, township,
or school district thereof, it shall be the duty of the board of officers
or agents contracting on behalf of the State, county, city, village,
township, or school district, to require sufficient security by bond,
for the payment by the contractor, and all subcontractors, for all labor performed, or materials furnished in the erection, repairing or
ornamenting of such building, works or improvements." Act No. 45,
Pub. Acts 1885.
Mr. Justice GRANT, in writing the majority opinion said, 97
Mich., at pages 253, 254 (56 N. W. 607):
"The regents make no contracts on behalf of the State, but
solely on behalf of and for the benefit of the Universify. All the
other public corporations mentioned in the Constitution, which have
occasion to erect public buildings or to make public improvements,
are expressly included in this statute. 'Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. ' It expressly enumerates the State, counties, cities, villages,
townships, and school districts. If the University were under the control and management of the legislature, it would undoubtedly come
within this statute, as do the Agricultural College, Normal School,
State Public School, asylums, prisons, reform schools, houses of correction, etc. But the general supervision of the University is, by the
Constitution, vested in the regents. * * *
"The University is the property of the people of the State, and
in this sense is State property so as to be exempt from taxation.
Auditor General v. Regents, 83 Mich. 467 [47 N. W. 440, 10 L. R. A.
376]. But the people, who are the corporators of this institution of
learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred the entire control
and management of its affairs and property upon the corporation
designated as 'the Regents of the University of Michigan,' and have
thereby excluded all departments of the State government from any
interference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not
bring the regents within the purview of the statute. The people may,
by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or property beyond the control of the legislature."
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The contract of employment in the instant case was made with
the State board of agriculture, not on behalf of the State, but primarily for the benefit of the Agricultural College. For the reasons
stated by Mr. Justice GRANT in the Weinberg Case, we must conclude that it cannot be said that the State board of agriculture or the
regents of the University are brought under the workmen's compensation act by virtue of said section 5 of part 1 of the act, and it cannot be said that the applicant was an emp10yee of the State within
the meaning of said law. The conclusion must therefore follow that
the respondent was not within the list of employers who come under
the provisions of the law of 1912 automatically; and, inasmuch as
the respondent has made no election to come thereunder, the applicant is not entitled to recover in this proceeding.
Because of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to discuss the
other interesting and well-argued questions raised in briefs of counsel. The decision of the industrial accident board is reversed, and the
claim of the applicant is disallowed.
McALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, STONE, OSTRANDER,
BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

Peters v. Michigan State College

320 Mich. 243, 244-63; 30 N. W. 2d 854 (1948)
REID, J. (for affirmance). On Apri123, 1946, plaintiff Robert
W. Peters ftled an application for hearing and adjustment of claim as
an employee of Michigan State College, which is under the control
and general supervision of the State board of agriculture, which board
is hereinafter referred to as defendant, alleging that he suffered a personal injury on February 12, 1946, which arose out of and in the
course of his employment.
On May 4, 1946, defendant ftled a motion to dismiss plaintiff's application for hearing and adjustment of claim on the ground
that defendant, not having elected to become subject to the Michigan
workmen's compensation act and amendments thereto, was not subject to the provisions of said act. A deputy commissioner entered an
order denying the motion.
On July 10, 1946, the defendant applied to the compensation
commission of the department of labor and industry for review of
claim. The commission on January 9, 1947, pursuant to opinion
simultaneously ftled, entered its order denying the defendant's
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motion, and remanded the case to a deputy commissioner to be heard
on its merits. From this order (on leave being granted) defendant appeals.
The sole issue presented is whether the defendant, a constitutional corporation, is subject to the provisions of the Michigan workmen's compensation act, as amended.
Part 1, § 2 of the act, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8408, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1945,
§ 8408, Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp. § 17.142), in part reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. On and after the effective date of this section, every
employer, public and private, and every employee, unless herein
otherwise specifically provided, shall be subject to the provisions of
this act and shall be bound thereby."
Part 1, § 5, of the act, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8411, as
amended by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1945,
§ 8411, Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp. § 17 .145), reads as follows:
"SEC. 5. The following shall constitute employers subject to
the provisions of this act:
"Public 1. The State, and each county, city, township, incorporated village and school district therein, and each incorporated
public board or public commission in this State authorized by law to
hold property and to sue or be sued generally;
"Private 2. Every person, firm and private corporation, including any public service corporation, who has any person in service
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written."
The defendant is an "incorporated public board" within the
meaning of section 5 above quoted.
Sections 7 and 8, art. 11, State Constitution 1908, are as follows:
"SEC. 7. There shall be elected on the first Monday in April,
nineteen hundred nine, a State board of agriculture to consist of six
members, two of whom shall hold the office for two years, two for
four years and two for six years. At every regular biennial spring
election thereafter, there shall be elected two members whose term
of office shall be six years. The members thus elected and their successors in office shall be a body corporate to be known as 'The State
Board of Agriculture.'
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''SEC. 8. The State board of agriculture shall, as often as necessary, elect a president of the agricultural college, who shall be exofficio a member of the board with the privilege of speaking but not
of voting. He shall preside at the meetings of the board and be the
principal executive officer of the college. The board shall have the
general supervision of the college, and the direction and control of
all agricultural college funds; and shall perform such other duties as
may be prescribed by law."
We note that in section 7, above cited, the defendant is designated a body corporate, hence our conclusion that defendant is an
incorporated public board.
The sole remaining question is whether it is competent for the
legislature to prescribe that the defendant shall be subject to the
workmen's compensation act.
Defendant claims that the provision in section 8, above cited,
that the board (defendant) shall have the general supervision of the
college and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds,
prevents the legislature from requiring the board to expend any of
the agricultural college funds for workmen's compensation.
Defendant cites Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228
Mich. 225, which involved malpractice suits brought against the regents of the University of Michigan and a surgeon employed in the
university hospital. The suits had been dismissed in circuit court and
plaintiffs in those suits brought mandamus to compel the circuit
judge to set aside his orders of dismissal. The board of regents (defendant in the original suits) had claimed immunity on the ground
that the university hospital operated by the regents is a charitable institution. The opinion in the case says, page 227, that that ground is
the only objection regarded as calling for serious consideration. However, at the conclusion of the opinion on page 230 we say, "On the
case stated in plaintiffs' declarations we think denial of liability as to
the regents could safely be rested on either ground," referring to the
words, "State instrumentalities, as well as charities," in the immediately preceding excerpt quoted in that opinion. In other words, we
held that the board of regents was immune both on the ground of
being a State instrumentality and on the ground of their hospital
being a charitable or eleemosynary institution.
Immunity of defendant in the case at bar as a State governmental agency is not provided for in our State Constitution and the legislature by force of the words, "incorporated public board" has included defendant as an employer subject to the workmen's compensation act, thus to that extent depriving defendant of its immunity as
an instrumentality of government. See Benson v. State Hospital Com-
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The Robinson Case, supra, does not in any wise discuss the
meaning and effect of the constitutional clause giving defendant control of the funds of the college and the decision in that case does not
aid the defendant in the case at bar.
Under the workmen's compensation act as originally enacted
by Act Nb. 10, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), the private employer
was at liberty to accept or not to accept the provisions of the act,
but the State and political subdivisions thereof in general (with certain exceptions) were included as subject to the act without their
consent.
In part 1, § 5, of the act, as amended by Act No. 50, Pub.
Acts 1913, effective August 14, 1913 (2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8411
[Stat. Ann. § 17.145]), under the heading, "Public. 1.," incorporated public boards are made subject to the provisions of the act.
Such incorporated public boards were not subject to nor mentioned
in the act as originally enacted (Act No. 10, Pub. Acts 1912 [1st Ex.
Sess.] ), above referred to. In the case of Agler v. Michigan Agricultural- College, 181 Mich. 559 (5 N. C. C. A. 897), the employee was
injured April18, 1913, which was before the act of 1913, supra, was
effective; hence in the Agler Case we say, page 563, that "the respondent was not within the list of employers who come under the
provisions of the law of 1912 automatically." Defendant was not
within such list at the time Agler received his injuries. The words just
quoted must be construed to apply to the situation at the time of
the occurrence of the supposed liability. The question before the
Court in the case at bar was not decided in the Agler Case.
The case of State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 226
Mich. 417, was brought in consequence of an effort on the part of
the State administrative board to control the expenditures of the
plaintiff State board of agriculture (the same board which is defendant in the case at bar) under an act of the legislature granting the
State administrative board such powers. If the administrative board
had been upheld in its contention, it would have exercised control
over the educational activities of the college. In that case we held
that the State administrative board could exercise no control over the
funds of the college, such control being given to plaintiff board under
the provisions of the Constitution 1908, art. 11, § § 7, 8 (hereinbefore cited in this opinion). However, the provision of the Constitution giving the State board of agriculture sole control of the funds of
the college does not generally exempt the said board from the great
body of general laws of this State. It is to be noted that section 8 of
article 11 of the State Constitution above quoted closes with the
words, referring to the State board of agriculture, "shall perform
such other duties as may be prescribed by law."
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We have heretofore had occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of the workmen's compensation act as to some one or other
of its various provisions in several cases, among which are the following: Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8; Wood v. City
of Detroit, 188 Mich. 547 (L. R. A. 1916 C, 388); Grand Rapids
Lumber Co. v. Blair, 190 Mich. 518; Wall v. Studebaker Corporation,
219 Mich. 434; American Life Insurance Co. v. Balmer, 238 Mich.
580. In none of these cases has the act been found unconstitutional
as to any phase of the act brought under consideration therein.
We have heretofore decided in the Mackin Case, supra, that the
title of the act in question fairly expressed its purpose.
The purpose of the workmen's compensation act partakes of
the nature of the exercise of police power. It is aimed at promoting
the welfare of the people of the State. See Wallace v. Regents of University of California, 75 Cal. App. 274 (242 Pac. 892); Casey v. Hansen, 238 Iowa, 62 (26 N. W. [2d] 50).
"The sovereign power of the State includes protection of the
safety, health, morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience and welfare
of the public, or any substantial part of the public." (Italics supplied.) Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 504, 505.
The defendant corporation is not vested by the State Constitution with any power of a police nature. Neither is the defendant
corporation vested with any power to regulate the general welfare of
the people of this State. It is for the legislature to exercise such
powers.
As amended in 1920, article 5, § 29, of the State Constitution
provides as follows:
"SEC. 29. The legislature shall have power to enact laws relative to the hours and conditions under which men, women and children may be employed."
Before the amendment of 1920 (which added the word "men"
in the above section), we had decided in Wood v. City of Detroit,
188 Mich. 547 (L. R. A. 1916C, 388), that the workmen's compensation act was not violative of the State Constitution even as respects
liability for death of an employee of a municipality through its public
lighting commission, notwithstanding rights of local self-government
given by the Constitution to municipalities. In that case we said,
page 560,
"Whether it [the workmen's compensation act] is or is not
denominated a police regulation, municipal corporations are, for the
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purpose of carrying out such a measure, subject to legislative control."
We find that the workmen's compensation act is a valid constitutional exercise of the power of the legislature even when it makes
necessary the expenditure of agricultural college funds in the compensation of employees under the terms and within the provisions of
the workmen's compensation act.
The act is approved as a piece of legislation aimed not at the
defendant alone, nor against any of the activities of the defendant of
a nature peculiar to defendant. The act is of a broad scope addressed
to the subject of the liability of employers in broad fields of employment. The workmen's compensation act does not undertake to
change or disturb the educational activities of the defendant board.
The control of State college funds must be considered as given
to defendant for the purposes of the particular and peculiar educational activities of the State college, not for the purpose of disturbing the general relationship in this State of employer and employee,
nor evading laws enacted to promote the general welfare of the people of this State. Article 11, § 8, above cited, is not to be construed
as withholding from the legislature the authority to make the defendant board liable and subject to the entire workmen's compensation act in question.
The order of the department remanding the claim for hearing
on its merits is affirmed. No costs are allowed, a matter of public importance being involved.
BUTZEL, J. (concurring). I concur on the ground that the
workmen's compensation act is a valid exercise of the police power.
BUSHNELL, C. J., and SHARPE, J., concurred with BUTZEL, J.
DETHMERS, J. (for reversal). My attitude toward the opinion
of Mr. Justice REID is well expressed in the language employed by
the majority of this Court in commenting on the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice WIEST in State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 226 Mich. 417, in which Mr. Justice McDONALD, speaking for
the majority of the Court, said:
"I am in entire disagreement with the conclusions reached by

Mr. Justice WIEST in reference to the powers and duties of the State
board of agriculture. If his opinion is to prevail we will have completely overturned the well settled policy of the State relative to the
management and control of the university and of the agricultural
college. These institutions of learning are very close to the hearts of

AUTONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

103

the people of Michigan. They have made of them the most unique
organizations known to the law, in this, that they are constitutional
corporations created for the purpose of independently discharging
State functions. The people are themselves the incorporators; the
boards that control them are responsible only to the people who
elect them; they are independent of every other department of State
government."
To the statement contained in Mr. Justice REID's opinion that
plaintiff suffered a personal injury which arose out of and in the
course of his employment by defendant should be added the further
fact that it is not disputed that such employment and the ,duties
which plaintiff was performing at the time of his injury were within
the scope and in furtherance of college operations. May the legislature, as relates to such employment, prescribe that the defendant
shall be subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation
act? I think not.
As stated in my Brother's opinion, the Michigan Constitution
of 1908, art. 11, § 8, provides that the board "shall have the general
supervision of the college, and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds." Plaintiffs work, at the time he became injured, was being performed squarely within the field over which the
defendant board is given supervision. Furthermore, to require payment of compensation in such case directly affects the defendant's
constitutionally-conferred power of direction and control over all
agricultural college funds. The constitutional grant to defendant
board of supervision, direction and control in these respects, must be
deemed absolute to the exclusion therefrom of interference by the
legislature. Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich.
369 (34 L. R. A. 150); Weinberg v. Regents of University ofMichigan, 97 Mich. 246; Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich.
415; State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, supra.
My Brother's opinion cites no decisions of this Court as authority for the proposition that the legislature may exercise control directly or indirectly over those fields as to which the regents of the
university or the State board of agriculture are given the powers of
supervision by the Constitution. This is not because the question has
not heretofore been considered by this Court. Our decisions on the
subject are numerous, ranging from shortly after the grant of powers
to the board of regents by the Constitution of 1850 until recent
times. Through them all runs a uniform thread of authority to the effect that the fields over which the Constitution delegates supervisory
powers to the regents or board of agriculture are not to be invaded
by the legislature. A review of these cases is essential here.

104

CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION
In People, ex rel. Drake, v. Regents of the University, 4 Mich.
98, this Court denied an application for mandamus to compel the
regents to comply with a statute enacted by the legislature requiring
appointment by the regents of a professor of homeopathy. In response to the claim that the statute was unconstitutional because it
constituted an invasion of the regents' constitutional powers, this
Court said:
"We are compelled to recognize in this question what might
well suggest doubts of the binding force of the law."
In People v. Regents of the University, 18 Mich. 469, like application for mandamus was made as in the case reported in 4 Mich.
98 and the application was not granted because a majority of the
Court could not be convinced that "the legislature had power under
the Constitution to exercise any such control over the regents, who
are vested with the 'general supervision of the university, and the direction and control of all expenditures of the university interest
fund'" (syllabus).
In People, ex rel Attorney General, v. Regents of the University, 30 Mich. 473, like application received like treatment because
the Court, as stated in its opinion, had not changed its previous
views (clearly a reference to the last above cited case).
In Weinberg v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 97
Mich. 246, plaintiff brought suit against the regents to recover the
value of materials furnished to a subcontractor in building the university hospital. Action was predicated upon a statute requiring public boards, officers or agents making contracts for the construction of
public buildings to require security by bond for payment by the contractor and all subcontractors of all labor and material claims. The
regents, in contracting for the building of the hospital, had required
no such security by bond. A judgment for plaintiff in the court below was reversed, a majority of this Court holding that the statute in
question did not control the regents. The majority opinion, in so
holding, alluded to the fact that this Court had refused to compel
the regents to comply with certain legislative acts in the three last
above cited cases.
In Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 369
(34 L. R. A. 150), mandamus was sought to compel the regents to
comply with an act of the legislature providing for removal of the
homeopathic medical college from Ann Arbor to Detroit. The writ
was denied on the authority of the Weinberg Case for the expressed
reason that "the legislature has no control over the university or the
board of regents." The opinion in this case contains an extended
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analysis of the entire general question before us, including the history of the constitutional grant of powers to the regents, the reasons
therefor, construction of the constitutional language employed for
that purpose, and a review of the decisions thereon.
In Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415, wherein
the power of the defendant board to expend funds of the college for
the purpose of constructing a building for lease to the United States
government for post office purposes was challenged, this Court, in
upholding such power, held that the defendant board had exclusive
control and direction of the general funds of the college appropriated
for the general purposes of the college.
In Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor
General, 167 Mich. 444, we granted a writ of mandamus to compel
the auditor general to issue a warrant upon the State treasurer for
certain university expenditures after the auditor general had refused
to issue it because the university had expended moneys in violation
of the accounting laws of this State. The writ was granted on the
ground "that the board of regents has independent control of the affairs of the university."
In Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College, 181 Mich. 559 (5
N. C. C. A. 897), discussed at greater length later in this opinion, we
held that the defendant was not subject to the workmen's compensation act for the reasons stated in Weinberg v. Regents of University
of Michigan, supra.
In People for use of Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Brooks, 224 Mich. 45, involving condemnation proceedings for the
use and benefit of the regents, we said:
"The 'board of regents' is a separate entity, independent of the
State as to the management and control of the University."
State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, (syllabus 2)
supra, reads as follows:

"The condition attached by Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, that
the money thereby appropriated to the State board of agriculture for
the purpose of carrying on agricultural extension work in co-operation with the United States department of agriculture should be subject to the general supervisory control of the State administrative
board, held, beyond the power of the legislature to impose, being in
conflict with the Constitution (Art. 11, § 8) giving to the State
board of agriculture exclusive control of all of its funds."
This concludes a summary review of all the Michigan decisions
on the subject, disclosing the uniform position taken by this Court
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over a period of almost 70 years, in unmistakably clear opposition to
the views now expressed by Mr. Justice REID.
In Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College, supra, we said:
"By virtue of the Constitution of 1909 (1908), the State
board of agriculture was put on the same plane with the board of regents of the university of Michigan. It has been established beyond
question by decisions of this Court that neither the legislature nor
any officer or board of this State may interfere with the control and
management of the affairs and property of the university."
From this quotation it is clear that all which this Court has
heretofore said concerning the independence of the board of regents
of the university applies with equal force and effect to the State
board of agriculture under its present constitutional powers.
I am not in accord with my Brother's analysis of the Agler
Case. In that case, we said, in part, as follows:
"For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice GRANT in the Weinberg
Case, we must conclude that it cannot be said that the State board
of agriculture or the regents of the university are brought under the
workmen's compensation act."
The reasons stated by Mr. Justice GRANT in the Weinberg
Case, and quoted in the Agler Case, are as follows:

" 'If the university were under the control and management of
the legislature, it would undoubtedly come within this statute, as do
the agricultural college, normal school, State public school, asylums,
prisons, reform schools, houses of correction, et cetera. But the general supervision of the university is, by the Constitution, vested in
the regents. * * *
" 'The university is the property of the people of the State, and
in this sense is State property so as to be exempt from taxation.
Auditor General v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 83 Mich.
467 (10 L. R. A. 376). But the people, who are the corporators of
this institution of learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred
the entire control and management of its affairs and property upon
the corporation designated as "the Regents of the University of Michigan," and have thereby excluded all departments of the State government from any interference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not bring the regents within the purview of the statute. The
people may, by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or
property beyond the control of the legislature.' "
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Tiris language from the Weinberg Case I deem controlling here.
In that case we also said "under the Constitution, the State cannot
control the action of the regents."
In Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, supra, in commenting on the Weinberg Case, we said:
"We might with propriety rest our decision upon that case, and
should be disposed to do so were it not for the urgent contention of
the counsel on the part of the relator that that case does not apply.
We are therefore constrained to state some further reasons to show

that the legislature has no control over the university or the board of
regents.
"(1) The board of regents and the legislature derive their power from the same supreme authority, namely, the Constitution. In so
far as the powers of each are defmed by that instrument, limitations
are imposed, and a direct power conferred upon one necessarily excludes its existence in the other, in the absence of language showing
the contrary intent. Neither the university nor the board of regents
is mentioned in article 4, which defmes the powers and duties of the
legislature; nor in the article relating to the university and the board
of regents is there any language which can be construed into conferring upon or reserving any control over that institution in the
legislature. They are separate and distinct constitutional bodies, with
the powers of the regents defmed. By no rule of construction can it
be held that either can encroach upon or exercise the powers conferred upon the other."
In Board of Regents of the University v. Auditor General,
supra, we said:
"By the provisions of the Constitution of 1850, repeated in
the new Constitution of 1909 (1908), the board of regents is made
the highest form of juristic person known to the law, a constitutional
corporation of independent authority, which, within the scope of its
functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the legislature. By
the old Constitution it is given 'direction and control of all expenditures from the university interest fund' (section 8, art. 13); a11d by
the new Constitution 'general supervision of the university, and the
direction and control of all expenditures from the university funds.'
Section 5, art. 11. That the board of regents has independent control
of the affairs of the university by authority of these constitutional
provisions is well settled by former decisions of this Court."
In State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, supra, 423,
we also said:
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"The State board of agriculture stands on the same constitutional footing as the board of regents of the university. The progress
which our university has made is due in large measure to the fact that
the framers of the Constitution of 1850 wisely provided against legislative interference by placing its exclusive management in the hands
of a constitutional board elected by the people. The underlying idea
was that the best results would be attained by centering the responsibility in one body independent of the legislature and answerable
only to the people. See Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan,
110 Mich. 369, 382 (34 L. R. A. 150). For this reason the Constitution gave the regents the absolute management of the university, and
the exclusive control of all funds received for its use. This Court has
so declared in numerous decisions. People, ex rei. Drake, v. Regents
of the University, 4 Mich. 98; Weinberg v. Regents of the University
of Michigan, 97 Mich. 246, 254; Sterling v. Regents of University of
Michigan, supra; Board of Regents of the University v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444."
Mr. Justice REID writes that the State Constitution does not
provide for the "immunity of defendant * * * as a State governmental agency" and that the legislature by including defendant within
the terms of the workmen's compensation act has deprived it of such
immunity, citing Benson v. State Hospital Commission, 316 Mich.
66. The Benson Case is not in point inasmuch as it involved an action
brought against the State under the court of claims act, Act No. 135,
Pub. Acts 1939 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 13862-1 et seq., Stat.
Ann. 1940 Cum. Supp. § 27.3 548 [1] et seq.), and the construction
of section 24 of that act as amended by Act No. 237, Pub. Acts
1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1943, § 13862-24, Stat. Ann. 1944 Cum.
Supp. § 27.3548[24] ), which waived the defense of governmental
immunity in certain cases brought before the court of claims. That
act never had application to claims for compensation brought before
the compensation commission of the department of labor and industry. See Rogers v. Kent Board of County Road Commissioners, 319
Mich. 661, 668, decided on rehearing January 5, 1948. Furthermore,
said section 24 of the act as thus amended in 1943 was expressly repealed by Act No. 87, § 2, Pub. Acts 1945 (Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum.
Supp. § 27.3548 [42] ), and was no longer in effect when the cause
of action in the instant case, if any, arose. The matter of governmental immunity is irrelevant here, the question before us being whether
the legislature may, constitutionally, apply the workmen's compensation act to employees of the State board of agriculture.
Mr. Justice REID bases his conclusion that it is competent
for the legislature to impose the provisions of the workmen's
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compensation act upon the defendant on the theory that it constitutes an exercise of the police power vested solely in the legislature.
The people, through the State Constitution, may vest the powers of
State government or limit them where and as they will, consistent
with the guarantee contained in article 4, § 4, of the Constitution of
the United States. As said in Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207:
"It is beyond question that, when the people of this State
adopted their Constitution, police power was placed in the legislature, except as distinctly reserved or conferred elsewhere."
In the field of "general supervision of the college and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds," the people have
"distinctly reserved or conferred elsewhere" than in the legislature
the power to supervise, direct or control, and by the Constitution itself have barred legislative intrusion.
Wood v. City of Detroit, 188 Mich. 547 (L. R A. 1916C, 388),
relied upon by Mr. Justice REID, is distinguishable. There the defendant city claimed that its constitutionally conferred powers of
local self-government were invaded by the legislature's attempt to apply the workmen's compensation act to certain of the city's employees. The Court, referring to article 8, § 21, of the State Constitution
authorizing cities and villages to adopt and amend charters and pass
laws and ordinances "subject to the Constitution and general laws of
this State," said:

"The Constitution of 1909 [1908] has pointed out the extent
of the local powers and capacities of cities and villages * * * thus restricting the power of the legislature to grant or to deny to particular
communities the enumerated capacities and powers, at will, but it
has not * * * denied the power of the legislature to enact general

laws applicable to cities."
The situation in the instant case is different because the powers conferred upon the defendant board of agriculture by the Constitution are not expressly declared to be subject to the general laws
of this State. We do not overlook the concluding words in articl0 11,
§ 8, that the defendant board "shall perform such other duties as
may be prescribed by law." These words do not give the legislature
the power to invade the field granted exclusively to the board of
agriculture by the Constitution. As was said in Bauer v. Board of
Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415:
''The addition to the last clause of section 8 of the words, 'and
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law,' makes
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it clear that the duties to be prescribed by the legislature are other
than 'the general supervision of the college and the direction and
control of all agricultural college funds,' as to which as we held in
Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, supra, the State board
of agriculture has exclusive supervision and control."
Plaintiff is apprehensive as to certain suggested consequences
were we to hold the defendant "immune from all legislation." Similarly, Mr. Justice REID writes, "However, the provision ofthe Constitution giving the State board of agriculture sole control of the
funds of the college does not generally exempt the said board from
the great body of general laws of this State." To ascribe such immunity to defendant or to hold it thus exempt is not necessary to decision for defendant on the facts before us. Suffice it to say that within the confmes of the field of "general supervision of the college,
and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds" it is
the clear intent of the people, as expressed in the Constitution, that
the defendant shall exercise exclusive authority therein without legislative intrusion.
I can only conclude that the employment of persons for the
prosecution of college business, functions or operations is within defendant's exclusive supervision; that the payment of compensation,
from college funds, in the event of personal injury arising out of and
in the course of such employment involves an act of direction and
control of agricultural college funds which, again, is within the exclusive power of the defendant board; that for these reasons it is not
competent for the legislature to impose the workmen's compensation act on the defendant with respect to the type of employment
here involved.
The order of the department denying defendant's motion to
dismiss and setting the case for hearing on its merits should be set
aside and the cause remanded to the department for entry of an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs application.
No costs, a public question being involved.
BOYLES, NORTH, and CARR, JJ., concurred with DETHMERS,J.
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Jackson Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. State Board of Agriculture

360 Mich. 481, 496-98, 499; 104 N. W. 2d 350 (1960)
DETHMERS, C. J ....
Plaintiffs bill seeks injunctive relief to prevent defendant from
entering into a construction contract or expending any public funds
for the erection of a television broadcasting station. It bases its
claimed right to such relief on the grounds that defendant, in so
doing, would be proceeding under and in furtherance of its written
agreement with Television Corporation of Michigan, Inc., and that
this would be unlawful in the following 2 respects: (1) that the construction and operation of the television station under that agreement would be a self-liquidating project within the meaning of PA
1958, No. 224, § 11, under which such construction contract is prohibited because approval thereof by the legislature was not first obtained, and (2) the agreement with Television Corporation of Michigan, Inc., constitutes an attempt on the part of defendant to grant
the credit of the State to or in aid of that corporation in violation of
Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 10, § 12.
The trial court, fmding plaintiffs said 2 claims of illegality, as
in its bill alleged, not well founded as a matter oflaw, dismissed the
bill. We think he was correct and that the order dismissing, from
which plaintiff appeals, should be affirmed. Our reasons follow:
(1) No facts are alleged in the bill from which a conclusion
may be drawn or a fmding may be made that the project in question
is self-liquidating, as in the statute mentioned. That appellation appears in the bill as plaintiffs legal conclusion, without supporting
averments. If its conclusion were to be accepted as correct, there are
no allegations in the bill that moneys appropriated by Act No. 224
on the supposed condition contained in its section 11 are to be expended on this project, warranting enjoining thereof. If section 11 of
that act were to be construed as a general prohibition against the
board of trustees of Michigan State University, without regard to the
source of the funds to be used or involved, it would exceed legislative authroity. Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 11, § 8. * State
Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 180 Mich. 349; State Board
of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 226 Mich. 417; Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich. 246.
(2) Defendant's first sworn answer contained language tending
to admit plaintiffs second charge of illegality of the agreement.
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Thereafter defendant filed an amendment sworn answer, to which it
attached as an exhibit a copy of the agreement referred to and relied
on in plaintiffs bill of complaint. It shows by its express terms that
defendant was not, thereunder, to advance credit to the other contracting party but only to permit it use of the television studio and
facilities on a time-sharing and rental basis. Plaintiff made and makes
no denial of the correctness of the copy of the agreement attached
to defendant's amended sworn answer. By the agreement's express
terms plaintiffs second claim of invalidity collapses.
Is defendant bound by its apparent admission in its first answer
or may it stand on its amended sworn answer? That the latter is the
rule is apparent from Carroll v. Palmer Manfg. Co., 181 Mich. 280,
285, City of Lebanon v. DeBard, 110 Ind. App. 79, 82 (37 NE2d
718); Staley v. Espenlaub, 128 Kan. 1, 2 (275 P 1095); Dahl v.
Winter-Truesdell-Diercks Co., 62 ND 351 (243 NW 812); 71 CJS,
Pleading, § 321, p 716.
In the above view of the case plaintiffs bill stated no cause of
action as a matter of law and was properly dismissed.

** *
An important public project is here involved. It being obvious
that plaintiff has no legal cause of action, we should not permit technicalities to stand in the way of our saying so and disposing of the
case accordingly, without need for further fruitless proceedings. This
is the more so in view of the well-known fact, not in the record but
of which we may take judicial notice, that for over a year the entering into and performance of the contract for the erection of the television station and facilities have been a fait accompli with the station
and facilities fully constructed and in operation by defendant and its
lessee, Television Corporation of Michigan, Inc., leaving the question
of enjoining the entering into the contract by defendant and its expending money for the project moot.
Affirmed. No costs.

KELLY, SMITH, EDWARDS, and SOURIS, JJ., concurred
with DETHMERS, C. J.
KAVANAGH and BLACK, JJ., dissented.
CARR, J., did not sit.
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2.COMMENT

Several important legal principles may be deduced from
the cases in Chapters II and III. They may be summarized as follows:
1. The Michigan Constitution vests in the Board of Regents, as well as in the governing boards of other state institutions of higher education, the "general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the
institution's funds." (Art. 8 § 5.) The words "general supervision" must be construed to mean complete authority over all
the internal affairs of the University.
2. On the other hand, the University is subject to the general laws of the state concerning the public health, safety, morals and welfare. A university campus cannot be an extraterritorial state within a state.
3. Appropriations made by the legislature become the
"property" of the University when the appropriations act becomes effective. Therefore, the legislature cannot subject University appropriations to change or to the control of state
administrative officers.
4. The legislature may attach conditions to its appropriations for University support. However, a condition to an appropriation will be struck down as unconstitutional if its effect is to
deprive the Board of Regents of any substantial part of its discretion over the educational policy or operation of the University. If such a condition is constitutional, the University must
comply with it in order to be entitled to the appropriated
money.

Another important legal principle is set forth in the Michigan Constitution (Art. 8 § 4) although it has not been involved
in any of the cases in these chapters. To the end that higher education may be maintained and encouraged, the constitution
commands the legislature to provide financial support for the
University of Michigan and other state institutions. Of course,
the amount of this support must be consistent with the other
needs and revenues of the state. Therefore, this provision of the
constitution probably creates a moral obligation which cannot
be enforced by a court of law.
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The existence of these rules has guaranteed the independence of the Univeristy, and they are in large measure responsible
for its pre-eminent status.
3. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING AUTO..
NOMY

The University has been often protected in the preservation of its important constitutional powers by opinions of the
state's chief legal officer, the Attorney General. 1 Of course,
when the Attorney General makes a ruling adverse to the University, as he did in 1868 by deciding that the University was
bound to have a homeopathic professor, he must go to court to
enforce his opinion. As a legal corporation with the right to sue
and to be sued in its own name, the University can hire its legal
counsel, and, as the homeopathic cases make so obvious, the
Attorney General does not always prevail.
As respects the ordinary non-corporate state agency, however, the Attorney General has enhanced authority since it is he
who by virtue of his office represents the agency in court and
provides all legal advice. Thus, advice to such an agency very
often takes the place of a court case. Attorneys General, however, seem to have much more freedom to change their minds
than the courts do under the doctrine of stare decisis, and it
seems that old opinions of the Attorneys General are almost
never cited by the courts as authority, at least not in the cases
with which this volume is concerned, although they probably
very often reflect current legal doctrines which are taken too
seriously to be challenged in court.
Citations for all opinions here discussed appear at the end
of these comments. Many opinions simply reiterate the clear
doctrine of the case law to officials who are not familiar with it.
For example, in 1922, citing Weinberg, the Attorney General
ruled that the University was not required to obtain bonds from
its construction contractors. 2 On other occasions, however, the
Attorney General may venture into controversies completely
untouched by judicial opinion. In 1955, for example, the Attorney General ruled as unconstitutional legislation forbidding
the University of Michigan and Michigan State University from
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operating television stations and from self-liquidating projects
without legislative consent. 3 Seven years later, the television
issue arose in the Jackson Broadcasting and Television case previously discussed. 4
Cataloguing opinions of the Attorney General under the
general heading of the University's freedom from legislative control in the conduct of its general operations, we find many rulings. In 1898, the construction of an addition to the Law Department was not governed by a general statute purporting to
control construction at all state institutions. 5 In 1900, the
Auditor General had to approve vouchers for the purchase of
land by the University without regard to whether the funds
came from the University interest fund or from the mill tax. 6 In
1912, the Auditor General was informed that the University
might buy its own fire insurance on its own buildings. 7 In 1924,
the Board of Regents, with the consent of the State Administrative Board, could obtain low-cost fire insurance within a system
set up for state property only. 8 In 1927, a statute requiring the
registration and supervision of laboratories within the state, applied to University laboratories only if they were in the business
of selling laboratory products at a profit. 9 A tuberculosis unit
built with state funds in 1930 as an addition to the University
Hospital was outside the authority of the State Tuberculosis
Commission. 10 In 1943, the University was not covered by a
statute forbidding state institutions from serving oleomargarine. 11
In 1953, the provisions of the School Building Code were intended by the legislature to apply only to classroom buildings. 12
In 1954 the question of whether the University was required to
follow the State or City Plumbing Codes was not answered because of voluntary compliance by the University. 13
In one of the most recent, and most significant opinions,
the Attorney General ruled in 1965 that the 1963 Constitution
did not permit the legislature to delegate authority over building
programs at the ten constitutionally autonomous state colleges
and universities to the State Administrative Board and the State
Controller. 14 The device of appropriating money to the Controller rather than to the governing boards could not be used to subvert the constitutional status of the educational institutions.
Another category of opinions concerns legislation which
affects the governing board's control of its employees. In 1905,
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before Michigan State College had achieved constitutional status,
the Auditor General was supported in his refusal to pay for outof-state travel by a professor which could only "indirectly" result in improving performance of employee's duties. 15 However,
in 1907 an act purporting to control salaries at all state institutions did not apply to the University of Michigan. 16 Similarly,
in 1932, Veterans Preference Laws did not apply to the then
two constitutional schools, and neither did the Civil Service Law
in 1937. 17 In 1931, statutory delegation of the control over
Michigan State's financial affairs could be upset by the governing State Board. 18 And, in 1955 the statutory delegation to the
faculty of the control of students, laboratories, museums and
libraries was overturned by constitutional provisions which, of
course, placed the general supervision of everything in Michigan
State in the State Board. 19
Legislation purporting to affect students has also been disregarded by the Attorney General. In 1901, and again in 1936
and 1959, he ruled that only the constitutionally established
governing boards, and not the legislature, could determine the
tuition. 20 The statute forbidding tuition for Michigan residents
is C.L. para. 390.13 and is reproduced in this volume on page
119. Similarly the children of certain veterans who are residents
are purportedly exempted from tuition by C.L. para. 35.111
(see page 123 ). In 1911, an attempt by the legislature to set
the entrance standards for the University of Michigan was rejected, 21 as was a statute enacted in 1949 which exempted members of the Michigan National Guard from military instruction
at Michigan State. 22 Complete control over intercollegiate athletics was affirmed in opinions directed at legislators who, provoked by the NCAA television blackout of football in 1951,
were considering corrective legislation. 23
Other rulings illustrate the wide diversity of issues on which
the Attorney General has ruled. In 1919, and again in 19 58, constitutional status was found to exempt academic publications
from control by the State Board of Auditors and the statutory
requirement of in-state printing. 24 In 193 9, the Attorney General ruled that the legislature had no authority to waive the
sovereign immunity of the then Michigan State College and the
University of Michigan. Compare this result with the Branum
case in Chapter VII, page 239. The State Administrative Board
therefore, could not be authorized to dispose of minor claims

AUTONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

117

against the universities. 25 In 1938 a legislator was advised that
money could be appropriated to Michigan State on the condition that it be used solely to build and equip 4-H buildings at
Chatham, Michigan. 26 On the other hand, a 1962 opinion advised the legislature of the unconstitutionality of conditioning
the whole appropriation for Michigan State University on the
retention of a labor relations center. 27
4. STATE STATUTES RELATING TO UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

This section contains the basic statutes which purport to
govern the University of Michigan. Although some of these statutes are relatively recent, many of them are very old. Because
of the constitutional posture of the University, some of these
statutes are of doubtful validity. Several of these statutes have
even been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court or
by the Attorney General, but they remain on the statute books
unrepealed-for example, the provisions of statutes requiring the
appointment of a homeopathic professor, and prohibiting tuition charges for certain categories of students ( § § 390.5, 390.41,
and 390.12, 390.13, 35.111).
Other statutes, although perhaps not technically invalid
have become completely obsolete-such as the elaborate provisions for the use of interest on the University fund. This fund
was at one time the principal support of the University, but today it is insignificant. Moreover, the 1963 Constitution eliminated all reference to the interest fund contained in Section 11
Article XI of the 1908 Constitution. No payments of interest are
now made to the University.
P.A. 1851, No. 151 Eff. July 5 as amended by P.A. 1957,
No. 87, § 1 Eff. Sept. 27.
AN ACT to provide for the government of the state university, and to repeal chapter 57 of the Revised Statutes of 1846.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:

390.1 University of Michigan
Sec. 1. That the institution established in this state and known
as the university of Michigan, is continued under the name and style
heretofore used.
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390.2 Same; object
Sec. 2. The university shall provide the inhabitants of this state
with the means of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various
branches of literature, science and arts.
390.3 Same; government
Sec. 3. The government of the University is vested in the board
of regents.
390.4 Board of regents; body corporate, suits, seal
Sec. 4. The board of regents shall constitute the body corporate, with the right, as such, of suing and being sued, of making and
using a common seal, and altering the same.
390.5 Same; powers; professor of homeopathy
Sec. 5. The regents shall have power to enact ordinances, bylaws and regulations for the government of the university; to elect a
president, to fix, increase and reduce the regular number of professors and tutors, and to appoint the same, and to determine the
amount of their salaries: Provided, That there shall always be at least
1 professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine.
390.6 Same; removal power
Sec. 6. They shall have power to remove the president, and any
professor or tutor, when the interest of the university shall require it.
390.7 Same; appointive power
Sec. 7. They shall have power to appoint a secretary, librarian,
treasurer, steward, and such other officers as the interests of the institution may require, who shall hold their offices at the pleasure of
the board, and receive such compensation as the board may prescribe.
390.8 Departments of university
Sec. 8. The university shall consist of at least 3 departments:
1. A department of literature, science and the arts;
2. A department of law;
3. A department of medicine;
4. Such other departments may be added as the regents shall
deem necessary, and the state of the university fund shall allow.

AUTONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

119

390.9 Special courses
Sec. 9. The regents shall provide for the arrangement and selection of a course or courses of study in the university, for such students as may not desire to pursue the usual collegiate course, in the
department of literature, science and the arts, embracing the ancient
languages, and to provide for the admission of such students without
previous examination, as to their attainments in said languages, and
for granting such certificates at the expiration of such course or term
of such students, as may be appropriate to their respective attainments.
390.10 Repealed. P.A. 1957, No. 87, § 1, Eff. Sept. 20
390.11 Authority of regents, president and facnlty; degrees
Sec. 11. The immediate government of the several departments
shall be entrusted to the president and the respective faculties; but
the regents shall have power to regulate the course of instruction,
and prescribe, under the advice of the professorships, the books and
authorities to be used in the several departments; and also to confer
such degrees and grant such diplomas as are usually conferred and
granted by other similar institutions.
390.12 Fees and tuition; literary department; free courses
Sec. 12. The fee of admission to the regular university course
in the department of literature, science and the arts, shall not exceed
10 dollars, but such course or courses of instruction as may be arranged under the provisions of section 9 of this act/ shall be open
without fee to the citizens of this state.
1

Section 390.9.

390.13 Same; residents of state
Sec. 13. The university shall be open to all persons resident of
this state, without charge of tuition, under the regulations prescribed
by the regents, and to all other persons, under such regulations and
restrictions as the board may prescribe.
390.14 Same; payment to treasurer; expenditure
Sec. 14. The moneys received from such source shall be paid
to the treasurer, and so much thereof as shall be necessary for the
purpose, shall be expended by the regents in keeping the university
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buildings in good condition and repair, and the balance shall be appropriated for the increase of the library.
390.15 Annual report of regents to superintendent of public instruction
Sec. 15. The board of regents shall make an exhibit of the affairs of the university, in each year, to the superintendent of public
instruction, setting forth the condition of the university and its
branches, the amount of receipts and expenditures, the number of
professors, tutors, and other officers, and the compensation of each;
the number of students in the several departments, and in the different classes; the books of instruction used; an estimate of the expenses for the ensuing year, together with such other information
and suggestions as they may deem important, or the superintendent
of public instruction may require, to embody in his report.
390.16 Interest on university fund; use for erection of buildings
Sec. 16. From the increase arising from the interest of the university fund, the board of regents may erect, from time to time, such
buildings as are necessary for the uses of the university, on the
grounds set apart for the same; but no such buildings shall be erected
until provisions shall be made for the payment of the existing indebtedness of the university, nor until1 branch of the university shall be
established in each judicial circuit of the state.
390.17 Same; use for improvement of grounds and purchase of apparatus
Sec. 17. The board of regents shall have power to expend so
much of the interest arising from the university fund, as may be necessary for the improving and ornamenting the university grounds, for
the purchase of philosophical, chemical, meteorological, and other
apparatus, and to keep the same in good condition.
390.18 Branches of university; support
Sec. 18. As soon as the income of the university interest fund
will admit, it shall be the duty of the board of regents to organize
and establish branches of the university, 1 at least, in each judicial
circuit or district of the state, and to establish all needful rules and
regulations for the government of the same. They shall not give to
any such branch the right of conferring degrees, nor appropriate a
sum exceeding 1,500 dollars, in any 1 year, for the support of any
such branch.
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390.19 Same; establishment
Sec. 19. The regents may establish and organize a branch or
branches, by the creation of a trusteeship for the local management
of the same, or they may in their discretion select for a branch, under the restrictions aforesaid, any chartered literary institution in the
state.
390.20 Meeting of regents; quorum
Sec. 20. The meetings of the board may be called in such manner as the regents shall prescribe; 5 of them shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, and a less number may adjourn from
time to time.
390.21 Repealed. P.A. 1957, No. 87, § 1, Eff. Sept. 27.
390.22 Expenses of regents and board of visitors
Sec. 22. The regents and visitors of the university shall each receive pay for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by them in
the performance of their duties, which shall be paid out of the university interest fund.
390.23 Orders on treasurer; signatures
Sec. 23. All orders on the treasurer shall be signed by the secretary, and countersigned by the president.
P.A. 1965, No. 245, Imd. Eff. July 21
AN ACT to establish an institute of gerontology; to prescribe its functions; and to make an appropriation for its operation.

The People of the State of Michigan enact:
390.31 Institute of gerontology; authority to establish, purposes
Sec. 1. There may be established by the university of Michigan
and Wayne state university jointly, an institute of gerontology for
the purpose of developing new and improved programs for helping
older people in this state, for the training of persons skilled in working with the problems of the aged, for research related to the needs
of our aging population, and for conducting community service programs in the field of aging.
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390.32 Same; duties

Sec. 2. The institute shall:
( 1) In the field of training,
(a) Stimulate and contribute to training in gerontology in the
various schools and departments of the universities.
(b) Offer specialized interdisciplinary training in gerontology at
the graduate and postgraduate levels for those entering or already
working in the field.
(2) In the fields of research and publications,
(a) Encourage, foster and conduct research in all important
areas of gerontology.
(b) Provide research support for university instructional staff
and other investigators in gerontology.
(3) In the field of community service, organize and promote
programs of community education and services in the field of aging,
and shall conduct courses and educational activities designed to serve
those working with our older citizens.
390.33 Same; establishment and government by boards

Sec. 3. The institute shall be established by, and governed in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the board of governors
of Wayne state university and the board of regents of the university
of Michigan.
P.A. 1875, No. 128, Eff. Aug. 3
AN ACT for the establishment of a homeopathic medical
department of the university of Michigan.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
390.41 Homeopathic medical department, authority of regents to
establish

Sec. 1. The board of regents of the university of Michigan are
hereby authorized to establish a homeopathic medical college as a
branch or department of said university, which shall be located at the
city of Ann Arbor.
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P.A. 1895, No. 36, Eff. Aug. 30
AN ACT to enable the regents of the university to take and
hold in perpetual trust land or other property.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:

390.51 Board of regents; holding property in trust
Sec. 1. That it shall be competent for the regents of the university to take, by gift, devise or bequest, and hold in perpetuity any
land or other property in trust for any purpose not inconsistent with
the objects and purposes of the university.
P.A. 1935, No. 245, Eff. Sept. 21 as amended by P.A. 1963,
No. 128, § 1 lmd. Eff. May 10 and P.A. 1965,
No. 371, § 1, Eff. March31, 1966.
AN ACT to provide educational opportunities for the children of certain soldiers, sailors, marines and nurses. As amended P.A. 1937, No. 84, Imd. Eff. June 15; P.A. 1943, No. 38,
Eff. July 30.
The People of the State ofMichigan enact:

35.111 Children of deceased or disabled serviceman; educational aid
Sec. 1. Any person not under 16 and not over 22 years of age
who has been a resident of the state of Michigan for 12 months, who
is a child of a member of the armed forces of the United States who
was killed in action or died from other cause during any war or war
condition in which the United States has been, is, or may hereafter
be a participant, or who as a result of wartime service has since died
or is totally disabled, shall be admitted to and may attend any state
tax supported educational or training institution of a secondary or
college grade. Such persons admitted to tax supported institutions
shall not be required to pay any matriculation fee, athletic fee, tuition or any other fee which takes the place of tuition charges during
the time in which he is a student at said state institution.
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FOOTNOTES
Section 1 - Cases Interpreting the Constitution of Separation
of University & State

1. This term as used in this chapter shall include all educational institutions referred to in the 1963 Constitution authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees.
2. The legislation relating to the University of Michigan has been included at the
end of this chapter.
3. Buehler and Draper, Chapter X.
4. This issue is now before the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham. TheRegents of the University of Michigan et aL v. The State of Michigan et al., Civil
Case No. 7659-C.
5. The Washtenaw County Circuit Court has ruled that the statute embraces the
University. The Regents of the University of Michigan v. The Labor Mediation
Board, Civil Action 1952. The decision has been appealed.
Section 3 - Opinions of the Attorney General Concerning Autonomy
1. The office of the Attorney General states that it has bound volumes containing
opinions of the Attorney General from 1837 to date. Each volume is indexed,
and there is a cumulative index in four volumes for all opinions rendered after
July 1, 1913.
2. 1920-22 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 289.
3. 1955-56 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 262.
4. Supra p. 111.
5. 1898 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 88.
6. 1901 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 75.
7. 1912 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 212.
8. 1925-26 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 13.
9. 1927-28 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 467.
10. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 25.
11. 1943-44 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 364.
12. 1952-54 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 440.
13. Unpublished opinion, dated December 31, 1954.
14. Opinion dated January 8, 1965.
15. 1905 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 85.
16. 1908 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 95.
17. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 475; 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 129.
18. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 243.
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19. 1955-56 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 721, vol. I.
20. 1901 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 87. 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 29; unpublished
opinion, No. M-541, dated June 3, 1959.
21. 1911 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 215.
22. 1949-50 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 405.
23. 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 115; 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 255; 195152 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 433.
24. 1920 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 106; 1957-58 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 26, vol. II.
25. Unpublished opinion No. 11937, dated August 23, 1939.
26. 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 422.
27. 1961-62 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 594.

Part Two

The University as a Part of State
Government

CHAPTER IV
THE BOARD OF REGENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Each governing board of the three major state universities
in Michigan is composed of eight elected members. The president of each institution is ex officio, a member of the board
without the right to vote. The members are popularly elected
for overlapping terms of eight years. The statutes which prescribe nomination of candidates by political party, and also such
matters as qualifications for office, and the procedure for removal from office, impeachment, resignation and recall, are reproduced at the end of this chapter.
Although the Attorney General has been called upon from
time to time to pass on questions under the statutes, the only
case which was litigated in the Supreme Court on these issues
was Attorney General ex rei. Cook v. Burhans in which the
court decided that the man who had received the most votes
was disqualified from serving as a Regent because at the time of
the election, he was a state senator. Legislators are not qualified
to hold any other state office during their term as legislators.
The majority of the court decided that the disqualification of an
acting Regent created a vacancy to be filled by gubernatorial appointment. A vigorous dissent argued that if Burhans was not
qualified, Cook who received the next largest number of votes
had been legally elected a Regent; hence, there should be no
vacancy to be filled.

2. JUDICIAL DECISION
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Attorney General ex rei. Cook v. Burhans
304 Mich. 108, 109-20; 7 N.W. 2d 370 (1942)
WIEST, J. The attorney general, ex rel. Franklin M. Cook, by
information in the nature of quo warranto, seeks ouster of defendant
from the office of regent of the University of Michigan on the
ground that he has no legal right to the office and is a mere usurper
therein and also asks the court to adjudicate that Franklin M. ·Cook
is the regent. Defendant by answer asserts right to hold the office by
valid election thereto. At the biennial State election in April, 1941,
two regents of the University of Michigan were to be elected and defendant was a candidate. At that time he was a member of the State
senate and is still such officer. The board of State canvassers found
that defendant received 410,767votes, Alfred B. Connable, 409,672,
Franklin M. Cook, relator herein, 408,438, and some lesser votes for
other candidates, and certified the election of defendant and Connable to the secretary of State. Defendant filed his oath of office as
regent and has since acted as such.
Defendant is not a regent of the University of Michigan, for
every vote cast for him at such election was void under article 5,
§ 7, of the Michigan Constitution, which reads:
"No person elected a member of the legislature shall receive
any civil appointment within this State or to the senate of the United
States from the governor, except notaries public, or from the governor and senate, from the legislature, or any other State authority,
during the term for which he is elected. All such appointments and
all votes given for any person so elected for any such office or appointment shall be void."
This provision applies to elections and its mandate must be
obeyed. Fyfe v. Kent County Clerk, 149 Mich. 349.
Defendant having usurped the office of regent, in defiance of
the mandate of the Constitution barring him under any circumstances
from holding such office and rendering all votes cast for him void, it
was proper for the attorney general to bring this proceeding in the
nature of quo warranto to oust him from such office. The provision
in the Constitution not only rendered defendant ineligible to the office but to prevent his intrusion therein rendered every vote cast for
him void. Defendant received no votes capable of being recognized
bylaw.
Defendant contends that regents of the university are not State
officers but only officers of the corporate body known as the board
of regents of the university.
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The university is a State institution, with obligation on the
legislature to maintain it. The regents are State officers and, as the
board of regents, constitute the body corporate known as the "Regents of the University of Michigan"* and have the general supervision of the University and the direction and control of all expenditures from the university funds. Const. 1908, art. 11, § 5. In People,
for use of Regents of the University of Michigan, v. Brooks, 224
Mich. 45, we held the board of regents is a department of the State
government created by the Constitution to perform State functions.
Defendant is a usurper in the office of regent and a writ of
ouster will issue if necessary to remove him therefrom. This ouster
creates a vacancy in the office of regent.
The statute, 1 Comp.l.aws 1929, § 3350 (Stat. Ann. § 6.693),
provides that:
"Every office shall become vacant, on the happening of either
of the following events, before the expiration of the term of such
office: * * *
"6. The decision of a competent tribunal, declaring void his
election or appointment."
The Constitution of 1908, art. 16, § 5, provides:
"The legislature may provide by law the cases in which any office shall be deemed vacant and the manner of fllling vacancies,
where no provision is made in this Constitution."
The Constitution also provides in art. 11, § 3:
"When a vacancy shall occur in the office of regent it shall be
filled by appointment of the governor."
The ouster of Mr. Burhans creates a vacancy to be filled by the
governor. No costs.
BOYLES, NORTH, BUTZEL, BUSHNELL, and SHARPE, JJ.,
concurred with WIEST, J.
NORTH, J. (concurring.) I concur in the result reached by Mr.
Justice WIEST; but to avoid a possible misconstruction of our holding, I think the following should be specifically noted. Defendant
while holding the office of State senator sought the nomination and
*See Const. 1908, art. 11, § 4.-REPORTER.
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election as a regent of the University of Michigan for a term which
began a year before the expiration of defendant's office as senator.
Both offices are State offices and are incompatible. Under the constitutional provisions (art. 5, § 7, art. 11, § 3) and the statute (1
Comp. Laws 1929, § 3350 [Stat. Ann. § 6.693]) cited in my
Brother's opinion defendant was ineligible to election as regent for a
term which began prior to the expiration of defendant's term as senator and our decision herein creates a vacancy in the office of regent.
See Fyfe v. Kent County Clerk, 149 Mich. 349, and Murtha v. Lindsay, 187 Mich. 79.
Under the cited constitutional provision (article 5, § 7) it cannot be said that since the two offices are incompatible, when defendant assumed the office of regent he vacated the office of senator. To so hold would be to circumvent the express provisions of the
Constitution, and in effect to nullify its clear mandate.
I am not in accord with the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice CHANDLER wherein he holds that by our judgment in this case
Mr. Cook should be installed in the office of regent of the university.
To so hold would be in plain violation of the specific provision of
article 11, § 3, of the Constitution and also of article 6, § 10, of the
Constitution. Section 3, art. 11, contains the following explicit provision: "When a vacancy shall occur in the office of regent it shall be
filled by appointment of the governor;" and section 10, art. 6, reads:
"Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any of the State offices, the
governor shall fill the same by appointment, by and with the advice
and consent of the senate, if in session." The office of regent of the
University of Michigan is a State office; and our decision herein
creates a vacancy in that office. Regardless of any statutory provision
which may be considered as in conflict with the two above-quoted
constitutional provisions, I am unable to understand how it can be
held that the statute controls instead of the constitutional provisions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing would seem to be conclusive of
the question under consideration, it may be pertinent to point out
that the decisions upon which Mr. Chief Justice CHANDLER relies
have no application to the instant case. First, it should be noted thai
the statutory provisions quoted in my Brother's opinion (3 Comp.
Laws 1929, §§ 15274-15276 [Stat. Ann. §§ 27.2318-27.2320])
have been a part of the statutory law of this State since the enactment of the statutes of 1846. See Rev. Stat. 1846, chap. 136, § § 3,
4, and 5. These provisions are still effective (in the absence of some
other conflicting statutory or constitutional provision) provided the
vacancy to be filled is not a State office. But they are not operative
as to vacancies in State offices because subsequent to the enactment
of the statute each of the above-quoted constitutional provisions was

THE BOARD OF REGENTS

133

embodied in the Constitution of 1850* and carried over into the
Constitution of 1908. No provision will be found in the Constitution
of 1835 which is comparable to either of the constitutional provisions hereinbefore quoted.
As noted above none of the cases cited in the opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice CHANDLER tends to sustain his position because none
of them ibvolves the filling of a vacancy in a State office. The following are the cases upon which my Brother relies: People, ex rel
Falkenburg, v. Miles, 2 Mich. 348, in which the office involved was
that of county clerk; People, ex rel Wagenseil, v. Stephenson, 98
Mich. 218, involved, as appears from the original records in this
court, the office of city clerk of Port Huron; and Emmons v. Board
of Supervisors, not reported but cited in the Stephenson Case, involved the office of township supervisor, as also appears from the
original records in this court. It would seem to go without saying
that the decision in each of these cases in no way conflicts with the
constitutional provision that: "Whenever a vacancy shall occur in
any of the State offices the governor shall fill the same." And it is
equally plain, in view of the quoted provisions of the Constitution,
that this court in this proceeding is without power to fill the vacancy
in the office of regent created by our decision herein.
Chief Justice CHANDLER says: "We should not apply a portion of one statute, which has remained on the books for almost 100
years, and then utterly disregard its remaining provisions and apply
those of another statute, even though of equal age and respect." I am
in full accord with this statement, except where, as in my Brother's
opinion, an attempt is made to apply a statutory provision in a manner which is plainly violative of constitutional provisions.
The conclusion reached by Mr. Justice WIEST should be the
decision of this court herein; and if necessary a writ of ouster should
issue. No costs allowed.
BOYLES and BUTZEL, JJ., concurred with NORTH, J.
CHANDLER, C. J. (dissenting.) We all agree that the votes cast
for the defendant Burhans for the office of regent of the University
of Michigan while he was a member of the State Senate are void, but
we do not agree on the result of such holding.
Mr. Justice WIEST holds that the ouster of the defendant
creates a vacancy in the office of regent because of 1 Comp. Laws
1929, § 3350 (Stat. Ann. § 6.693), and that the vacancy under the
provision of article 11, § 3, of the Constitution, shall be filled by
*Article 13, § 6, art. 8, § 3-Reporter.
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appointment of the governor. Tills same provision is found in article
13, § 6, of the Constitution of 1850, and the statute upon which Mr.
Justice WIEST relies has remained unchanged since it was amended
by Act. No. 172, Pub. Acts 1851. Relator Cook's information is
based upon the quo warranto statutes, 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15271
et seq. (Stat. Ann. § 27.2315 et seq.). Many decisions of this court
have been based upon the use of this procedure, among these being
People, ex rel. Falkenburg, v. Miles, 2 Mich. 348, decided in 1852,
and People, ex reL Wagenseil, v. Stephenson, 98 Mich. 218, decided
in 1893. In the Falkenburg Case Mr. Justice DOUGLASS said:
"In a State like ours, where public officers are nearly all elective, and where public opinion must usually be an effective check
upon all usurpations of office without some pretences of right,
founded upon the suffrages of the people, it is obvious that the question most frequently to be tried on informations like the present,
will be whether the defendant received a majority of the votes cast
at an election. If he did not, some one else must have received it. In
such cases, and in others of like character, it is apparent that the right
of some other person is necessarily involved in the issue between the
people and the defendant, and being so involved, the statute permits
the Court, when justice so requires, to adjudicate upon it. The averment in question seems designed merely to furnish some foundation
in the record for this judgment.
"It is not traversable by the defendant, for it is no concern of
his who is entitled to the office if he is not. Of course it is not admitted by his omission to traverse it. There is no need that it should
be special, because no issue can be formed upon it. The defendant is
required to set forth the facts which constitute his own title specifically by plea. An issue of law or fact must generally be formed by the
replication to this plea. This is the issue to be determined. If it is determined against the defendant, and if it is a necessary inference
from this judgment and the facts upon which it is based, that the person alleged to be entitled to the office the defendant has usurped, in
law and in fact is so, the Courts are authorized, from considerations
of public policy quite apparent, to affirm his right by a direct adjudication."
In the Wagenseil Case Mr. Justice MONTGOMERY said:

"Upon a judgment of amotion from office, the party amoved
is divested of all official authority; and excluded from office, so long
as the judgment remains in force. High, Extraordinary Remedies,
§ 756. And, when judgment is rendered in favor of a relator, he

THE BOARD OF REGENTS

135

needs no writ to invest him with the office. Under How. Stat. § 8639,
he is entitled to take upon himself the execution of the office. Can
this right be defeated or suspended by suing out a writ of error and
giving a bond to stay execution? The statute (sections 8679, 8681)
provides for a stay of execution by suing out a writ of error, but
does not authorize a suspension of a judgment which requires no aid
from process to give it effect. The practical result of permitting such
a writ to suspend the judgment in quo warranto cases would in many
cases be to defeat the relator of his remedy wholly. Such a construction is not to be indulged, except it be imperatively required by the
terms, which we thirik is not the case here. This precise question
was determined by the Court in the October term of 1886, in the unreported case of Emmons v. Board of Supervisors. See, also, Welch
v. Cook, 7 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 282."
I am unable to see how we can consider an information ftled
under the quo warranto statutes and then deprive the relator of the
benefit of those statutes.
Sections 15274-15276, 3 Comp. Laws 1929 (Stat. Ann.
§§ 27.2318-27.2320), read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Whenever any such information shall be filed against
any person for usurping any office, the attorney general, in addition
to the other matters required to be set forth in the information, may
also set forth therein the name of the person rightfully entitled to
such office, with an averment of his right thereto.
"SEC. 5. In every such case judgment shall be rendered upon
the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the party so
entitled; or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice shall require.
"SEC. 6. If judgment be rendered upon the right of the person
so averred to be entitled, and the same be in favor of such person, he
shall be entitled, after taking the oath of office, and executing any
official bond which may be required by law, to take upon him the
execution of the office; and it shall be his duty, immediately thereafter, to demand of the defendant in such information, all the books
and papers in his custody or within his power, belonging to such
office."
We are required under these statutes, in the light of the averment of the information, to render judgment upon the right of defendant, and also upon the right of the relator, or only upon the
right of the defendant "as justice shall require." It does not seem to
be justice to deny the relator the right to a judgment if the votes cast
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for Senator Burhans are void. In the light of section 6 and the facts
as stated by Mr. Justice WIEST, the relator is entitled, "after taking
the oath of office, and executing any official bond which may be required by law," to take upon himself the execution of the office of
regent.
Mr. Connable received the highest number of countable votes
and was duly elected. Relator Cook received the next highest number of countable votes and was also elected. The vacancy statute was
obviously intended to cover a situation where no one other than the
usurper has a claim to the office; and, unless the quo warranto statutes can be fully applied, I know of no other procedure whereby
one lawfully elected to an office can gain possession of that office.
We should not apply a portion of one statute, which has remained on
the books for almost 100 years, and then utterly disregard its remaining provisions and apply those of another statute, even though
of equal age and respect. Both of these statutes were on the books
when the Constitution of 1850 was adopted and when Mr. Justice
DOUGLASS wrote the Falkenbury Opinion in 1852.
This is not a case of mere ineligibility to an office but one
where the Constitution provides that all votes cast for one who is a
member of the legislature were void. In point of law, defendant received no votes for the office which may be considered for any purpose. The ouster of defendant does not create a vacancy but only removes a usurper who has kept relator out of office.
In a democracy there is no higher authority by which a civil officer can receive an election or appointment than by the exercise of
the elective franchise by qualified electors. This court said in Fyfe v.
Kent County Clerk, 149 Mich. 349, cited in the opinion of Mr. Justice WIEST, that the terms "election" and "appointment" are synonymous. See, also, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (13 Sup. Ct.
3, 36 L Ed. 869).
Connable and relator had the highest number of valid votes
that could be counted for the office of regents of the University of
Michigan and were duly elected. To hold otherwise, by declaring
that a vacancy exists by reason of certain statutory provisions, is a
clear attempt to circumvent the express provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, nullify its clear mandate.
No department of the State government, executive, legislative
or judicial, has authority to disregard the letter or spirit of the Constitution.
Article 16, § 5, of the present Constitution, quoted by Mr.
Justice WIEST, is not applicable to the instant case because article 5,
§ 7, is controlling.
It should therefore be determined that relator is entitled to the
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office of regent of the University of Michigan by virtue of the 1941
general election, upon compliance with the provisions of 3 Comp.
Laws 1929, § 15276 (Stat. Ann. § 27.2320).
A judgment should issue ousting defendant from the office of
regent and entitling relator to that office upon his compliance with
the statute. It should be so ordered.
STARR, J., concurred with CHANDLER, C. J.

3. OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Questions involving interpretation of election laws are often directed to the Attorney General. As early as 1894, an Attorney General ruled that the Regent appointed by the Governor
should serve the balance of the unexpired term. 1 A statute
which would have limited the appointment to the period until
the next election was void because of a conflict with the constitution. The present statute conforms to the Attorney General's
opinion, 2 but the present wording of the constitution would
seem to permit the legislature to limit the term of an appointee:
It reads, "Each appointee shall hold office until a successor has
been nominated and elected as provided by law." 3
In 1907, a Federal District Judge sitting in Grand Rapids,
was assured that he was qualified to serve as Judge and Regent
at the same time, although he should disqualify himself from
judging any case in his court to which the University was a
party. 4
The Superintendent of Public Instruction, as ex officio Regent, [changed under the 1963 Constitution] was assured of his
rights to use the title of Regent, to speak and to enter discussions at meetings of the board. He could not, however, vote, and
thus his presence could not be counted in determining whether
a quorum was present. 5
In 1943, the Attorney General was called upon to determine the time at which a Governor's appointment took effect.
He ruled that the appointment was complete when a document
was signed by the Governor, even though the document had
never been delivered to the Secretary of State. 6
Miscellaneous rulings by the Attorney General's office have
determined the funds from which the expenses of the Regents
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should be paid, 7 approved the practice of holding closed meetings of the governing boards8 (but, see Article 8, § 4 of the
1963 Constitution), and have forbidden the delegation of the
preparation of vouchers, in 1925, for the State Auditor. 9
Recently the Attorney General's rulings involving conflicts
of interest have had drastic effect. The Attorney General's office
issued opinions in this area as early as 1907 when it held a contract between the then Michigan State College and adjoining
property owners to be void largely because the college secretary
who signed the contract on behalf of the college had property
interests in some of the affected lands. 10 In 1958, a Regent of
the University of Michigan who was associated with University
Microfilms Company, a concern which regularly took books
from the University Library to make copies for other college
libraries, requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to
the conflict of interests law. At that time, the Regent was assured of the propriety of his situation because such borrowing
of library books involved no "contract" in the statutory sense
of the word. 11
After the adoption of the present state constitution, the
Attorney General again made a landmark ruling on this question
of conflict of interest. He issued a comprehensive opinion, the
effect of which was to cause a large number of resignations by
persons holding positions in businesses from their positions as
officers or board members of universities, and vice versa. Extracts from this opinion appear at the end of this chapter.
The Attorney General in 1968 issued rulings concerning
three officers of Michigan State University and their activities
which might have been held violative of the conflict of interest
statute. President Hannah sold land adjoining the campus to a
private party after acquiring it over the period of his tenure as a
University official, 12 Vice President May had an interest in corporations which did business with the University, 13 and Trustee
Harlan had been employed by a corporation which did business
with the University. 14
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4. STATE ELECTION LAWS

P.A. 1954, No. 116, Eff. June 1, 1955 (as amended by
P.A. 1963, 2nd Ex. Sess., No.5, § 1)
AN ACT to reorganize, consolidate and add to the election
laws; to provide for election officials and prescribe their powers
and duties; to provide for the nomination and election of candidates for public office; to provide for the resignation, removal
and recall of certain public officers; to provide for the filling of
vacancies in public office; to provide for and regulate primaries
and elections; to provide for the purity of elections; to guard
against the abuse of the elective franchise; to define violations
of this act; to prescribe the penalties therefore; and to repeal
certain acts and all other acts inconsistent herewith.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:

* * *
168.281 State board of education, board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors; eligibility
Sec. 281. No person shall be eligible to membership on the
state board of education, the board of regents of the University of
Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the
board of governors of Wayne State University who is not a registered
and qualified elector of this state.
168.282 Board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors;
nomination, time
Sec. 282. At its fall state convention each political party may
nominate 2 candidates for membership on the board of regents of
the University of Michigan, 2 candidates for membership on the
board of trustees of Michigan State University and 2 candidates for
membership on the board of governors of Wayne State University.
Nomination to membership on the board of regents of the University
of Michigan shall occur in 1966 and every second year thereafter.
Nomination to the board of trustees of Michigan State University and
to the board of governors of Wayne State University shall occur in
1964 and every second year thereafter.
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168.282a State board of education; nomination, time
Sec. 282a. At its fall state convention of 1964, each political
party may nominate 8 candidates for membership on the state board
of education. Two candidates shall be nominated for 2-year terms, 2
for 4-year terms, 2 for 6-year terms and 2 for 8-year terms. At its fall
state convention of 1966, and every 2 years thereafter, each political
party may nominate 2 candidates for membership on the state board
of education.
168.283 State board of education, board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors; certification of nominees;
vignette
Sec. 283. Not more than 24 hours after the conclusion of the
fall state convention, the state central committee of each political
party shall convene and canvass the proceedings of said convention
and determine the nominees of said convention for membership on
the state board of education, the board of regents of the University
of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, and
the board of governors of Wayne State University. The chairman and
secretary of said committee shall, within 24 hours after the conclusion of the state convention, forward by registered or certified mail
to the secretary of state and to the board of election commissioners
of each county, in care of the county clerk at the county seat, a copy
of the vignette adopted by said state central committee and the
typewritten or printed names, together with residence, including the
street address if known, of the candidates nominated at said convention for said offices.
168.284 Same; withdrawal of nominee
Sec. 284. Any person who has been certified by the state central committee of any party as nominated for membership on the
state board of education, the board of regents of the University of
Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the
board of governors of Wayne State University may withdraw by filing a written notice of withdrawal with the secretary of state or his
duly authorized agent and a copy with the chairman and the secretary of the state central committee of said party not later than 4 p.m.
eastern standard time, of the thirty-third day preceding the election.
168.285 Same; vacancy of nomination
Sec. 285. Whenever a candidate of a political party, after having been nominated to membership on the state board of education,
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the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of
trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of governors of
Wayne State University, shall die, withdraw, remove from the state,
or become disqualified for any reason, the state central committee of
said party shall meet forthwith and, by a majority vote of the members thereof, shall select a candidate to fill the vacancy thereby
caused. The name of the candidate so selected shall be immediately
certified by the chairman and the secretary of said committee to the
secretary of state and to the board of election commissioners for each
county, whose duty it is to prepare the official ballots, and said
board shall cause to be printed or placed upon said ballots, in the
proper place, the name of the candidate so selected to fill the vacancy.
168.286 Board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors;
election, time
Sec. 286. Two members of the board of regents of the University of Michigan shall be elected at the general election in 1966 and
in every general election thereafter. Two members of the board of
trustees of Michigan State University and 2 members of the board of
governors of Wayne State University shall be elected at the general
election in 1964 and in every general election thereafter.
Constitution
Art. 2, § 5, provides:
"Except for special elections to fill vacancies, or as otherwise
provided in this constitution, all elections for national, state, county
and township offices shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in November in each even-numbered year or on such other
date as members of the congress of the United States are regularly
elected."
168.286a State board of education, election, time, terms
Sec. 286a. Eight members of the state board of education shall
be elected at the general election in 1964. Two members shall be
elected for 2-year terms, 2 for 4-year terms, 2 for 6-year terms, and
2 for 8-year terms. Two members of the state board of education
shall be elected for 8-year terms at the general election in 1966 and
in every general election thereafter.
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168.287 State board of education, board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors; certificate of determination by
board of state canvassers.
Sec. 287. The board of state canvassers shall determine which
candidates for membership on the state board of education, the
board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees
of Michigan State University and the board of governors of Wayne
State University have received the greatest number of votes and shall
declare such candidates to be duly elected. The said board shall forthwith make and subscribe on its statement of returns a certificate of
such determination and deliver the same to the secretary of state.
168.288 Same; certificate of election
Sec. 288. The secretary of state shall me in his office and preserve the original statement and determination of the board of state
canvassers of the result of the election and shall forthwith execute
and cause to be delivered to the persons thereby declared to be
elected to membership on the state board of education, the board of
regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University and the board of governors of Wayne State University a certificate of election, certified by him under the great seal
of the state.
168.289 Same; terms of office
Sec. 289. Subject to section 286a, 1 the term of office of members of the state board of education,, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, and the board of governors of Wayne State University shall be 8
years and shall begin at 12 noon on January 1 next following their
election. The terms of office of members of said boards shall continue until a successor is elected and qualified.
1

Section 168.286a.

168.290 Same; oath, deposit
Sec. 290. Every person elected to membership on the state
board of education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the board
of governors of Wayne State University, before entering upon the
duties of his office, shall take and subscribe to the oath as provided
in section 1 of article 11 of the state constitution, and shall deposit
said oath with the secretary of state.
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Constitution
Art. 11, § 1, provides:
1

'All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, before entering
upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe
the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties
of the office of . . . according to the best of my ability. No other
oath, affirmation, or any religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust."
168.291 Same; resignation, notice
Sec. 291. Any person duly elected to membership on the state
board of education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University or the board
of governors of Wayne State University, who desires to resign shall
file a written notice containing the effective date of such resignation
with the governor and a copy with the secretary of state.
168.292 Same; vacancy, creation, notice
Sec. 292. There shall be a vacancy on the state board of education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of
trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of governors of
Wayne State University upon the happening of any of the following
events: Death of the incumbent; his resignation; his removal from office for cause; his ceasing to be a resident of the state; his conviction
of an infamous crime, or an offense involving the violation of his
oath of office; the decision of a competent tribunal declaring his
election or appointment void; or his neglect or refusal to take and
subscribe to the constitutional oath of office and deposit the same in
the manner and within the time prescribed by law. When a vacancy
shall occur on any of the said boards, a notice of such vacancy and
the reason why the same exists, shall, within 10 days after such vacancy occurs, be given in writing to the governor. Such notice shall
be given by the secretary of state.
168.293 Same; impeachment, removal from office; notice of charges
Sec. 293. Any member of said boards may be removed from
office upon conviction in impeachment proceedings for the reasons
and in the manner set forth in section 7 of article 11 of the state
constitution. The governor shall have the power and it shall be his
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duty, except at such time as the legislature may be in session, to examine into the condition and administration of said boards and the
acts of the members enumerated herein and to remove from office
for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct in office, or any
other misfeasance or malfeasance therein, and report the causes of
such removal to the legislature at its next session. Such person shall
be served with a written notice of the charges against him and be afforded an opportunity for a public hearing conducted personally by
the governor.

Constitution
Art. 5, § 10, provides:
The governor shall have the power and it shall be his duty to
inquire into the condition and administration of any public office
and the acts of any public officer, elective or appointive. He may remove or suspend from office for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt
conduct in office, or for any other misfeasance or malfeasance therein, any elective or appointive state officer, except legislative or judicial, and shall report the reasons for such removal or suspension to
the legislature.
Art. 11, § 7, provides:
"The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeaching civil officers for corrupt conduct in office or for crimes or
misdemeanors, but a majority of the members elected thereto and
serving therein shall be necessary to direct an impeachment."
168.294 Same; appointment to fill vacancy
Sec. 294. Whenever a vacancy shall occur on the state board of
education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the
board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of governors of Wayne State University, the governor shall appoint a successor to fill such vacancy, and the person so appointed shall take the
oath of office and shall hold office for the remainder of the unexpired term and until his successor is elected and qualified. A candidate receiving the highest number of votes for membership on any of
said boards and who has subscribed to the constitutional oath shall
be deemed to be elected and qualified even though a vacancy occurs prior to the time he shall have entered upon the duties of his
office.
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168.295 Same; recount
Sec. 295. The votes cast for any candidate for membership on
the state board of education, the board of regents of the University
of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University and
the board of governors of Wayne State University at any election
shall be subject to recount as provided in chapter 33 of this act.
168.296 Same; recall
Sec. 296. Any person elected to membership on the state board
of education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the
board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of governors of Wayne State University shall be subject to recall as provided in chapter 36 of this act.
Constitution
Art. 2, § 8, provides:
"Laws shall be enacted to provide for the recall of all elective
officers except judges of courts of record upon petition of electors
equal in number to 25 percent of the number of persons voting in
the last preceding election for the office of governor in the electoral
district of the officer sought to be recalled. The sufficiency of any
statement of reasons or grounds procedurally required shall be a political rather than a judicial question."

5. EXCERPTS FROM OPINION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL (NO. 4587)
dated Sept. 1967, relating to conflict of interest
Representative Faxon submitted to me several questions,
phrased in general terms, relative to possible conflicts of interest by
members of governing boards and officers of state institutions of
higher education. These questions may be condensed to read as follows:
1. Would a member of a governing board or an officer of an institution of higher education that enjoys constitutional status under
Article VIII of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 be in violation of
Article N, Section 10 of the Constitution and/or Act 317, PA 1966
if such person were to serve simultaneously as an officer or director
of a bank, or any other enterprise for profit, that does business with
the educational institution that he is serving?
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2. If any violation does exist, what legal consequences could
ensue?

The Purpose and Meaning of Conflict of Interest
Article IV. Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963
provides:
"No member of the Legislature nor any state officer shall be
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with the state or any
political subdivision thereof which shall cause a substantial conflict
of interest. The Legislature shall further implement this provision by
appropriate legislation."
As a statement of the basis and public policy upon which this
statement prohibiting conflicts of interest now embedded in our
Constitution rests, it would be difficult to improve upon the language of Justices Manning and Christiancy in The People, ex rel
Albert Plugger, et al v. The Township Board of Overyssel, 11 Mich.
222 (1863). Speaking for the court, Justice Manning said:

" ... All public officers are agents, and their official powers
are fiduciary. They are trusted with public functions for the good of
the public; to protect, advance and promote its interests, and not
their own. And, a greater necessity exists in private life for removing
from them every inducement to abuse the trust reposed in them, as
the temptations to which they are sometimes exposed and stronger,
and the risk of detection and exposure is less .... " (p. 225)
To which Justice Christiancy added in his concurring opinion:
"The public were entitled to their best judgment, unbiased by
their private interests, and by accepting the office they became
bound to exercise such judgment, and to use their best exertions for
the public good, regardless of their own. They had no right, while
they continued in office, to place themselves in a position where
their own interests would be hostile to those of the public.... And,
though these contractors may, as members of the board, have acted
honestly, and solely with reference to the public interest, yet if they
acted otherwise, they occupy a position which puts it in their power
to conceal the evidence of the facts, and to defy detection." (pp.
226, 227)
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Private Corporation
Since the constitutional provision establishes the pattern, the
answer to the first question as rephrased requires only a determination of whether the facts described, or rather the circumstances deducible from the facts described, fall comfortably within this pattern. If it be determined that members of governing boards and officers of institutions of higher education enjoying constitutional status
are "state officers" within the ambit of Article IV, Section 10 of the
Constitution, supra, then there can be no doubt that their simultaneous service as officer or director of a bank, or any other enterprise
for profit, which enters into contractual relationship with their educational institution is prohibited by the aforesaid section of the Constitution.
Service as an officer or director of a private corporation is per
sea substantial interest in that entity. See Opinion No. 4555 of April
12, 1967.
Directors of a corporation must safeguard, care for and promote the corporation's interest, Wiseman v. United Dairies, Inc., 324
Mich. 473 (1949), and they must exercise the same degree of fidelity
and care which an ordinarily careful man would use in his own affairs of like magnitude and importance, Trembert v. Mott, 271 Mich.
683 (1935). The conclusion that the interest a director has in the
corporation he is serving must be "substantial" is therefore inescapable; any other conclusion would derogate from the degree of dedication and fidelity that he must devote towards the corporation.
Insofar as officers of private corporations are concerned, it is
equally clear that, although such officers generally derive their authority to represent the corporation from the board of directors, the
corporate functions must be performed by corporate officers or
agents. And, as in the case of directors, corporate officers have a
duty to serve their corporation with fidelity.
While it is conceivable that, in some rare instance, a corporate
officer may hold a title devoid of any apparent substantial interest
to himself, the title itself must be deemed to have been conferred for
the mutual benefit of the corporation and the officer in question.
Were only a trivial benefit running to the officer to exist, it would be
advisable for any state officer holding such an empty title to divest
himself of it if a prohibited contractual relationship is present-such
a gesture could hardly be viewed as too great a sacrifice for the opportunity to engage in public service. This would be necessary since
any title as officer of a corporation must be presumed to carry with
it commensurate obligation to serve the interest of that corporation.
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With the exception of the colleges and universities that are
newly formed, the decision of a college or university to avail itself of
a particular public utility service is a matter of history and based upon such decision the college or university and the public utility company have undertaken financial obligations to insure proper service.
Thus it must be held that any conflict of interest that may result
from a person serving as a university governing board member or officer and also as an officer or director of a public utility furnishing
service to a college or university is unsubstantial as it relates to a
public utility service rendered to the university.

Employe of Labor Organization
Representative Hampton advises me that Don Stevens, a member of the Michigan State University Board of Trustees, is employed
by the Michigan AFL-CIO. Several months ago he voted favorably
upon a resolution requiring Michigan State University to purchase
printing services only from unionized printing shops. Subsequently,
this resolution of the Board of Trustees was modified so as to permit
non-union shops to provide such services if they certified that they
are observing union standards.
Representative Hampton asked my opinion on the following
question:
"Whether Don Stevens, a member of the Michigan State University Board of Trustees, is engaged in a similar, or any, conflict of
interest with MSU."
Article N, Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution provides
in pertinent part:
"No member of the Legislature nor any state officer shall be
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with the state or any
political subdivision thereof which shall cause a substantial conflict
of interest."
Mr. Don Stevens occupies neither an executive office nor is a
member of the Executive Board of the Michigan AFL-CIO. Instead
he is employed as education director of that organization by virtue
of appointment of the president and approval of the Executive
Board.
. . . A substantial conflict exists where a state officer accepts
other employment or engages in a business of professional activity
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which would require him to disclose confidential information acquired by him in the course of his official duties. There appears to be
no foundation for any conclusion that Mr. Stevens, by virtue of his
position as educational director of the Michigan AFL-CIO, is required to disclose confidential information acquired by him in the
course of his duties as a member of the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University.
Are Officers and Board Members 'State Officers'?
Having established that directors and officers of private corporations must be deemed to have a substantial interest in the business affairs of such corporations, the proper answer to the first question stated above requires only determination of whether persons
serving as members of governing boards of state institutions of higher
education or as officers thereof are "state officers" within the meaning of Article N, Section 10.
Governing boards of state institutions of higher education having authority to grant baccalaureate degrees owe their existence to
provisions of the Constitution.... It has been pointed out that state
universities are corporations created for public purposes. Regents of
the University of Michigan v. Board of Education of Detroit, 4 Mich.
213 (1856) and, under Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of
1963, the Legislature is required to appropriate money to maintain
these institutions and must be given an annual accounting of all income and expenditures by each of them. Thus, despite their independent constitutional status, state institutions of higher education
retain a part of the state government. Branum vs. Board of Regents
of University of Michigan, Mich. App. 134 (1966).
Members of the governing boards of such state colleges and
universities are either elected by the people or appointed by the govenor. In either case the governor is empowered to fill board vacancies
by appointment. Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article III, Sections
5 and 6.
Thus, as stated in OAG No. 0092, March 10, 1966, "There can
be no question but that members of the Board of Regents of the
University of Michigan are state officers." Attorney General, ex rei
Book v. Burhans, 304 Mich. 108, 1942). And the same would be true
of other state institutions of higher education.
Turning to officers of the state colleges and universities it is
clear that, while their duties and responsibilities do not encompass
the establishment of broad policy reserved to the governing board,
they actually have greater involvement in the negotiation, execution
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and administration of contracts entered into by the institution. For
example, the board may select a bank in which to deposit its funds,
but it is the officers that have direct and regular contact with officials and employes of the bank. Disputes regarding interpretation of
terms of deposit, time of deposit, amount of deposit or bank charges
are generally resolved by the institution's officials and not by the
governing board unless the dispute assumes major proportions. Also,
while board members serve part time devoting the major portion of
their activities to other matters, the officers of the institution are
normally required to devote their full time and attention to the university's affairs. It would be an anomalous quirk of the law indeed
were board members of an institution prohibited from having a conflicting interest in a state contract while no such prohibition applied
to its officers. Thus, if the policy upon which the constitutional prohibition against conflict of interest rests is to be meaningful, it must
be applicable to the very state officials who might be in a position to
violate it.
Therefore, since establishment and maintenance of state institutions is an exercise of the sovereign functions of the state pursuant
to its constitution and, since officers of such institutions are engaged
in the implementation of this exercise of sovereign power, it is clear
that they are state officers within the contemplation of Article N.
Section 10 of the State Constitution.
The specific officers of the subject educational institutions so
included are its president, secretary, treasurer and vice-presidents.
The president is designated in Article VIII, Sections 5 and 6, as
the principal executive officer of the institution and is ex-officio a
member of the board so that there is no doubt of his status as a
public officer.
While not specifically designated in the Constitution, the delegation to the other officers of universities and colleges of a portion
of the sovereign power in which the public is concerned contains the
requisite elements to bring them within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition against conflicts of interests.
Consequences of Conflict
Turning next to your question as to the consequences that
could ensue where a state officer is found to be in conflict of interest, the constitutional provision, Article IV, Section 10, supra, while
self-executing insofar as the prescribed standard of conduct is concerned, also provides that the Legislature shall further implement
this provision by appropriate legislation. Consequently there is no
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doubt that the following provision of the Michigan Penal Code, Section 122 of Act 328 PA 1931; MSA 1962 Rev Vol §28.317; CL
1948 §750.122, is valid and enforceable:
"No trustee, inspector, regent, superintendent, agent, officer or
member of any board or commission having control or charge of any
educational, charitable, penal, pauper, or reformatory public institution of this state, or of any municipality thereof, shall be personally,
directly or indirectly, interested in any contract, purchase or sale
made for, or on account, or in behalf of any such institution, and all
such contracts, purchases or sales shall be held null and void; nor
shall any such officer corruptly accept any bribe, gift or gratuity
whatever from any persons interested in such contract; and it is hereby made the duty of the governor or other appointing power, upon
proof satisfactory of a violation of the provisions of this section, to
immediately remove the officer or employe offending as aforesaid;
and the offender shall be guilty of a felony."

This section of the Penal Code, it will be noted, refers to three
consequences that can ensue where it can be established that a conflict of interest is present. First, the contract itself is declared to be
"null and void"; secondly, the officer is subject to removal from office, and thirdly, upon conviction thereof, the officer is guilty of a
felony.
It is recommended, however, that any prosecuting authority
before whom such complaint may be brought take into consideration
the fact that this problem has been awaiting formal legal clarification, and that until the issuance of this opinion there has been considerable uncertainty as to whether the described activities amount
to a conflict of interest.
Section 2 of Act 317, PA 1966; MSA Cur Mat §4.1700(2), also prohibits any state officer from having any interest in a contract
with the state or any of its political subdivisions which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties in the public interest. And this statute left undisturbed the second and third of the
consequences flowing from a violation of Section 122 of the Michigan Penal Code, supra, by providing, as it does in Section 7 thereof,
MSA Cur Mat §4.700(7), that:
"The failure of a state officer or government employe to comply with this act subjects him to appropriate disciplinary action or
civil action."

In addition, it should be noted, under Article V, Section 10 of
the Michigan Constitution of 1963 the governor has the power and
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the duty to remove or suspend from office any public officer, elective or appointive, "for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct
in office, or for any other misfeasance or malfeasance therein."
There can be no doubt that any public officer who has an interest in
any contract which is prohibited by Article N, Section 10 of the
constitution is subject to such removal or suspension by the governor.
However, Section 5 of Act 317 states that:
"If the attorney general fmds that a contract contains a direct
or indirect interest that causes a substantial conflict of interest, the
contract is not void but is voidable by the state or political subdivision. A party who entered into a voided contract in good faith and
without knowledge of the existence of a prohibited interest therein
may recover from the state or political subdivision the reasonable
value of any benefits conferred upon the state or political subdivision
in good faith reliance upon the contract." (MSA Cur Mat §4.170(5))
Thus, with respect to the status of the contract, there appears
to be an irreconcilable conflict between Section 122 of the Penal
Code as to the officers and institutions covered therein, and Section
5 of Act 317, PA 1966. A contract cannot be "null and void" and
be "not void but voidable by the state or political subdivision" at
the very same instant. Applying the proper rule to statutory construction reserved to such circumstances, City of Detroit v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company, 374 Mich. 543 (1965), it is my opinion that Act 317, being a later expression of the Legislature is
controlling despite the absence of a repealing clause. The contract
would thus be voidable.
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CHAPTERV
STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT
1. INTRODUCTION

A most important connection between a state government
and a state university has become the dependence of the university upon legislative appropriations. Although the state constitution has provided each university with an independent governing
board with its own separate corporate existence, the constitution presently provides no university with a separate independent
source of funds.
The constitutional issues relating to conditions the legislature may attach to appropriations for university use are considered in Chapters II and III. This chapter is descriptive. The
first article from a monograph by Richard Price tells the story
of University of Michigan support from the time of its founding
until the 1920's. The.article by Mr. Lederle describes the modern
administrative problems involved in formulating the executive
budget and controlling expenditures. Mr. Lederle viewed these
problems from an interesting perspective. After being a professor, he was appointed State Controller, and, by the time he wrote
the article, he had returned to academic service at the University
of Michigan. At present, he serves as the distinguished president
of the University of Massachusetts.
The one case in this chapter, Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Turner, Auditor General, has some historical interest. It certainly reveals the favorable inclinations of the Supreme
Court toward the University. The case holds that the interest
payable to the University from the proceeds of the original federal land grant should not be decreased by the lowering of the
legal rate of interest even though no other rate was ever specifically prescribed.
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2. OPINIONS OF AITORNEY GENERAL

Not only are the universities directly supported by legislative appropriations, but they may also qualify for benefits under many other programs of the state and federal governments.
State support under these auxiliary programs usually is based
upon opinions of the Attorney General, there being no judicial
decisions in this area.
Because of the status of the University of Michigan as a
"political subdivision of a state," the Attorney General ruled
that the salaries paid its employees were not subject to federal
income tax under the provisions in force in 1914. 1 In 19 56 the
same qualifying status as a "political subdivision" entitled the
University to qualify for state airport money for the operation
of Willow Run. 2
The "War Tax" of 1915 imposed on deeds, telephone and
telegraph messages, and the like was ruled as not applicable to
the University in 1915, 3 but in 1960 the University failed to
qualify for exemption from a similar tax on telephone and telegraph service under a much more restrictive exemption clause.4
In the year 1924 three rulings were issued which benefited
the universities. Goods imported into the country for the use of
a university were not subject to federal tax, under the opinions
of the U.S. Supreme Court. 5 A university, if it elected, could
avail itself of the benefits of the low-cost State Fire Insurance
Fund. 6 And, corporate stock given to the then College of Mines
at Houghton to be used to finance student loans was not subject
to the personal property tax. 7
In more recent rulings the Attorney General has issued
opinions that Michigan Stadium Bonds, although not supported
by the full faith and credit of the state, were nonetheless exempt
from the state intangibles tax;8 that the constitutionally earmarked gasoline taxes could be used for access roads for state
institutions;9 and that, under certain restrictions, university employees may participate in the State Employees Retirement
Fund. 10
In a 1957 opinion, it was ruled that students employed at
state colleges were not covered by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, which embraced provisions for the payment of a minimum wage, because the colleges were not engaged in commerce
and because a state college is a political subdivision of a state. 11
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3. EXCERPTS FROM THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT, by Richard
R. Price (Harvard Bulletins in Education, No. 8, 1923, pp. 26-45. ) 1

PART II
ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT
OF THE UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER III
THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES LAND GRANT
IT will be remembered that the university endowment consisted first
of a township of land, afterwards increased to two townships, and of
three sections of land granted by the Indians in the Treaty of Fort
Meigs. The federal grant of two townships amounted to 72 sections,
or 46,080 acres. This, of course, has no connection with the
240,000 acres subsequently granted to the state by the federal government for the purpose of an Agricultural College. In Michigan the
Agricultural College and the State University are separate institutions.
The acreage of land granted to the several states by the federal government for educational and various other purposes may be verified
by consulting a mimeographed document issued by the General
Land Office, Department of the Interior, entitled "Land and Scrip
Granted to States and Territories for Educational and Other Purposes."
Before taking up the history of the university federal land
grant, let us dispose, in passing, of the matter of the Fort Meigs Indian land. The trustees of the 1821 university sold these three sections,
and the proceeds, together with some additional gifts and subscriptions, can be traced fmally to a lot and building on Bates Street in
Detroit. This property passed into the hands of the Board of Education of Detroit. In 1858 the Board of Regents of the University recovered the property by a Supreme Court decision and subsequently
sold it for $22,010. This amount, with perhaps four or five thousand
dollars of gifts and subscriptions, would then represent the fmal value
of the Indians' gift. This money, at least up to 1875, was kept separately as a reserve fund for the use of the University library. 1 Later
1

Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 138. See also Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 24.
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it was all spent for other purposes considered then more pressing.
A typical instance of poor management in the disposal of university lands is to be found in the matter of the Toledo lots. The
trustees of the university of 1821 in 1827located six "river lots" at
the confluence of Swan Creek and the Maumee River, then in Michigan, now in Ohio. This land is now in the heart of the city of Toledo.
The lots contained 916 acres, which the trustees accepted as 1280,
or two sections, as they were required to locate not less than one section in any one piece. In 1830 the Board exchanged the most valuable of these lots, those numbered One and Two, for other less valuable land in the immediate neighborhood. Four years later the Board
sold this land received in exchange to the former owner for $5000.
The remaining 621 acres at Toledo were sold between 1849 and
1855 at an average of nineteen dollars an acre. "The Toledo lands,
which might have brought the university some millions altogether,
brought about $17,000." 1
The Board of 1821located twenty-three sections of the university land. The remaining sections were chosen by the Board of 1837.
This land was scattered through most of the counties of the state that
had been organized up to 1844. The locations were generally advantageous. 2
The two townships of land conveyed by Congress to Michigan
as an endowment for a university, when compared with the amounts
since granted to other states, were by no means exceptional in quantity. On the contrary, very many of the states now occupying the
place of the old Northwest Territory have received much larger appropriations for the same purpose. If the grant to Michigan has been
productive of exceptional results, it is owing to the fact that lands
were selected of exceptional value. With so much wisdom, indeed,
had the lands been chosen, that in ten years from the time the grant
had been made, they were estimated by the Superintendent of
Public Instruction to have attained an average value of $20 per
acre. 3 As a matter of comparison, it may be stated that of the twentyseven public land states, nineteen received each two townships of
land for university purposes; while of the remaining eight, Alabama,
Florida, Wisconsin, and Minnesota each received four townships;
Mississippi and Ohio three townships apiece, Tennessee 100,000
acres, and Utah 200,000 acres. 4
In the first Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
January, 1837, he estimated the value of the university land at not
1
Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 109.
~Ibid. See also Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 21.
4

C. K. Adams, as quoted by McLaughlin, op. cit., p. 22.
Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 19.
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less than $15 an acre, or $691,200, with an annual income of
$48,384; or more probably $20 an acre, or $921,000, with annual
interest of $64,912. He added his opinion that in any event it could
not fall short of his lowest estimate and believed that it would exceed his highest computation. 1 The event showed, however, that he
had not taken into account the fact that the control of the land was
vested in a political body-the state legislature.
In March, 1837, the legislature authorized the Superintendent
of Public Instruction to sell at auction so much of the university
lands as should amount to the sum of $500,000, with the proviso,
however, that none of the land was to be sold at a price lower than
$20 an acre. In pursuance of this enactment, during that year sales
amounting to more than $150,000 were made, and the land brought
an average price of $22.85 per acre. Now came a series of persistent
assaults on the university property and a period of rather discreditable yielding on the part of the legislature to self-seeking public pressure. When in 1837 the Superintendent came to sell the university
land, he found much of it in the possession of squatters. These persons had no shadow of a legal right or claim, but some had been in
possession for years and had craftily made improvements. Naturally,
since the university land had been well chosen, these were choice
pieces of property. On an attempt being made to oust these squatters they raised such a clamor that the legislature yielded and in
March, 1838, released 10,240 acres of university land that had been
located in 1830. Although the University was allowed to take in exchange as good lands elsewhere, it suffered a double loss: it lost eight
years in which the best lands in the state went off the market, and it
lost the appreciation in value of its own lands for the eight years. In
1839 the legislature went a step further and authorized the sale at
$1.25 an acre of large quantity of the university lands that had been
occupied by settlers. Fortunately the Governor vetoed this Act. In
1838 and 1839 the legislature passed a comparatively innocuous
measure extending the time of payment to purchasers of university
lands. In 1840 hard times struck the new state and the legislature
authorized the sale of nearly 5000 acres of this land at an average
price of $6.21 per acre. This brought to the University some $65,000
less than would have been realized at the minimum price of 1837.
This act was passed as relief for persons who had settled on university
lands. In 1841 the minimum price was reduced to $15 an acre, and
in 1842 to $12 an acre. But as a fmal blow, this last act was made
retroactive. It granted new appraisals of land already sold and repayment of overcharges. In 1843, $34,651 had been either returned or
1

Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 116.
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credited to purchasers. The total sales up to this time had been about
$220,000. All these relief and retrospective acts reduced the amount
realized for the University to about $137,000, which is some $83,000
less than the amount for which the lands had been actually sold.
This does not include the reduction in the price of the land made in
1841 and 1842! Mter this recital of legislative acts it would seem
that little commentary is called for as to the wisdom of vesting control of lands or similar property for educational endowment in a political body like a legislature,-a body which in all history has been
prone to succumb to the political pressure of the moment, without
too much thought of the future, ultimate, and permanent consequences of its immediate acts. A body such as a board of trustees or
regents, whose interests and concern were solely in the guardianship
of the real welfare and prosperity of the university, would, perhaps,
as a matter of expediency, considering the circumstances of the population, have yielded merely to the extent of prolonging the times of
payments on the university land. This would have done the University no harm, for it did not need all the money at that time, and in
due course of events, as the state recovered its prosperity, the full
value of the land would have been realized for the university endowment.
In the ways sketched above the so-called "permanent endowment" of the University of Michigan was established and continues
even unto this day. It is a fund inviolable and not to be diminished,
the interest of which only is available for university expenses. In
1882, when all the university lands except 287 acres had been sold,
the fund amounted to $543,317.66. The average price per acre received for the entire quantity sold up to that time was $11.87, or
more than twice that received for any other educational grant in the
Northwest Territory. 2
On June 30, 1920, the endowment fund amounted to $547,489.40 and the annual interest was $38,428.89. This is probably the
ultimate status of the endowment fund and of the annual interest. It
should be noted that the annual interest includes not only the
amount paid by the state, but also interest on unpaid balances paid
by purchasers of university land. 3
An interesting question may be raised here, and that is, what
has actually become of the money thus paid into the state treasury
to form the university permanent endowment. In 1853 the legislature directed the proper officer to pay to the University at stated
1

356.

Report of State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1880, pp. 354-

2
Knight,
3

op. cit., p. 144.
Financial Report, University of Michigan, 1920, pp. 8, 34.
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intervals, "the entire amount of interest that may hereafter accrue
upon the whole amount of University lands sold or that may be hereafter sold." This act was limited in its effect to two years, but it was
repeated with the same limitations in 1855, 1857, and 1859. In 1861
a similar act passed without limitation. One effect of these acts directing state officers to pay interest on the moneys that came into
the state treasury from the sale of University lands, was to create a
credit on the one side and a debt on the other. In other words, the
state borrowed the university fund, or permanent endowment, and
expended it for state purposes, pledging itself to pay the interest
thereon. The interest is paid in four installments each year at the rate
of seven per cent. 1 It would appear, therefore, from the facts as set
forth by Hinsdale that the entire university endowment has disappeared, having been expended by the state for state purposes. It
exists now only as a book item on which the state obligates itself to
pay seven per cent annual interest. In other words, the endowment
from the United States, instead of being an aid to the tax payers by
relieving them of that much of university support has actually been
transformed into a permanent state debt. This has apparently come
to pass because the management of the fund has been in the hands of
the biennial legislature instead of in the hands of Regents or independent trustees. In the latter case the funds would have been invested under proper safeguards, and at regular intervals the loans
would have been repaid or bonds would have matured and the principal would thus have reverted to the fund. The endowment would
then be actually in hand as a tangible possession. The interest would
relieve the people by that much of taxation. As it now is, the people
of Michigan are taxed to pay annual interest on an endowment which
was given them freely by the government of the United States. They
must now pay the interest plus the additional support of the university. Compare this with the policy pursued by certain other states,
where these endowment funds were placed in the hands of separate
trustees or investment boards, who, under strict legal safeguards, invest and reinvest the funds and turn over the interest to the beneficiaries. Such boards are always able to show either the money in hand
or gilt-edged securities to its full value. Of course, in the case of
Michigan the money is perfectly safe, for the whole credit of the
state is pledged for the payment of the interest, and the interest is of
more importance to the university than is the principal; but the fact
remains, nevertheless, that the people are not relieved of any of the
support of the university by the United States, which was the purpose of the endowment.
1

Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 25.
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Section I, article XIV, of the Michigan constitution pledges the
specific state taxes, except those of the mining companies of the Upper Peninsula, to the payment of interest on the university endowment and the interest on other trust funds in the keeping of the state.
The state Supreme Court has decided, 1896, that when the Act creating the debt to the university was passed, the Legislature must have
intended that it should bear interest at seven per cent and that a
mere change of the legal rate of interest in the state could not nullify
the legislative intent. 1 This of course means, that regardless of the
fluctuations in the price of money as reflected by interest rates, the
state of Michigan must always pay interest on the university endowment at the ft.xed rate of seven per cent.
It should be noted here that the University of Michigan was
supported from its founding to the year 1867 on the income of its
endowment and the fees derived from students,-with the exception
of the $100,000 loan of 1838, the circumstances of which will be detailed later. There was no support from the legislature, then, until
1867. 2 Obviously then, until the latter date the institution was not
in any real sense a state university. It was still a United States land
grant university. The true conception of a state university had not yet
been grasped by the people. It was not unti11867 that the true basis
was established which has been maintained ever since.
CHAPTER IV
THE LEGISLATIVE $100,000 LOAN OF 1838
The university of 1837 as founded had a large potential endowment but no money. Money was needed at once to erect the university buildings at Ann Arbor and to provide the necessary running
expenses. The Regents therefore made application to the Legislature
for a loan against the credit of the endowment. This loan was granted
in 1838 to the amount of $100,000 and took the form of certificates
running twenty years and bearing six per cent interest. The university
was to pay the annual interest and to repay the principal at maturity
from the university fund, that is, from the proceeds of the land
grant. The Regents received a premium of $6000 on these bonds.
They spent the whole amount in carrying on the university branches
already established and in erecting the buildings at Ann Arbor. 3
1

gan

Regents of the University of Michigan vs. Auditor-General, 109 Michi124; as cited by Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 26.
Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 56.
3
Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 24. See also Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 126.
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For several years the income of the university fund was almost
wholly consumed in paying the $6000 annual interest on this loan.
In 1844 the Legislature authorized the acceptance of depreciated
state obligations at par in payment for university lands, and applied
these payments on the university debt. The state also accepted certain Detroit real estate at $8,095 toward this indebtedness. In 1848
the debt had been reduced in this manner to a little over $20,000. In
1852 the whole debt had thus been paid. Then the point was raised
that the trust fund granted by the United States had by these proceedings been illegally and improperly diminished. In 1859 the Legislature, therefore, directed the Auditor-General to pay the university
"interest on the entire amount which has heretofore been or may
hereafter be received by the state for university lands sold or contracted." This action had the effect of restoring the fund to its original status. To clinch the matter, the Legislature of 1877 directed that
$100,000 should be added to the university fund on the books of the
state. This made the loan fmally a gift from the state, with the exception of the $6000 annual interest which had been paid for some
years by the Regents. 1 Whether the university did or did not ever repay the loan to the state has been the subject of a considerable historical controversy. The point is now of no practical importance,
being merely a problem in technical accountancy.
With the proceeds of the $100,000 loan the Regents prepared
to erect the first buildings at Ann Arbor. The Legislature, in the university organic law of 1837 had authorized the Board to procure
suitable plans for buildings, which had to meet the approval of the
Governor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Regents
thereupon employed an architect from New Haven, who drew up
"truly a magnificent design," involving the expenditure of over half
a million of dollars, or twice the whole sum then realized from the
land grant. The plan was accepted by the Regents and approved by
the Governor, but the Superintendent refused his assent. He urged
that the plan would absorb so much of the university fund as to
cripple it in all time to come; and also that a university did not consist in buildings but in the number and ability of its professors and in
its other appointments, as library, cabinets, and works of art. This
Superintendent, it will be remembered, was that same Mr. Pierce who
had been so influential in forming and organizing the educational system of the state in the first constitutional convention. This present
action brought upon his devoted head a storm of denunciation.
There was great indignation especially at Ann Arbor. The Regents
1
Ten Brook, op. cit., pp. 126-133. See also Hinsdale as cited in the preceding note, and Knight, op. cit., p. 144.

164

THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT
fmally receded and adopted a much less ambitious and expensive
plan. 1 It is a pleasure to record that Mr. Pierce lived long enough to
have his sensible veto of the over-ambitious plans fully vindicated
and to regain his merited esteem in the eyes of his fellow citizens.
Thus ended this tempest in a tea pot.
CHAPTERV
THE STATE PERMANENT MILL TAX
The first appropriation from the State for the benefit of the
University was made in 1867. At this time the university fund had
about reached the limit of its growth and student fees had already
been increased. Expenses were increasing, there was an era of high
prices following the Civil War, and the university found itself with a
growing student body and in an impossible position. Recourse was
therefore had to the Legislature for relief. To the credit of that body
be it said that the relief was promptly forthcoming. The 1867 Legislature granted the University the proceeds of a tax of one-twentieth
of a mill on the dollar on all the taxable property of the state. This
brought in $15,000 or $16,000 a year. But the Legislature saw fit to
couple with the appropriation bill an amendment providing that the
Regents must use part of the money for installing at least one professor of homeopathic medicine. This caused great alarm in the university medical school. The Regents, however, declined to accept the
grant on these terms as tending to establish an undesirable precedent
of legislative interference in the internal affairs of the university. In
1869 the Legislature, after some recrimination and censure of the
Regents, granted the $15,000 a year without any conditions; and
also turned over to the university the funds that had accumulated
under the Act of 1867. By these Acts and by the Act of 1871 perpetuating the $15,000 a year appropriation and granting $75,000
for a new lecture and class-room building, the Legislature firmly established the precedent and principle of state aid to the university?
The legislature of 1873 granted the University $25,000 for the
completion of University Hall, and $13,000 to cover a deficit in
revenue for the year ending in June, 1873. It also repealed the Act
granting the University $15,000 a year and adopted a new one giving
the institution the proceeds of a tax of one-twentieth of a mill on
each dollar of taxable property in the state. This was to be a regular
1
Hinsdale,
2

op. cit., p. 30. See also Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 135.
Farrand, op. cit., p. 185.

STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT

165

and permanent tax for the support of the University, and as such it
continued in force for twenty years. The Act became a law without
the approval of the Governor, who believed that the University should
render an account of its trust and receive its maintenance appropriation every two years. 1 Any unprejudiced observer who will read the
subsequent history of the university will, it is believed, concur in the
opinion of the present writer that the Governor in this case was
wrong. Those who were responsible for the institution's management
could now plan definitely for years ahead on a certain fixed income.
It is difficult to plan a university's growth and development on a
hand-to-mouth basis. Growth must be foreseen, systematic development must be projected, needs must be anticipated by allocation of
funds, and orderly and symmetrical progress must be sustained. None
of these things can be done properly without exact knowledge of
available and continuing funds over a term of years. Without this, enlightened and progressive management becomes mere opportunism.
Under the biennial appropriation system, a temporary popular reaction against the university over some comparatively trivial matter, if
it should by unhappy chance coincide with a session of the legislature, might bring about almost irreparable damage through the withholding of necessary funds. The University of Oklahoma suffered
this very thing from the legislature of that state in its 1921 session.
Moreover, the continuing mill tax has the inestimable advantage that
as the state grows in population and wealth, and the increasing demands upon the university call for increasing support, the proceeds
of the mill tax are also automatically enlarged.
It has already been stated that the Legislature of 1873 fixed
the mill tax at one-twentieth of a mill, and this levy raised a sufficient amount for the support and maintenance of the University until
1893. In the latter year it was found necessary to raise the levy to
one-sixth of a mill. In 1899 the rate was made one-fourth of a mill. 2
In 1907 the rate was again raised to three-eights of a mill, and in
1921 to six-tenths of a mill. This last rate was applied to a new
equalized valuation of the state which was increased in 1921 to
$5,000,000,000. Thus the new mill tax will yield $3,000,000 a year
for support. In addition, the Legislatures of recent years have made
appropriations of considerable amounts for building purposes. 3 It
will be seen from all this that the mill tax as a source of maintenance
and support for the university seems now to be a fixed principle of
the fiScal policy of Michigan.
1
Ibid., p. 218.
2
Hinsdale, op.
3

cit., p. 153.
From a letter to the writer, dated October 24, 1921, from Mr. S. W.
Smith, Secretary of the University of Michigan.
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In Table 1 is given a statement of the annual proceeds of the
mill tax at five-year intervals. It will be remembered that the increments represent not only certain increases of rate but also periodic
increases in the state valuation. Some slight variations are due to variations in date of payment from the state to the university treasurer.
TABLE 1. ANNUAL PROCEEDS OF THE MILL TAX, UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN. BY FIVE-YEAR PERIODS 1
Year ending
June 30
1873
1878
1883
1888
1893
1898

Year ending
June 30

Mill Tax

......
......
.......
.......

......
......

$ 15,000

31,500
40,500
35,454
70,625
221,020

1903
1908
1913
1918
1920

. .....
. .....
. .....
. .....
. .....

Mill Tax
$ 315,620

520,230
858,000
1,155,000
1,818,750

CHAPTER VI
LEGISLATIVE DIRECT APPROPRIATIONS
It has already been pointed out that, outside of the $100,000
loan of 1838, the state Legislature contributed nothing to the support of the university until 1867. It was assumed in 1837 that the
avails of the congressional land grant would be abundantly sufficient
to found a university and to maintain it on a large scale. Competent
authorities estimated that the endowment would yield a capital of at
least a million dollars and an annual income of $60,000,-which indeed it would have done if wisely and honestly handled. In considering this annual income it is well also to bear in mind the fact that
there was not then a college in the country that enjoyed an annual
income equal to $60,000 a year. 2 The plans and expectations of
those days, then, were certainly justified by what men know of the
circumstances and prospects of the other colleges of the country.
The frrst appropriation from the state treasury was made in
1867, $15,000 a year, which was brought in by a one-twentieth of
a mill tax on all the taxable property of the state. As has been
pointed out, this tax was renewed biennially for a time and then was
finally made a permanent tax. But it must not be assumed that this
1
Compiled from Reports of the President, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and Financial Reports of the University.
2 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 152.
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was the limit of the state's generosity. From time to time special appropriations were made for specific purposes, such as for meeting
deficits in the university's income or for the erection of needed buildings. One thing should be said here about the latter item. In theory
the mill tax was supposed to meet the university's needs for maintenance and also for buildings. In practice, as the university grew rapidly, it was often found impossible to provide the necessary buildings
out of the stated current income. In those emergencies it was customary to appeal to the state for help, and this help was usually
forthcoming. The Homeopathic Medical School was for years given
a special annual grant of $6,000. In an address made by President
Angell in 1879, he stated that the total sum received by taxation for
the University from the state treasury down to January, 1879, was
$469,000. This was not more than the buildings, grounds, museums,
and libraries were then worth. The sums set aside from the mill tax
for buildings were usually denominated in the official reports as
"Savings for Buildings." These savings are not included in the statement of the proceeds of the mill tax given in Table 1. In Table 2 we
have summed up and consolidated all of the state appropriations for
the University of Michigan from 1867 to 1900. This will then include
all state grants from the beginning up to 1900, with the sole exception of the $100,000 loan of 1838.

TABLE 2. STATE APPROPRIATIONS, 1867-1900.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 1
Law of 1867, 1/20 mill, two years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 30,797
Law of 1869, $15,000 a year for 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75,000
1873-1893, 1/20 mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803,862
1893-1899, 1/6 mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,121,700
276,295
1899, 1/4 mill . . . . . . • . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13,000
To cover deficit, 1873 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
To pay outstanding warrants, 1875 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13,000
Appropriations for specified Buildings and Improvements ... .
553,289
Homeopathic Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
238,750
College of Dental Surgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
129,750
University Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .. . .
93,500
Books for libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79,000
Special salaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36,600
Repairs and contingent expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
125,125
Unclassified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78,766
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1

Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 153.

$3,668,434
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From Table 2 it will be seen that in the thirty-three years between 1867 and 1900 the state made very considerable additions to
the amounts allowed the university through the adopted system of
state aid by a mill tax. Most of these additional contributions were
for buildings or for the provision of special or additional functions,
but nevertheless there were occasions when the Legislature was

TABLE 3. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, INCOME FROM SPECIAL
LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS AND SAVINGS FROM MILL
1
TAX FOR BUILDING PURPOSES, 1901-1920.
Mill Tax Savings
for Buildings*

Year
1901 ......
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906 ......
1907
1908
1909 . . . . 0.
1910 ......
1911 ......
1912
1913 .. " ...
1914 ......
1915 ......
1916 ......
1917
1918
1919
1920 . . . . 0.
••

0

0

••

••

0

•••

0

••

•••

0

••

0

•••••

•••

0

0

••

••

•••••

•••

0

0

••

•

0

••••

0

••••

$

36,048
71,298
167,960
98,905
39,452
80,000
44,375
99,000
252,214
324,866
17,780
8,989
128,500
127,235
83,000
50,000
20,385
35,000

0

Totals . . . .

$1,685,007

Special Appropriations
For Maintenancet For Buildings
$

6,000
9,000
12,000
9,000

$

25,000
25,000

15,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
9,000
109,000
200,000

37,000
50,000
198,000
320,000
55,000
250,000
95,000
215,000
325,000

$468,000

$1,595,000

* The savings from mill tax for building purposes are derived from savings from
the mill-tax income remaining in the hands of the State Treasurer from year
to year, and are available for buildings and permanent improvements. The
amounts shown in this column in Table 3 are the amounts received from the
State Treasurer and are in addition to the mill-tax receipts shown in Table 9.
t With the exception of appropriation for deficit in current expenses of
$100,000.00 in 1919 and $200,000.00 in 1920, all amounts in this column
are for the maintenance of the Homeopathic College and summer hospitals.
1

Compiled from annual Reports of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Financial Reports of the University. These figures have been
carefully checked and corrected through the kindness of Mr. S. W. Smith,
Secretary of the University of Michigan.
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called upon to make up deficits in the ordinary running expenses of
the institution. The proceeds of the mill tax from 1873 to 1920 have
already been given in Table 1. It remains now only to give the extra
or special legislative appropriations from 1901 to 1920 in order to
present a complete conspectus of the state support of the university.
It will be observed that Table 2 lumps the respective sums under
their proper heads without attempting to apportion these amounts
through the years. In Table 3 is presented a statement by years and
general items of the extra or special appropriations from 1901 to
1920 inclusive. There is also included a statement of savings from
mill tax devoted to building purposes. It will be observed that most
of these appropriations are for buildings and repairs. Under the item
of Special Appropriations there is always included an annual grant of
$6,000 for the Homeopathic Medical School, which the Regents
had refused to establish out of the regular state appropriation. In the
last two years there will be noted some large grants to make up deficits in current expenses.
CHAPTER VII
STUDENT FEES
The University of Michgian, in common with other state universities, was founded on the fundamental idea of free tuition. It is
interesting to observe in the history of this institution how circumstances compelled a modification of this idea, at least to the extent
of collecting from the students a contribution toward the incidental
expenses attending instruction. The fees thus levied on students were
increased from time to time as the exigencies of university finance
demanded until today the students are making quite a respectable
contribution toward their own education. It is carefully pointed out,
however, that these are not tuition fees; the odious term tuition fee
is avoided by labeling the contribution with the specious title, "annual tax." Other state universities have had the same experience, and
the "incidental fee" has now generally ceased to be merely nominal
and has apparently become a permanent feature of university life.
Any protest on the part of legislators, alumni, or other interested
persons, is met with the irrefutable argument that the authorities
were driven to take this step of increasing the charges by the necessity of making the budget balance; and that the Regents are perfectly
willing to lower the fees if the legislature will make up the resulting
deficit.
Up to 1865, every student of the University of Michigan,
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resident or non-resident, paid a matriculation fee of $10 and an annual tax of $5. In that year the matriculation fee for non-residents
was raised to $20, and in 1866 to $25. In the latter year also the annual tax for all students was made $10. 1 The annual tax was increased again in 1874, 1878, 1882, 1884, and 1896. The matriculation fees were left unchanged. In 1882 the scale of fees was as
follows:
STUDENT FEES, 1882 2
Matriculation:
Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$10
25

Annual Tax
Literary Department:
Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20
30

Law Department:
Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25
35

The fees for the Medical Department, Homeopathic College, Dental College, and Pharmacy School were the same as for the Law Department. Extra
charges were made for laboratory material, instruments, etc.

In 1896 the annual tax for students of the Department of Literature, Science and the Arts was made $30 for residents and $40
for non-residents. In the professional departments the fee was $35
for residents and $45 for non-residents. The diploma fee remained
unchanged at $10. In 1905 the Regents advanced the annual fee in
all professional schools by $10, but no change was made in the Department of Literature, Science and the Arts. 3 By 1920 we find the
scale of fees to stand as follows:

1

Farrand, op cit., p. 173.
Report, 1882, p. 19.
Hinsdale, op. cit., pp. 149, 370.

2
President's
3
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STUDENT FEES, 1920 1

Matriculation
Michigan Students
Women
Men
All Colleges and Schools

$ 10

$ 10

Non-Residents
Men
Women

$ 25

$ 25

Annual Fees
College of Literature,
Science and Arts. . . . . . .
Colleges of Engin. and
Architecture . . . . . . . . .
Medical School . . . . . . . . .
Law School ...........
College of Pharmacy
Homeopathic Medical
School
College of Dental Surgery . . .
Graduate School. . . . . . . . .

...........

49

45

69

65

64
107
74
64

60
103
70
60

94
127
84
84

90
123
80
80

107
114
49

103
110
45

127
134
69

123
130
65

We find in the scale of fees for this year of 1920 two novel features. One is that the fees run into odd dollars or uneven numbers.
The other is that an unexplained discrimination is shown between
men and women students in the amount of the fee charges, the
women being favored in every instance. Whether this discrimination
is meant to show in a delicate manner that women are incapable of
deriving as much benefit from instruction as are men, and therefore
should not pay so high a fee, the documents do not show? One is
struck also by the wide variety of fees charged in the several schools
and colleges. A certain amount of uniformity would create a more
favorable impression of the institution. A rational scheme would
seem to be to charge one fee for the literary Department and
another fee for all of the professional schools, with the possible exception of the Medical School, where higher operating costs would
justify a markedly higher fee. It should be noted that in the fee scale
quoted above, the fees for the two medical departments include the
laboratory fees.
1

Catalogue of University of Michigan for 1919-1920, Vol. XXI, No. 39,

p. 107.

2

1t is quite probable that the additional amount charged the men is for
club or Union or athletic dues, or some similar activity, the men having more
elaborate or expensive facilities than the women.
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In a supplement pasted into the University Bulletin for 19191920 we fmd a change of fees, to take effect in 1921, announced as
follows:
STUDENT FEES, 1921 1
Matriculation Fee (unchanged)
Annual Fees

Michigan Students
Men
Women
College of Literature, Science
and Arts . . . . . . . . . .
Colleges of Engin. and
Architecture . . . . . . . .
Medical School . • . . . . . .
Law School . . . . . . . . . .
College of Pharmacy
Homeopathic Medical
School . . . . . . . . • .
College of Dental Surgery . .
Graduate School. . . . . . . .

Non-Residents
Men
Women

.

$ 80

$ 76

$105

$101

.
.
.

95
140
105
95

91
136
101
91

120
165
125
120

116
161
121
116

.
.
.

140
140
80

136
136
76

165
175
105

161

171
101

Summer Session

All Students
Colleges of Literature, Science, and the Arts, of Engineering
and Architecture, of Pharmacy, and the Graduate School ...
$26.50
Medical School:
21.50
Laboratory and Demonstration courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinical courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31.50
31.50
Law School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The annual fees for the regular university year include the laboratory
fees charged separately heretofore. A cash deposit is required to cover cost of
material and unusual breakage in the laboratory of chemistry, hygiene, and
bacteriology. In the summer session, laboratory fees are charged extra.

It will be recognized at once, of course, that this relatively large
increase of fees was occasioned and, indeed, necessitated by the
enormous increase in the cost of all services and commodities which
educational institutions use, that immediately followed the close of
the Great War. All colleges were forced to adopt unusual expedients
to tide over the emergency.
1

Catalogue for 1919-20, Vol XXI, No. 39.
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In Table 4 is given a statement of the receipts from student
fees at ten-year intervals from 1845 to 1915, with the additional
item of the receipts for the years 1920 and 1921. The statement is
slightly inaccurate because the different records do not agree in every
respect as to the amounts received under this head. The variation is
explained by the fact the amount would naturally vary a little
through belated payments on any given date; and also because in the
records the receipts from students are usually lumped with small
"receipts from other sources." These small discrepancies, however,
will not materially distort the result.

TABLE 4. RECEIPTS FROM STUDENTS BY TEN-YEAR PERIODS,
1845-1921 1
1845
1855
1865
1875
1885

........... $ 403.94
...........
3,344.84
. . . . . . . . . . . 20,580.78
. . . . . . . . . . . 29,255.00
. . . . . . . . . . . 69,789.07

1895
1905
1915
1920
1921

........... $141,888.34
. . . . . . . . . . . 221,285.97
. . . . . . . . . . . 457,411.04
. . . . . . . . . . . 682,445.16
. . . . . . . . . . . 938,886.55

CHAPTER VIII

GIFTS AND BEQUESTS OF INDIVIDUALS
President Angell, who for so many years represented the university in its relations with the state and with the alumni as well as
with the outside world, made it a point to emphasize in his recurring annual reports that the University of Michigan was a legitimate
object of the benevolence or munificence of its friends and wellwishers, whether among the alumni or the general public. He referred often to the great stream of gifts and bequests that was flowing
in ever-increasing volume to the great Eastern endowed universities
and colleges, and asked why this kind of support should be so conspicuously lacking to a state university. The obvious answer is, of
course, that men of wealth do not feel moved to contribute t0 the
support of an institution that has behind it the resources of a great
and wealthy state. However, the appeal could be made more successfully for things which a legislature may not reasonably be asked to
provide out of public taxation. Therefore bequests and gifts gradually began to be made of collections of books, a natural history collection, an art collection, an athletic field, an auditorium, a dormitory,
1
Compiled from the Financial Reports of the University, and from Reports of the President and the State Superintendent.
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a memorial building. The most notable gift of recent years was the
Men's Union, costing over a million dollars, the contribution of thousands of alumni. As the first generations of Michigan alumni began to
make their way in the world and to acquire wealth, gifts began to increasa for endowment, for scholarships and for various specific trust
purposes. The appeals of President Angell were no longer in vain.
The generosity of the state was being matched by the grateful generosity of the recipients of its educational bounty. Of the total value
of the university's land and buildings in 1921,31 per cent had been
given by alumni and friends. One of the great achievements of the
administration of President Hutchins between 1909 and 1919 was
the organization of the alumni body with special reference to participation in the financial burdens of the university. On June 30,
1921, there were in the hands of the university treasurer trustfunds
consisting of gifts and money for special purposes, mostly from
alumni, to the sum of $967,634.95. 1
1

Financial Report for 1921, p. 45.

4. THE STATE AND IDGHER EDUCATION: A REPORT FROM MICHIGAN, by John W. Lederle, Director, Institute of Public Administration,
University of Michigan 1
This statement* by John Lederle, formerly Controller of the
state of Michigan, portrays relations between the state and
higher education as they have developed in one of our principal
states. It reflects a view that has gained increasing strength
among state officials and students of administration-that there
is much to be said for decentralization of authority in public
as well as private administration.
AT THE OUTSET I should like to express great sympathy for the
objectives of your committee. I abhor any trend to extend governmental controls in such a way as to endanger the initiative and imagination of leaders of higher education. I oppose vehemently a philosophy, seemingly held by some state budget officers, that all
educational institutions should be cast in a common mold, subjected
to standardization, and left no room for experimentation and differentiation.
I assume that you would want me to make some comments on
the problems of government and higher education as seen from the
*Prepared for delivery before the Committee on Government and Higher Education, Baltimore, Maryland, on March 1, 1958.
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government end of the spectrum. Toward the end of this discussion I
will, of course, return to the university end of the spectrum and add
additional Michigan examples of dissatisfaction with external controls.
It was quite an experience for me to go from the relatively
quiet setting of a university professorship of public administration to
the hot seat of Michigan state controller, responsible, under the governor, for preparing the state's budget, for exercising the various
follow-up controls associated with budget execution, and for handling such central housekeeping functions as accounting, purchasing,
motor transport, and capital outlay construction. An ex-professor
controller suddenly discovers that higher education-hitherto the center of his universe-is only one of many state functions competing
for the taxpayers' dollar. He is besieged for funds on all sides. The
department of conservation wants 100 additional forest rangers and
shouts that if it does not get them, there may be a conflagration
which will destroy hundreds of thousands of trees, irreplaceable in
our lifetime. The state police point to the mounting death toll on the
highways and indicate the millions they must have to put an end to
this holocaust. And the department of mental health-to hear this
department's well-intentioned representatives talk, we must forthwith construct a roof over the entire state, since all citizens are on
the verge of mental breakdowns and will need hospitalization. Basically sympathetic to higher education, the ex-professor controller
suddenly finds himself forced to initiate decisions as between higher
education and other worthwhile government services. Having done
so his task is not over, for he must then make recommendations
whereby the figure for all higher education is allocated among the
various colleges and universities in the state system.
It is impossible to give higher education all that it ideally could
use and requests. As the level of services which people demand of
their state government rises, the competition for limited revenues becomes more severe. In Michigan we have not only the competition
between higher education and the demands of mental health, state
police, and conservation, for example, but the decline of the real
property tax at the local level has led to increasing competition for
state funds between state agencies on the one hand and local school
and municipal agencies on the other. Higher education faces particularly severe competition from the public secondary and elementary
school people, who today draw substantial state support rather than
rely wholly on local real property taxes. In this highly competitive
atmosphere, state budget officers, governors, and legislators are understandably asking more and more detailed questions about the
management and programs of public colleges and universities.
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Michigan's two constitutionally independent universities have
not readily accepted this situation. It seems to me that they have
sometimes failed to appreciate their "public" character, one crucial
aspect of which is public accountability and administrative life in a
"goldfish bowl." The plain fact is that our universities are in "politics" and what they do is of concern to the outside public which
foots the bills. As a political scientist this does not disturb me, for I
view politics not as an evil thing but as an influence which can help
universities to improve.
In Michigan there is mounting criticism of the veil of secrecy
with which our constitutionally independent universities have often
surrounded themselves. For a number of years the two university
governing boards refused to open their meetings to the public. The
press was critical of these closed sessions and alleged a "right to
know." Belatedly the governing boards did give in. However, neither
constitutionally independent institution makes its internal operating
budget available to the public, or for that matter, to the budget office, governor, or legislature. Specific requests for information are
promptly complied with, but the entire document, from which the
whole picture of the educational operation could be gauged, is not
available. This secrecy, unique to the two universities, does not set
well with state officials and legislators, or with the press. One does
not have to be around the state capitol for long before he hears numerous antagonistic comments about the "fourth branch" of state
government. While there are great reservoirs of good will, some cracks
are appearing.
Your staff has been accumulating nation-wide evidence which
may indicate a more and more questioning attitude toward public
colleges and universities generally. A past president of the Association of State Budget Officers told me recently that at their annual
conferences there has been a hardening of critical comments by the
membership. From an attitude of "Let's get together and work things
out," which he says budget officers had a very few years ago, he now
reports a change to an attitude that might be described as "You can't
work with the colleges and universities, so let's go ahead on our own
and knock them down to size." As Arthur Naftalin told you last
year, budget people do not see higher education as unique. They are
not likely to treat it as sacrosanct. They must allocate limited funds
between competing services and are not for putting higher education
on a pedestal.
Not only is higher education in severe competition with other
governmental services, with the obligation of first establishing its
over-all portion of state appropriations, but individual colleges and
universities are in competition with each other for that portion of
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total funds to be allocated to higher education. The scramble for
funds among the colleges and universities, always well publicized by
the press, often hurts the prestige of higher education.
Because in Michigan our six separate boards governing nine institutions reach little, if any, advance agreement, the battle for funds
sometimes has descended to the level of name-calling between competing institutions. On occasion clientele groups have been marshalled
and the pressure on the legislature has been so severe that the legislative attitude has in a few instances become one of "a plague on all
your homes." If public higher education in Michigan could agree and
present a common front, some of the fumbling, inept questions raised
by budget officers and legislators would never be asked. External investigators are particularly likely to look for duplication and waste
when colleges and universities get away from their primary and
unique function of teaching and research, into television, extension,
and a variety of off-campus service activities. Single state boards of
higher education to co-ordinate the separate institutions are not an
absolute answer, any more than a single department of defense is the
final answer to interservice rivalries. But colleges and universities in a
particular state must maximize areas of agreement so as to present a
common front. It is unseemly and ruinous to fight each other.
So much for comments on the way relations between government and higher education in Michigan look from the government
end of the spectrum. Now let us turn to the opposite end. The two
constitutionally independent universities, which receive their funds
in a lump sum, have been singularly free to handle their own accounting, purchasing, and other administrative arrangements without external interference. However, in the capital outlay area, the legislature has more and more seen fit to tie up release of construction
funds by requiring clearances from the state's building division. Also,
self-liquidating projects which used to be authorized by the governing boards independently, now need legislative advance approval,
even though they do not involve expenditure of state funds, and
even though any taxpayer liability, should they go sour, would be
moral rather than legal. However, up to now such approval has been
automatic and perfunctory.
I should mention one new development, namely recent appeals
to the legislature by each of the constitutionally independent universities for special projects which, when granted, come in the form of a
line item. Beginning with a special agricultural marketing program at
Michigan State University in 1954 there has followed a traffic administration center and a labor and industrial relations center at the same
university. The University of Michigan, a little slow in the up-take
and perhaps fearing the implications of the line item for special
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projects, has only this current year begun to push this approach in
earnest. It has presented requests, which have been included in the
governor's budget recommendations, for funds for an institute oflabor and industrial relations, a Great Lakes research institute, a program of research and service for small business enterprise in Michigan,
and an institute of science and technology. If, as some observers
have felt, the University of Michigan and Michigan State have been
unusually fortunate in having fleXibility of educational management
because of lump sum appropriations, we are witnessing a perceptible
trend away from this in recent requests for special program items.
One cannot be certain whether funds for these programs could only
have been obtained on a line-item basis. Enthusiasm for line-item
programs might dissipate rapidly if hindsight indicates them to be an
incursion upon the concept of lump-sum appropriation. One gets the
impression that some educators are going overboard on the salable,
categorical programs at the expense of more central institutional objectives. Perhaps we are only witnessing here what has been true for
a long time in the capital outlay area; namely, that it is easier to get
a legislature to appropriate for medical and science buildings than for
music and library buildings.
In contrast to the two constitutionally independent universities, the other institutions present requests for funds after submitting
a detailed proposed operating budget which is gone over by budget
officials and legislative committees. They receive their operating
funds not in a lump sum but under the three headings of (I) salaries
and wages, (2) contractual services, supplies and materials, and (3)
equipment. When it comes to spending their funds, these schools are
subject to central accounting procedures, centralized purchasing controls, and central motor pool surveillance. They do, of course, control their own personnel practices.
In preparing for today's session I took pains to ask a number
of Michigan college administrators how central state controls look to
them. Do these officials feel that they are being assisted or are they
being improperly circumscribed? On the whole there can be no question that Michigan external controls are more wisely exercised than
external controls in most states. I am convinced however that from
the worm's eye point of view; rather than from the state controller
point of view, there is plenty of room for improvement. There is
many a slip between the statement of policy by the state controller,
expressing sympathy for vesting large discretion in the educational
institutions, and the actual carrying out of this policy by the personnel of the central controlling department. Time and again during my
period in lansing, when conflicts between departmental personnel
and educational institutions were called to my attention, I found it
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necessary to reverse over-zealous centralist activities by my staff.
Some staff members were real martinets. There are those who assert
that there is a congenital tendency on the part of central purchasing,
accounting, and budget people to get beyond their depth and to violate the principle of service which they avow as their reason for being.
I believe there is much truth in this claim. External control personnel,
particularly those in the lower ranks, tend to "go by the book" and
frequently show little real judgment or discretion. Their frame of
mind emphasizes negative values.
Let me briefly run over some of the headaches and criticisms
which the institutions, other than the constitutionally independent
schools, have brought out.
I believe the basic complaint is related to the legislative practice of appropriating under the three headings mentioned above.
Even though the gross appropriation is adequate, the schools cannot
transfer moneys from any one of these three major accounts to the
other in the interest of efficiency and flexibility to meet changed
conditions. In one of our smaller institutions, whose enrollment has
more than doubled in five years, tight budgeting has consistently underestimated enrollments by as much as twenty per cent of total
enrollment. The legislative policy for this institution encourages accepting all qualified applicants, but the school's administrators are
handicapped by another legislative policy which prohibits transfers.
Consequently, school officials hang on tenterhooks as they push
through deficiency bills, not knowing until May of the fiscal year
whether the legislative leaders will pick up the check for the deficit.
As another example, one college controller told me that the "notransfer" rule sometimes leads to spending $300 from the salaries
and wages account to build a supply cabinet which could have been
bought for $100 from the exhausted equipment account.
There is much complaint about unrealistic application of
student-teacher ratio figures by budget personnel. Certainly Ferris
Institute, with its extensive trade-technical program, and the University of Michigan, with its large graduate and professional program,
should have student-teacher ratios which differ greatly from those
suitable for schools where more traditional, essentially undergraduate, programs dominate. Yet budget examiners do not make those
distinctions and many an attempt to quantify and compare institutions turns out to be a non sequitur.
There are complaints about capital outlay controls. All educators are very conscious that budget office cuts in totals for new
buildings may be necessary in view of current limited state capital outlay resources. However, the students will shortly be in
college; additional construction will be too late and at inflated
prices.
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While the schools generally like central motor transport facilities, they are less happy about the central purchasing unit. There are
the usual complaints about long delays in receiving materials ordered.
When central purchasers exercise their right to differ on specifications by adding a phrase permitting substitution of "or equal"
products, the schools claim they get some pretty inferior substitutions. They are almost bitter over recent attempts by the state purchasing and accounting divisions to codify expenditures by materials
groupings, and to apply these new account titles to all institutions,
whether they be hospitals, prisons, state police posts, or educational
institutions. In this way, instructional materials for pharmacy or
chemistry classes are classified under the code as "hospital supplies,"
instructional materials used at the one institution teaching cosmetology are classified as "housekeeping supplies," and trade and industrial class materials are coded as "maintenance supplies." One
college controller told me that he had to keep two sets of books with
separate classifications, because the state-imposed classifications did
not give the true picture of educational operations. I could go on.
Suffice it to say that the climate is one of ferment-the relationship
between educational institutions and external control agencies is uneasy, though not bitter as in some states.
I should like now to make some constructive suggestions on
how higher education might proceed so as to secure improved relations with government. Your committee is doing a fine job of accumulating the criticisms and gripes. But this is essentially a negative
approach. In the end you will no doubt wish to consider a positive
program. Although I have not given this the years of thought that
most of you have devoted to the subject, I would like to present four
suggestions which I believe you might well include in any action
program.
First, you should look at your campus educational role, and
improve programs in public administration so as to raise the level of
public service and turn out better potential government administrators.
Second, you should focus on the statutory jungle which governs external administrative control procedures in almost every state
to the end of developing improved laws, if not model laws, for accounting, purchasing, budgeting and so forth.
Third, you should approach the national professional associations of state budget officers, purchasing officers, controllers, etc.,
talk over mutual problems, and in an atmosphere of frank discussion
seek to improve relations.
Fourth, higher education itself should demonstrate a very real
concern about economy and efficiency, rightly defined, which
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concern will make unnecessary many of the external controls presently being experienced. Let me now discuss each of these suggestions in greater detail.
Higher education can do much through its professional training
programs to assure that we get better informed, professionally trained
government officials. As I read the parade of horribles set forth in the
early studies of the Committee, I am not so much depressed by the
fact that these are improper interferences with higher education as I
am by the fact that they represent violations of current administrative doctrine, whether applied to higher education or to any other
function of government. The pressures for centralized purchasing,
for co-ordination of state expenditures for higher education through
central budget preparation and executing agencies, for central supervision of capital outlay construction, etc., were based on a desire to
improve the economy and efficiency of state government and to put
an end to evils associated with wide dispersion of authority. But
when external control agencies hamper rather than promote, when
they unduly delay, as seems so often the case, their rationale disappears.
What is needed is better trained professional purchasing agents,
budget officers, accounting officials, who recognize that they are not
the main reason for government, but necessary evils. Applied to higher education they must come to understand that education is one of
the major functions of government and that purchasing or budgeting
or accounting or personnel officials have a supporting rather than
dominating role. Where there is a conflict between external control
officials and those responsible for carrying out such a major governmental function as education, doubtful cases should be resolved in
favor of the views of the major function officials. In cases of doubt,
it is only with the greatest of temerity that the external control officials substitute their judgment for that of the major function officials
who have the ultimate responsibility for getting the job done.
Of course, whether there is doubt, is often a question. Even
within educational institutions there are frequent conflicts between
central administrative officials and the functional departments which
are engaged in teaching and research. If you question this, you
should read the delightful book by William G. Morse, the former
Harvard purchasing officer, entitled Pardon My Harvard Accent. In
this book he describes with much humor the difficulties he experienced in attempts to economize and standardize and save money at
Harvard. Professors have their idiosyncrasies and some are absolutely
certain that they cannot write except with Venus lead pencils or with
Parker ink, even though the purchasing officer contends that he can
get off-brand products of equal quality at a much cheaper price. If
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the professor insists on a Zeiss microscope while the purchasing officer contends that a Bausch and Lomb microscope is just as good and
costs much less, we get into a somewhat more doubtful realm. If I
were the purchasing agent I would be inclined to overrule the professor on the pencils and ink but would be inclined to give him his head
on the microscope, on the theory that he is doing the research and
will have to live with the microscope through the years. But other
purchasing officers would very likely consider his desires for the
more expensive microscope as being an idiosyncrasy which should be
overruled. Even ink may be a doubtful case for I have heard librarians
complain about the ink that purchasing has wasted its money on.
Recent management literature has shifted the emphasis away
from centralized managerial controls. Hierarchical values, while important, are being challenged by new concepts such as "Bottom-up
Management." Present thinking is that we should decentralize, that
the role of central control officials is to assist the departments and
agencies and encourage them to develop their own control units. In
purchasing, in budgeting, in personnel management, the new emphasis is to reverse the centralist trend of a few years ago. The federal
Hoover Commission and most state Little Hoover Commissions have
stressed decentralization.
Fifty years ago a U.S. forest ranger could not sell a cord of
wood without advance clearance from Washington. Not so long ago
there would be long delays in the settling of minor claims arising
from collisions between army vehicles and civilian motor cars due to
centralized control procedures. Today these matters are handled
quickly in the field, without the frustrating delays and increased possibility of error that would have been involved under previous more
centralized procedures. Maybe the present generation of state external control officials are out of touch with these trends. However,
it is up to higher education to make sure that our future graduates,
many of whom are bound to move into external control positions,
acquire a proper understanding of the primary responsibility of the
major function agency to resolve the doubtful questions. The trend
away from centralization of managerial controls is a confirmation of
the axiom that not all roads should lead to the state capital.
Turning now to my second suggestion, I have the impression
that the laws dealing with accounting, purchasing, capital outlay, etc.,
laws which state officials are enforcing, are frequently outdated, inconsistent, and as unpalatable to these officials as they are to the universities and colleges. It seems to me that the time is ripe for a frontal
attack with the objective of modernizing these laws in particular
states or of developing model laws which might be adopted rather
generally by the several states.
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As Michigan's state controller, I discovered that much of our
accounting legislation was very ancient, adapted more to the horse
and buggy days, than to the present. But in my short tour of duty I
found no way to marshal support for a complete face lifting. Paradoxically, Michigan had created a shiny-new central department of
administration with the hope of introducing sound business management in state government, but had left the new department with
moss-encrusted accounting laws which proved a constant source of
frustration. Well do I remember an attorney general's opinion,
rendered late in the fiscal year, which suddenly informed all state
agencies through the department of administration that it was no
longer sufficient to order supplies and materials and encumber the
appropriation within a fiscal year. There must be actual delivery of
the ordered goods within the fiscal year. If there should be failure of
delivery only for a few days beyond the end of the fiscal year the
funds would lapse. A new request for funds would have to be justified and pushed tortuously through the legislature. This particular
attorney general's ruling raised complete havoc. Yet no matter how
sympathetic the state controller and his subordinates might be, it
was necessary to apply the ruling to all agencies including the colleges and universities.
In the purchasing area modern practice calls for delegating to
the agency the authority to make small purchases within the local
community without going through central competitive bidding procedures. Yet in many states the central purchasing people insist upon
central handling of even the smallest purchase. While in some instances they may require this out of pure cussedness, I suspect that
at other times their hands are tied by law. Not infrequently statutes
governing competitive bidding eliminate all discretion. Your committee might well explore the legislative jungle which governs external
control procedures to see what can be done about making a better
statutory environment for relations between higher education and
government.
As a third suggestion, it seems to me that there are many possibilities for improving relations between higher education and government through conversations with the professional associations of
government officials. The state budget officers, state purchasing officers, and other groups have national organizations. It should be possible to get the viewpoint of higher education expressed by speeches at
their national conferences. Joint committees to study common problems might be helpful. In a particular state, where there is a rather
benighted state official riding herd on the colleges and universities, it
may be possible to educate him through the admonitions or ribbing
of his professional colleagues from the outside. After all, while he
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may not be willing to listen to complaints from university representatives from his own state, many times he will react to the comments
of his professional colleagues from other states.
Finally, if there is any truth to the old adage that a good offense is the best defense, it seems to me that it may well have application in connection with the relations of higher education to external control officials. If the philosophy of decentralization, about
which I have been talking, is actually to be implemented, it is up to
the universities to demonstrate that they are as much concerned
about efficient and economical management as are the advocates of
external controls. Carping criticism will get nowhere in the face of
strong public demand for economy and efficiency in state government. There can be no doubt that colleges and universities have much
to learn. With no harm to institutional objectives they could save
public funds by paying greater attention to modern business practices. While Michigan's two constitutionally independent universities
are on the whole very efficiently run, they could learn much from
studying procedures that have been developed by the state department of administration. The state motor pool, maintained by the department of administration, for example, makes cars available to operating agencies for 5~ a mile and is completely self-supporting. As
a professor at the University of Michigan, using the University of
Michigan motor pool, my unit is charged 7p a mile. What are the reasons for this difference in cost? They are worth exploring. In these
days of taxpayer concern about rising governmental costs, external
controls over higher education are bound to expand unless leaders of
higher education can convince the public that they have as much concern about operating costs as any external control official could ever
have. This concern must be communicated to the public and internal
administrative procedures must be tightened so as to reflect the concern.
Although the situation may look black at times, in any struggle
between a prominent state university and state officials, never underestimate the power of the university. In Michigan, at least, it takes
considerable temerity for a legislator to attack one or the other of
the two major state institutions. The institutions have tremendous
prestige, and their alumni, both of the real and of the synthetic variety, are likely to remember criticisms of their favorite school when
voting at the next election. Of course, much of the interference with
universities occurs in the less public atmosphere of bureaucratic
decision-making, and hence, it is not always easy to crystallize support for the university's viewpoint. However, let me remind you that
if you are on the university end, you are probably exaggerating your
helpless situation. Believe me when you are on the external-control-
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end, you feel that the best cards are in the hands of the leaders of
higher education. I have no doubt that if you take pains to get your
story across, you will win the day.

5. JUDICIAL DECISION

Regents of the University of Michigan v. Turner, Auditor General

109 Mich. 135, 135-39; 66 N. W. 956 (1896)
HOOKER, J. Certain lands granted by the Federal Government
to the State as an endowment to the State University having been
sold by the State, the fund resulting therefrom constitutes the university fund. A similar provision exists for primary schools, while
State land grants for the endowment of the State Normal School and
the Agricultural College have resulted in funds for the support of
these institutions. It is the custom of the State to pay interest upon
such funds annually, the same having been paid from specific taxes.
See Const. art. 14, § 1. Act No. 114, Laws 1845, provided for the
payment of interest upon the primary school fund, at a rate therein
specified, viz., 7 per cent. This act was repealed in express terms. See
Rev. Stat. 1846, p. 736.
Rev. Stat. 1846, p. 216, § 8, provides for interest for the university and primary school funds in the following language:
"Upon all sums paid into the state treasury on account of the
principal of the university or primary school funds, except where
other provision is or shall be made by law, the treasurer shall compute interest from the time of such payment, or from the time of the
last computation of interest thereon, to the first Monday of April in
each and every year, and shall give credit therefor to the universityor primary school interest fund, as the case may be, and such interest
shall be paid out of the general fund."
Laws 1847, p. 173, Act No. 107, makes provision for interest
upon these funds from the annual state tax upon railroads. Laws
1851, p. 116, Act No. 99, § 10, provides for the payment of interest
upon the various educational funds. See, also, Laws 1853, p. 85, Act
No. 60; Laws 1855, Act No. 73; Laws 1857, Act No. 56.
Laws 1859, p. 397, Act No. 143, being 2 How. Stat. § 5360,
provides:
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"That the auditor general be, and he is hereby, requiredo to
credit to the university interest fund, interest from and after the
thirty-first day of December, eighteen hundred and sixty, on the entire amount that has heretofore been, or may be hereafter, received
by the State for university lands sold or contracted, and to draw his
warrants upon the state treasurer for the same, who is hereby required to pay the same to the treasurer of the university upon his application therefor, from time to time, as the said interest may accrue,
and be required for the use of the university."
Section 5361 is as follows:
"The people of the State of Michigan enact, that upon all sums
paid into the state treasury upon account of the principal of any of
the educational funds, except where the provision is or shall be made
by law, the auditor general shall compute interest from the time of
such payment, or from the time of the last computation of interest
thereon, to the first Monday of April in each and every year, and
shall give credit therefor to each fund, as the case may be; and such
interest shall be paid out of the specific taxes."
Thus, it will be seen that at no time has the law fixed the rate
of interest to be paid upon these funds in express terms, except by
Act No. 114 of the Laws of 1845, which was repealed, as stated, the
next year. During all of the time since 1845, up to the present year,
7 per cent. upon the several funds has been paid by the State, and,
up to the year 1887, 7 per cent. has been the rate of interest established by the usury laws. In 1887 the general statute was changed,
and the legal rate of interest upon money was then fixed at 6 per
cent., where it has since remained. See Act No. 138, Pub. Acts 1887;
Act No. 156, Pub. Acts 1891.
The relators ask a writ of mandamus, to compel the payment
of 7 per cent. upon the university fund. The question before us is,
therefore, a construction of the statutes referred to. It appears to be
conceded that the several laws providing for the payment of interest
upon the university fund contemplated its computation at 7 per cent.,
that being the legal rate. It is a general rule of construction that,
where an act is passed for a particular purpose, it is not abrogated by
general legislation, sufficiently broad to include it, unless the intent
to abrogate it is clear, under the maxim, "Generalia specialibus non
derogant. "Earl of Derby v. Commissioners, L. R. 4 Exch. 226;Kidston v. Insurance Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 546; Conservators of River
Thames v. Hall, L R. 3 C. P. 419; Endl. Interp. Stat. § 223, and cases
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this case, unless we are to say that the legislature intended that the
legal rate should be paid upon the fund, whatever that rate might be.
We think it more reasonable to say that, when those acts were
passed, the intention was to pay interest at the then-existing legal
rate, which was 7 per cent., and that the general statute was made a
part of these several acts by reference, which reference must necessarily be implied, as there could be no other means of determining
the rate intended. The rule in such cases is that such adoption does
not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so
taken, unless it does so by express intent, and that the repeal of the
statute adopted will not affect its operation as a part of the statute
adopting it. Schlaudecker v. Marshall, 72 Pa. St. 200; Nunes v. Wellisch, 12 Bush, 363; Knapp v. City of Brooklyn, 97 N.Y. 520;In re
Main Street, 98 N. Y. 454; Allen v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah, 9 Ga.
286; U.S. v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141; Kendall v. U.S., 12 Pet. 524; Clarke v.
Bradlaugh, 8 Q. B. Div. 69;Darmstaetter v. Moloney, 45 Mich. 621.
The latter case is as closely analogous to this as it could well be
without raising the identical question before us. In that case the charter of the city of Detroit provided that "the assessor * * * shall be,
and is hereby, vested with the powers and duties of supervisors, as
provided by the laws of this State" etc. It will be noticed that this
does not specifically refer to any particular statute or statutes, but in
a general way it adopts such as prescribe the duties of supervisors,
and it cannot be doubted that the effect would have been the same
had the words "as provided by the laws of this State" been omitted,
as they would have been clearly implied. It might as well be said in
that case that the legislature intended that the duties of the assessor
should change, like those of supervisors, with changes in the law fixing the duties of the latter, as to say in this case that the legislature
intended that the rate of interest to be paid upon the educational
funds should change from time to time, with changes made in the
usury laws, because the act providing for the payment of such interest failed to fix a specific sum as the rate to be paid, or to specifically
mention the then-existing law fixing the legal rate of interest, which
was unnecessary. This court held in the case cited that changes in
the duties of supervisors did not affect the assessor of Detroit, saying:
"The case falls under the rule that a piece of legislation for a
particular city, which adopts, under general words of reference, a
specific regulation in a separate general law, is not to be taken as
adopting prospectively the future alterations in the provision of the
general law so appropriated, unless the intent therefor is express or
strongly implied."
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It is reasonable to suppose that the framer of the interest law
had not in mind the question of interest upon educational funds,
and, if he had, there is nothing to call attention to that subject in the
bill or title; and while we do not say that this would be fatal to the
bill, or exclude the respondent's contention, if the intent were manifest, the construction here given to this act is in harmony with the
spirit of the Constitution, which provides safeguards against concealed or unintended legislation.
These principles seem to us conclusive of the question, and the
writ will issue as prayed, but without costs.

The other Justices concurred.
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CHAPTER VI
EMINENT DOMAIN
1. INTRODUCTION

Under our form of government private property cannot be
taken from the owner except for a public purpose. The courts
have affirmed that use by a public university constitutes therequired public purpose.
In Brooks, 1 the property involved was to be the site of the
Lawyers' Club of the University of Michigan Law School. The
Lawyers' Club is used mainly as a student dormitory, and, apparently this use was challenged because at that time the lodging
of students was almost exclusively the function of private boarding houses, some of which were probably condemned to make
way for the Lawyers' Club. The court, however, had no trouble
in sanctioning this use of condemned land, and to show how far
the University must go, the court seemed to have no more difficulty approving the construction of an 18-hole golf course on
condemned land in Pommerening.
The tenants of a hotel about to be condemned in the
Hooper case would have had a right to challenge the "necessity"
of the taking in a condemnation case, but, when the owners
agreed to sell the property to Wayne University, the tenants had
no standing to challenge the sale.
In the final case in this chapter, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the right of the Board of Trustees of Western
Michigan University to condemn land adjacent to the University
campus for use as a nature park. The court rejected as "foolhardy" the contention that the taking of land for such a use was
not necessary for the welfare of students who are no longer interested in the "birds and the bees."
The statutes setting forth the procedure in these condemnation cases are appended to this chapter.
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2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The People ex rei. The Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Brooks
224 Mich. 45, 46-53; 194 N. W. 602 (1923)
McDONALD, J. This is a review by certiorari of certain condemnation proceedings had in the circuit court of Washtenaw
county. An alumnus of the university of Michigan proposed to the
regents that he would contribute a million and a half dollars for the
construction of a building to be used for law school purposes, and to
be known as "The Lawyers' Club." The regents accepted the proposal and arranged with the State administrative board for the money
with which to purchase a portion of two blocks immediately south
of the campus as a site for the building. Eleven property owners refused to sell, and it became necessary for the board of regents to endeavor to acquire the title by judicial condemnation. By resolution
of November 24, 1922, they declared the taking of this property a
public necessity for use of the university and directed the attorney
general of the State of Michigan to institute condemnation proceedings. A petition was filed, trial was had, and on February 6, 1923, the
jury rendered its verdict, finding a public necessity for the taking of
the property and awarding the defendants damages in various
amounts, totaling $230,874. The court entered an order confirming
the verdict. Six of the property owners accepted the amount awarded
them and made deeds to the university. Five are here seeking a review
of the proceedings.
The first question presented by the record is stated by defendants in their brief as follows:
"The statute under which the proceedings were brought is unconstitutional, to the extent that it attempts to authorize proceedings in behalf of the regents of the university of Michigan, because
the title of the statute is not broad enough to authorize the enactment of such authority."
The proceedings were brought under Act No. 236 of the Public
Acts of 1911 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 349 et seq.), the title of which
reads as follows:
"An act to authorize proceedings by the State to condemn private property for public use."
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The following provisions of the Constitution of the State of
Michigan form the basis of defendants' objections to the title in
question.
"No law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title." * * * Const. 1908, Art. 5, § 21.
"The regents of the university and their successors in office
shall continue to constitute the body corporate known as "The Regents of the University of Michigan.' " Art. 11, § 4.
"The board of regents shall have the general supervision of the
university and the direction and control of all expenditures from the
university funds." Art. 11, § 5.
"The regents of the university of Michigan shall have power to
take private property for the use of the university in the manner prescribed by law.'' Art. 13, § 4.
It is argued by the defendants that the title only authorizes
proceedings by the State, that "The Regents of the University of
Michigan" is a constitutional corporation, independent of the State,
separate and distinct in its authority, and, therefore, the title does
not indicate that one of the objects of the legislation is the taking of
private property by that corporation. While it is true that "TheRegents of the University of Michigan.'' more commonly called the
"board of regents," is a separate entity, independent of the State as
to the management and control of the university and its property, it
is nevertheless a department of the State government, created by the
Constitution to perform State functions, and the real estate which it
holds, or acquires, is public property belonging to the State, held by
the corporation in trust for the purposes of the university which are
public purposes. See Auditor General v. Regents of the University,
83 Mich. 467 (10 L. R A 376).
In support of their conception of the legal character of this
corporation, counsel for the defendants seem to rely on Weinberg v.
Regents of the University, 97 Mich. 246. A careful reading of the
opinion of Justice GRANT in that case will show that the decision
is based solely on the constitutional right of the regents to the absolute and exclusive control of all university property. That right has
been recognized by every judicial decision of this court in which this
question has been considered. It has become the well settled purpose
and policy of the law. But it has not been held that the university
was not a State institution, or that the real estate which the regents

192

THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT
are authorized to acquire and hold for university purposes is not
property of the State. The following cases are of interest on the history of the university and the constitutional powers and duties of its
board of regents. Regents of the University v. Board of Education, 4
Mich. 213; Regents of the University v. Detroit Young Men's Society,
12 Mich. 138; Sterling v. Regents of the University, 110 Mich. 369
(34 L. R A. 150);Regents of the University v. Auditor General, 167
Mich. 444.
With this understanding as to the character of the corporation,
it will plainly be seen that there is here no constitutional objection
to the title of the act in question. The one general purpose as expressed in the title and in the body of the act is the same, viz., the
condemnation of private property for public use. Every section is
germane to the object expressed in the title. It is not necessary for
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the various institutions for which the land is to be used should be designated in
the title. In Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, this court, speaking
through Mr. Justice STEERE, said:
"If the act centers to one main general object or purpose which
the title comprehensively declares, though in general terms, and if
provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title
are germane, auxiliary or incidental to that general purpose, the constitutional requirement is met.
••A title is but a descriptive caption, directing attention to the
subject-matter which follows."
We think the general object of the act under which this proceeding is brought is sufficiently expressed in its title.
It is further urged by counsel for the defendants that though
the act be constitutional in respect to its title, it does not include the
board of regents, because it provides that the judgment of confmnation vests the title of the land in the State instead of in the corporation, and requires the proceeding to be brought in the name of the
State. In this regard it is the claim of counsel that only the regents in
their corporate capacity can hold title to the property, and that the
Constitution gives the corporation the right of eminent domain in its
own name. It will be observed, however, that this right is to be exercised by the regents in ••the manner prescribed by law." The act in
question is apparently the attempt of the legislature to prescribe the
proceeding necessary to the exercise of this power. We see no constitutional objection to the provision requiring the suit to be prosecuted
in the name of the State. It is the manner prescribed by law. The
money for the payment of this property was furnished by the State,
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and deposited in court by the administrative board for the payment
of the judgment. The title to the land was taken and is held by the
State, by consent of the board of regents, for the use and benefit of
the university. The buildings to be erected thereon are for the use of
the people, under the exclusive management and control of the regents. The State alone may not sell it or divert it from the use for
which it was acquired. The regents could not sell it if the title had
vested in their corporation. It is the public property of the State devoted to a particular public purpose, and whether held by the State
or by the regents in their corporate capacity, it is still subject to the
absolute control of the latter, and that is all the Constitution requires.
Our attention has not been called to any law prohibiting the State of
Michigan from holding title to lands for the use and benefit of the
university. Inherently it may do so. The right of the regents of the
university, however, to take and to hold title in their corporate capacity for the purposes of the university is unquestioned, and,
though it is not a constitutional right, if the exercise of that right be
necessary to the absolute management and control of the property,
to permit the State to take it would be a violation of the spirit and
purposes of the provisions of the Constitution, as construed by this
court. But as affecting the question of control, it would seem to be
immaterial whether the title of real estate be held by the regents or
by the State. The mere holding of the title without the right to sell
or divert, or to manage or control, could not interfere with the present constitutional powers of the board of regents. It is held by the
State subject to the right of the regents, to exclusively control and
manage it. There is no constitutional objection to the requirement
that title to the land shall vest in the State. If the State may hold the
title, the law in question is applicable to proceedings by the regents
for the judicial condemnation of land for use of the university. It was
plainly so intended by the legislature, and, we think, in its enactment,
due regard was given to the constitutional rights and powers of the
regents. They are not here questioning it.
The third objection raised by defendants in their brief is "That
the use for which the property is being taken is not a public use."
The following letter from the donor, supplemented by the testimony
of university officials, clearly shows the necessity of the proposed
building for use of the students attending the law school:
"To the Board or Regents,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
"Dear Sirs:-If agreeable to you, I will erect on the two blocks
on South University avenue, between South State street and Tappan
avenue, a law students' combined club and dormitory building, with
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the same advantages as you have extended to other buildings, namely,
the university to furnish free heat, light, and power. The building is
to be known as 'The Lawyers' Oub,' to be governed by five governors, consisting of the dean of the law faculty (who shall be presideht), and four other governors to be selected by the board of regents
from the law faculty. All members of the law school are to be eligible
to membership in the proposed club, subject to such conditions as
the club authorities may prescribe. All lawyers whether residing in
the State or not, and whether previously connected with the university or not, shall be eligible to membership, subject to being elected
by governors. All occupants of the building shall be members of the
club and shall pay annual dues as the governors may determine, and
are to be selected by the dean of the law school from the senior law
class. Members of the club not living in the building shall also pay
such annual dues as the governors may determine. Going prices shall
be charged for rooms and board.
"The proposed building will furnish sleeping and study rooms
for one hundred and fllty law students and dining accommodations
for three hundred.
"All dues and all profits from the operation of the building
shall be used exclusively for legal research work, to be expended
from time to time as the governors may deem best. This legal research work will render possible the study of comparative jurisprudence and legislation, National and State, and also of foreign countries, ancient and modern. Such work should be of use in proposed
legislation, and besides leading to the production of reliable law
treatises and studies, would help to systematize the law as a science.
The European plan of giving leisure time to professors to pursue
their studies and produce original works, may well be applied in
America to professors of law, who at present are absorbed too exclusively in classroom work. A legal research fund could be used to
pay part of their salaries, thus giving them time for original research.
"The character of the legal profession depends largely on the
character of the law schools. Real lawyers were never needed more
than now, and they have grave responsibilities. There never was a
time when they had so much power as now. It will be for the lawyers
to hold this great republic together, without sacrifice of its democratic institutions.
"Yours very truly,
"April 25, 1922."
The claim that the property to be acquired is not for public
use is so plainly without merit that we do not deem it necessary to
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The final objection to the proceeding relates to the failure of
the jury to allow Rose T. Lueck any damages for the impairment of
the value of the east 44 feet of her lot not included in the petition
for condemnation. Under proper instructions the court left this question to the jury. The verdict made no reference to damages to the
east 44 feet, but awarded a lump sum of $14,000. The evidence
taken as to damages, which counsel say is undisputed, is not included in the return, and we are therefore unable to determine the
question raised.
After careful consideration of the various questions presented
by this record, we are convinced that there is no ground for issuing
the writ of certiorari. The writ heretofore issued will be dismissed,
with costs to the plaintiff.
WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE,
MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

The People ex rei. Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Pommerening
250 Mich. 391, 393-98; 230 N.W. 194 (1930)
WIEST, C. J. The university of Michigan is a corporation, vested
with right to invoke the power of eminent domain.
For declared educational purposes, the regents of the university, desiring land for an 18-hole golf course, instituted this proceeding to acquire, by condemnation, 10% acres of defendants' land. A
jury in the Washtenaw circuit found the necessity for taking the land
and awarded defendants $11,058 compensation. Defendants contested the alleged need, asserted the power was being exercised in behalf of the board in control of athletics of the university of Michigan,
a corporate entity, without right to invoke the power of eminent
domain, and sought compensation in excess of the sum awarded.
The proceeding to take the land was brought under Act No.
236, Pub. Acts 1911 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 349 et seq.), authorizing proceedings by the State to condemn private property for public
use. The act is silent upon the subject of review. Act No. 149, Pub.
Acts 1911 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 353 et seq.), also authorizes proceedings by State agencies and public corporations to condemn private property for public use. That act provides for review by appeal.
Why one act provides for and maps procedure for review, and the
other, enacted at the same session of the legislature, is silent on the
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subject, when both acts are, in practical effect, in pari materia, is not
apparent.
Defendants made application for and were allowed to take out
a writ of error, and the point is raised that certiorari, and not error,
is the proper method of review. Certiorari is the right method and we
now so term the review, and proceed as upon certiorari, and, within
the limits of such review, to determine questions presented.
The needs of a great educational institution involve no judicial
question, except it is made to appear that the desire of those having
the management thereof outruns reason, and it is sought to take private property for a purpose foreign to educational purposes. The
necessity for taking defendants' land, in order to establish a golf
course for educational purposes of the university, was an issue before
the jury, and, by verdict, found to exist. The evidence supported the
verdict, and we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that in no event can
such necessity exist.
The court did not give a requested instruction that the land
was wanted for a golf course, but such was the whole trend of the
evidence and the admitted purpose of the proceeding, and every one,
inclusive of the jurors, so understood. The requested instruction
stated no more than the obvious, and there was no error in not giving
it. Error assigned upon exclusion and admission of evidence, with
one exception, needs no review.
The land taken was but part of defendants' holding. Their land
was suitable for platting, and the court admitted testimony that the
golf course would benefit the land not taken. This was error. No law
so permits, and all holdings forbid. The error, however, so far as possible, was cured by instruction to the jury that such claimed benefit
must not be considered in fixing compensation. We cannot fmd the
error reflected in the award. The compensation awarded was less than
claimed by defendants and more than fixed by many of plaintiffs
witnesses. The award, being within the range of evidence submitted,
may not be disturbed under review by certiorari.
It is claimed that no sufficient effort to purchase was made.
The statute authorizing the proceeding does not require an effort to
purchase, and, in such case, an effort to purchase is not necessary.
Commission of Conservation v. Hane, 248 Mich. 473.
Defendants ftled objections to confirmation of the verdict,
stating that one juror was not a freeholder and another was disqualified by reason of his interest, as co-owner with Mr. Burke, counsel
for plaintiff, in a parcel of land used by witnesses as a basis of comparison as to value. The statute required a jury of resident freeholders and the court ordered such to be summoned. The record shows
the examination, by counsel, of the jurors, but no inquiry of whether
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they were freeholders, and, at the close of the examination, counsel
announced satisfaction with the jury. The qualifications of the jurors
should have been inquired into upon the voir dire examination, and
challenge for cause, if any, then exercised. The objection now made
was waived. Village of Paw Paw v. Flook, 214 Mich. 486, and cases
there cited. The objection to the other juror is without merit. A juror
is not disqualified by such a trend of evidence at the trial.
In the brief, counsel for defendants put this question:
"Have the board of regents of the university of Michigan, acting through the State, the power to condemn land for the use and
benefit of a private corporation, whose funds, not the State's or university's, will pay for the purchase of the property condemned?"
The answer is no. A State agency, vested with power of eminent domain, may not employ the power, directly or indirectly, for
the use and benefit of another, unless so authorized by law. But the
answer given to the question does not at all decide this case.
The regents, by resolution, declared it necessary, for the development of physical education as an integral part of a broad program of education, to acquire the property for the use of the university, and requested the attorney general to institute the proceeding
at bar. The jury found the averred necessity, the court confrrmed the
verdict, and vested title to the property in the State of Michigan, for
the use of the regents of the university of Michigan.
The compensation awarded defendants was deposited in court
by the regents. But it is contended that the purpose of this proceeding is to obtain the land for the use and benefit of a corporate entity
existing wholly apart from control and management of the regents.
In 1924, under the provisions of Act No. 84, Pub. Acts 1921,
and as a creature of the board of regents, a nonprofit corporation was
organized for the declared purpose of "The furtherance of general or
physical betterment of the students at the university of Michigan,
particularly the conduct of intercollegiate athletics in said institution." The name adopted was "Board of Control of Athletics of the
University of Michigan." In the articles of incorporation it was also
stated:
"Said corporation is to be fmanced under the following general
plan: Funds for operating affairs of the corporation are to be derived
from (1) proceeds of sale of tickets for athletic contests; (2) athletic
fees collected by university of Michigan and paid to this corporation."
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The qualifications required of officers and members were fixed
by the articles as follows:
"Election or designation by board of regents as member of governing board or committee in charge of intercollegiate athletics at
the university of Michigan."
Supplementing this the by-laws of the corporation provided:
"The business of this corporation shall be the control and management of intercollegiate. and other athletics at the university of
Michigan; the furtherance of the physical development of the students thereof; the control and management of such property of the
university as is now, or may hereafter be, devoted to this purpose, all
in so far as the governing body of the university of Michigan has or
shall from time to time delegate to the board in control of athletics
of said university; the construction or extension of present plant facilities for this purpose; the collection, control and disbursement of
all revenues derived from athletic games or contests or any other
source."
The secretary of the board of regents, and business manager of
the university, testified that he presented to the board of regents the
resolution upon which this proceeding was initiated, and from his
personal knowledge of the athletic program of the university, "the
acquiring of this property is a part of the general program of the
athletic development of the university of Michigan at the present
time." We omit further quoting of testimony. The evidence clearly
establishes the fact that the board in control of athletics of the university of Michgian, while a corporate entity, is but an operating
agency of the regents of the university in the management of designated educational activities, and, at all times, under full control of
the regents.
We fmd no reversible error.
Mfirmed, with costs against defendants.
BUTZEL, CLARK, POTTER, SHARPE, NORTH, and FEAD,
JJ., concurred. McDONALD, J., did not sit.

EMINENT DOMAIN

199

Hooper v. Board of Education of the City of Detroit
315 Mich. 202; 23 N.W. 2d 692 (1946)
BUTZEL, Chief Justice.
Adeline M. Hooper, plaintiff, a resident of the city of Detroit,
Michigan, in a bill of complaint alleged that she resided in the Webster Hall Hotel (and that on behalf of herself and upwards of 570
other tenants she seeks to restrain the purchase of the hotel property
and the fixtures and appurtenances at private sale to the Board of
Education of the City of Detroit, defendant herein. The property
consists of a very large hotel building opposite the campus of Wayne
University, which is a part of the educational system owned and conducted by defendant. Plaintiff concedes that proper proceedings to
condemn the property were brought in the recorder's court of the
city of Detroit, and in which she and 570 tenants, or thereabouts, appeared and categorically denied that there was a public necessity for
the taking of the property. While the condemnation proceedings
were pending, defendant entered negotiations for a contract for the
purchase of the property for $1,200,000, which amount defendant
has available. After the bill of complaint was filed, defendant entered
into further negotiations with a financial institution for the issuance
and sale of self-liquidating revenue bonds in the amount of
$2,000,000, which would be amply sufficient to pay the purchase
price of the property and the cost of expensive remodeling and improving of the property so as to adapt it for the purposes of the university. There can be no question after reading the record that defendant has reason to believe it very necessary and essential to
acquire the property for its purposes, and that the present tenants
of the hotel may have considerable difficulty in obtaining suitable
new living quarters because of the lack of housing facilities in the
city of Detroit. On the other hand, the university in its attempts to
take care of over 12,000 students, a large number of whom are returning veterans, and to participate in the national program to increase the number of trained nurses, has a pressing need for the
property, as its present buildings are woefully inadequate.
The bill of complaint mainly stresses the claim that, as there is
a condemnation suit pending in which the necessity of taking the
property is controverted by the present tenants of the rooms of the
hotel, the plaintiff and those on whose behalf she has filed the bill
are entitled to their day in court in order to have the question of
necessity determined.
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Plaintiff claims a right to sue both as a tenant and taxpayer.
The defendant concedes that the purchase of the property by the
city must be subject to such rights, if any, plaintiff and the other
tenants may have obtained from the present owners of the hotel. Her
right to sue as a taxpayer has not been questioned in the lower court.
After the filing of the bill of complaint, in which many allegations
were made on information and belief, a sworn answer was filed by
defendant in which it categorically denies some of the charges made
on information and belief, and, as to these charges, on motion to
dismiss there is no presumption that they are true, inasmuch as the
allegations to the contrary in the answer have not been controverted.
Case v. City of Saginaw, 291 Mich. 130, 288 N.W. 357. A motion to
dismiss the bill of complaint was made and some testimony taken.
The trial judge entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, and
plaintiff appeals. We shall discuss the main questions raised.
The first and main question stressed on appeal is whether defendant can purchase the property during the pendency of condemnation proceedings in which a question of necessity must be passed
upon by a jury. The answer is unequivocally in the affirmative. Defendant is a State agency clothed with the power of eminent domain and as such has a right to discontinue condemnation proceedings any time before confirmation of the verdict of the jury. See In
re Board of Education of Detroit, 242 Mich. 658, 219 N.W. 614,
where condemnation proceedings were also brought, as in the instant
case, under Act No.149, Pub. Acts 1911, as amended, 1 Comp. Laws
1929, § 3763 et seq., Stat. Ann. § 8.11 et seq., which act permits
the petitioning body to withdraw any property whenever such will
not interfere with the substantial rights of the parties, or it may discontinue the condemnation proceedings before the confirmation of
the verdict of the jury. And see In re Huron-Clinton Metropolitan
Authority, 306 Mich. 373, 10 N.W. 2d 920, where we permitted the
withdrawal of several parcels, as well as the acceptance of some as a
gift, and the purchase of other parcels without the· determination of
necessity. Plaintiff relies on In re Board of Education of City of
Grand Rapids, 249 Mich. 550,229 N.W. 470, in which condemnation
proceedings were begun against three parcels of land. During the proceedings one parcel was purchased. The validity of the purchase was
not attacked, the court merely deciding that as to the two small parcels not purchased, the condemnation proceedings must be continued. Plaintiff also relies on Detroit v. Judge of Recorder's Court,
253 Mich. 6, 234 N.W. 445, which is not at all applicable. We simply
held that in order to transform a park into a wide roadway against
the protests of the abutting property owners, who claimed an easement, it was necessary for the city to bring condemnation proceedings
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in which necessity would be determined and damages to the abutting
property owners on account of the destruction of their easement
and to the holders of the reversion would be awarded. There was no
purchase of the property involved.
Plaintiff, however, claims that under Article 13 of the Constitution of 1908, "private property shall not be taken by the public
nor by any corporation for public use, without the necessity therefor
being first determined," et cetera. It will be noted that Article 13 is
entitled "eminent domain" and it is obvious that this section refers
only to taking of property by eminent domain." It is unquestionably true that where the property is sought to be condemned, the
above quoted constitutional provision applies, but it does not apply
where property is being purchased.
It was stated in Allen v. Rogers, 246 Mich. 501, 505, 224 N.W.
632, 634: "In this state no man's land can be taken from him for
public use except by gift, purchase, or condemnation. If he is unwilling to dedicate it and will not sell for a reasonable price, resort
may be had to condemnation."

***
The decree dismissing the bill of complaint is affirmed without
costs as a public question is involved.
CARR, BUSHNELL, SHARPE, REID, NORTH, and STARR,
JJ ., concurred with BUTZEL, C. J.
BOYLES, J., concurred in the result.

Western Michigan University v. Slavin

6 Mich. App. 291, 293-97; 148 N.W. 2d 908 (1967)
McGREGOR, J. This appeal arises out of eminent domain proceedings initiated by the board of trustees of Western Michigan University. Appellants own undeveloped and wooded land adjacent to
the University's land. There is dispute whether the parcel comprises
approximately 40.09 acres or approximately 38 acres of land; however, this difference is not as serious as it could be, as the adjoining
land of the acquiring university is also undeveloped and wooded. In
May, 1964, the University was granted authority by the legislature to
construct resident halls and a food service center to accommodate
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1,100 students. In November of 1964, the board of trustees adopted
a resolution declaring it would be necessary to take the subject parcel for public purposes.
During the 14~ day trial, which produced a voluminous record,
there was introduced widely divergent expert testimony as to the
value of the parcel. The appellee introduced two expert witnesses
who both testified the highest and best use for the land was for
single-family residences, and set the value at $29,200 and $30,000
respectively.
Appellant introduced two expert witnesses who set the highest
and best use of the land as for development of multifamily apartment buildings, and set the value at $414,000 and $476,500 respectively. The appellants were prohibited by the trial judge from introducing into evidence a purported sales contract between the appellants
and an Ohio corporation, wherein the subject parcel would be sold
for apartment-house development for $620,000 less costs of streets,
sewers, and water lines on the property.
The jury returned a verdict declaring the necessity of taking
the property and set just compensation of $145,000. Judgment was
entered confirming that verdict.
This appeal was filed after appellants' motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied.
This appeal proceeds on several claims of error and theories.
Appellants claim error in that the purported sales contract with the
Ohio corporation was refused admission by the trial judge, that there
was insufficient evidence from which the jury could determine the
necessity of taking the subject parcel, that the appellee lacked the
necessary authority to condemn the subject parcel, that instructions
to the jury on the credibility of witnesses was inadequate, and that
the verdict of the jury was inadequate and without evidentiary support.
Evidence of sales contracts or offers traditionally have been
suspect as tools in condemnation evaluations. See Annotation, 7
ALR2d 781 (1947). Such evidence is prone to fraud and uncertainty.
Sharp v. United States (1903), 191 US 341 (24 S Ct 114, 48 Led
211 ). Certainly such offers must be bona fide and the parties capable
of performance. City of Kalamazoo v. Balkema (1930), 252 Mich
308; City of Grand Rapids v. Ellis (1965), 375 Mich. 406. In this
case, an Ohio corporation purportedly entered into the contract of
purchase; however, there was insufficient proof that the corporation
could fulfill its obligation under the contract. There is only the unsupported testimony of a witness, who claimed to be an officer of
the aforesaid corporation, that he had seen the reports of the corporation and that it had the necessary funds or capital-raising
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potential to carry out the purchase. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow the admission of the proffered sales
agreement, as there was insufficient foundation laid by the appellant
to insure the reliability of the evidence.
The argument was presented by the appellants that the board
of directors of Western Michigan University did not present sufficient
evidence of the necessity of taking the subject parcel for the question
to go to the jury. Appellants argued that the board did not show the
necessity of approving a campus development plan encompassing
the appellants' land and maintaining land owned by the university,
adjacent to the subject parcel, as a recreational and nature-study
area. Appellants' counsel argued that today's youth are no longer interested in the "birds and the bees", thus the proposed nature park
is foolhardy. It is this Court's opinion that such an argument is unfortunate and ill-informed. The board of trustees of Western Michigan University has the responsibility of maintaining an institution to
educate several thousand students. Const 1963, art 8, § 6, PA 1963
(2d Ex Sess), No 48, as amended (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp
§ 15.1120{1) et seq.). Its determination of necessity is prima facie
evidence of necessity. City of Allegan v. Vonasek (1932), 261 Mich
16; In reAcquisition of Land for Civic Center {1953), 335 Mich
582. There was testimony by the members of the board of trustees
and the faculty of the university that the park and recreational
areas planned are important to the physical and psychological wellbeing of the students. The board of trustees declared, and supported
with testimony, that it is necessary to the well-being of the students
to provide grouped student residential facilities, with open spaces
and recreational and park areas close to student dormitories. Such
testimony was competent evidence to go to the jury on the question
of necessity.
The appellants seem to argue that the proper course for university development is to place future buildings by considering only
where there is physical room for them and where the ground is
proven capable of supporting such buildings. There was testimony of
experts on drainage and sewer facilities that supports the proposition
that the proposed park area would be undesirable for dormitories
even under the appellants' limited criteria for adequate construction sites. Thus, under the theories of both the appellants and appellee, we find the jury had sufficient basis for the fmding that it was
necessary for the subject parcel to be taken for a public purpose.
As to the argument that the board of trustees lacked the requisite legal authority to condemn the subject parcel, we find that it had
the necessary authority by virtue of PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 48,
as amended by PA 1964, No 14 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp
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§ 15.1120[8]); House Concurrent Resolution No 61 (1962), House
Journal, pp 1302, 1934; and House Concurrent Resolution No 58
(1964), House Journal, pp 850, 1824, which specifically authorized
the construction of the new dormitories for Western Michigan University.
The appellants claim that there was an improper instruction as
to the credibility of witnesses in that there should have been an instruction that, if the testimony of a witness was false in one regard,
it was false in the whole. Appellants' attorney noted his exception
to the charge in this regard immediately after the charge. The trial
judge refused to modify .his charge on the ground& that it was adequate as given. We agree. The proposed charge would have been incorrect. If the testimony is false in one aspect, the jury may in its
discretion, disregard the entire testimony, or it may give credence to
other testimony supported by other witnesses or evidence. People v.
Johns (1953), 336 Mich 617; People v. Hunter (1963), 370 Mich
262. It is the opinion of this Court that reversible error was not committed by the trial court in charging the jury.
The precedent in Michigan is that condemnation awards are
not disturbed on appeal if within the range of competent evidence.
Department of Conservation v. Connor (1947), 316 Mich 565. The
decision of the lower court is affirmed, as within the range of what
was presented as competent, expert testimony. No costs, a public
question being involved.
T. G. KAVANAGH, P. J., and J. H. GILLIS, J., concurred.

3. STATUTE
STATE
P.A. 1911, No. 236, Eff. Aug. 1
AN ACT to authorize proceedings by the state to condemn private property for public use.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:

213.1 Condemnation of private property for state use; authority
delegated; jurisdiction
Sec. 1. It shall be lawful for the governor or any other person
or persons, or any board of regents, board of control or other
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governing body of any state educational, penal or reformatory institution, when by law authorized to secure for the state or such institution, land as a site for any state building or buildings, state institution
or public use, and for the board of regents, board of control or other
governing body of any state institution desirous of obtaining the right
of way over lands for the benefit of such state institution, when such
persons, board of regents, board of control or other governing body,
or a majority thereof shall have by resolution declare<l the taking
thereof necessary for the public use of such state institution, to institute or cause to be instituted proceedings in the name and behalf
of the state of Michigan against the land sought to be acquired, and
against the owners and persons interested therein, in the circuit court
of the county where the land is situated, for the purpose of acquiring
by the state title to such land by judicial condemnation. And the
said court in which such proceeding may be instituted, shall have
and possess full jurisdiction of the subject matter of such proceedings, and power to hear, adjudge, and determine all matters touching
the proceedings, and the rights and interests of all concerned.
Constitution
Art. 10, § 2, provides: "Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation therefor being first made or
secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record."
213.2 Same; duty of attorney general; petition, contents; summons,
issuance and return; incompetents; non-residents, service,
notice by publication
Sec. 2. Upon request of the governor, board of regents, board
of control or other governing body of any state institution, or other
person or persons authorized as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the
attorney general of the state, or when directed by the attorney general, the prosecuting attorney of the county where the land is situated, on behalf of the board of regents, board of control or other
governing body, if a body corporate under the law of its creation,
and in behalf of the people of the state of Michigan if such governing
body is not a body corporate, of any state institution, to cause a petition to be made in the name of the people of the state of Michigan
and ftled in the proper court, signed by the attorney general, or
prosecuting attorney of the county, and by the secretary of such
governing board, if a body corporate, and if not a majority of such
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trustees, board of control or other governing body, or other properly
authorized person, as the case may be, addressed to the court setting
forth, with reasonable certainty a description of the land sought to
be acquired, the names of all persons owning or having an interest
therein, so far as disclosed by the records of titles of the county in
which the land is situated, or can be ascertained from actual occupants; that the petition is made and presented for the purpose of acquiring the title and ownership of the land described in the petition,
to and for the use of the state of Michigan, and specifying generally
the purpose for which it is to be used. And the petition shall ask that
all persons interested in the premises, or any part thereof, be summoned to appear and answer the petition, and show cause, if any
they have, against the same. Upon filing the petition, summons shall
issue in accordance with the prayer thereof, against the persons
named therein, returnable on a day to be named, which shall not be
less than 5 days from the issuing and test thereof, and shall be served
at least 3 days before the return day, by the sheriff or other officer
authorized to serve process of summons according to the rules and
practice of the circuit court in other cases at law. If there are minors
or persons of unsound mind interested in the premises, service may
be made upon the guardian of any such person or the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for any such person, who may appear and
defend for the person he represents. If there are non-resident or absent persons upon whom service cannot be obtained within the
county, the court may order service upon any such person wherever
he may be found, and in such manner as may be directed. The person serving any such process on such non-resident or absent person
shall make proof of service by affidavit, stating the place, time, and
manner of service. Or the court may order and cause notice to be
given to such absent or non-resident person, by publication in such
newspaper printed and published in the county as the court shall
designate, and for such length of time as the court may think proper,
not less than 3 weeks, once in each week; and any such service out
of the county, or notice by publication, shall be as effectual for all
the purposes of such proceeding and in the condemnation of the
land as though the persons had been personally served within the
county.
213.3 Same; petition, hearing on necessity and compensation; commissioners procedure;jury, procedure
Sec. 3. When all the parties named in the petition have been
summoned or notified, in the manner provided, and the time for
their appearance shall have expired, the court shall hear any and all
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persons who shall have appeared and interposed objections to the
petition or proceedings, and proceed to decide the questions raised,
and may vacate the petition, or any part of the proceedings for
cause, and may allow amendments of the petition, in form or substance, as the right of the matter shall demand. If any person having
an interest in the land has been overlooked, or not summoned or notified, the court may continue the proceedings and cause such person
to be served or notified. If the petition and proceedings are sustained,
the court shall appoint 3 commissioners, residents and freeholders
within the county, not interested or of kin to any of the persons interested in the land to ascertain and determine the necessity of the
proposed public use, the necessity for using such property and the
just compensation to be paid therefor by the state, which ought to
be paid by the state to each of the owners and persons interested in
the premises, as and for his, her or their just compensation for the
land sought to be taken. Such commissioners before entering upon
their duties as such shall take an oath in substantially the following
form: "We do each of us solemnly swear that we will faithfully and
justly determine the public necessity of the proposed use, the necessity of taking the property described in the petition filed in this
cause and the amount of compensation which ought to be paid to
each of the owners and persons interested in the premises described
in said petition according to our best ability." They shall visit the
land sought to be acquired, shall ascertain the separate interest of
each person owning or interested in any part of the premises, and
the description of his or her separate interest in the parcel; shall hear,
in the presence and under direction of the court, evidence touching
the matters they are to fmd, brought forward by any person having
an interest, and shall find all necessary facts to possess the court
with the truth and right of the matter, but shall not be required to
find what evidence was offered or given, and shall report to the
court, in writing, their findings. Instead of commissioners, the court,
with or without the request of any person interested in any portion
of the premises described in the petition, may, and upon the request
of any such person shall, order a venire to issue to the sheriff, to summon 12 jurors who shall be residents and freeholders of the county
where the land is situated, to attend at a time to be named, before
the court, to serve as a jury. Any person interested in any part of the
premises may object for cause to any of the jurors, but there shall
be no peremptory challenge allowed. In case any juror fails to appear,
is excused, or set aside from the panel, the court may order the
sheriff, or other proper officer in attendance, to summon forthwith
the requisite number of talesmen to form the jury. The jury shall be
sworn, as is required of commissioners, and they shall view the
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premises, hear evidence if offered, determine the necessity of the
public use, the necessity for taking such property and the amount of
compensation to be paid therefor and the same proceedings be had
as near as may be, as hereinbefore required in reference to commissioners.
213.4 Same; objections to report filed; conimnation; deposit; vesting of title; payment of compensation; dismissal; expenses;
record
Sec. 4. The court shall hear objections, if any, to the report of
the commissioners or jury, as the case may be, and may set aside the
report and finding, or confrrm the same, and if confirmed, shall enter
a judgment of confirmation, and that all right, title and interest of,
in, and to the land and premises, vest in the state of Michigan: Provided, That the state, within such time as shall be therein prescribed,
shall deposit in the court the amount found by the report of the
commissioners or jury, as the just compensation and damages to be
paid to the owners and persons interested. If, within the time so prescribed, the state shall cause to be deposited the sum so found, the
court shall thereupon enter an order and judgment that the title of
the state in and to said land and every part thereof is perfect, and
has become absolute, and may issue the necessary writ of assistance,
commanding the sheriff to deliver the possession of such land to the
state; and thereupon the title and right of the state to such land shall
be absolute and binding against all persons whomsoever. The persons
owning and interested in said land according to the report and fmding aforesaid, shall be entitled, on applying to the court, to be paid
on the order of the court the amount or sum to which they are respectively entitled, according to such report or fmding; for the sum
received they shall respectively give to the clerk their receipt, in writing, to be by the clerk forwarded to the state treasurer. In case the
state does not, within the time so prescribed, deposit in court the
amount of compensation and damages awarded, the court shall order
the proceedings dismissed, and the state take nothing thereby. In the
proceedings authorized by this act the court shall, as to the practice
and mode of proceedings, be governed by the rules applicable in
cases at law, except as is in this act otherwise expressly provided. The
expense of the proceedings shall be paid by the state, and a certified
copy of the record of the proceedings and judgment of the court
shall, together with the record thereof in the office of the register of
deeds of the county, be evidence in all courts and places.
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CHAPTER VII
THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
l. INTRODUCTION

The great medical center of the University of Michigan provides academic functions of teaching and research, and also
functions much like many other state institutions for the treatment of ill persons. State-sponsored programs for the treatment
of various classes of patients are provided for in statutes which
have been interpreted in a series of opinions of the Attorney
General. Apparently no court case has been brought under these
statutes.
The issue to which the courts have at length addressed
themselves is the liability of the University for the malpractice
of its medical staff. Of course, the classic case is that of the surgeon who leaves sponges inside his patient after an operation.
In the first case in this series, Scott, 1 the hospital was not
involved, but rather the University of Michigan Athletic Association. The Association was sued by persons injured in the collapse of bleachers at a Michigan-Wisconsin football game of long
ago. Since the Association was a voluntary group legally separate from the University itself, it did not claim sovereign immunity, and the court held that it was liable for negligence, if such
could be proved.
The Bancroft case was settled on procedural grounds alone.
The Supreme Court would permit no appeal before a final judgment in the Circuit Court below.
The Robinson case laid down the substantive rule that the
University, as a charitable institution, was not liable for sponges
left in its patients by surgeons. In Herrst, which involved the
destruction by fire of both a University-owned barn and neighboring property, the court ruled that the University could not
be held for the negligence of the neighbor boys whose careless
211
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smoking was thought to have set the blaze.
Both the procedural and substantive rules of the early cases
were disregarded in the Christie case. No final judgment had
been entered in the Circuit Court, but an appeal was permitted
from a pretrial discovery order requiring the University to produce its public liability insurance policy. Although the opinion
is confused on this point, the official proceedings of the Board
of Regents make it clear that the University had for some time
maintained such an insurance policy which would protect injured parties unless the Regents specifically authorized the
pleading of the defense of sovereign immunity.
The immunity of the University from suit was, however,
not as clear as it had been at the time of the Robinson case because the court had already abolished the immunity from suit
of all charitable institutions. Absent charitable immunity, sovereign immunity was now in question, and the different opinions expressed by the justices in this case demonstrate their
confusion over which branch of government should have the
authority to abolish it. Justice Black thought that because of
the constitutional autonomy of the University, the legislature
was unqualified for the task, and that if they had authorized
the purchase of insurance, the Board of Regents had implicitly
abolished immunity themselves. The dissenters still favored
legislative competence in this area, but although a majority of
the court did not completely agree with Justice Black's reasoning, and, technically, only affirmed the discovery order, it now
seems clear that the judicial branch no longer favors the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
The effect of this apparent abolition of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was mitigated, in the transitional period, by
the Glass and Fox cases which held that suits against the universities continued to be regarded as suits against the state. The result was that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over
these cases and the statute of limitations protected the universities against suits which had been wrongfully filed in the Circuit
Courts. 2
It remained, however, for the Michigan Court of Appeals
to confront squarely the issue of whether the legislature could
waive the sovereign immunity of the constitutionally established
universities. In the case of Branum v. Board of Regents of
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University of Michigan, that court finally disposed of the issue
by upholding the statute waiving immunity and conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Claims.
The legal question of whether the University is immune to
suit in the federal courts was decided in the last two cases in this
chapter. In both cases the University is accorded the same Eleventh Amendment protection from suit that the State of Michigan itself would have received. In the case of Huckins v. Board
of Regents of University of Michigan the court ruled that the
University could be sued under the Jones Act for injuries to a
seaman employed on a research vessel, since the Supreme Court
had ruled that a state was subject to suit in similar cases. In the
MacDonald case the Court of Appeals ruled that the University's
protection from suit under the Eleventh Amendment was not
waived by a technical error in pleading.

2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Scott v. University of Michigan Athletic Assn.

152 Mich. 684, 685-88; 116 N.W. 624 (1908)
OSTRANDER, J. Testimony was given from which the jury
might have found that plaintiff was injured by the collapse of a
stand, or bleacher, erected by the defendant association, for the use
of and used by the public, at a game of football to which the public
was invited and required to pay an admission fee for the profit of
said association; that the stand, designed to support 5,000 spectators,
collapsed, from inherent and discoverable weakness, when put to its
intended use, when occupied by less than 3,000 persons. At the trial,
both parties introduced testimony and the court, without so far as
the record discloses, assigning reasons, directed a verdict for defendants. Judgment was entered on the verdict.
Plaintiff, appellant, contends that the case should have been
submitted to the jury. Defendants make three contentions. They are
(1) that the plaintiff has in any event no right of action against these,
or any of these, defendants; (2) that plaintiff has not shown that defendants were guilty of any negligence; (3) that if the circumstances
made out a prima facie case of negligent construction of the stand,
the undisputed testimony for defendants established the fact of the

214

THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT
exercise of due care on the part of defendants to render the premises
safe.
And first, as to the parties defendant. They are the voluntary
association and its officers, of whom defendant Baird is one, filling
the position of graduate director. The active members of the association are the undergraduates and alumni who contribute money, with
an associate membership of business men. Defendant Pipp is the person employed by the association to erect, and who did erect, the
stand. The theory of defendants is:
"Mr. Baird as agent of the board of regents was authorized by
Regent Fletcher to put up the bleacher; he did so, had it inspected,
and the board of regents had it inspected. Not only does the record
fail to show any act whatever on the part of the Athletic Association
in regard to the building of the bleacher, but it shows affirmatively
that the Athletic Association could not have built a bleacher had it
desired to do so. Ferry Field was a recreation ground for the students,
and the students, of course, used the field and the structures standing upon it. As Regent Fletcher testified, the association was simply
the student in another form. It appears, therefore, that while the
Athletic Association had nothing to do with the erection of this
bleacher, it was allowed by the regents to use the field and the
bleacher for the purpose of carrying on and exhibiting the football
game between Michigan and Wisconsin Universities on November 18,
1905. But the board of regents never surrendered full and absolute
control of Ferry Field. While the association was using the field it
was as much subject to the control of the board of regents as at other
times. In other words, Ferry Field is exactly like other University
property; it is owned and controlled by the board of regents for the
use of the students, but such use can never be hostile to or exclusive
of the continued control by the board. Having no independent right
in Ferry Field the Athletic Association could sustain no independent
liabilities consequent upon its use.
"It seems clear that the Athletic Association, under its permission from the board of regents to use Ferry Field pursuant to the
general purposes of the University, at most merely represented the
board of regents in conducting the game in question. So far as the
public is concerned, the association might therefore be deemed the
agent of the board of regents in conducting and exhibiting the game
for the benefit of all who wished to witness it. And in that capacity
the liability of the Athletic Association would appear to be the
same as that of Mr. Baird himself. Each is liable, if at all, as agent of
the board of regents.
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"Now, it is an elementary principle of the law that an agent is
not liable for mere acts of nonfeasance, but only for acts of misfeasance. This principle has been applied in a great variety of cases."
Whether the fact is or is not controlling, a point not precisely
involved, we do not find in the record any testimony tending to
prove that the regents, directly or indirectly, constructed or supervised the construction of the stand, or that the defendant association
or Mr. Baird was an agent of the regents in that behalf. The record
discloses that while Mr. Baird applied to the chairman of the committee on buildings and grounds for and received permission to build
the bleacher, it and all other structures upon the grounds were paid
for out of the moneys of the defendant association. The funds of the
association are devoted to athletics and to the furnishing and maintaining of Ferry Field. The association receives and disburses its
money and the regents exercise no control of its funds except to insist that there shall be a proper auditing of accounts. Assuming that
the regents might have refused permission to erect the particular
bleacher, they did not do so. They did not erect it. Assuming, further,
that Mr. Baird is paid for his services as adviser of the association's
athletic policy by the regents, and that his position of graduate director is dependent upon his engagement with the regents, he is nevertheless one of the directors of defendant association, and by its constitution is a member of its financial committee, and he also exercises
such powers and performs such duties as its board of control may
from time to time determine and require. Whether the related facts
affect alike all of the defendants, whether for any reason the judgment should be affirmed as to some of the defendants, are subjects
not referred to in argument and questions not considered.
The remaining contentions may be considered together. The
testimony goes much beyond proving merely an accident and resulting injury. That relied upon to show that defendants exercised
due care tends to prove that the stand was erected by a competent
and experienced builder, of good materials; that before it was used
it was inspected by engineers and others admittedly competent to
perform the work of inspection, who pronounced it safe. It is clear,
however, that a wholly inadequate structure was in fact tendered for
public use, and it cannot be determined, upon this record, as matter
of law, that a latent and not a patent defect, discoverable in the exercise of proper care, existed. The managers of the grounds and
stands occupied upon the occasion in question the position of proprietors of a public resort. Plaintiff was not a mere licensee and did
not occupy the stand by mere invitation. Whether responsibility to
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the plaintiff is grounded, in the form of action instituted, upon a
contract or upon a duty, it exists, if at all, because of an implied contract. The implied contract was that the stand was reasonably fit and
proper for the use to which it was put; the duty was to see to it that
it was in a fit and proper condition for such use. Neither plaintiff
nor the public generally would be expected to examine the stand and
judge of its safety. This consideration, and the probable consequences
of failure of the structure, imposed upon the responsible and profiting persons the duty of exercising a high degree of care to prevent
disaster. They were not insurers of safety, they did not contract that
there were no unknown defects, not discoverable by the use of reasonable means; but, having constructed the stand, they did contract
that, except for such defects, it was safe. 1 Thompson on Negligence,
§§ 994-997; 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 472; Francis v.
Cockrell, L R. 5 Q. B. 184, 39 L J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 113, 291.
See, also, Fox v. Buffalo Park, 21 App. Div. (N.Y.) 321, 163 N.Y.
559.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted.
GRANT, C. J., and BLAIR, MONTGOMERY, and CARPENTER, JJ., concurred.

Bancroft v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan

192 Mich. 168, 169; 158 N.W. 337 (1916)
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff ftled her suit to recover damages for
personal injuries which she claims to have incurred and which she
avers were occasioned by the negligence of defendants. The defendants demurred to the declaration, and after argument the same was
sustained. This was followed by the issuance of a writ of error from
this court without any !mal judgment having been entered in the
trial court, and, so far as the record shows, we are not advised that a
!mal judgment has since been entered therein. Under this state of
facts the practice will not permit of a review of the case in this court.
Green v. Eaton Probate Judge, 40 Mich. 244;Delaney v. Lumber Co.,
144 Mich. 351 (108 N. W. 77); Barribeau v. City of Detroit, 146
Mich. 392 (109 N. W. 665); In re Vetter's Estate, 162 Mich. 109
(127 N. W. 306).
The writ will be dismissed, with costs to appellee.
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Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge

228 Mich. 225, 225-30; 199 N.W. 618 (1924)
STEERE, J. Plaintiffs in the above entitled cases are husband
and wife. Each commenced a tort action in the circuit court of
Washtenaw county against Dr. Scott C. Runnells and the regents of
the University of Michigan to recover damages resulting from injuries
alleged to have been wrongfully inflicted upon her (Fay Robinson)
while a surgical patient in the University hospital. The questions involved in these mandamus proceedings are substantially the same in
both cases and they were submitted upon the same briefs. Service
was duly had upon defendants and similar declarations, each containing two courts of like import, were ftled and served. Counsel for
defendant appeared specially in said cases and entered motions requesting the court for orders dismissing the declarations "or in the
alternative, in case such relief cannot be granted, to dismiss the second count in said declarations against said regents of the University
of Michigan," stating various grounds therefor. The court denied
said motions as to Dr. Runnells and granted them as to the regents.
Plaintiffs ask mandamus to compel defendant herein to set aside his
orders dismissing the declarations against the regents.
The first count in the declarations alleges that Mrs. Fay Robinson being ill consulted Dr. Runnells, a physician and agent of the
regents of the University, who advised her that an abdominal operation was necessary, to which she consented and was operated upon at
the University hospital by him; and charges that in performing the
operation he negligently permitted a sponge which he had placed in
her abdomen to remain after the wound caused during the operation
had been closed, in consequence of which she suffered greatly and
became yet more dangerously ill, rendering another operation necessary in order to save her life, which disclosed the presence of the
sponge left there during the former operation. The second count in
the declarations more distinctly charges such neglect and lack of skill,
with the serious results which followed, to the regents of the University of Michigan, their physicians, nurses, agents, servants, etc.
Plaintiffs' counsel in his brief points out that the actions are
not brought "against the hospital of the University of Michigan, but
against the regents of the University of Michigan," and urges that the
question is disposed of by the provision of section 1159, 1 Comp.
Laws 1915, providing that "The board of regents shall constitute a
body corporate, with right as such of suing and being sued," contending that the regents are in no sense an eleemosynary institution
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entitled to be excepted from the general rule that a corporation is liable for the torts of its agents; while counsel for the regents urge that
no cause of action is stated against them because the University hospital, maintained under the direction of the regents in connection
with its medical department, is a charitable institution, eleemosynary
in character. Other objections are raised but this is the only one
which we regard as calling for serious consideration.
The regents of the Michigan University are constitutional State
officers, their selection and election being on the same basis as that
of the judges of the Supreme and circuit courts, the State superintendent of public instruction and other specified State officers who
are elected at the biennial spring election, all of whose names are required by law to be placed upon an official State ballot in a designated order, those of the regents being second on the list.
Our Constitution recognizes "Education" as a subject of governmental concern and activity. Its article 11 is so entitled and devoted to that subject, three sections of which relate e~clusively to
regents of the University, who are to be eight in number, hold office
for eight years, two to be elected at each regular biennial spring election. They are to constitute a "body corporate known as 'The Regents of the University of Michgian.' " They are given, as a board,
"general supervision of the University and the direction and control
of all expenditures from the University funds." Section 10 of the
article contains the mandate that "The legislature shall maintain the
University" and other named State educational institutions, "and
also such normal schools and other educational institutions as may be
established by law." With such provisions in our Constitution it
seems clear that the general supervision of the University, and direction and control of all expenditures from its funds is a governmental
activity, and the board of regents a State agency to carry out the will
of the people, as expressed in the Constitution they adopted, in regard to the educational institution committed to its care and supervision.
Prior to adoption of the old Constitution of 1850 the University was supervised and its affairs administered by a board of trustees
as a body corporate to whom the regents succeeded under substantially the same provision as in our present Constitution of 1909. Its
corporate character was, and is, clearly that of a public corporation,
created for public purposes only, for no private emolument or advantage, and therefore an agency of the State government. It is required by law in broad terms to provide the inhabitants of the State
the means of "acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various
branches of literature, science and the arts." To that end it is required
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to establish and maintain numerous departments of schools devoted
especially to instruction in various callings and professions, including
a medical department in connection with which its hospital is maintained for the benefit of the public at public expense. Special laws of
charitable import have been passed from time to time such as providing admission to the hospital and free treatment of indigent persons and others, admission of indigent children afflicted with curable
deformity or chronic diseases with both medical and surgical treatment, board, lodging and nursing free of charge, for maintenance of
said hospital in operation during the summer vacations of the University, etc., all of which, furnished and maintained by the State, gives
that adjunct of the medical department of the University the character of a public charitable hospital. The money raised by the State to
maintain it, as well as the other activities of the University, is a trust
fund of which the board of regents is trustee. As was said in Downes
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555 (25 L R. A. 602, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 427):
"If, in the proper execution of the trust, a trustee or an employee commits an act of negligence, he may be held responsible for
his negligent act; but the law jealously guards the charitable trust
fund, and does not permit it to be frittered away by the negligent
acts of those employed in its execution. The trustees of this fund
could not by their own direct act divert it from the purpose for
which it was given, or for which the act of the legislature authorized
the title to be vested in the defendant. It certainly follows that the
fund cannot be indirectly diverted by the tortious or negligent acts
of the managers of the fund, or their employees, though such acts result in damage to an innocent beneficiary. Those voluntarily accepting the benefit of the charity accept it upon this condition.
"The fact that patients who are able to pay are required to do
so does not deprive the defendant of its eleemosynary character, nor
permit a recovery for damages on account of the existence of contract relations. The amounts thus received are not for private gain,
but contribute to the more effectual accomplishment of the purpose
for which the charity was founded."
So far as we discover, the authorities are practically all to the
effect that charitable or eleemosynary institutions supported wholly
or in part by a State or municipality are not liable for personal injuries suffered through the negligence of an employee, servant or
agent of the institution. Plaintiffs' counsel cites no authority to the
contrary, and apparently contends that decisions to that effect are
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not in point because the actions are against the regents made by statute capable of suing and being sued. The fact that the regents as a
public body corporate have the right of suing and being sued in a
proper case, involving property rights or based on contract relations,
is immaterial here. The question before us is whether these declarations sounding in tort based on personal injuries state a cause of action against the board of regents.
The hospital is an adjunct of the medical department of the
University, which is a State educational instrumentality maintained
by the public at public expense, controlled and operated by the
board of regents, a governmental agency which receives in trust and
expends the public money devoted to that purpose. In the exhaustively discussed case of Bruce v. Central M E. Church, 147 Mich.
230, 238 (10 L. R. A. (N. S.] 74, 11 Ann. Cas. 150}, it is said by
Justice OSTRANDER in his dissenting opinion:
"An examination of cases, including most of those cited in the
opinion in the Downes Case, shows that in many instances the institutions were in fact State instrumentalities, as well as charities, and
the denial of liability might have been rested in such cases wholly, as
it was in some of them in part, upon that ground."

On the case stated in plaintiffs' declarations we think denial of
liability as to the regents could safely be rested on either ground.
The writs of mandamus applied for are therefore denied.
CLARK, C. J ., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE,
FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ., concurred.

Herrst v. Regents of the University of Michigan

231 Mich. 369; 204 N.W. 119 (1925)
WIEST, J. Plaintiffs own a lot on Belser street in the city of
Ann Arbor. The regents of the University own a lot on Volland
street in the same city. Plaintiffs' lot and the University lot abut at
the rear. Defendant Edward C. Pardon, in July, 1923, was superintendent of buildings and grounds held by the regents and, as such,
had permitted Earl Rising, tenant of the Volland street lot, to build
a barn on the lot, so close to the line and near a barn standing on
plaintiffs' lot that, when the Rising barn burned, July 26, 1923, it
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set fire to plaintiffs' barn and destroyed it and its contents. This suit
was brought to recover the loss suffered by plaintiffs, and verdict
was had against both defendants, but judgment against defendant
Pardon alone. The regents were discharged from liability under the
authority of Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 Mich. 225.
Defendant Pardon reviews by writ of error. Plaintiffs claim it was the
duty of Mr. Pardon to supervise the use made by the tenant of the
property rented from the regents and prevent the tenant from endangering plaintiffs' property. It is claimed the tenant of the regents
built his barn within about three feet of the rear lot line and within
about four feet of plaintiffs' barn, fastened some pieces of 2x4 to
plaintiffs' barn in violation of the housing code of the State, piled
combustible material between the barns and permitted children to
frequent the barn. The day of the fire a 12-year-old boy, it is claimed,
came out of the barn with a cigarette and soon thereafter the Rising
barn was discovered on fire, and the fire spread to and destroyed
plaintiffs' barn. What negligence of defendant Pardon was the proximate cause of this fire? Assuming, but not deciding, that the liability
of Mr. Pardon is the same as that of an owner, did the duty rest upon
him to so supervise the use of the bam by the tenant as to prevent
children from being permitted therein or to prevent some trespassing
boy from visiting the premises and smoking therein? We think not.
A landlord is not liable for the use of premises by a tenant in
such a way as to occasion damage to a neighboring proprietor,
merely because there was a possibility of their being so used. The
wrong in such a case is that of the tenant and the liability therefor
will stop with the tenant. The erection of the barn was lawful and its
use legitimate. Any abuse of rights of neighboring proprietors in the
use of the barn by the tenant was not chargeable to the landlord unless such abuse was sanctioned by the landlord; and such sanction
could not rest upon implied notice and acquiescence. If the fastening
of the 2x4 to plaintiffs' barn was wrongful, still there is nothing in
the case to show defendant directed, sanctioned, or even knew that
it had been done, and besides, it cannot be said to have had even a
causal connection with the fire. The same may be said of the claimed
combustible material piled between the barns, for the fire did not
originate in such material, neither was such material the cause of
carrying the fire to plaintiffs' barn. Up to the very hour of the fire
there had been nothing done by the tenant which would have justified the landlord in ending his tenancy. If in law the landlord could
not have interfered with the use made by the tenant of the premises,
surely liability for such use does not fasten to the landlord. There is
no evidence in the case of a violation of the State housing code.
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Section 18, Act No. 326, Pub. Acts 1919 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1922,
§ 5180 [19]), upon which plaintiffs rely, has no bearing. This section regulates the space between buildings on the same lot with a
dwelling; permits a stable at the rear of a lot but requires a passage at
least three feet wide from the yard to an alley. The barn built by the
tenant was wholly upon the land of the regents and there was no
negligence on the part of the regents or of their agent in permitting it
to be built close to the line. Plaintiffs claim the fire was set in the
Rising barn by the 12-year-old boy lighting a cigarette therein. This
boy, so far as the record shows, was a trespasser. The tenant had no
children. But it is said the tenant had ponies in the barn and this
called children and it was the duty of defendant Pardon to notice
such fact. The evidence fails to show smoking by children about the
barn previous to the date of the fire. It was not the duty of Mr. Pardon to pay attention to the fact that the tenant had ponies in the
barn and this called children, nor should he have anticipated that
some boy might visit the barn and smoke therein.
The circuit judge instructed the jury that:
"Something was said to you about the construction of the
barn contrary to the housing code. Unless you fmd that was the
proximate cause of the injury complained of, of course you could
not find for the plaintiffs in this cause."
We have searched this record to discover what violation, if any,
with reference to the provisions of the housing code, was before the
jury, and fmd none. If there was no violation of the housing code
permitted or acquiesced in by Mr. Pardon, then he is not liable in this
case. The building of the barn did not violate the housing code. The
two barns being less than four feet apart rendered it inevitable that
the burning of one would spread to the other and the combustible
material, if any, lying between the two barns, cannot be said to have
caused the fire to spread from one barn to the other. The proximate
cause of the fire was under plaintiffs' evidence the careless act of an
intruding boy.
Rowland v. Kalamazoo Sup'ts of Poor, 49 Mich. 553, relied on
by plaintiffs, involved liability arising from negligently permitting set
fires to spread, to the injury of a neighboring proprietor, and lays
down no rule aiding plaintiffs in this case. We fmd no negligence
chargeable to defendant Pardon rendering him liable in this case. The
proximate cause of the fire was not his failure to perform any duty
or in permitting the tenant to perpetrate a wrong. The court should,
notwithstanding the verdict, have entered judgment in favor of Mr.
Pardon.
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The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with direction
to enter such judgment. Defendant Pardon will recover costs.
McDONALD, C. J., and CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE,
STEERE, and FELLOWS, JJ ., concurred.

Christie v. Board of Regents of The University of Michigan
The Supreme Court of Michigan, 1961
364Mich. 202,203-07,209-19, 228-31; 111 N.W. 2d 30 (1961)
BLACK, J. Comes the intruder spoilsport as the legislative and
judicial branches continue their gambol o'er the field of sovereign
immunity. Here the recurrent problem-what to do with another aspect of such immunity-cannot be buck-lateraled to the legislature.
By the Constitution that august body has been rendered ineligible to
receive, in today's game, any kind of a pass from the judicial branch.
Plaintiff, at 7 years of age, sues for personal injury said to have
been negligently inflicted while he was a patient-during early infancy-in the university hospital. The asserted negligence consists of
permitting him to fall "from an unattended crib from which all restraints had been removed."
Suit was commenced by summons. With commencement of
suit plaintiff filed a petition for discovery, asking among other things
that the defendant board of regents be compelled "to produce its
policy of liability insurance for the inspection and examination by
the plaintiff." The circuit judge entered an order for production and
inspection of the policy, doing so on theory that the policy should
be ordered in as possibly admissible evidence tending to establish
that the defendant board had waived its immunity from liability, to
the plaintiff, to the extent of the insurer's monetary obligation.
On application of defendant and grant of leave we review such
order for production and inspection. Plaintiffs statement of the reviewable question is comprehensive and fully explanatory:
"In civil action against board of regents of university of Michigan for personal injuries suffered by infant patient of university hospital through negligence of defendants' servants, agents and employees, did circuit judge abuse his discretion on plaintiffs amended
petition for discovery filed prior to declaration when he ordered defendants to produce for plaintiffs examination the contract of
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insurance existing between them and their liability insurance carrier
when the cause of action arose?"
I would affirm on ground that the questioned order is well
within the discretionary authority Court Rule No 40 (1945) provides. The relevantly sole requirement of that rule is that there be
fair showing that the petitioning plaintiff needs such production and
irlspection in order to declare properly the cause his petition supposedly portrays.
Does this plaintiff need the policy in order to declare? From
the face of his untraversed petition I conclude he does. McNair v.
State Highway Department, 305 Mich 181, has made it abundantly
clear that when an apparently immune public body is sued on allegation of tort liability the plaintiff must allege facts which. if true,
overcome the standard, posture of such body that "no court can hold
us liable." In a word, a part of this plaintiff's burden is that of duty
to plead and prove some status which legally impairs or destroys the
defendant board's seeming exemption. No waiver by neglect to raise
the question can exist (McNair, supra), and so it is necessary to explore the ultimate and decisive question: Whether the resolution of
the defendant board to acquire and maintain such liability insurance
operates as a matter of law to waive its immunity to the extent of
the insurer's obligation.
I agree with the statement of the annotator of a recent and exhaustive appraisal of this question who says (annotation headed "Liability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as
affecting immunity from tort liability"; 68 ALR2d 1437, 1448):
"In a few jurisdictions the courts have taken the view (which is
worthy of characterization as enlightened) that to the extent that a
liability insurance policy protects a governmental unit against tort liability, the otherwise-existing immunity of the unit is removed."
In this case there are 2 good reasons for concurrence with the
annotator's conclusion that such is the "enlightened" view. The first
is that the fact of such insurance has eliminated the classically suave
reason for immunity of the defendant board from liability (if proven)
to this plaintiff.* The other and specially distinctive reason is that
*See, for recent exposition and repudiation of the doctrine that immunity is required to protect public revenues from dissipation on account of torts
of public servants, Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18
ill2d 11 (163 NE2d 89), and Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal2d
211 (11 Cal Rptr 89, 359 P2d 457).
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the defendant board is so far autonomous and constitutionally independent as to clothe it with plenary as well as exclusive power of
waiver of such immunity and that it has already exercised such power so far as concerns this case.
The first point-that the board's determination to acquire and
carry liability insurance removes the historic reason for immunityrequires no extended analysis. We are yet free to pick and choose
among authorities extant. My choice, if it were presently necessary
to choose, would be with the "enlightened"-and visibly growingminority. As the cited annotation shows, the more numerous authorities adhere to position that public bodies, having spent public money
for liability protection thereby incur no liability; a game which in
fact if not by design unjustly enriches the insurer for carrying a risk
where there is no risk.* Other authorities, "enlightened" I repeat,
pursue the opposite and more explicable view.
Whatever view one may take of this diversity, the majority rule
becomes irrelevant when it is shown that the critical bastion thereof
(that the legislature only may waive) is nonexistent. Such is the case
here. If the defendant board is by the Constitution given the exclusive power to waive, then it would surely seem that the reasoning of
such minority is best for the specific case at bar.
The board of regents is a separate and self-governing body corporate, made so by the Constitution (Const 1908, art 11, § 4). By
our decisions it is "a constitutional corporation of independent
authority, which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate
with and equal to that of the legislature." It has "independent control of the affairs of the university by authority of these constitutional provisions" (quotations from Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General, 167 Mich 444, 450), and so its
counsel are right when they insist in their brief that the legislature
(as in the case of the State proper and its statutory agencies) cannot
waive the immunity of the board without consent of the board.**
*The majority rule, and the reasoning submitted in support of it, was
comprehensively summarized in the recent case of Maffei v. Incorporated
Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo 33 (338 P2d 808, 817):
"There are many decisions from other jurisdictions which hold there can
be no waiver of a municipality's immunity unless by specific legislative authority, and they are persuasive. [Citing cases.] We, therefore, hold it is beyond
the power of a municipality to waive an immunity which it possesses by virtue
of its being an arm of the State's government and that any waiver of such an
immunity must come by direct action of the legislature or through the clear
and unmistakable implication of its legislative acts."
**Counsel for the board do not stop with assertion that the legislature
cannot waive the board's immunity. They take a 7-league step farther by this
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But this is a knife with 2 edges. If the board by the Constitution
stands separate from and declaredly equal to the legislature, then it
alone has a right to waive and, by the same token, a right to reject
any legislative act of waiver in its behalf. By the past and tried reasoning of this Court the board is, "within the scope of its functions,"
its own legislator and may legislate that which I fmd implicit in its
decision to carry the insurance that this plaintiff would unearth for
the purpose of pleading.
Consider these interpretations we have made of the eleventh
article and its predecessor:
* * *

Summary: The board of regents has exclusive power to waive
the immunity our decisions have bestowed on it.* Such may be
done by implication from action of the board as well as by express
resolution thereof. Here the board has solemnly resolved to carry and
pay for, out of funds of the university committed to its discretion,
such insurance against liability as is quite inconsistent with an immunity from such liability. Originally there was no liability. Now, by
voluntary and lawful action of the board, there is liability and insurance against loss occasioned by such liability. If this is not true, then
we must instead attribute to an unusually exalted group of constitutional officers the intent solely of awarding some politically influential insurance agency a fat and steady premium account for insuring
the board and the university against risks which do not exist. That I
am unwilling to do. The board does not sit and govern in the midst
of partisan pressures and it should be accorded the presumption that
each determination of its members to spend university funds imports
a consideration; something for something which is valuable to the
university.
It requires no Churchillian-worded resolution of the board of
regents-adorned say with red ribbon and blue seal-to waive a status
which at best stands precariously at bay before the developing impact
of judicial authority (see discussion and exhaustive examination of
authorities in Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1, and the
(Footnote Continued)
bold ipse dixit: The people only, by constitutional amendment, may waive in
behalf of the board. With the latter I cannot agree. By force of the broad construction this Court has placed on article 11 the board may lawfully waive its
own immunity from tort liability.
*Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 Mich 225, is not opposed
to these conclusions. The effect of acquisition of liability or indemnity insurance was not considered on that occasion and we may assume from the Court's
opinion that the board did not carry such protection at the time.
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most recent case in point, Muskopf, supra). In the law as elsewhere
actions sometimes speak louder than words. Here, by force of contemplative action of the board, we must either by our decision tacitly
approve dissipation of university funds to no useful end or draw
from that action whatever liability the judicial process may decide is
a reasonable incident thereof. I prefer the latter and accordingly agree
with the reasoning of Chief Justice DETHMERS, recorded in Peters
v. Michigan State College, 320 Mich 243, 251.
Plaintiffs undenied petition for discovery discloses good reason
for exercise of the discretion Court Rule No 40 (1945) confers. The
defendant board should be required to bare its policy-insurance
policy, that is. Further, and if the inspected policy fairly suggests
additional inquiry, the minutes or other evidences of corporate action by which the insurance was acquired should be discovered under
the rule.
I vote to affirm, without an award of costs.
SUPPLEMENT (September 1, 1961 ).
This case of Christie was duly assigned to the writer prior to
commencement of our April term. In pursuance of such assignment
the foregoing opinion was prepared and delivered to other members
of the Court under date of June 6, 1961. Since then Mr. Justice
CARR, writing under date of August 30, 1961, for reversal, has
called attention to an affidavit, "executed by 1 of the attorneys for
defendant, indicating that a search of the files and records of the
university had not disclosed any copy of such a policy, and such had
not been otherwise discovered or made known to defendant."
The affidavit to which my Brother refers was prepared (and included in defendant's appendix) long after Judge Breakey's presently
reviewed order for discovery was entered, and long after we had
granted (July 11, 1960) defendant's application for leave to appeal.
No one claims that it or the thrust thereof-that no policy can be
produced-was ever brought to the trial judge's attention, and no
motion designed to include same in the record on appeal (see Court
Rule No. 72, § 1 [d], [e] [1945]) has been made at any time.
In order that the exact content of this "unable to find" affidavit may be read by the profession with verbated accuracy, same is
quoted in full as follows:
"1. That on December 18, 1959, the circuit court ordered the
production of the defendant's liability insurance policy which was in
force in September of 1953, for the purpose of permitting the plaintiff to inspect the same.
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"2. That from said order application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court was taken and said application was granted on July
11, 1960.
"3. That at the time the matter was being considered by the
circuit court and during all of the time that appeal proceedings were
pending the defendant did not know that the said policy was not
capable of being produced.
"4. That upon request of your deponent, a search was made of
the files and records of the University of Michigan for the policy,
which could not be found, and on information and belief a search
was made of the files and records of the defendant's insurance carrier, both in the Detroit office and in the New York office, and no
copy of such policy was discovered. That as of this date, a continuing search of the company's New York office is being made.
"5. That this fact was not known conclusively by the defendant
or by this deponent until on or about October 28, 1960."
It will be noted that the affiant carefully refrains from saying
that no policy was ever existent or in effect, and the fact that an instrument once at hand has since been lost provides no way for evasion of discovery. In such case the law employs its tried rules of best
and secondary evidence.
I do not care to encourage the growing practice of bolstering
circuit court records by post-appeal ex parte affidavits of fact (see
Chircop v. City of Pontiac, 363 Mich 693). Such affidavits usuallyas here-set forth facts which have never been brought to the attention of the trial judge or chancellor. It is suggested instead that we
have no right to consider instruments of that nature unless and until
they have been made a part of the record pursuant to said Court
Rule No 72 (1945).
If in this case it is shown-ultimately-that the defendant at no
time acquired a policy such as Judge Breakey ordered produced, the
judge will surely modify his order. Until such showing is made we
should proceed to review upon the circuit court record as it stood
when the order of discovery was made and our order granting leave
to review that order was entered.
My vote to affirm, without costs, is cast again.

EDWARDS, J. (concurring). We concur in affirmance on the
grounds stated in sentences 4 through 14 of the opinion of Mr. Justice BLACK.
KAVANAGH and SOURIS, JJ., concurred with EDWARDS, J.
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CARR, J. (dissenting). The determination of the issue here is of
vital concern not only to the university of Michigan but also to the
State, governmental institutions and agencies of the State, municipalities, governmental subdivisions, and school districts. It requires our
most serious consideration. Shall basic principles of law and public
policy, uniformly recognized and upheld in this State up to this
time, be now abandoned?
The case now before us was instituted by issuance of a summons from the circuit court of Washtenaw county, requiring defend~
ant's appearance within 15 days after service thereof. The writ specified that plaintiff claimed damages in an amount not exceeding
$375,000. On the same date that the summons was issued counsel
for plaintiff ftled a petition, or motion, for an order of discovery. It
was set forth therein that on or about September 13, 1953, plaintiff
was a patient in the university of Michigan hospital, and that as a result of negligence on the part of hospital attendants he was allowed
to fall in such manner as to cause serious physical injuries. Disclosure
of certain facts and of exhibits presumably desired for admission on
the trial was asked, including "the insurance contract of defendants
and their liability carrier."
Apparently all information sought by the petition was furnished
to plaintiff's counsel pursuant to agreement with attorneys representing defendant, with the exception of the liability insurance policy. By subsequent amendment to the petition it was asserted on
behalf of plaintiff that access to said policy, if in existence, was necessary to enable his counsel to properly allege the cause of action relied on in the declaration to be ftled. The language of the petition for
discovery indicated that counsel representing plaintiff were proceeding on the theory that, if liability coverage was afforded by a policy
of the character in question at the time of the injury to plaintiff,
public funds, at least to the extent of such coverage, would not be
jeopardized, that the taking out of the policy eliminated pro tanto
the right of governmental immunity, and that a cause of action was
in consequence created as against defendant (or the insurance carrier)
to the extent of the liability coverage specified in such policy, assuming that there was such.
Following a hearing on the discovery petition the circuit judge
before whom the matter was heard entered an order directing that:
"The defendants produce for plaintiff's examination the contract of insurance which was existing between defendants and their
liability insurance carrier on the 13th day of September, 1953. Said
contract may be photographed by plaintiff."
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It will be noted that the order above quoted, from which defendant

on leave granted has appealed, assumes the existence of a policy of
the general nature suggested by the petition for discovery. Said petition did not aver the actual fact in this regard, the request for the
order sought, and granted, apparently resting on the theory that a
general liability insurance policy covering defendant and its agents,
representatives and employees, might be in existence, and that if so
it should be produced to the end that the cause of action might be
averred accordingly. In appellant's appendix we find an affidavit,
executed by 1 of the attorneys for defendant, indicating that a search
of the files and records of the university had not disclosed any copy
of such a policy, and such had not been otherwise discovered or
made known to defendant. Whether there was a sufficient basis afforded by the petition for discovery to entitle plaintiff to the order
sought may well be questioned, but in view of the importance of the
basic question at issue it will be assumed herein that compliance with
the order of the circuit court is possible.
Counsel for plaintiff contend in substance that if defendant
procured to be issued to it a policy of insurance covering liability for
negligence of its agents and employees generally it thereby waived
the right to assert governmental immunity as a defense. The argument concedes the existence of the immunity doctrine and that it is
applicable to defendant. This, of course, is in accord with prior decisions of this Court. Counsel apparently base their argument on the
theory that such immunity is a matter of defense, but such is not the
fact. If immunity exists there is no cause of action. In consequence,
we are not here concerned with the problem of waiver of a defense
to an action for damages. Rather, the question before us is whether
the taking out of a liability insurance policy, if such there was, abrogated, at least pro tanto, the immunity that otherwise would exist.
Necessarily involved in the problem before us are 2 questions:
First, did the board of regents have the power to abrogate as to itself
the doctrine of governmental immunity, either wholly or in part?;
Second, would the taking out of an insurance policy against liability
for negligent acts of employees and others have the effect of abolishing such governmental immunity, either partly or wholly? Both of
these questions must be given a negative answer. Emphasis is placed
on the fact that under the Constitution of the State (article 11, § 5)
the board of regents is charged with "the general supervision of the
university and the direction and control of all expenditures from the
university funds." Section 10 of the same article requires that the
legislature "shall maintain the university" and other designated educational institutions. The supervision of the university and the expenditure of its funds do not involve the exercise of legislative
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authority. Nowhere in the Constitution of the State do we find
granted to the defendant board authority of such character. The
making of appropriations for the support of the institution was expressly committed to the legislature, such action obviously falling
within the scope of legislative powers.
Article 5, § 1, of the Constitution declares that "The legislative
power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and house of
representatives", such vesting being subject to the powers reserved to
the people under the initiative and referendum provisions in said
section. In Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich 586, 590 (90 ALR
853), it was stated that:
"The legislative power is the authority to make, alter, amend,
and repeal laws. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p
183."
The doctrine of immunity in connection with the performance
of governmental functions has been accepted in Michigan, and in the
other States of the Union as well, as a part of the common law. The
3 Constitutions adopted in the past expressly recognized the continuing force of the common law, the Constitution of 1850 declaring
in section 1 of the schedule thereof that:
"The common law and the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire
by their own limitations or are altered or repealed by the legislature."
In the Constitution of 1908 the last 3 words quoted were omitted,
the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention indicating that such omission resulted from the plan for local self-government for cities and villages, adopted by the convention, such plan
contemplating the preparation and acceptance of home-rule charters
to take the place of existing legislative charters. Obviously it was
deemed expedient to eliminate any question as to the necessity of
having a legislative repeal of existing special charters. The omission
of the words in question did not alter the fact that all legislative power was vested, under the specific provisions of the Constitution, in
the legislative department of government. Such power extended to
and included specifically the repeal or modification of the common
law recognized by the Constitutions, including the present fundamental law of the State. The conclusion necessarily follows that the
board of regents of the university of Michigan was not vested with
legislative authority to abrogate as to itself the existing doctrine of
governmental immunity.
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It was declared by this Court in Lucking v. People, 320 Mich
495, 503, that:
'

"The lands, buildings and equipment under the management,
supervision and control of the board of regents of the university are
public property, owned by the State of Michigan."
As before noted, the Constitution of the State commits to the defendant board the duty and responsibility of exercising supervisory
control over the university and also responsibility for the expenditure of its funds. The duty thus created exists and must be exercised
for and on behalf of the people of the State. No one will seriously
contend that the authority so granted would permit gifts of property
or money, belonging to defendant board, required to be used for the
purpose above indicated. By the same process of reasoning defendant
in the exercise of the supervisory and administrative functions vested
in it by the Constitution may not surrender or abrogate valuable rights
recognized by the fundamental law of the State, and created and
existing for the benefit and protection of defendant in the performance of its governmental duties. Had defendant by express resolution undertaken to abolish or modify the doctrine of governmental
immunity as to it, such action would have been ineffective. Nor
could such result follow from a contract executed in connection with
the carrying on of functions of the board.
A State agency or municipal governmental authority may not
bind itself by a contract into which it is not authorized to enter. As
above pointed out the Constitution of Michigan, by which defendant
board is bound, contains no grant of power to invade the legislative
field nor to enter into contractual undertakings other than in furtherance of the authority granted and in the exercise of the purposes
thereof.

[Out of state cases are discussed.]
By analogy the above cited cases sustaining the majority rule
are in accord with the holding of this Court in DeGroot v. The Edison Institute, 306 Mich 339. In that case the plaintiff brought an
action for damages claimed to have resulted from negligence on the
part of the defendant. The proofs indicated that the Institute was a
nonprofit and public benevolent institution. The trial court granted
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the
jury in plaintiffs favor, and this Court approved under the rule that
eleemosynary institutions are exempt in Michigan from liability
based on the grounds asserted in plaintiffs declaration. It was stated
that (pp 343, 344):
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"Nor does the fact that the nonprofit corporation carries liability insurance so change its status as to make the corporation liable
for an injury for which it would not otherwise be liable."
Other decisions in States adhering to the majority rule are in
accord with the above cases, the opinions in which indicate the
weight of authority and the reasons on which the prevailing rule
rests. The New Hampshire decision, supra, fairly epitomizes the
proposition at issue with its statement indicating that the purpose of
a policy of insurance is to indemnify the insured rather than to
create liability. As hereinbefore noted, however, the acceptance of
plaintiffs claim as to the effect that may be given to the existence of
a general policy of indemnity insurance rests on the theory that by
such a contract the abrogation or modification of the doctrine of
governmental immunity has resulted.
In the instant case it is clear that under the provisions of our
Constitution the board of regents of the university of Michigan is
not invested with legislative powers. Its powers and duties have reference to the administration of the affairs, educational and financial,
of the university. Whether the rule of governmental immunity should
be modified or abrogated is a legislative matter, and in the final
analysis the authority must be exercised in accordance with Constitutional provisions relating to the legislative department of government. Obviously the people, by Constitutional amendment, have
full authority to act. Whether the State legislature may by general
law abrogate or modify the existing rule of governmental immunity
as to defendant board of regents is not involved in the instant case.
No such law has been enacted. So far as the instant case is concerned,
defendant board of regents has not by express resolution undertaken
to abolish or alter such rule of immunity which it has possessed from
the time ofits creation. For the reasons above pointed out it is without power to take such action, and what it may not do expressly
may not be accomplished impliedly through or by means of a contract of indemnity insurance.
The conclusion follows that the examination of the policy to
which the order of the circuit court had reference would not enable
counsel for plaintiff to allege in their declaration a cause of action
against defendant board of regents. Such policy would not be entitled
to admission in evidence in the trial of the case and, in consequence,
it must be said that Michigan Court Rule No 35, § 6 (1945),* on
which plaintiffs petition for discovery was based did not authorize
the order from which the appeal has been taken.
*As added June 27, 1952 and amended June 11, 1958. See 334 Mich xl
and 352 Mich xvii.-REPORTER.
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Counsel for appellant calls attention to the decision of this
Court in Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 Mich 225, in
which it was held that the hospital of the university of Michigan was
a charitable or eleemosynary institution, because supported at public
expense, and that the regents of the university were not liable for
damages for injuries, alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff while
a surgical patient in the hospital, because of the status thereof, as
well as on the ground that as an agency of State government the general rule of immunity was applicable. Attention is directed to the
fact that the injuries sustained by plaintiff in the instant case were
suffered in 1953. In the prevailing opinion in the case of Parker v.
Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1, it was held that the change in the
rule as to the liability of charitable nonprofit hospital organizations
should apply in that case and (p 28) "to all future causes of action
arising after September 15, 1960." It is suggested in substance that
the decision in Parker may not be applied to the instant case in view
of the limitation as to the effective time of the holding. Also involved is the question whether such holding is applicable to the hospital of the university of Michigan which under the provisions of the
State Constitution is subject to supervision and control by the defendant board of regents. However, we think that the instant case
should be determined on the basis that the doctrine of governmental
immunity is applicable to the defendant.
The case should be remanded with directions to set aside the
order from which defendant has appealed.
KELLY, J., concurred with CARR, J.
DETHMERS, C. J., and TALBOT SMITH, J., did not sit.

The Christie case was decided September 22, 1961. The
Board of Regents held its September meeting one week later.
The official Proceedings of the Board of Regents for that meeting contains the following paragraph with the marginal notation
"Sovereign Immunity":
The Vice-President in charge of business and finance
commented upon a report from the Interim Committee of
the legislature on sovereign immunity. He referred to a letter from the Attorney General and to his reply to that letter. The Vice-President said that the Board of Regents in
1939 directed that public liability insurance be taken out
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(R.P., 1936-39, p. 968), and that at present the University
carries a public liability policy with limits of $500,000 to
$1,000,000 for bodily injury and $50,000 to $500,000 for
property damage. He said that this policy also contains insurance against malpractice with an aggregate limit of
$1,000,000. The liability policy in effect contains a provision that the insurer will not invoke the defense of sovereign immunity without the specific authorization of the
Board of Regents in individual cases.

-Proceedings of the Board of Regents, 1960 to 1963,
at 460.
Glass v. Dudley Paper Company

365 Mich. 227, 228-31; 112 N.W. 2d 489 (1961)
DETHMERS, C. J. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued in the
Ingham county circuit court for damages resulting from injuries allegedly sustained by the wife when a glass milk container, purchased
from defendant State board, crumbled in her hand. Defendant board
moved to dismiss as to it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in that
court, contending that it reposes exclusively in the court of claims.
The motion was granted. Plaintiffs appeal.
The question presented is a jurisdictional one. Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 11, § 8, provides that the defendant, the State
board of agriculture, now known as "The Board of Trustees of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science",* "shall
have the general supervision of the college, and the direction and
control of all college funds". With respect to this and the like constitutional provision relating to the University of Michigan,t this Court
has held that they have invested the governing bodies of the 2 universities with the entire control and management of the affair~ and
property of these institutions, to the exclusion of all other departments of the State government from any interference therewith.
Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich 246; Agler v. Michigan
Agricultural College, 181 Mich 559 (5 NCCA 897). For discussion of
point, see, also, Peters v. Michigan State College, 320 Mich 243.
*See PA 1959, p. 485.-REPORTER.
tMichigan Const 1908, art 11, § 5.
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It is on the above basis that plaintiffs contend that the legislature could not include the defendant board within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of claims because this would represent an invasion by the legislature of the board's exclusive right of control of the
affairs and property of the university.
It is to be noted that the mentioned constitutional article 11,
§ 8, in nowise empowers the board to create courts or to confer upon or withhold jurisdiction from any court. On the contrary, article
7, § 1, after establishing certain courts, provides for "such other
courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction, inferior to the Supreme
Court, as the legislature may establish by general law." That expressly conferred power the legislature exercised in creating the court
of claims by the enactment ofPA 1939, No 135 (CL 1948, § 691.101
et seq. (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.3548(1) et seq.]). By that
act the legislature conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the court of
claims over "claims and demands", over $100, "against the State or
any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or
agencies". That language is broad enough to include defendant
board. In thus conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the court of
claims, the legislature has also exercised the power contemplated by
Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 7, § 10, which provides that:
"Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal not excepted in this Constitution and not prohibited by law. " (Italics supplied.)
By the enactment in question jurisdiction in this matter has become
prohibited to the circuit court by law.
To conclude, involved in the jurisdictional question here presented is not the power to control university affairs and property,
vested by the Constitution in defendant board, but, rather, the power to ftx the jurisdiction of courts inferior to the Supreme Court,
vested by Constitution in the legislature. The court of claims act is,
therefore, in the respect here considered, constitutional.
Order dismissing is affirmed, without costs, a public question
being involved.
KELLY, BLACK, EDWARDS, KAVANAGH, and SOURIS,
JJ., concurred.
CARR, J., did not sit.
OTIS M. SMITH, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
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v. Board of Regents of The University of Michigan
Mich. 238, 240-43; 134 N.W. 2d 146 (1965)
T. M. KAVANAGH, C. J. Separate actions were commenced in
the Washtenaw county circuit court by the various plaintiffs against
the board of regents of the University of Michigan and others.
In the Fox and Mitchell cases the declarations were filed in
two counts:
Count one alleged that the University Hospital, an agency
controlled by the board of regents, made warranties as to the qualifications, knowledge, and skill of its agents and employees, being doctors employed at the said hospital, which qualifications were ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession
in the locality, and that the warranties were breached in that the
diagnosis, treatment, and surgery performed on plaintiff was unskillfully and negligently performed, resulting in permanent injury and
disability to the plaintiff.
Court two was entitled "trespass on the case," in which the
claim was made that the defendant board of regents was responsible
for the negligent and unskillfull performance of surgery and treatment during plaintiffs hospitalization.
Subsequent amendments to the declarations alleged breach of
contract and eventually an additional amendment was filed alleging
that any immunity from liability on the part of the board of regents
had been waived by the purchase of a comprehensive general liability
insurance policy.
The Hyma case was begun by summons. No declaration was
filed.
Motions to dismiss the cases as to the regents of the University
of Michigan only were filed. The motions were based upon the ruling
of this Court in Glass v. Dudley Paper Company, 365 Mich 227, in
which it was held that the circuit courts of this State ·did not have
jurisdiction to entertain claims against the governing body of Michigan State University, for the reason such jurisdiction is vested by
statute 1 exclusively in the court of claims. A similar rule woulJ apply to the board of regents of the University of Michigan.
The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction but that
serious injustice would result by reason of the running of the statute
of limitations in a court of claims action if dismissal were granted.
The trial court instead ordered transfer of jurisdiction to the court
of claims.
1
PA 1961, No 236, § 6419 (CLS 1961, § 600.6419 [Stat Ann 1962
Rev§ 27A.6419]).
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On leave granted, the board of regents of the University of
Michigan presented the following question:
"Can the circuit court, which has acknowledged itself to be
without jurisdiction to entertain and determine the issues of fact and
law presented, by reason of the court of claims act, which vests that
court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against
the defendant, enter an order transferring the cause from the circuit
court to the court of claims?"
Plaintiffs contend that the General Court Rules of 1963 are to
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action so as to avoid the consequences of any error or
defect in the proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.
Plaintiffs further contend the spirit and effect of the revised
judicature act of 1961 1 is to eliminate the old concepts of "jurisdiction" and to assure that actions shall be justly and promptly heard
without stilted concepts of territorial or other limitations, by permitting transfer to the proper forum if filed in an improper forum.
They also argue that the law in Michigan prior to Glass permitted the
bringing of such an action in the Washtenaw circuit court, since actions had previously been brought there and no one had ever questioned its jurisdiction. For this reason, they argue, that in justice and
fairness they should not be deprived of a cause of action because of a
change in the law.
Jurisdiction and venue are not the same thing. Lack of proper
venue under the new General Court Rules 2 can be corrected by transfer of a cause to the proper forum; lack of jurisdiction cannot.
When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any
action with respect to such a cause, other than to dismiss it, is absolutely void.
In In re Estate of Fraser, 288 Mich 392, this Court said (p
394):
"Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of
jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing
the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceeding."
1

CLS 1961, § 600.101 etseq. (Stat Ann 1962 Rev R 27A.101etseq.).REPORTER.
2
GCR 1963, 404.-REPORTER.
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7 MLP, Courts, § 24, p 627, is to the same effect:
"Where a court is without jurisdiction in the particular case, its
acts and proceedings can be of no force or validity, and are a mere
nullity and void. 1
"A court which has determined that it has no jurisdiction
should not proceed further except to dismiss the action." 2
The orders of the circuit court in transferring the cases against
the defendant board of regents of the University of Michigan to the
court of claims are reversed and set aside, and the causes remanded
to the lower court for entry of an order dismissing the actions.
A public question being involved, no costs are allowed.
DETHMERS, KELLY, BLACK, SOURIS, SMITH, O'HARA,
and ADAMS, JJ., concurred.

Branum v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan

The Michigan Courtof Appeals, Division 2 (1966)
5 MiGh. App. 134, 135-39; 145 N.W. 2d 860 (1966)
McGREGOR, P.J. This action arose as the result of an injury
sustained by Joyce Branum on July 2, 1963. At about 3:15p.m.,
plaintiff was struck by a truck owned by the University of Michigan,
being driven by Harold F. Dresselhouse, an employee of the University of Michigan. Mrs. Branum was injured when the truck left the
street, went over the curb and sidewalk, and struck her. The plaintiff
Carl Branum is the husband of Joyce Branum and makes his claim
for loss of consortium and medical expenses of his wife.
The statement of claim was ftled in the court of claims on
October 3, 1963. Plaintiffs argue that the legislature of the State of
Michigan did abolish the defense of governmental immunity for the
State of Michigan and the board of regents of the University of
Michigan, or-alternatively-that the purchase of automobile liability
insurance by the board of regents of the University of Michigan did
waive any claim that it might have of governmental immunity. The
plaintiffs argue that, in any event, the State of Michigan would be
1

In re Braver (ED Mich 1931), 51 F2d 123, affirmed by Detroit Trust
Co. v. Dunitz (CCA 6, 1932), 59 F2d 905;In re Dowling's Estate (1944), 308
Mich 129 (probate court).
2
Lehman v. Lehman (1945), 312 Mich 102.
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liable upon the accident because the State of Michigan was, in fact,
the owner of the truck, even though it was registered in the name of
the board of regents of the University of Michigan. The defendants
based their defense on the governmental immunity of the board of
regents of the University of Michigan. They argue that the legislature
of the State of Michigan could not waive the governmental immunity
of the University of Michigan, as it is a constitutional corporation
and not subject to the control of the legislature.
On March 22, 1965, the court of claims ordered a summary
judgment of no cause of action, based upon the defendants' previous
motion to dismiss.
The decision of this Court could be simplified if we could
adopt the plaintiffs' arguments that purchase of automobile liability
insurance by the defendant board of regents of the University of
Michigan acted to waive governmental immunity of the board of regents to the extent of the insurance coverage. Opinions from the
courts of some sister States have adopted such a position. Marshall v.
City of Green Bay (1963), 18 Wis 2d 496 (118 NW2d 715);Schoening v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. (1963), 265 Minn 11~ (120
NW2d 859); Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education (1942) 292
Ky 767 (167 SW2d 700, 145 ALR 1333);Marion County v. Cantrell
(1933), 166 Tenn 358 (61 SW2d 477); Vendrell v. School District
# 266 (Oregon) (1961), 226 Or 263 (360 P2d 282). The Supreme
Court of the State of Michigan had the chance to adopt such a position in the opinion of Justice BLACK in Christie v. Board of Regents
of the University of Michigan (1961), 364 Mich 202, but did not
adopt such a position. It is noted that Justice BLACK, in the later
case of Sayers v. School District # 1 Fractional (1962), 366 Mich
217, abandoned his former position in the face of the "overwhelming
edict" on the part of his fellow Justices on the Supreme Court
against his position. This Court cannot, therefore, rule that the board
of regents waived governmental immunity by taking out a policy of
automobile liability insurance, in view of the recent action on this
question by the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.
We must decide whether the waiver of governmental immunity
by the State of Michigan, PA 1961, No 236 (CLS 1961, § 600.2904,
Stat Ann 1962 Rev 27A.2904) and PA 1961, No 236, CLS 1961,
§ 600.6475 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev 27A.6475), did waive the governmental immunity of the board of regents of the University of Michigan.
The defendants argue that historically, by judicial decisions of
the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, the board of regents of
the University of Michigan has not been held subject to the control of
the legislature. See Weinberg v. Regents of University of Michigan
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(1893), 97 Mich 246; Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan
(1896), llOMich 369, (34 LRA 150);Board of Regents of University
of Michigan v. Auditor General (1911), 167 Mich 444; Robinson v.
Washtenaw Circuit Judge (1924), 228 Mich 225. This Court recognizes the wisdom of establishing a separate governing body of the
University of Michigan, free from the political influences that are
necessarily a part of a State legislature. This Court recognizes that
such independence must be maintained in educational matters in order to provide the highest quality education for the students of Michigan, and in order to maintain the outstanding national reputation of
the University.
In spite of its independence, the board of regents remains a
part of the government of the State of Michigan. The Supreme
Court of the State of Michigan has ruled that the judicial doctrine of
governmental immunity no longer exists in Michigan. Justice EDWARDS, in Williams v. City of Detroit (1961), 364 Mich 231, 250,
so ruled, and was concurred in by three other justices. It is clear that
the public policy of Michigan is that the defense of governmental immunity to tort actions should no longer exist.
The governing bodies of both the University of Michigan and
Michigan State University are equal in both creation and power. In
Peters v. Michigan State College (1948), 320 Mich 243, the Supreme
Court, by handing down a split 44 decision, affirmed the lower court
decision that Michigan State College was not immune from the workmen's compensation act. It is the opinion of this Court that the legislature can validly exercise its police power for the welfare oflhe people of this State, and a constitutional corporation such as the board
of regents of the University of Michigan can lawfully be affected
thereby. The University of Michigan is an independent branch of the
government of the State of Michigan, but it is not an island. Within
the confines of the operation and the allocation of funds of the University, it is supreme. Without these confines, however, there is no
reason to allow the regents to use their independence to thwart the
clearly established public policy of the people of Michigan.
The decision of the court of claims is reversed and the case remanded to the court of claims for determination upon the merits.
No costs are awarded because of the public nature of the questions
involved.
T. G. KAY ANAGH and J. H. GILLIS, JJ., concurred.
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Huckins v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan

263 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich. 1967)
LEVIN, Chief Judge.
This suit is based on three counts: I, the Jones Act, 4C U.S.C.
§ 688; II, unseaworthiness; and III, the duty of maintenance and
care, the latter two counts under the general maritime law. The plaintiff was employed as a seaman by the defendant on the Myscis, a vessel owned by the defendant and used by it for scientific purposes on
the Great Lakes and connecting tributaries, and alleges that the injuries occurred on July 8, 1964, while in the course of that employment. The defendant, the Board of Regents of the University of
Michigan, a corporation created by the Constitution of the State of
Michigan and generally known as a constitutional corporation, moves
to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the ground
that it is immune from liability and suit under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
[1] The motion to dismiss Count I is denied. The Jones Act
provides in part:
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at
law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of
the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply

*** "
The Federal Employers' liability Act (FELA), to which the
Jones Act refers, provides in part:
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States * * * shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce * * * " and that " [u] nder this chapter an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States * * * ." 45 U.S.C.
§§51, 56.
In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department et al., 377 U.S. 184,84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964),
the Supreme Court held that Congress intended to subject a state to
suit under the FELA and had the authority under the commerce
clause to do so.
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[2] The Jones Act, by express language, gives seamen injured
in the course of their employment the equivalent rights available to
railway employees. It is clear that Congress intended and had the
power to subject a state to suit in a federal court under the Jones Act
just as it did under the FELA See Cocherl v. State of Alaska, 246
F.Supp. 328 (D.Alaska 1965).
[3] Counts II and III, based on the maritime law and not on
congressional enactment, are dismissed. The eleventh amendment of
the United States Constitution precludes suits against a state under
the general maritime law in federal court absent the consent of the
state. In Copper Steamship Co. v. State of Michigan et al., 194 F.2d
465, 468 (6th Cir. 1952), a libel against the State of Michigan for
property damage caused by one of its ferries, the court said:
"We are of the opinion that the logical overall construction of the
Court of Claims Act is that Michigan created a court to hear all
claims against the State with the exception of any claims that were
or might be enforcible in the federal courts; that with respect to
claims of either nature a 3-year state of limitations would be applicable; and that there was no intention in creating the Court of Claims
to enlarge or extend the existing jurisdiction of the federal court
over the State or any of its departments, commissions, or agencies.
This was the construction given to the Act by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Manion v. State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mich. 1, on
page 22, 5 N.W.2d 527, 529, where, in a case involving the Act, the
Court stated: 'Nor has the State waived its immunity from suit for a
maritime tort in the courts of the United States.' This expression of
opinion was not necessary for the ruling which the Court gave in that
case, and is not binding upon us as is usually the case where the state
court of last resort has given its construction of a statute of the State.
[omitting citations] However, it is persuasive as being in accord with
our own view in this matter."
[4] The plaintiff argues that the rules governing the immunity
of municipalities are different from those governing the immunities
of a state and that the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan is more akin to a municipality, and therefore the rule of the
Copper case would not apply. It is not necessary to consider the law
applicable to municipalities, as I am not persuaded by the analogy.
The immunity of a state extends to its agencies and departments.
The Board of Regents of the University of Michigan is a unique constitutional corporation, and is similar to a department of the state.
[5] The plaintiff also argues that the defendant waived its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance and cites Christie v.
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Board of Regents of University of Michigan, 364 Mich. 202, 111
N.W.2d 30 (1961), in support of his position. In Grant v. Cottage
Hospital Corp., 368 Mich. 77, 79, 117 N.W.2d 90 (1962), the court
held that purchase of insurance by a hospital did not waive its immunity from suit and also remarked:
"The majority opinion in Christie v. Board of Regents of University
of Michigan, supra, is not to the contrary since the effect of that
opinion was simply to require the production of insurance policies
for examination in order that a plaintiff might plead. There was no
determination that, once having pleaded a waiver by the purchase of
insurance, the plaintiff would have pleaded a good cause of action.
That issue is here now determined adversely to the pleader."
Even if the existence of liability insurance had amounted to a waiver
of immunity from suit, the State of Michigan did not consent to such
suit in the federal court.
It is of interest to note that Public Act No. 170 of the Public
Acts of 1964, Comp. Laws 1948, § 691.1401 et seq. M.S.A.
§ 3.996(101) et seq., effective July 1, 1965, subsequent to this accident, waives governmental immunity in certain cases. The case before the court is not one of them.
[6] The motion to dismiss Count I is denied; the motion to
dismiss Counts II and III is granted; and the motion for summary
judgment in the alternative, with respect to Count I, is denied because there are genuine issues of material fact.

MacDonald v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan

371 F. 2d 818 (6th Cir., 1967)
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant is a citizen and resident of the Province of
Nova Scotia, Canada. On February 2, 1965, she ftled suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
against the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, alleging
that while a patient in the University of Michigan Hospital, she had
suffered injuries as a result of the negligence of employees of that
hospital.
Appellee Board of Regents filed an answer in this cause on
February 24, 1965. On June 29, 1965, a pretrial order was entered
by the United States District Judge which recited in part: "Defendant
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contemplates flling a motion challenging the jurisdiction of this
Court and such motion shall be filed without delay." The order also
granted defendant leave to amend its answer within 15 days in order
to ch'allenge jurisdiction.
Subsequently, on July 6, 1965, the Board of Regents f:Jled a
motion to dismiss, alleging: "That this court is without jurisdiction
to hear the issues here involved and that the plaintiffs exclusive
remedy, if any, is with the Court of Claims of the State of Michigan."
The parties concede that the defendant here, the Board of
Regents of the University of Michigan, is for all legal purposes one
and the same as the State of Michigan itself.
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Appellant concedes that absent appellee's answer in this cause,
the Eleventh Amendment would be a final bar to the United States
District Court having jurisdiction over this litigation. Appellant,
however, argues that filing of an answer should be read by this court,
and should have been by the District Judge, as a waiver of its right to
assert lack of jurisdiction.
We do not believe that a constitutional proscription against the
judicial power of the United States being construed to extend to any
suit commenced by a citizen of a foreign state against one of the
United States can be waived by such a technical error. Ford Motor
Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct.
347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945).
In the Ford case, the claim of lack of jurisdiction due to the
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued by the state in the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court therein stated:
"This was in time, however. The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial
power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue
arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the
first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury
of State of Indiana, supra at 467, 65 S.Ct. at 352.
The order of the District Court is affirmed.
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3. OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

The statutes which provide for the treatment of children
and poor people at the state expense by University Hospital
have been the subject of many opinions of the Attorney General. In 1911 and again in 1920 the Attorney General read the
statutes in an extremely literal way and ruled that the statutory
words "medical care" did not include surgery for children. 1 In
1915, however, the Attorney General was able to demonstrate
that he could read language more liberally when he ruled that
the words "University Hospital" included the homeopathic hospital which was then operated by the University. 2
In other rulings under these same laws, the Attorney General, in 1919, ruled that the superintendent of University Hospital could not refuse to admit a child brought to the hospital
under an order of Probate Court 3 ; but in more recent opinions
the Attorney General has ruled that the admission of state patients to the Neuropsychiatric Institute and the tuberculosis unit
of University Hospital are subject only to the rules of the Board
of Regents and not subject to the provisions of the Michigan Afflicted Children's Act or the regulations at the Tuberculosis
Sanitarium Commission. 4
Despite the University's acknowledged constitutional independence in the framework all ready discussed in Chapters II
and III, it is clear from subsequent rulings of the Attorney General that the University continued to cooperate with other state
authorities who were acting under the various statutes. Under
these laws, the Attorney General has ruled that a Judge of Probate may commission any person to transport children to University Hospital at state expense. 5 The word "child" in the
statutes was defined as any person who has not attained his
majority. 6 The authority of the former county superintendents
of the poor to guarantee expenses at University Hospital has
been examined, 7 and the procedure for submitting separate invoices to the state for the same patient who received treatment
under two different laws was prescribed in another opinion. 8 In
1943, on the request of a social worker, the Attorney General
was able to find four different sets of statutory provisions under
which a child with homicidal tendencies might qualify for commitment at state expense to the Neuropsychiatric Institute on
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either a permanent or a temporary basis. 9 In the same year the
Attorney General ruled that the University could not collect
additional charges from a patient admitted at state expense even
though the patient could collect under an insurance policy. 10
A rather startling number of rulings have been issued under
statutes providing that unclaimed bodies for which no private
person has paid burial expenses shall be shipped to the Medical
School for the use of its students. As early as 1886 the Attorney
General ruled that the body of a deceased inmate of the Northern Michigan Asylum (today, the Traverse City State Hospital)
might be buried at the asylum at the request of her widower
even though the widower did not provide funds for burial. 11
By 1890, however, the Attorney General's office seems to have
abandoned its earlier position, and it ruled that the only alternative to shipment to the Medical School was burial at private expense. 12 In 1907, the office made it clear that the statutory
maximum of $15.00 for packing and shipping cadavers to the
Medical School could not be exceeded, 13 and, in 1910, the superintendent at Traverse City, who had requested most of the
opinions in this series, was informed that he must continue to
ship cadavers to Ann Arbor despite the fact that the Medical
School was then oversupplied since the statute did not make any
other provision for such a contingency. 14 As late as 1930, the
Attorney General had to advise the Auditor General that he
should not pay for burial at public expense despite an order of
the Circuit Court since the body should have been shipped to
Ann Arbor. 15
A few opinions of the Attorney General have been concerned with the sovereign immunity of state institutions of higher education. In 1926, on the authority of the Robinson case, he
ruled that University Hospital was not liable for burns suffered
by a patient because of the negligence of an employee. 16 A
1939 ruling held that the legislature could not waive the sovereign immunity of the then Michigan State College, and, therefore, a statute granting jurisdiction to the Claims Committee of
the State Administrative Board to decide small claims was not
constitutional as applied to claims against the college. 17 (This
opinion was overruled by the Branum case discussed in this
chapter.) Finally, in 1948, the members of a faculty committee
in charge of athletics at Central Michigan College were told that
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incorporation could not protect them from personal liability for
injuries to athletes or patrons if their own negligence was the
proximate cause of the injuries. 18
4. STATUTE ON JURISDICTION OF COURT CLAIMS
P.A. 1961, No. 236, § 6419, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963
AN ACT to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts of this state; the powers and
duties of such courts, and of the judges and other officers thereof; the
forms and attributes of civil claims and actions; the time within which
civil actions and proceedings may be brought in said courts; pleading,
evidence, practice and procedure in civil actions and proceedings in
said courts; to provide remedies and penalties for the violation of certain provisions of this act; and to repeal all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with, or contravening any of the provisions of this act.

The People of the State of Michigan enact:
600.6419 Court of Claims
(1) Except as provided in section 6440, the jurisdiction of the
court of claims as conferred upon it by this chapter over claims and
demands against the state or any of its departments, commissions,
boards, institutions, arms or agencies, shall be exclusive. The state
administrative board is hereby vested with discretionary authority
upon the advice of the attorney general, to hear, consider, determine
and allow any claim against the state in an amount less than $100.00.
Any claim so allowed by the state administrative board shall be paid
in the same manner as judgments are paid under section 6458 upon
certification of the said allowed claim by the secretary of the state
administrative board to the clerk of the court of claims. The court
has power and jurisdiction:
(a) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated
and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state
and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions,
arms or agencies.
(b) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated
or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, which may be pleaded
by way of counterclaim on the part of the state or any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof
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against any claimant who may bring suit in such court. Any such
claim of the state or any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof may be pleaded by way of counterclaim in any action brought against the state, or such or any other
department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency of the
state.
(2) The judgment entered by the court of claims upon any
such claim, either against or in favor of the state or any department,
commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof, upon becoming final shall be res adjudicata of such claim. Upon the trial of any
cause in which any demand is made by the state or any department,
commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof, against the
claimant either by way of setoff, recoupment, or cross declaration,
the court shall hear and determine each of such claims or demands
and if the court shall find a balance due from the claimant to the
state it shall render judgment in favor of the state for such balance.
Writs of execution or garnishment may issue upon said judgment the
same as from one of the circuit courts of this state. The judgment entered by the court of claims upon any such claim, either for or
against the claimant shall be fmal unless appealed from as herein
provided.
(3) The court of claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim
for compensation under the provisions of either:
(a) Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of the First Extra Session
of 1912, as amended;
(b) Act No. 93 of the Public Acts of 1929, being sections
17.91 and 17.92 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, as amended; or
(c) Act No. 329 of the Public Acts of 1937, as amended.
(4) This chapter shall not be construed so as to deprive the circuit courts of this state of jurisdiction over actions brought by the
taxpayer under the provisions of Act No. 167 of the Public Acts of
1933 or any other actions against state agencies based upon the statutes of the state of Michigan in such case made and provided, which
expressly confer jurisdiction thereof upon the circuit courts, nor of
the proceedings to review findings as provided in Act No. 1 of the
Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936, or any other similar proceedings expressly authorized by the statutes of the state of Michigan in such case made and provided.
(CL '48, § 600.6419.)
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2. See supra 248.
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5. 1920 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 72.
6. 1921-22 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 382.
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8. 1943-44 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 195.
9. 1943-44 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 600.
10. 1943-44 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 650.
11. 1886 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 51.
12. 1890 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 13.
13. 1908 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 95.
14. 1910 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 262.
15. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 25.
16. 1926-28 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 33.
17. Unpublished opinion, No. 11937, dated August 23, 1939.
18. Unpublished opinion, No. 692, dated May 11, 1948.

CHAPTER VIII
THE UNIVERSITY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
ZONING AND PROPERTY TAXES
1. INTRODUCTION

The relations between a state university and local governments are discussed in this chapter. Probably the most noticeable area of potential conflict between university and municipal
authorities relates to the application of local zoning ordinances
to the construction and operation of the physical plant of the
university. So far, no case has been decided by the appellate
courts of Michigan on this exact point, but it is the subject of
several opinions of the Attorney General.
The cases do, however, deal with a second subject which
affects the relations between city and university, i.e., the exemption of university property from taxation. Since property taxes
are so important to the support of local government and since a
university is likely to own a large amount of property in the city
in which it is located, the exact applicability of its tax exemption is very important.
Three cases have been decided by the Michigan Supreme
Court which have determined the extent to which the property
of the University of Michigan is exempt from taxation. The first
case, Aplin, 1 decided in 1890, held that the property of the University of Michigan was exempt from taxation as state property,
and not as the property of an educational institution. This distinction was important because the statute exempting the property of incorporated educational institutions from taxation
limited the exemption to real estate "occupied by them for the
purposes for which they were incorporated." The land involved
in the case was Detroit real estate which apparently had not been
recently used for educational purposes.
MacKinnon Boiler, the next case in this series, modified
the rules by permitting one minor exception which embraced
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vacant lots not used by the University. They were declared to
be subject to special assessment taxes for local improvements.
Since these local improvements add to the value of the property
subject to the tax, this exception to the rule should not unduly
burden the University.
The broadest attack on the tax exemption of the University
came in the final case in this series, Lucking v. People. An Ann
Arbor taxpayer brought suit against the State of Michigan and
the University of Michigan seeking to force the payment of real
estate taxes to the City of Ann Arbor on certain properties of
the University which, he did not think were being used for purely educational purposes. The Supreme Court adhered to its
precedents and the suit was dismissed.
Despite the establishment of the rule, however, there are
enormous practical problems involved when a city which must
depend for its support upon property taxes finds that a large
share of the property within the city is exempt from taxation.
Both the city and the university can be injured if the city cannot
provide adequate services. In order to remedy this problem, a
statute 2 provides that state universities may enter into agreements with the cities in which they are located for police and
fire protection. The agreement between the City of Ann Arbor
and the Regents of the University of Michigan is appended to
this chapter.

2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Aplin v. The Regents of The University of Michigan
83 Mich. 467, 467-71; 47 N.W. 440 (1890)
CHAMPLIN, C. J. Prior to July 1, 1888, certain land situated
in the city of Detroit, the title of which was vested in the Regents of
the University of Michigan by a grant from Walter Crane, bearing
date March 22, 1880, was and has since the date of such deed been
held for corporate purposes. This land was assessed upon the general
tax roll of the city for the year 1887, and was returned as delinquent,
and the bill is ftled in this case under Act No. 195, Laws of 1889 (3
How. Stat. p. 2936), to enforce collection of such taxes. No question
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is made concerning the title to the land, and the only question presented is whether the land was exempt from taxation.
The legislation affecting the organization of the University of
Michigan is given in the case of Regents v. Board of Education, 4
Mich. 213, and need not be here repeated. Section 7 of Article 13 of
the Constitution which was adopted in 1850 declares that"The Regents of the University, and their successors in office,
shall continue to constitute the body corporate known by the name
and title of 'The Regents of the University of Michigan.' "
Section 8 of the same article declares that"The board of regents shall have the general supervision of the
university, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the
university interest fund."
By these provisions the body corporate, which was at first the
creation of the legislative will, has received the sanction of the Constitution, and has become a part of the fundamental law, and in some
respects is not subject to legislative control or interference. It is not,
however, independent of, but is part of, the State, a department to
which the education of the people in the higher branches of literature, science, and the arts is confided. As such it is fostered by the
State. Appropriations are made which are raised by taxation upon
the property of individuals of the State. A tax is also imposed of onetwentieth of a mill upon the taxable property of the State for the
support of a university. The public character of the institution has
been recognized and declared in repeated decisions of this Court. It
was said in the case of Regents v. Board of Education, above referred
to, that the corporation has been since its incorporation in 183 7"A public corporation, created for public purposes alone. * * *
The institution was erected and has been supported by a public fund,
and the corporators have no private interest whatever connected
with their corporate character." And again it was said that-"the
corporation was created for the purpose of administering a great
public trust, and the present plaintiffs are but trustees for the same
great purpose.''
In the case of Regents v. Detroit Young Men's Society, 12
Mich. 163, it was said:

"The University of Michigan is a public corporation. The people, in their political capacity, are the corporators. It is a part of the
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educational system of the State, and is under the control of the Legislature, except so far as it has been placed beyond the reach of that
body by the Constitution and the trust attached to the university
fund. * * * It was a public corporation originally, and has been
throughout. It was created to subserve a great public want,-the education of the people."
Exemption from taxation is claimed under the provision of the
first subdivision of section 3 of Act No. 153, Laws of 1885 (3 How.
Stat. § 116912), which provides that all public property belonging
to this State shall be exempt from taxation.
It is contended that all of the property of the University of
Michigan is public property of this State within the meaning of the
above exemption. We are of the opinion that the land in question is
exempt from taxation under the terms of the above statute. The
property held by the Regents of the University of Michigan in their
corporate capacity is the public property of the State held by the
corporation in trust for the purposes to which it was devoted.
It does not follow that the State can have no property except
such as is in the control and at the disposition of the Legislature. The
Legislature is not the State, but only a department of the State. All
subjects of legislation otherwise than such as are excepted from
their authority by the Constitution are within their jurisdiction and
control. They have said that all public property belonging to the
State shall be exempt from taxation. The public property belonging
to the State includes the property of all public departments of the
State; such as the Michigan University, the Reform School, the
School for the Deaf and Dumb, the State prisons, the asylums, the
Agricultural College, the State Normal School, and other public institutions supported by the State through taxation or by funds or
property appropriated by public or private generosity for that purpose. It cannot be supposed that the Legislature would make large
appropriations for the support of these institutions, or levy taxes for
the same purpose, and then assess the property held by them in trust
to carry out the same object for which such taxes are levied.
It is claimed by the solicitor for petitioner that the second
subdivision of section 3 is the one applicable to the Michigan University, which exempts the personal property of library and scientific
institutions incorporated under the laws of this State, and such real
estate as shall be occupied by them for the purposes for which they
were incorporated. We think it plain that the language of this subdivision cannot apply to the class of institutions above enumerated as
exempt under the first subdivision. It refers to such institutions as
are incorporated under the general laws of the State for library,
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benevolent, charitable, and scientific purposes, and not those institutions which may be regarded as departments of the State provided
for in the organic law, or supported by direct taxation.
The decree is affirmed, without costs.
The other Justices concurred.

Auditor General v. MacKinnon Boiler & Machine Company

199 Mich. 489, 489-96; 165 N.W. 771 (1917)
BIRD, J. In the year 1905 C. A. Kent of Detroit conveyed certain lands in Bay City to the regents of the university, the same
being a gift, for the use and benefit of the university. Subsequently
the regents sold a portion thereof to petitioner. Prior to the sale,
however, a special assessment for sewer purposes had been made
thereon by the local authorities. The assessment remaining unpaid
the premises were included in the auditor's annual petition ftled in
the circuit court of Bay county for the sale of lands for delinquent
taxes. Petitioner intervened and made the objection that at the time
the assessment was made it was the property of the university, and
therefore invalid, as no valid tax or assessment could be levied thereon. This objection was overruled at the hearing, and petitioner has
appealed.
1. The one question presented for solution is whether vacant
real estate owned by the university, but not actually used for any
purposes in connection with its affairs, can be subjected to a special
assessment for local improvements. Counsel for relator argues that
the assessment is invalid on the ground that the board of regents is a
constitutional body, has independent control of the affairs of the
university, and therefore its property is not subject to the acts and
control of the legislature.
We think it is clear that if this property is exempt from the assessment in question it must be so by force of some legislative acts.
The Constitution does not deal with exemptions from taxation.
There being no constitutional restriction on this power of the legislature, it follows that it can exercise the power of exemption as it
chooses. It has exercised this power by declaring in section 7 of the
tax law that "all public property belonging to the State of Michigan
shall be exempt from taxation." 1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 4001. This
and similar language has been the subject of much construction by
the courts, and in the majority of cases it has been held not to include
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special assessments for local improvements. Chicago Schools v. City
of Chicago, 207 ID. 37 (69 N. E. 580); State v. Robertson, 24 N. J.
Law, 504; School District of Ft. Smith v. Board of Improvement, 65
Ark. 343 (46,S. W. 418);Sioux City v. School District, 55 Iowa, 150
(7 N. W. 488); City of Atlanta v. Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 737
(13 S. E. 252; 12 L. R A. 852);Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y.
528; Sewickley M E. Church's Appeal, 165 Pa. 475 (30 Atl. 1007);
Inhabitants of Essex County v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 141 (26 N.
E. 431 ); Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.), p. 172.
The holding in most of the cases is that these words of exemption apply only to general taxation. It appears, however, to have
been settled in this State that these words of exemption protect
public property from local assessments (City of Big Rapids v. Board
of Sup'rs of Mecosta Co., 99 Mich. 351 [58 N. W. 358]); but this
has been construed to mean such property as is used for governmental purposes (Newberry v. City of Detroit, 164 Mich. 410 [129 N. W.
699, 32 L. R A. (N. S.) 303] ). In this case it was held that a public
park was not exempt from special assessment for paving purposes because not being used for governmental purposes. If the general words
of exemption in the statute do not apply to property owned by a
municipality which is not used for governmental purposes, a like
reasoning seems to lead to the conclusion that real estate owned by
the university, but not used for governmental purposes, would not
be included within the exemption. The university as well as the municipality is a corporate entity, made so by force of the Constitution,
and both are State agencies.
The reason which underlies the exemption of public property
from general taxation is that it would be without profit to assess
public property as the tax would have to be paid out of the general
fund to which all contributed, but this reason does not exist when
special assessments are made for local improvements. Whenever property is exempt from special assessment the remaining property owners included within the special assessment district must pay for the
benefits which accrue to the exempt property. This is so manifestly
unfair that I am of the opinion that it was not the intention of the
legislature to exempt property from special assessments which was
owned but not used by the public authorities for governmental purposes. This question was before the California court on a similar state
of facts involving its university, and the same arguments were urged
in support of the exemption. But that court held that inasmuch as
the property of the university was not made use of in connection
with the affairs of the university, it was subject to the special assessment. It was there said in part:
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"The principle is well established that where any of such lands
are not directly and necessarily used for a public purpose they may
be subjected to the payment of special assessments for benefits. And
this is in consonance with justice and equity. For to assess certain lot
owners upon a street for all the cost of the work, part of which is for
the benefit of a public institution, is to enhance the value of the university property at the expense of the few, instead of by taxation
upon all the people at the expense of all. So it is said in Hassan v.
City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528:
" 'A different rule would compel individual lot owners to pay
assessments levied for improvements which were a benefit to the
State lands, without any adequate advantage, and in many instances
impose a burden which would be extremely onerous and produce
great injustice.' " City Street Imp. Co. v. Regents of the University of
California, 153 Cal. 776 (96 Pac. 801, 18 L. R. A. [N. S.] 451).
In view of the fact that the record discloses that the property
in question was vacant unimproved lots in the city of Bay City, and
that they were not being used for governmental purposes of the university, we think the conclusion of the trial court should be affirmed.

KUHN, C. J., and MOORE, STEERE, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred with BIRD, J.
FELLOWS, J. {dissenting in part). I am for affirmance, but not
for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice BIRD, and by the learned trial
judge. I do not agree that a municipal unit of the State may enforce
by sale for delinquency a special assessment upon the property held
by its creator, the sovereign, the State, even though such property be
not in use for governmental purposes, nor that this court committed
itself to such doctrine by the case of Newberry v. City of Detroit,
164 Mich. 410 (129 N. W. 699, 32 L. R. A. [N. S.] 303). That case
involved a special assessment for paving purposes, and the question
involved was whether the city should assess upon property owned by
itself and not used for governmental purposes its proportion of the
costs. The charter provision was as follows:
"For the purpose of such assessment, the lots and parcels of
real estate situated on said street, and fronting the portion thereof
ordered to be improved, shall constitute one local assessment district"; * * * the cost and expense of the paving to be assessed according to frontage. Detroit Charter 1904, §§ 266, 267, pp. 182-184.
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It was held that the municipality should assess upon its own
property, not used for governmental purposes, its proportion of the
cost of the local improvement, and that such property was not
exempt from such special assessment. This was the question there before the court and there decided. That case is not authority to the
point that property owned by the State is subject to sale for failure
to pay local assessments, but only to the point that property owned
by the municipality, and not used for governmental purposes, should
pay its proportion of the cost of local improvements made under the
provisions of its charter. In the instant case the State parted with its
title to the property on June 24, 1912. On March 24, 1913, the tax
roll for this special assessment was approved by the board of public
works, and the certificate of the comptroller was attached and the
entire assessment approved May 1, 1913. The ordinance ordering the
improvement was passed July 3, 1911, but this special assessment did
not become due until nearly a year after the State had parted with
its title and the property had become subject to private ownership.
In the case of Case v. City of Saginaw, 196 Mich. 687 (163 N. W.
115), the writer expressed the view:

"That the lands were not liable for special assessments falling
due while they were owned and held by the State, but were liable for
such special assessments as became due after they became subject to
private ownership."
I am unable to distinguish the facts in that case from those in
this case. There, as here, the property was vacant city property, used

for no governmental purpose; it had been bid off by the State for delinquent taxes. One of the special assessments in that case, as was the
assessment in the instant case, was for the construction of a sewer.
Entertaining the views there expressed, I think this case should be
affirmed.
OSTRANDER, J. (dissenting). It is a sound rule, approved by
this court (City of Big Rapids v. Board of Sup'rs of Mecosta Co., 99
Mich. 351 [58 N. W. 358]), that property owned by the State, or by
the United States, or by a municipality for public uses, is not subject to taxation, unless so provided by positive legislation. The rule
is the same whether the tax sought to be imposed is a general or a special tax, an exaction for general or for special local purposes. The
application of the rule is not affected by the fact that the legislature
may have expressly exempted such property from taxation.
In Iron Mountain Public Schools v. O'Connor, 143 Mich. 35
(108 N. W. 426), it appeared that after land had been listed for
taxation, the roll completed, approved by the board of review, and
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returned to the board of supervisors for equalization, the petitioner
bought the land for school purposes. Subsequently, the tax was
spread thereon and not paid. The land was returned delinquent and
sold at the annual tax sale under the usual decree. The school district
filed its petition to vacate and set aside the decree and cancel and set
aside the deed made upon the sale. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was overruled. The order overruling was set aside by
this court upon the ground that the land was subject to the assessment when it was made and when the township board of review
passed upon and reviewed the assessment, and no power was lodged
in any person to thereafter take from the roll property listed therein;
that there must be some deftnite period when a purchaser, whose
property is generally exempt, must purchase property subject to the
tax levied or to be levied thereon. Usually, the question whether a
tax must be paid by one person or by another arises in cases where
the land is subject to taxation, and between the vendor and the purchaser. No such question is involved here.
The land here was not liable to assessment when the proceeding
to assess it was begun because it belonged to the State. The title, it
is true, was in the regents. But as affecting the question here involved
the beneftcial owner was the State. Auditor General v. Regents of
University, 83 Mich. 467 (47 N. W. 440, 10 L R A. 376). Under the
rule stated, it was not liable to be assessed for a special improvement
because it belonged to the State, and there was no law which permitted land so owned to be subjected to assessment and sold for a
tax or levy for special improvements. The title to the land passed to
the regents of the university in 1905. The regents sold it to appellant
in June, 1912. Before that time the city of Bay City had ordered the
construction of the sewer, a survey and estimate of cost had been
made, reported and approved, a contract for the construction of the
sewer had been let, and the sewer was completed in the summer of
1912. The roll of the special assessment was made and approved in
March, 1913. The proceeding was a single one; the validity of the assessment depending upon the lawfulness of the ftrst quite as much as
upon the legality of the last step or act taken therein. As between the
municipality instituting the proceeding and its offtcers and the land
in question, jurisdiction to subject it and its owner to the exaction
attached when the proceeding was instituted. Appellant bought it
subject to no lien. It purchased it from an owner in whose hands it
was not liable to the assessment.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the decree should be reversed
and one entered annulling the tax complained about.
STONE, J., concurred with OSTRANDER, J.
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Lucking v. People
320 Mich. 495, 498-505; 31 N.W. 2d 707 (1948)
BOYLES, J. Plaintiff herein, as a resident of Washtenaw county and one of the testamentary trustees of the estate of Alfred Lucking, deceased, the owner of real estate in the city of Ann Arbor, flied
this bill of complaint in the circuit court for the county ofWashtenaw in chancery, said to be on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of said city, and naming as defendants the people of the State
of Michigan, the regents of the university of Michigan, and the city
of Ann Arbor. The prayer of the bill seeks the following relief:
That the board of regents of the university be estopped from
claiming that the lands, buildings and equipment of the university
within the city limits are exempt from taxation by said city; that said
property be placed upon the general tax rolls of said city; that the
university hospital, the athletic buildings and stadium, the Michigan
Union and the Michigan League buildings, and the Hill auditorium,
not used solely for educational purposes, be placed upon said tax
rolls; that an accounting of the purposes and uses and values of all
other university property be had and that their taxability or nontaxability be determined by the court; that the defendants State of
Michigan and regents of the university be required to account to the
city of Ann Arbor for all sums of money ex;pended since the enactment of the Michigan Constitution (1908) for the protection, support, upkeep and maintenance of the lands, buildings and equipment
of the university within the corporate limits of said city of Ann
Arbor, and that fmal "judgment" be entered therefor against the
State of Michigan and said board of regents; that the State of Michigan and the said board of regents be enjoined from claiming any
exemption from taxation in the future except as an educational corporation or institution, and then only as to such lands, buildings and
equipment as are occupied and used solely for educational purposes;
that the exemption from taxation by the city of Ann Arbor of the
property of the university of Michigan within the city limits be decreed to be invalid as the taking of said city's property and its taxpayers' property without due process of law and without the equal
protection of the laws; that the tax exemption statutes of the State
of Michigan be adjudged to be unconstitutional as a violation of the
14th amendment of the Federal Constitution, and the Constitution
of Michigan; that a "judgment" be entered against the people of the
State of Michigan and the board of regents of the university in favor
of the city of Ann Arbor for all sums expended by said city to maintain the university of Michigan since the effective date of the
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Michigan Constitution (1908); that the city of Ann Arbor be required to protect and enforce the rights and interests of the taxpayers of said city as against the people of the State of Michigan and
the board of regents of the university; that the court require the people of the State of Michigan and the board of regents of the university to account to the plaintiff and the city of Ann Arbor for the
reasonable value of all services furnished by said city to the people
of the State of Michigan and said board of regents since August 28,
1929; and that the court fmd by a declaratory "judgment" the rights
of the plaintiff as an individual, and as representing the taxpayers,
and enforce the same against the people of the State of Michigan,
the regents of the university, and the city of Ann Arbor, by fmal
judgment and injunction of the court.
On filing the bill of complaint, service of process on the people
of the State of Michigan was made by serving summons on the governor and the attorney general. The attorney general, on behalf of
the people of the State of Michigan, entered a special appearance and
moved to set aside the service of process on the ground that the State
could not be sued without its consent and that the State had not so
consented. The board of regents of the university filed an answer in
the form of a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint on the above
ground, that the plaintiff was not authorized to institute the suit,
and that the bill of complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action in equity or at law. The city of Ann Arbor did not file a motion to dismiss, but filed an answer to the bill
of complaint, concluding with a prayer that the bill of complaint be
dismissed.
Judge Robert M. Toms of the Wayne circuit court, sitting in
the Washtenaw circuit, after hearing the motions and considering
briefs filed, entered an order setting aside the service of process as to
the people of the State of Michigan, and dismissing the bill of complaint both as to the defendant board of regents and the defendant
people of the State of Michigan. The trial court held that inasmuch
as no motion to dismiss had been made by the city of Ann Arbor,
the cause would stand at issue as between the plaintiff and that municipality. From the aforesaid order of dismissal, the plaintiff appeals. The record here does not indicate what further action, if any,
has been taken in the case against the city of Ann Arbor.
The bill of complaint, consisting of some 70 paragraphs, consists mainly in statements of law, conclusions therefrom, and arguments in relation thereto. However, well-pleaded material allegations
of fact must be taken as true. The substance of the bill of complaint
is that city of Ann Arbor is now and has been giving free ftre and
police protection and other city services to the property owned by
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the people of the State of Michigan, under the control of the board
of regents, for which no compensation has yet been paid to the said
city of Ann Arbor; that the State of Michigan should pay into the
treasury of the city of Ann Arbor as a reasonable value for such
services at least $200,000 per year; that the regents of the university
have received from said city the same fire protection and other city
services as do all property owners and taxpayers, that the students in
the university have received municipal advantages and facilities, including fire and police protection and the use and enjoyment of city
parks and streets, transportation, lighting and water, the same as used
by taxpayers of said city; that for those reasons the State of Michigan
is estopped from claiming that the lands, buildings and equipment of
the university of Michigan within said city limits are exempt from
taxation by said city; that some of said lands, buildings and equipment are actually used and occupied as noneducational facilities for
profit-making purposes, that upwards of $20,000,000 of the assets
of the university are unlawfully exempted from taxation of the city
of Ann Arbor in that they are not occupied solely for educational
purposes.
As to the defendant, the people of the State of Michigan, the
controlling question here is whether this suit may be maintained by
a taxpayer against the people of the State of Michigan without the
express consent of the State to be sued, for the purpose of compelling the State to account to and pay the city of Ann Arbor for
moneys expended by the city for police and fire protection and
other services rendered by the city to the board of regents of the
university. The answer is "No." Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
R. Co., 109 U.S. 446 (3 Sup. Ct. 292, 609, 27 L. Ed. 992);Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (10 Sup. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842); United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (61 Sup. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058);
McDowell v. Warden of Michigan Reformatory at Ionia, 169 Mich.
322;Missouri Tie & Lumber Co. v. Sullivan, 275 Mich. 26;Manion v.
State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mich. 1 ; Mead v. Michigan Public
Service Commission, 303 Mich. 168; McNair v. State Highway Department, 305 Mich. 181.
The order of the circuit court setting aside the service of process
on the governor and the attorney general and dismissing the bill of
complaint as against the people of the State of Michigan as defendant
is affirmed.
As to the board of regents of the university of Michigan is defendant, it is obvious that a money judgment cannot in this suit be
lawfully entered against said defendant; and, if so entered, could not
be enforced. It is equally obvious that if such relief were sought by
writ of mandamus, such writ cannot issue in a chancery court and,
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furthermore, no circuit court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against State officers such as the regents of the university. 3
Comp. Laws 1929, § 15186 (Stat. Ann. § 27.2230). The Michigan
Constitution (1908), art. 11 § 5, provides that the board of regents
shall have general supervision of the university and direction and
control of all expenditures from the university funds. Appellant
places much reliance on Act No. 98, § 1, Pub. Acts 1929 (1 Comp.
Laws 1929, § 441), as amended by Act No. 214, Pub. Acts 1937
(Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 441, Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp.
§ 4.191). However, this act is not mandatory but permissive only
and merely authorizes the State administrative board, the board of
regents of the university and other public agencies to contract for the
furnishing of sewage and garbage disposal facilities, lights, water, fire
protection, and other public facilities. The act does not form any
basis for a decree to compel the board of regents to enter into such
contracts.
The lands, buildings and equipment under the management,
supervision and control of the board of regents of the university are
public property, owned by the State of Michigan. Such public property belonging to the State is exempt from property tax. 1 Comp.
Laws 1929, § 3395, as last amended by Act No. 24, Pub. Acts 1946
(1st Ex. Sess.) (Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp. § 7.7). Auditor General
v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 83 Mich. 467 (10 L. R. A.
376); City of Detroit v. George, 214 Mich. 665; People, for use of
Regents of the University of Michigan, v. Brooks, 224 Mich. 45;
James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85.
Appellant points to the Constitution (1908), art. 11, § 10,
which provides that "the legislature shall maintain the university,"
and from this argues that the court in chancery should compel the
board of regents to account to the city of Ann Arbor for moneys expended by the city for police and fire protection and other services
provided by the city for the university property; or a fortiori that
the city should be compelled to levy a tax on the State property
under the control of the board of regents to provide for such services. Appellant's argument that the legislature is not properly maintaining the university, perhaps might be addressed to the legislature.
However, we do not conceive that it is within the province of the
court in chancery to compel such action. As well stated by the trial
judge, the arm of the chancellor may be long, but it is not that long.
Appellant devotes much time to argument that the statutes
which exempt State-owned property under the control of the board
of regents are unconstitutional. However, appellant does not point to
any provision in either the United States Constitution or the Michigan Constitution (1908) which imposes any limitation upon the
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power of the State legislature to exempt property from taxation.
The tax-levying authority of the State is vested in the legislature, and
this necessarily includes the power to exempt property from taxation. Auditor General v. MacKinnon Boiler & Machine Co., 199 Mich.
489;Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 586 (90 A. L. R. 853).
The court has no power to compel the city of Ann Arbor to
levy a tax upon State property within the control of the board of
regents which the legislature has declared exempt from property
taxation. The legislative classification of property into exempt and
nonexempt categories does not in itself necessarily offend the due
process* or equal protectiont clauses of either the State or Federal
Constitutions. 26 R C. L. p. 253, 254, § § 224, 225; Union Steam
Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261 ; Banner Laundering Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, 297 Mich. 419.
It is not for the court to consider the propriety of a contract
between the city of Ann Arbor and the board of regents for the city
to furnish police or fire protection or other public facilities for State
property within the corporate limits. Nor is the city of Ann Arbor
here before us seeking affirmative relief against the people of the
State of Michigan or the board of regents. The plaintiff herein does
not represent the municipality. The levying of municipal taxes is a
matter of municipal prerogative and concern to be exercised by the
proper authorities of the city of Ann Arbor. The court in chancery
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the proper municipal
authorities, or the board of regents, as to whether taxes should be
levied or contracts entered into to provide for the furnishing of
police facilities by the city. We are unable to conclude from the facts
and circumstances alleged in appellant's bill of complaint that either
the appellant or the taxpayers of the city of Ann Arbor are being deprived of property without due process of law. The relief sought by
appellant does not come within the jurisdiction of a court of chancery, at least in so far as such relief is sought against the people of
the State of Michigan or the board of regents of the university. Any
issues between the plaintiff and the city of Ann Arbor are still pending in the circuit court and are not here for decision.
The order dismissing the bill of complaint as to said defendants
is affirmed and the cases remanded. No costs, questions of public interest being involved.
BUSHNELL, C. J., and SHARPE, REID, NORTH, BUTZEL,
and CARR, JJ., concurred. DETHMERS, J., did not sit.
*See U.S. Const. am. 14; Mich. Const. 1908, art. 2, § 16.-REPORTER.
tSee U.S. Const. am. 14; Mich. Const. 1908, art. 2, § 1.-REPORTER.
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3. AGREEMENT FOR THE FURNISHING OF POLICE AND FIRE PROTECTION SERVICES

AGREEMENT made this 15th day of October, 1964, by
and between The Regents of the University of Michigan, a Michigan constitutional corporation of Ann Arbor, Michigan, (hereinafter referred to as the University) and the City of Ann Arbor,
Michigan, (hereinafter referred to as the City).
WIT N E S SETH:
WHEREAS, under date of March 14, 1947, the parties
hereto entered into an agreement pursuant to the provisions of
Act No. 98 of the Public Acts of Michigan of 1929, as amended,
which agreement among other things provided a formula for determining the amount that the University would pay to the City
for the police protection rendered by the City to the University;
and
WHEREAS, under date of July 31, 1956, the parties hereto entered into a similar agreement providing for furnishing of
fire protection by the City and payment therefor by the University; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for the furnishing
of such police and fire protection and the payment therefor in a
single agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed by and between the parties hereto as follows:
1. In consideration of the police and fire protection services to be furnished by the City, the University shall pay
to the City:
a) An amount equal to 18% of the City's Police Department budget annually, plus related employee benefits;
b) An amount equal to 18% of the City's Fire Department budget annually, plus related employee benefits.
2. The payments provided in Paragraph 1, a), and b) above
are to be made quarterly in advance for each fiscal year
beginning July 1, 1964, on the basis of the estimated
budgets and adjusted at the end of each fiscal year on
the basis of actual expenditures.
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3. In determining the amount payable by the University
under this contract, there will be deducted from the
Police Department budget (and the actual expenditures)
the amount which the University pays to the City under
a separate contract for policing the University parking
regulations. Any amounts collected by the City from
others for police or fire protection services as such shall
be credited to the University in determining the actual
expenditures for the year-end adjustment of charges.
4. The amounts provided herein shall constitute complete
payment for all services furnished to the University by
the City Police and Fire Department; except the services
for enforcing parking regulations provided under separate
contract. This paragraph shall not be interpreted as preventing the City from collecting for special police services furnished during varsity football games under agreement with the Board in Control of Intercollegiate
Athletics of the University.
5. This agreement supersedes, as of July 1, 1964, all provisions of the aforesaid agreement dated July 31, 1956,
relative to fire protection services and all provisions relating to the furnishing of police services or the payment
therefor of the aforesaid agreement of March 14, 1947.

4. OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

The freedom of the University from local zoning restrictions has been the subject of several opinions. In 1929, the Attorney General ruled that the University of Michigan was exempt
from the provisions of the Ann Arbor Building Code. 1 In 1943,
the Attorney General issued a broader opinion which ruled that
no city or county could control the construction of buildings
by any state institution within its boundaries. 2 In 1954, however, the Attorney General refused to rule as to whether either
the State Plumbing Board or the City of Ann Arbor could set
plumbing standards for the University of Michigan. The University was following the Ann Arbor standards at that time; so the
question was entirely hypothetical. 3
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Rulings of the Attorney General have also dealt with the
problem of tax exemptions. An illustration of the technicalities
of the exemption of the property of private educational institutions as contrasted to the broad exemption of state institutions
established in Aplin 4 are rulings made in 1928 concerning certain properties of Olivet College. The Attorney General ruled
that the college president's house and a vacant lot owned by the
college and occasionally used for athletics were not faxable, but
a college-owned house occupied by the college secretary was
subject to taxes. 5
Dormitories financed under the "self-liquidating plan," 6 in
which the bondholders had an interest, raised questions as to
tax exemption in 1928. The Attorney General decided that the
dormitories remained nontaxable because the bondholders' interest pertained to a leasehold, and leaseholds are not taxable as
such. 7
In another opinion, the Regents were instructed in 1932
that they were not liable for real estate taxes; and a failure to
notify the assessor of a change in ownership would not subject
University property to taxes. 8 In 1940, following the MacKinnon9 case, the Attorney General ruled that the University must
pay drainage district taxes on lands not then being used by the
University. 10 In 1942 he ruled that the property of the separately incorporated Michigan Union and Lawyers Club was exempt
from taxation because these two corporations were merely the
instrumentalities of the Board of Regents. 11

FOOTNOTES
Section 1 - Introduction
1. The decisions mentioned appear after this Introduction.
2. Act. 98, P.A. Mich. 1929, as amended.
Section 4 - Opinions of Attorney General

1. 1928-30 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 596.
2. 1943-44 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 493.
3. Unpublished opinion dated Desember 31, 1954.
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4. Supra p. 252.
5. 1896 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 112; 1926-28 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 714.
6. Infra p. 288.
7. 1928-30 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 70.
8. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 429.
9. Supra p. 255.
10. Unpublished opinion dated June 11, 1940. No. 16209.
11. Unpublished opinion dated December 1, 1942, No. 24965.

Part Three

The Internal Government of the University

CHAPTER IX
UNIVERSITY PROPERTY AND BUSINESS CONTRACTS

1. INTRODUCTION

The authority of the University to engage in business operations which are connected with any large institution has not
often been challenged. Whenever it has been brought to the attention of the courts, the constitutional status now enjoyed by
all the state universities in Michigan has been decisive. In the instance of the Detroit Young Men's Society 1 it was held that no
enabling act of the legislature was needed by the Board of Regents to convey land belonging to the University of Michigan.
Since Michigan State University seems to have engaged in more
peripheral activities, its actions have more often been challenged
as "ultra vires." These cases, which are included in Chapter Ill,
all resulted in the vindication of the University.
Two cases included in this chapter involve the right of the
University to sue and to be sued on business contracts. In the
Pray case, the University as the holder of bonds of a drainage
district sued the County of Washtenaw for payment. In the
Seldon Breck case, the construction company sued the University under a contract to erect the general library. In both cases,
the University is treated by the courts as an ordinary litigant-it
is to be subject to suit in the same courts and under the same
courts and under the same law as a private corporation. In fact,
the federal judge in the Selden Breck case characterizes the case
as a regular diversity-of-citizenship action, a Missouri corporation suing a Michigan corporation.
The implicit holding in these cases that the University is
subject to suit like any private corporation may have been overruled by the tort cases and the Court of Claims statute. It is now
almost settled law that the University is subject to suit only in
the Court of Claims for personal injuries inflicted by its employees on others. 2 The Court of Claims statute, however, invests
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exclusive jurisdiction in that court of all claims "ex contractu
and ex delicto." 3
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The Regents of the University of Michigan v. The Detroit Young
Men's Society
12 Mich. 138, 159-68 (1863)
[In this case the Regents are suing the Society because it
has not paid money due under a contract to sell land. In defense, one of the arguments raised by the Society is that the
contract is void because the Regents have no power to convey
land belonging to the University.]
CHRISTIANCY, J. * * *
The only remaining question is that of the power of the regents to sell this property. This question might depend upon the
mode and purposes of the acquisition-the objects and terms expressed in the instrument by which the title was acquired. And as
the regents have been held to be the successors of the trustees of the
university under its old organization-who had an express power of
sale vested in them-and the powers and functions of the present organization are different in many other respects, the question might
perhaps be affected by the fact when and by which organization the
property was acquired. But so far as the question of the power of the
regents to sell may depend upon any of these considerations,
it can *not be definitely decided upon the present record, [160]
as the time when the title was acquired does not appear,
nor the mode or purpose of its acquisition. No particular title is set
forth, nor was this necessary. The allegation is general, that the
plaintiffs, on the third day of August, eighteen hundred and fiftyeight, "being the owners" of the premises, and the defendant wishing
to purchase, the said plaintiffs and defendant entered into the contract. This allegation, being mere inducement, was sufficient, and it
is broad enough to admit proof of any legal title or ownership under
which a right of sale could exist. The particular title would be matter
of proof only. The title of the plaintiffs is therefore well pleaded, if
they were competent in law to take or hold a title which would
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enable them to sell. If, therefore, as a legal possibility, there could
have been, at the time alleged, such a title in the plaintiffs as would
give them the power of sale, the judgment upon the demurrer must
be for the plaintiffs, however they might have failed upon the trial to
establish such title by proof.
The abstract question, therefore, of the legal possibility of
such ownership by the plaintiffs, is the only question upon this
branch of the cause which can be decided upon this demurrer. Upon
this question I think there can be little room for doubt. This being
an action at law, any conveyance, by grant or devise, vesting in them
the whole legal title, though it were upon special trusts, would satisfy
the allegation of ownership contained in the declaration, if it conferred the power of sale, as well as if no trust had been declared. The
power of taking and holding real estate-as well as personal propertyis generally laid down as one of the powers incident to every corporation, unless there be an express prohibition, or such power be
clearly repugnant to the purposes of its creation, or forbidden by
some positive law: A. &A. on Corp., §§ 110, 111; 2 Kent,
[161] 224. And the power to convey, except *where its acquisition is for some special purpose, not shown here, and inconsistent with the power of sale, is a correlative of the right to acquire: A. & A. on Corp., ut supra. And see Ibid, § § 187 to 192. We
have no statute of mortmain which can affect the question. And the
power of this corporation to take, hold, and convey real estate, for
any purpose clearly tending to promote the interest of the university, to increase its funds, or otherwise to further the great public objects for which the corporation was created, can not, I think, admit
of a reasonable doubt. The right to take and hold property, such at
least as the university grounds and buildings, library and apparatus,
and to transmit or continue its ownership by corporate succession,
was doubtless one of the main objects of the incorporation in its
present form; yet no express power of this kind is to be found in the
act of incorporation. And though it is clear that they can exercise no
power over the land granted by congress to the state for the support
of a university, nor over the principal of the university fund, the disposition of both of which the legislature has placed in other hands,
yet if some benevolent individual, desirous of promoting the public
interest, should have conveyed this or any other land to these regents in their corporate capacity, vesting in them the whole legal
title, for the express purpose and upon the express trust, that they
should sell and convey the land in such manner and on such terms
as they should deem best for the interest of the institutions, and
place the proceeds in the state treasury to the credit of the university
fund, or expend them for the increase of the library, or the chemical
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or philosophical apparatus, I can see no possible ground to doubt
their power to take and hold the property, or to accept and execute
the trust by a sale of the land for such purpose. See Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 2 How., 190; Executors of McDonough v. Murdock, *15 How., 367; Perrin v. Carey (McMickin's will), 24 [162]
How., 465.
Many other cases might be put in which their power of sale
would be equally clear. But it is unnecessary to multiply instances,
since a title like that above supposed would be admissible under the
allegation of ownership contained in this declaration.
But it is said we can not presume a trust, as none is mentioned
in the contract. It is sufficient to say that, if such trust existed, it was
unnecessary to mention it in the contract, or in the declaration. It
would be sufficient if the title, when produced in evidence, disclosed
a trust which would sustain the power of sale. There is no occasion
for any presumption. It is not a question for presumption, but what
evidence would be admissible under the allegation; and we are certainly not at liberty to indulge any presumption against the truth of
the allegation of ownership, which is broad enough to include such
title in trust. What right, on the other hand, have the court to presume that this is a part of the land conveyed to the state for the use
of the university? Or that, though conveyed to the regents, the conveyance was such as to deprive them of the power of sale, when it
may have been so granted as to give them that power? Can we deny
them the right to prove their allegation? It is not for the court, upon
demurrer, more than for the opposite party, to deny the truth of the
allegation demurred to. The question is not upon its truth, but its
sufficiency. Its truth is admitted by the demurrer, unless legally impossible.
It was stated on the argument that the lot mentioned in the contract was conveyed, in the year 1825, by the governor and judges of
the territory of Michigan, to the "trustees of the university of Michigan" as organized under the act of 1821, for the use of the university;
and we are referred to the decision in The Regents of the
[163] University v. The Board of Education of Detroit, 4 *Mich.,
214, holding the regents under the present organization to
be the successors of said trustees, or, rather, a continuation of the
same corporation. But to enable us to decide upon demurrer the
power of the present corporation to sell lands thus conveyed, the
fact, date, and nature of the conveyance, should appear upon the
pleadings. It is not desirable, if it were competent, to decide a case
of this magnitude, hypothetically, further than we may be compelled
to do by the nature of the question. The question of the power of
the plaintiffs to convey, under the supposed deed from the governor
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and judges, is in no way necessary to the decision of the cause, and is
not involved in it; since, if this were decided against the plaintiffs, the
decision upon this demurrer must still be in their favor. It will be
time enough to decide this question when it is presented by the
pleadings, or upon objections taken to the proof which may be offered.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, with costs
to the plaintiffs in both courts. And the defendant must have leave
to plead to the declaration.
MARTIN CH. J. concurred.
MANNINGJ.:
The university of Michigan is a public corporation. The people,
in their political capacity, are the corporators. It is a part of the educational system of the state, and is under the control of the legislature, except so far as it has been placed beyond the reach of that
body by the constitution, and the trust attached to the university
fund. In all other respects it is subject to state legislation, and may
be molded from time to time to suit the actual or supposed wants of
the public. The corporation of to-day is the corporation known as
the university of Michigan, under "an act for the establishment of a
university," approved April 30, 1821: Laws of Michigan,
*1827, p. 445. And the corporation under this last men- [164]
tioned act was the corporation created by the governor and
judges of the territory of Michigan, on the 26th August, 1817, by an
act entitled "An act to establish the catholepistemiad, or university
of Michigan," if an organization in fact ever took place under this
last mentioned act. See Regents of the University of Michigan v. The
Board of Education of the City of Detroit, 4 Mich., 213. The present
corporation has been made to differ from what it was under the two
last mentioned acts by the legislation and constitution of the state.
It was a public corporation originally, and has been throughout. It
was created to subserve a great public want-the education of the
people. For while freedom is the corner-stone of our political fabric,
intelligence is the cement that holds it several parts together.
The act of April 30th, 1821, gave to the trustees of the university the control of both the property and government of the institution. They were declared capable of holding property, real and personal, and of buying and selling, and otherwise lawfully disposing of
it, with certain restrictions imposed on the disposition of property
mentioned in the seventh and eighth sections of the act. Under the
state government a different policy was inaugurated. The government
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of the institution and the control of its property were separated from
each other, and no longer trusted to the same hands.
The former was given to the regents, who took the place of
trustees under the territorial organization, while the latter was retained by the state, intrusted by law to the superintendent of public
instruction.
This office was created by the constitution of 1835. And by
"An act to provide for the disposition of the university and primary
school lands, and for other purposes," approved March 20th, 1837,
the superintendent of public instruction was to have the
[ 16 5] care and disposition of *all lands and other property reserved
and granted to the state for purposes of education: S. L.
1837, p. 209, § 1. He was to sell the university and school lands, and
loan the money, the interest on which was to be paid to the state
treasurer, and by him to be passed to the credit of the university or
school fund as the case might be: § § 16, 19. He was to submit to
the legislature an annual report, exhibiting the condition of the university and primary school fund; to apply the income of the university fund to the payment of such debts as should accrue from the op-eration of the law establishing the university; and to prepare annually
a table of the amount payable to the university, and also the amount
of the aggregate payable to the several counties, and present the
same to the auditor-general, who was thereupon to issue his warrant
on the treasurer of the state for the amount payable to the university,
and to the several counties: § 18. And it was made the duty of the
state treasurer to pay such warrant to the treasurer of the university,
or of the county, as the case might be: § 19. And by "An act to
provide for the organization and government of the university of
Michigan," passed at the same session, the university was organized.
See Laws of 1837, p. 102. This act does not, in express terms, repeal
the act of 1821, and yet as it and the act already mentioned cover
the ground covered by the act of 1821, and are inconsistent with the
latter act, it must be regarded as repealed by implication. It is not
necessary for our present purpose to point out the differences between the two acts, any further than to say, that the act of 1837, unlike the act of 1821, does not give the regents power to sell, or otherwise dispose of the property of the university. It states the object of
the university to be, to provide the inhabitants of the state with the
means of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various branches of
literature, science and the arts, and vests its government in a
[166] board *of regents, and declares them a body corporate, with
the right of suing and being sued, and prescribes their powers, and makes it their duty, as soon as the state shall provide funds
for that purpose, to erect the necessary buildings for the university,
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on grounds to be designated by the legislature, and in such manner
as shall be prescribed by law. No mention whatever is made of the
care and disposition of the property of the institution, for the reason
that that had been placed under control of the superintendent of
public instruction.
Changes have been made from time to time, but none showing
an intention on the part of the legislature to give to the board of regents power to dispose of the property of the institution.
By our present constitution, "The proceeds from the sales of
all lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United
States to the state, for educational purposes, and the proceeds of all
lands or other property given by individuals, or appropriated by the
state for like purposes, shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income of which only is to be expended:" Art. XIII, § 2.
And by § 8 of the same article it is provided, "The board of regents
shall have the general supervision of the university, and the direction
and control of all expenditures from the university interest fund."
Here is a constitutional provision giving the regents control of
the interest of the university fund, but not of the fund itself. Why
this constitutional provision if it was intended the regents should
have the control and disposition of the property of the university, as
the trustees had under the act of 1821? If it be said, these lands were
deeded to the university, and therefore do not come within the description of lands which the commissioner of the state land office is
authorized to sell-that officer, instead of the superintendent of
public instruction, now having the sale of the university and
school lands-the reply is, *the legislature can give him the [167]
power. It is no reason for giving by implication powers
which it is clear the legislature never intended to give. The property
the board of regents have contracted to sell amounts to $21,000.
What power have they to invest the money? On what security, and
to whom, and at what rate of interest is it to be loaned, and who is
to collect and account for the interest, and to whom? We can hardly
suppose the act would be silent on all these subjects if there was an
intention on the part of the legislature to give the power claimed.
And I can see no reason for dividing the university fund into two
parts, and placing one in charge of the state, and the other of the
board of regents.
I would stop here, but for a suggestion that has been started on
which I will say a few words.
It has been suggested whether the land contracted to be sold
may not be held by the corporation in trust, with power to sell the
same. If we suppose such to be the case, I do not see that it removes
the difficulty I have stated-the want of power in the board of regents to' convey. I do not understand that the functions of a
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corporation can be enlarged by a deed of trust; that is, that a trust
can be made the means of communicating new faculties to a body
corporate. The admission of such a principle would enable a corporation, after parturition, to be metamorphosed into quite a different
being; so much so as hardly to be recognized, if not seemingly to
lose its identity. An insurance company might be changed into a
bank, and a bank into an insurance company. When a corporation is
made a trustee, the execution of the trust must come within the
faculties of the corporation, or the trust must go unexecuted until a
competent trustee is appointed. If we are correct in these views, the
error in supposing the facts suggested would help the plaintiff, lies in
taking it for granted that the power of the corporation to
[168) convey is in the board of regents instead of the state. *It
must be borne in mind that this is a public corporation,
created for governmental purposes; that the people of the state in
their political capacity are the corporators; and that in creating the
corporation they reserved to themselves, through the legislature, the
power of disposing of the property of the corporation instead of giving it to the regents.
If it be said the suggestion may be carried a step further, and
take it for granted that by the trust-deed power to sell is given to the
board of regents, and not to the corporation, it does not extricate us
from the dilemma. If the trust is to the regents of the university of
Michigan, that being the corporate name, it is to the corporation,
and not to the persons composing the board of regents, as individuals.
If it is to them as individuals, they must execute it in their individual
capacity, and not in the name of the corporation. The contract is in
the name of the corporation. And the power of the corporation to
convey, as I have attempted to show, is not in the board of regents,
but in the corporators, the people in their legislative capacity; in
other words, in the state.
For these reasons, without noticing the other questions made
on the argument, I think the judgment of the court below should be
affirmed, with costs.
CAMPBELL, J. did not sit in this case.

Judgment reversed.
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Regents of The University of Michigan v. Pray
264 Mich. 693, 695-703; 251 N.W. 348 (1933)
NORTH, J. This is a mandamus proceeding by which plaintiff
seeks to compel payment of drain bonds from general funds of Washtenaw county, relying particularly upon that portion of 1 Comp.
Laws 1929, § 4937, which reads:
"In case the amount available in the drain fund shall be insufficient to pay the principal or interest of any such bonds heretofore or
hereafter issued when they become due the same shall be advanced
and paid by the county out of its general funds and reimbursement
to said general fund shall be made out of the drain taxes thereafter
collected."
After hearing in the circuit court, the writ of mandamus issued
against the defendant county officials. Leave having first been obtained, they have appealed.
Incident to the construction of the Darlington subdivision drain
in Washtenaw county, bonds aggregating $31,500were issued March
1, 1927. Provision for issuing such bonds is contained in Act No.
316, Pub. Acts 1923, as amended by Act No. 365, Pub. Acts 1925.
These statutory provisions are now embodied in the "Drain Code,"
1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 4838 et seq. Plaintiff purchased 20 of these
drain bonds, each in the amount of $1,000. Two of the bonds having
matured April 1, 1932, were presented for payment, which was refused. Also plaintiff was refused payment of accrued interest due
April1, 1932. There was practically no money in the Darlington subdivision drain fund. This condition seems to have resulted largely, if
not wholly, from delinquency in payment of assessments incident to
the construction of this drain. From taxes collected the county
treasurer had on hand approximately $25,000, which, when properly
entered on his books, constituted a part of the county's general fund.
But the record sustains defendants' claim that, notwithstanding such
money in the general fund, there would be a deficit in this fund resulting from the ordinary operating expenses of the county at the
end of the current fiscal year. The board of supervisors did not
authorize a transfer of any money from the general fund to the
Darlington subdivision drain fund, and no appropriation was made
to cover any deficiency in such drainage fund. Notwithstanding the
facts above recited, plaintiff asserts its right to have payment made
to it from the county's general fund.
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Defendants have challenged the constitutionality of the act
under which plaintiff asserts right of payment. In part unconstitutionality is asserted on the ground that the title to the drain code is
not sufficient to cover the amendments embodied therein, which provide for issuing drainage bonds and contingent payment thereof from
the county's general funds. Prior to the 1929 amendment the title
read:
"An act to codify and add to the laws relating to the laying out
of drainage districts, the construction and maintenance of drains, the
assessment and collection of taxes therefor; to prescribe penalties for
violations of certain provisions of this act; and to repeal certain acts
relating to drains."
While, as pointed out by appellants, the title does not refer to
the issuing of drain bonds, nonetheless we think that provision therefor in a drain law is clearly and necessarily germane to the general
provisions of the act having to do with "the construction and maintenance of drains, the assessment and collection of taxes therefor."
In 1917 the State Constitution was amended (article 8, § 15a), and
express provision embodied therein for issuance of bonds for drainage purposes by drainage districts. In 1923 the legislature codified
the drain law of this State and therein provided the manner and conditions for the issuing of drainage district bonds. Act No. 316, Pub.
Acts 1923. The title adopted in 1923 remained unchanged and as
above quoted until 1929. See Act No. 318, Pub. Acts 1929. Being a
codification, the statute necessarily embodied various and somewhat
diversified provisions of the drain law. But as against objections here
raised, we do not fmd that the act violates article 5, § 21, of the
Constitution, in that it embraces more than one object or because
the title is deficient in that it is not sufficiently broad to cover the
provisions of the act. Title to a codification statute can scarcely be
expected to embody reference to every detail of the act. Such is not
the constitutional requirement. If the title fairly apprises legislators
and the public generally of the purposes of the act as a whole, such
title is sufficient. Vernon v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157 (Ann.
Cas. 1915 D, 128). If the title is adequate, and the statute contains
only that which is germane to its general purposes, it does not offend
article 5, § 21, of the State Constitution which provides: "No law
shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its
title." The title specifically refers to the "construction" of drains.
Construction necessarily involves provision for payment of cost; and
issuing bonds is a commonplace method (possibly too commonplace)
for fmancing the cost of public improvements. Provision for issuing
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bonds is only incidental to the main general purpose of the drainage
act, and reference to the title to such provision is not necessary.
"The requirements of the Constitution, article 5, § 21, that
no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed
in its title, are met if an act centers to one main general object or
purpose which the title comprehensively declares, though in general
terms, and if the provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title are germane, auxiliary, or incidental to that general
purpose." Loomis v. Rogers (syllabus), 197 Mich. 265.
See also, People v. Stimer, 248 Mich. 272 (67 A. L. R. 552).
Substantially the same may be said of the portion of statute
embodied in Act No. 331, Pub. Acts 1927 (above quoted [see 1
Comp. Laws 1929, § 4937] ), wherein it is provided in case bonds
mature or interest is payable and the drain fund is insufficient to
meet the obligation "the same shall be advanced and paid by the
county out of its general funds and reimbursement to said general
fund shall be made out of the drain taxes thereafter collected."
Clearly this provision has to do with the marketability of drain
bonds. It has an important bearing upon the matter of obtaining
funds with which to pay for construction, and is germane to the
main purpose of the act. This provision of the drain code is not
materially unlike another and earlier provision in the drain law
(Comp. Laws Supp. 1922, § 4922 [Act No. 64, Pub. Acts 1921]),
which reads:
"Provided, further, That the holder of such (drain) order may,
if he so desires, have the right to require payment thereof out of any
moneys in the general fund of the county treasury that may be available, if the drain fund is insufficient for such purpose because of delinquency in the payment of drain taxes."
As against the objection now under consideration, the title was
held to cover the above-quoted amendment to the drain law.Moore
v. Harrison, 224 Mich. 512. The title is sufficient as against the objections here urged. See Vernon v. Secretary of State, supra.
The amendment to the act wherein provision is made for payment from general county funds (Act No. 331, Pub. Acts 1927) became effective subsequent to plaintiffs purchase of the bonds involved in this case. Appellants urge that this amendment is not
effective as to these bonds except it be construed as an ex post facto
law and therefore unconstitutional. We think this contention is without merit and is fully answered in Moore v. Ha"ison, supra. Appellants' position is not tenable.
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Defendants' answer denies the authority of the drain commissioner to issue the bonds; denies the duty or obligation to pay the
bonds presented on the grounds of lack of money in the Darlington
subdivision drain fund; asserts that the county has no right to levy
a tax upon the county at large for the purpose of paying these drain
bonds; and asserts that the condition of the general fund is such that
the payment of the drain bonds would impair operation of necessary
county governmental functions; and that, under the circumstances,
there is no legal obligation upon the county as such to pay the bonds
of the drainage district, the supervisors not having authorized a transfer of money from the general fund to the drainage district fund.
The statutory provision expressly authorizes and empowers the
drain commissioner to issue drainage bonds. Appellants' contention
that since a county is not authorized to construct a drain "at the expense of the county," it follows that a drain commissioner acting for
and in behalf of a drain district in issuing bonds cannot obligate the
county for the payment of the bonds, cannot be sustained. The
county does not pay or become obligated to pay these bonds except
in the event that the drain fund is inadequate to meet the obligation
of matured bonds or accrued interest; and in that event the statute
provides only that the same shall be advanced and paid by the county
out of its general fund and reimbursement to said general fund shall
be made out of the drain taxes thereafter collected. Regardless of
the temporary advancement by the county, in the end payment is by
the drainage district. If the first assessments are inadequate, there is
express statutory provision for an additional assessment upon the
drainage district. 1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 4940. In passing upon the
earlier provision of the drain law relative to drain orders being paid
from the county's general fund, this court said, as might well be
here said:
"There was no purpose to impose a tax on the county at large
to aid in the construction of a particular drain. Under the proceedings taken, the lands specially assessed would be benefited to the
amount of the assessment. There was no presumption that they would
be abandoned by the owners by reason thereof. The intent as evidenced by the language of the act, considered in the light of its other
provisions, was simply to require the county to advance out of its
general fund sufficient sums to retire any orders then unpaid, reimbursing itself when the lands delinquent were either redeemed or
sold. The legislature had already imposed certain expenses on the
county, presumably in its interest, and for which it would receive
benefit. In imposing this additional burden, we do not think it exceeded its power." Moore v. Ha"ison, supra, 517.
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On this phase of the case appellants, to some extent, rely upon
the decision in Spiegel v. Ba"ett, 189 Mich. 111. Obviously the cited
case is not at all applicable, because at that time there was no statutory provisions for paying the amount due on drain orders or drain
bonds from the general county fund.
There still remains to be considered appellants' contention that
because there was not sufficient money in the general county funds
to cover the expenses of the county's governmental activities for the
current year, refusal to pay these drain bonds from such general fund
was justified. The opinion of the trial judge disposes of this phase of
the case in the following language:
''Can the issuance of bonds by the drainage commissioner on
behalf of the drainage district impair or jeopardize the necessary
functions of government?
"In this connection our attention has been directed to the case
of Bay City Dredge Works v. Fox, 245 Mich. 523. This latter case was
mandamus to compel the county clerk and county treasurer to pay
certain drain orders. Plaintiff there held certain drain orders and the
drain fund being deficient demanded a payment out of moneys in the
general fund in the county treasury, basing right thereto under Act
No. 316, Pub. Acts 1923, as amended by Act No. 365, Pub. Acts
1925, and reading as follows:
"'The holder of such order may, if he so desires, have the right
to require payment thereof out of any moneys in the general fund
of the county treasury that may be available.'
"The opinion was by a divided court, but the controlling opinion written by Mr. Justice WIEST held that the statute placed a limitation upon the right to have payment and contemplated that there
might be moneys in the treasury not to be used for the payment of
drainage orders, for it confines payment out of funds usable for such
purposes.
"It was held that the term 'available' is employed in the statute
in the sense of 'usable,' and that the statute did not grant plaintiff
right to recourse to any and all moneys in the treasury, but limits resort to such only as are available for the payment of drain orders.
Further, that the moneys in the treasury raised by taxation to meet
ordinary current county expenses and needed for such purpose are
set apart to such use and are not usable to pay drain orders.
"The Bay City Dredge Case, in my opinion, merely interpreted
the statute there in question and with particular reference to the
language therein contained. I am of the opinion that such reasoning
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was not intended to control the present situation. Here that portion
of the statute under discussion is mandatory. It expresses the clear
legislative intent that when the amount available in the drain fund
shall be insufficient to pay the principal or interest of any drainage
bonds heretofore or hereafter issued when they become due, the
same shall be advanced and paid by the county out of its general
funds.
"The statute does not include the word 'available,' which under Justice WIEST's opinion would be regarded as usable for the
purpose. It simply states that bondholders shall be paid out of the
general fund and that reimbursement shall be made. The wording
does not indicate that the legislature intended that the probability
or possibility of reimbursement should be determined prior to any
payment for the purposes mentioned out of the general fund. * * *
"It is my further opinion that, under the case of Moore v.
Harrison, 224 Mich. 512, and the later case of Township of Waterford v. Willson, 257 Mich. 619, that the question of the depletion of
the county funds does not enter into the discussion, in view of the
statute, which is here upheld, and which provides for no exceptions
or limitations upon the use of funds to all practical intents and purposes included in the general fund for the purpose stated."
Both on the date of instituting suit and on the date of hearing,
there was in the Washtenaw county general fund money greatly in
excess of the amount of the payment sought by plaintiff. Mandamus
was the proper remedy, because plaintiff is clearly entitled to payment, and likewise the duty of respondents as public officers to make
such payment out of moneys in the county's general fund is clearly
and specifically imposed by statute. The record presents a clear legal
duty on the part of the defendants and a clear legal right on the part
of the plaintiff to have such duty performed. Taylor v. Isabella Circuit Judge, 209 Mich. 97;Miller v. City of Detroit, 250 Mich. 633.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to appellee.
McDONALD, C. J., and POTTER, SHARPE, FEAD, WIEST,
and BUTZELL, JJ., concurred. CLARK, J., took no part in this decision.
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Selden Breck Construction Co. v. Regents of the University of
Michigan
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, 274 Fed. 982,983, 984-85, (1921)
TUTTLE, District Judge. This cause is now before the court
on demurrer to the declaration.
The action is trespass on the case on promises, and was brought
to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, a
Missouri corporation, by reason of a breach by the defendant, a Michigan corporation, of a certain contract entered into between the parties hereto, for the furnishing by the plaintiff of labor and material
for the construction of a library building for the defendant to be
erected upon the campus of the University of Michigan, at Ann Arbor, Mich., which is under the control of the defendant board of regents. The damages claimed by plaintiff, which exceed the necessary
jurisdictional amount, are alleged to have been caused by delays to
which the plaintiff was subjected in completing its work under the
contract as a result of the failure of defendant to perform certain of
its duties under such contract.

***
1. Section 46 of the General Conditions forming part of the
contract provides as follows:
"The owner is not to be held responsible for any damage incurred by the contractor through the fault of any other contractor
employed by the owner. Should the contractor be delayed in the
prosecution of the work by reason of the above cause, or through the
owner, the time of completion shall be extended for a period equivalent to the time lost, which period shall be determined by the architect, but no such allowance shall be made unless a claim therefor is
presented in writing to the architect within forty-eight hours of the
occurrence of such delay."
The contention of defendant that this provision limits and
measures the extent of the rights and remedy of the plaintiff in the
event of delay occasioned through the fault of the defendant and deprives the plaintiff of the right to recover damages caused through
such delay cannot, in my opinion, be sustained. In the absence of an
express stipulation relieving the defendant from liability for damages
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caused by its breach of this contract, it would, of course, be liable
therefor. The language of the provision thus invoked and relied upon
by defendant as a basis for exemption from such liability certainly
does not in terms provide for such exemption, and to have that effect a meaning must be read into it which is not expressed in the
words used. There seems to be no ambiguity in this language. It
merely provides that if the plaintiff be delayed through the fault of
any other contractor employed by the defendant, or through the defendant, "the time of completion shall be extended for a period
equivalent to the time lost." The "time of completion" is obviously
the period of time referred to in the clause of the contract, copy of
which is attached to the declaration, providing that the plaintiff "is
to complete the entire work upon or before January 1, 1918." The
purpose, then, of the condition invoked by defendant, is, manifestly,
to relieve the plaintiff from the consequences of a failure on its part
to complete its work by the date mentioned, if such failure be
caused by the fault of the defendant, by allowing to the plaintiff an
extension of the time of completion for a period of "equivalent to
the time lost by reason of such fault of defendant." That this was intended to be an allowance to, and not a limitation upon the plaintiff,
is further indicated by the concluding clause in this section providing that such an "allowance" will not "be made" unless a claim
therefor is presented within the time therein specified.
Although some authority is cited apparently to the contrary, I
am unable to accept the reasoning or agree with the conclusion involved in the theory of the defendant in support of this contention.
I am satisfied that the provision in question, properly construed, was
intended to, and does, create an exemption in favor of the plaintiff,
and not of the defendant, and that to interpret it otherwise would
be to import into it a meaning which the parties thereto have not
themselves expressed. Nelson v. Pickwick Associated Co., 30 lll.
App. 333; W. H. Stubbings Co. v. World's Columbian Exposition
Co., 110 ill. App. 210; Del Genovese v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 13
App. Div. 412, 43 N.Y. Supp. 8; Id., 162 N.Y. 614, 57 N. E. 1108.
[2] 2. It is further urged by defendant that the act of plaintiff
in proceeding with, and completing, its work under the contract after
the alleged breach thereof by defendant, operated as a waiver of any
right to recover damages caused by such breach. I cannot agree with
this contention. Consideration of the subject satisfies me that the
correct rule is that upon breach of a building contract by the failure
of the owner to perform his obligations under such contract, which
delays the contractor in completing his work thereunder, the latter
is not obliged to abandon such work, but may elect to continue
therewith after such breach and, upon performance of the contract
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on his part, is entitled to recover the damages sustained by him as a
result of the delay caused by such owner. W. H. Stubbings Co. v.
World's Columbian Exposition Co., supra; Allamon v. Albany, 43
Barn. (N. Y.) 33; Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Reeves, 13 Colo.
App. 95, 56 Pac. 674; 9 Corpus Juris, 793.
[3] 3. The claim by defendant that the acceptance by the
plaintiff of an extension of the time within which it was bound by
the contract to finish its work, and the completion by plaintiff of
the building within the time so extended, operated to deprive the
plaintiff of any right to recover damages resulting from the alleged
breach by defendant, if such claim be intended to be separate from,
and in addition to, the contentions already considered, is disposed
of by the conclusions reached with respect to such contentions, as
hereinbefore indicated. The considerations pointed out in that connection are equally applicable and controlling, in principle, here;
from which it results that the demurrer must be overruled.

3. OPINIONS OF ATIORNEY GENERAL

Frequently the Attorney General has been requested to
rule concerning particular business operations of the universities.
Some of the important questions which have been answered in
these opinions are as follows: whether enabling legislation is required for the acquisition or disposal of university lands;
whether, and how, a state university may borrow money; and
whether certain statutes and administrative regulations affecting
the university are constitutionally valid. Also, the Attorney General repeatedly, has been called upon to interpret general statutes
which do not specifically exempt the universities from their
coverage.
The Attorney Generals' opinions relating to the authority
of the Board of Regents to acquire and to dispose 6f University
property go back to the year 1900. In that year, he ruled that
the Auditor General had no authority to prevent the acquisition
of land by the University of Michigan. 1 The year 1907 saw
another ruling to the same effect. 2 Since then the various Attorneys General of Michigan have consistently reaffirmed the
authority of the university boards, without enabling legislation,
to acquire property in trust; 3 to dispose oftrust property with
the proceeds of the property being used according to the terms
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of the trust;4 and to convey university property to another state
agency. 5
The authority of the governing board to borrow or to lend
money, however, has not been as clear as their authority to accept and to dispose of property. The state constitution closely
restricts the amount of state indebtedness, and provides further
that "the credit of the state shall not be granted to or in aid of
any person, association, or corporation, public or private." 6 Although there are no cases interpreting these provisions of the
state constitution as they apply to the universities, the settled
opinion seems to be that, as a part of state government, a general debt payable out of state appropriations would be illegal as
an unconstitutional state debt. 7
In 1928 the Attorney General approved a device known as
the "self-liquidating project" which has enabled the state universities to obtain money without violating the constitutional restrictions on state indebtedness. 8 The theory behind the selfliquidating project is that a university is not generally indebted
at all. It merely agrees to use the income generated by the project itself to repay the bondholders. This device has been extensively used to finance new dormitories, but it has also been
used to erect such diverse structures as football stadiums, student unions, and parking structures. The Attorney General has
gone so far as to approve short-term indebtedness by Michigan
State University secured by anticipated student fees. 9 And,
when legislators enacted a statute forbidding the issuance of
self-liquidating bonds without the approval of the state, the Attorney General ruled that the law was unconstitutional. 10
It would appear that the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan currently has, as a body corporate, the power
to finance the acquisition of truly self-liquidating facilities such
as housing and dining facilities, student activities facilities, parking facilities and athletic facilities, by the issuance of obligations
payable in future years without any legislative act, provided the
facilities are reasonably proper and necessary for the University
to function.
The restriction on extending the credit of the state to
others has also been the subject of opinions of the Attorney
General as it bears upon the financial operations of the state
universities. In 1928, he ruled that a police and fire protection
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agreement between the then Michigan State College and the City
of East Lansing was illegal because it amounted to an extension
of state credit by the college to a public corporation, the city. 11
For the same reason, Michigan State is prohibited from assisting
its fraternities to build houses, 12 and from supplying water and
sewer service to neighboring private persons. 13
The construction and maintenance of university buildings,
as well as their financing, has been treated in many opinions of
the Attorney General. As early as 1898, the Attorney General
ruled that construction of an addition to the Law School at the
University of Michigan was not governed by a statute which,
literally, would have applied to all state institutions. 14 In another
opinion, the Attorney General reiterated the Weinberg 15 rule
that the University need not require bonds from contractors for
the benefit of subcontractors. 16 In another opinion interpreting
the School Building Code, the Attorney General ruled that it
applied only to classroom buildings. 17 A recent ruling in 1965
held unconstitutional a statute which purported to vest authority in the state administrative board over the construction programs at the ten autonomous colleges and universities of the
state. 18
Many other opinions cover some of the vast miscellany of
legal questions which arise from particular business transactions
of the University. The Attorney General's office has issued the
following opinions. The Board of Regents may place fire insurance on University property without the approval of the Auditor General. 19 Alternately, with the consent of the state administrative board, the Regents may cover University property
through the state fire insurance fund. 20 State laws for the registration and supervision of laboratories govern only those University laboratories which sell their products for a profit. 21 The
University may serve oleomargerine despite a contrary statute. 22
Unclaimed checks issued by the University are subject to escheat
except those in payment of wages. 23 Michigan State University
may license the Dow Chemical Company to produce an insecticide which has been patented by that University. 24 A statute
requiring state agencies to have all their printing done within the
state does not apply to those universities with constitutional
status. 25 The Michigan Higher Education Assistance Authority 26
is not authorized to charge a fee to the schools for its services in
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guaranteeing up to 80% of a student loan. 27 Parking and traffic
regulations for university property may be adopted by the university's governing board and enforced by a city in accordance
with a con tract between the. board and the city. 28 The board of
Michigan State University may delegate financial authority to
the University president in spite of a conflicting statute which
would have delegated such authority to the University's secretary.29 An annuity plan adopted by a college in order to raise
funds is not subject to regulation under the state insurance
code. 3 ° Finally, although its name is one of a university's most
valuable assets, the Attorney General ruled that only the legislature, and not the governing board, could change the name of
Michigan State College to Michigan State University. 31
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CHAPTER X
THE FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES
1. INTRODUCTION

The first case in this chapter is the famous Rose case of the
1870's. This case involved shortages which were found in the
student deposit accounts for the chemistry laboratory of the
University of Michigan. At issue was whether one Professor
Douglas or whether his assistant Rose was responsible for the
shortages. The trouble was that Douglas and Rose represented
two different religious and political factions into which the University and the City of Ann Arbor were divided. Indeed, the entire State of Michigan seemed to be involved.
The case was litigated in the courts. The opinion of the
Supreme Court is included in this chapter, but the case was not
settled by judicial decision alone. By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, the Board of Regents was exhausted and
was equally divided. For this reason it was not represented before the court. The electorate and the legislature was aroused
by the scandal. The full sweep of the case which so seriously endangered the University is described in the survey edited by
Shaw, The University of Michigan: An Encyclopedic Survey.
The Buehler and Draper cases involve the application to
the University of Michigan of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. In these cases the court does not treat the University differently from any regular employer; but these cases should be
compared to the Agler and Peters cases in Chapter III which
concerned resistance of Michigan State University to coverage
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The final case in this chapter raises the most fundamental
issue of faculty employment. An Assistant Professor of German
at the then Michigan College of Mining and Technology, named
Sittler, was dismissed by the college's Board of Control apparently after discovering that he had been a Nazi during the Second
293
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World War. The Supreme Court in deciding whether he was entitled to compensation for the remainder of the academic year
did not even consider the reason for his dismissal. The court
simply ruled that since the arrangements for the professor's appointment had not been approved by the governing board in
formal session, he had no contract with the college. This case
was decided before the grant of constitutional status to Michigan
Tech, but there is no reason to believe that the lack of constitutional autonomy was decisive in this particular case. Sittler was
hired only two weeks before the beginning of classes by the
head of the language department. It is the practice of many universities to have the governing board formally delegate emergency authority to fill vacant faculty positions which must be
filled in a short time. Since there was no evidence of such
formal delegation by the college board in the Sittler case, it is
not a precedent for cases involving formal delegation.
In this connection, the tenure rules established in the Bylaws of the Regents of the University of Michigan deserve mention. In general, they establish the procedure by which faculty
members are given tenure, and they also provide the procedure
which must be followed in dismissing a member of the faculty
with tenure. 1
A statute in Michigan requires that all members of the
faculties at all colleges and universities in the state, public and
private, take an oath to support the constitutions of the state
and the country. This loyalty oath is significantly different,
however, from the loyalty oath at the University of Maryland
which was recently struck down by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Whitehill v. Elkins, 88 Sup. Ct. 184 (1967).
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The Regents of The University of Michigan v. Rose
45 Mich. 284, 288, 297-312; 4 N.W. 738 (1881)
[The Rose case affected the University much more seriously than is revealed in the court's opinion in this case. Political
passions aroused over the disappearance of money from the
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chemical laboratory accounts seriously divided the University
and the whole State of Michigan. The very independence of the
Board of Regents was threatened by an equal division within the
board and the possibility of legislative action to break the deadlock. For a complete account of this important episode in the
history of the University, see the article by Lewis G. Vander
Velde in Volume 1, The University of Michigan-An Encyclopedic Survey, pp. 208-13.]
MARSTON, C. J. In these cases, owing to the extraordinary
and unprecedented course adopted by the complainant in the original cause, declining to render that aid and assistance which the researches and argument of counsel would give, and which has been
universally recognized as proper and necessary in courts, especially
those of last resort, we find the request to dispense with the printing
of the record an embarrassing one. We do not know what questions
are to be presented on the hearing, or the extent of the investigation
that will be found necessary in the determination thereof.
We cannot, therefore, now say that the record should not be
printed in the usual manner. That this may result in heavy and unnecessary expense upon the losing party, much of which might be
avoided could we have the customary assistance of counsel, is very
probable. It is, however, one of the consequences which we cannot
avoid, when the case is thus thrown upon us, with no information on
one side whether the full printing of the record is or not necessary.
We must, as at present advised, assume that such printing is necessary, and act accordingly.

***
MARSTON, C. J. The original bill in this cause was filed for an
accounting between defendants Douglas and Rose respecting moneys
which had been received at the Chemical Laboratory of the University of Michigan, on account of the University, but not paid over or
accounted for to the complainants, and for a decree against the defendants, or either of them, for such amount as should be found in
their or his hands.
[The appeal is by defendant Douglas.]

***
Taking up these several questions raised by the appeal, the first
in order will be the one last above stated.
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First. Appellant claims to be credited the sum of $390 for error in balance brought forward in his account rendered for 1870-1. I
have carefully examined the evidence and the briefs referred to, in
order to ascertain if a mistake had been made as claimed. The report
made by defendant Douglas to the Regents for 1869-70 showed a
balance in his hands belonging to the University of $61.49. The two
last items of credits to the University upon this report are under
date of June 29, 1870, viz.: June 29th, sundry persons, $836.22,
and diplomas $19. His next report to the Regents credits the University, under date of July 1st, "By bal. $451.49." On turning to his
book of accounts from which these reports were made I find the balance there stated under the same date $361.49; the other credit items
correspond with his report. Turning back upon the same book to his
account for 1869 and up to June 29th, 1870, I find the total receipts
footed up at $5685.87, and the expenditures at $5324.38; this makes
the balance, as stated upon his books, $361.49. It is very clear, however, that a mistake was made in the footing-up of the receipts for
1869, as was pointed out during the argument by one of the members of the court. The correct footing-up is not $5685.87 but
$5385.87, thus clearly showing a mistake of $300 to have been
made in favor of the University. I have been unable to account for
the difference between the amount or balance as shown upon his
book and in his report. As already said, the book, as erroneously
footed, showed a balance of $361.49, while his report gave the balance as $451.49; the mistake of $300 is clear, while there remains
$90 unaccounted for. The evidence tends very strongly to show that
this $90 was not received, yet the manner of keeping accounts was
so loose and is so unsatisfactory that I am of opinion this $90 should
be charged to the defendant Douglas. He having once reported the
receipt thereof to the Regents, he must assume the burden of proving
the mistake. This has been done to the amount of $300 and that
amount should be credited to him.
Secondly. I now come to the question of interest. Defendant
Douglas while director of the Laboratory, claiming to have made certain advances therefor, over and above the receipts therefrom in his
hands, made monthly balances of his accounts and charged interest
upon any balance found in his favor at the rate of ten per cent. per
annum. In his annual accounts to the Regents the interest thus
claimed and computed was charged. In some of the accounts this
charge was more clearly and distinctly set forth than in others, it appearing in all as a charge of interest, but not in every instance showing how or upon what balance it was computed. The fact that such
advances were made and that such balance in his favor in fact existed,
is not disputed, except upon the theory of charging him with the
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entire receipts of the Laboratory. It was farther shown that there was
no express authority given him by the Regents to make any advances,
or if he did to charge interest thereon. These accounts, when presented to the Board, were usually referred to the fmance committee,
by them examined, and reported back as being correct. There was no
uniformity in the action taken by the Regents upon these reports;
some were "accepted and the account and vouchers placed on ftle,"
others "accepted," "accepted and adopted," and "adopted." And
this is true of all of the reports up to and including the report for
1871-2, except for the year 1866-7, which, although made andreferred to the proper committee, the record of the Board fails to show
any report made or action taken thereon. The report for that year is
found on file, and formed the basis for the next year's report which
was acted upon.
It has been claimed that the Regents, in auditing and allowing
his accounts, did so in ignorance of the facts relating to the charges
of interest, and that the Board had no authority to borrow money or
to pay interest upon such advances. I do not deem it necessary to
pass upon the question of the power of the Board of Regents to borrow money or to pay interest. I have no doubt but that where money
has been paid out or expended for the use and benefit of the University, in cases where the Board could have expressly authorized such
expenditures, they may ratify the act and direct payment thereof
with interest at any rate not exceeding ten per cent. per annum; and
where. the Board with full knowledge of the facts has made such payment, such action will be final and cannot afterwards be disturbed.
Did then the Board of Regents pass upon these accounts with
full knowledge of the facts? Whether as a matter of fact each member of the Board carefully examined these accounts for the purpose
of ascertaining what was charged therein, and the reason therefor, is
not of very much importance in the present inquiry. I shall not,
therefore, consider the evidence tending to show such to have been
the fact. In the presentation of these accounts, and the charges of interest therein, no fraud or concealment was attempted. The accounts
upon their face showed certain interest items charged against the
University. This was sufficient to put the Regents upon inquiry, and
in case they did not fully understand the charge as made, or the reason for making it, it became their duty, before acting farther thereon,
to make full investigation and ascertain all the facts relating thereto.
No one can doubt for a moment but that a proper investigation
would have given them all the facts and circumstances pertaining to
this question of interest. Such being the duty of the Board of Regents, this court cannot presume that it was either neglected or carelessly performed by that body. In the absence of fraud it must be
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conclusively presumed that the Board did know the facts relating to
these charges and allowed them in the light thereof. What was said in
Detroit Advertiser etc., v. City of Detroit 43 Mich. 116 is equally applicable in this connection and need not here be repeated, and the
rule there )aid down must be held decisive in the present case upon
this question, so far as interest was allowed, which includes the
amount in the report for 1871-2 and previous years.
The records of the Board do not show final action upon any
report subsequent to that of 1871-2, consequently no allowance of
interest thereafter. And I am of opinion, therefore, that interest after
that time cannot be allowed in this case. If it could, clearly, under
our statute, the rate could not exceed seven per cent, in the absence
of a written agreement. Where charged and paid in the absence of
such an agreement the person receiving such rate may retain it, but
he cannot make that the basis for the recovery of the same rate upon
implied contract. I am also of opinion that no implied contract can
thus grow up under which interest can be recovered; that the rule
applicable between individuals cannot here be followed, but rather
the rule applicable between the State or municipalities and individuals must here govern. I have heretofore had occasion to examine
the question whether interest could be claimed from the State upon
an implied contract, and came to the conclusion that such was not
the general rule, and I have seen no occasion to depart from or
change the conclusion then arrived at. Report of Auditor General
for 1874, ccxlv.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the interest charged in the report for 1872-3 and subsequently, cannot be allowed the defendant.
Thirdly. Old accounts amounting to $53.19. Before attempting
to pass upon this and the remaining claim, it might be well to first
ascertain the relations existing between the defendant Douglas and
the University, and his legal liability to the University resulting therefrom.
As I have already given a full statement of the facts, a brief
reference at this point will be sufficient. Defendant Douglas was at
an early day appointed assistant professor and afterwards professor
of chemistry. As such it was a part of his duty to purchase chemicals
for the Laboratory, furnish them to students therein as necessary,
collect the price thereof and account therefor to the Board of Regents. Our attention has not been called to, and I have been unable
to find, the record of his appointment or the authority then or afterwards expressly conferred upon him. Evidence has been introduced
as to what some members of the Board considered his duty, viz., to
superintend the business of the Chemical Laboratory, receive and
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account for all moneys coming into the same; to act as its director,
and to report to the Board the result of the management thereof, including all moneys coming into his hands, and all moneys paid out
by him in connection therewith. As early as 1864 assistants were appointed, who, amongst other duties, took charge of the books, dispensed chemicals to the students, kept their accounts, collected from
them and paid the same over to defendant Douglas.
In June, 1865, defendant Douglas made a report to the Regents in which the following appeared: The Dispensing of Chemicals
and Apparatus and the Keeping of Accounts in the Laboratory. An
account is kept with each student in the Laboratory, who is made to
pay for what he actually consumes; the labor attached to this branch
is very great and requires the services of a good and correct accountant; thus, in transacting the business of the past year, there have
been made in the books of the Laboratory upwards of 1800 entries
of charges and credits, and in the hands of a careless and inefficient
man large amounts may be lost to the University. Under all these
circumstances I respectfully suggest to your honorable Board the
appointment of an assistant of chemistry and lecturer on organic
chemistry and metallurgy, at a salary of $1000, and that the remaining two assistants now authorized to be employed be paid, respectively $250 and $300; the expenses of the Laboratory would be thus
increased $800; with this sum I think the services of one permanent
and efficient assistant can be secured, and if the waste and loss consequent upon irresponsible and inefficient help is taken into account,
it will prove little if any more expensive than the present arrangement." At the same session the committee to whom was referred the
above reported the following, which was adopted: "Resolved, That
an assistant professor of chemistry and lecturer on organic chemistry
and metallurgy, at a salary of $1000, be employed, and that theremaining two assistants, now authorized to be employed, be paid respectively $250 and $300 per annum." The following was also
adopted: "On motion of Regent Knight the appointment of an assistant professor in the Laboratory was referred to the executive
committee and Profe.;sor Douglas." Under this authority Dr. Lewis
was appointed to take charge of the books, dispense chemicals and
keep accounts, and he held such position until the spring of 1866,
when he resigned, and Dr. Preston B. Rose was then appointed.
I do not understand it to be claimed, or that, as a matter of
fact, defendant Douglas, during or after 1864, kept the books of account with the students or dispensed any of the chemicals, or, with
a very few exceptions, collected any moneys from the students. The
books were kept, and all this work was done, by an assistant who
accounted to defendant Douglas.
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Under such a state of facts it is important to first determine
whether defendant Douglas can be properly charged with and held
liable for all moneys, which the books show to have been paid, or
which were actually paid, to such assistants, or only for the amount
by them paid over to him. I have been unable to discover any principle or decision under which defendant Douglas can in this case be
held liable for moneys not actually received by him. No such enlarged responsibility can result from his office or the class of duties
he performed. The keeping of accounts and collection of moneys
from the students could not, from the very nature of his position
and the duties he had to perform, primarily fall upon him. He was
not a mere accountant and collector. That duty necessarily must have
and was in fact entrusted to others-assistants who were appointed
under authority from the Board of Regents, their salary fixed by
them, and paid out of University funds. I make no distinction on this
account, for there is none, because they may have been paid from
Laboratory moneys and by the director; they were none the less University funds which otherwise it would have received. These assistants
were not therefore the clerks, servants or agents of the defendant
Douglas, for whose acts he would be chargeable, and the mere fact
that he had power to employ or discharge them, would not make
them such. They were in the employ of the University and were subject to be called to account by, and were responsible to, the Board
of Regents for their acts and conduct.
If it was a part of the duties of the defendant Douglas to keep
strict watch and account of their doings to prevent loss to the University, and he was guilty of such negligence in this respect as would
render him responsible for the losses sustained in consequence thereof, the question might be different, but such is not the theory of the
bill in this case.
It is not necessary, however, to rest the case upon this ground
alone; as already intimated, the bill of complaint does not seek to
charge him with any but the moneys that came into his hands.
Farther than this, after the cause had been at issue, counsel representing all the parties, complainants and defendants, entered into a
written stipulation, in which I find the following: "1st. All the said
defendants who have appeared, consent and agree that said Douglas
is liable to account to and pay over to said complainants so much of
the Laboratory deficit, so called, as came into his lands, and which
has not been accounted for by him to the Regents, if any; and also,
that said Rose is liable to account to, and pay over to, said complainants so much of said deficit as came into his hands and which he
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has not accounted for to said Douglas or to said Regents, if any. * * *
4th Nothing contained in the record of this cause, or the decree to
be made therein, shall, at any time hereafter, be alleged or held to
estop the complainants from calling on said defendant Douglas to
account to them for any money which he may have received for
their use, other than such as was received by him from or through
said defendant Rose."
The authority to enter into this stipulation has not been and
could not well be questioned, and it clearly fixes the liability of each
to such amount "as came into his hands and which has not been accounted for by him." Whether therefore we look to the bill of complaint, the stipulation, or the legal liability resulting froin undisputed
facts, we can only charge defendant Douglas with the moneys received by him and not accounted for. It also follows from such a
state of facts that there must be evidence, at least, tending to show
moneys into Douglas' hands in order to justify the rendition of a decree against him. In stating this I do not overlook the second clause
of the stipulation referred to which fixed the amount of the deficit,
but left open the question what amount thereof should be charged
to Rose and what amount to Douglas. This matter of division or appointment was left to be settled by the court in the usual manner
upon relevant and competent testimony in the case. It is not sufficient, therefore, in order to charge defendant Douglas, to show by
the books kept by an assistant that a certain amount of money had
been paid to the assistant, or, as a fact independent of the books,
that such sums were paid to the assistant, as such evidence has no
tendency to show that Douglas received it. Proof of these facts would
necessarily be one of the steps in the case, but standing alone would
fall short of establishing a liability against Douglas, or call upon him
to account for what he has not been shown to have received. The
burthen of proof, in reference to these old accounts, is upon the
complainants; and in reference to the deficit fixed by the stipulation,
is upon defendant Rose, to show the money in Douglas' hands in order to charge him therewith. In seeking to establish such fact the
rules applicable to the proof of facts in civil cases must be observed,
and the fact may be shown by any competent testimony fairly ~end
ing, either alone or in connection with other circumstances, to establish it.
I have been wholly unable to find any satisfactory evidence
that defendant Douglas received any of these old accounts charged
to him in the decree. They are very old matters, running from 1860-1
to 18634, and the books kept at that time are principally relied
upon to charge him. These books are not in his handwriting; the
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evidence shows that they were very carelessly kept; that the tickets
then in use were relied upon in the settlement with the students, and
that corrections made in the settlement did not necessarily appear
upon the books, and that the entries therein are not correct. Under
such circumstances I am of opinion that these old accounts should
not be charged against the defendant Douglas. It may be very questionable whether the books, kept in such a manner, could be admitted in evidence as against this defendant, but as the proof stands,
the question is hardly of sufficient importance to justify an extended
discussion.
Fourth. I now come to perhaps the most difficult, certainly
the most important, question raised by the appeal. The decree
charges the defendant Douglas with certain deficit deposit moneys,
paid in 1866-7 and following years up to 1873-4, amounting to
$1275 and interest thereon. What has been said under the last subdivision, relating to the old accounts, as to the relation of the several
parties, their respective liabilities and the burthen of proof, is equally
applicable here and need not be repeated.
The principal evidence relied upon to charge defendant Douglas
with the receipt of this deposit money is the stubs remaining in certain books, with the name, or initials, or initial D. thereon, of
Douglas as a receipt or voucher that he had received the amount
mentioned in such stub. It is not disputed, but it is in fact conceded,
that if all the vouchers for deposit money on the stub-books are
genuine, the decree in this respect is correct and should not be
changed. Defendant Douglas testified that the vouchers on stubs 37
and 44 to 85, inclusive, in sub-book 2, are not in his handwriting,
and although testifying that there were others which he believed
were not, these were the only stubs specifically pointed out by him.
This, in my opinion, puts these stubs in issue, as would an affidavit
denying the execution of an instrument sued upon. Twelve stubbooks, running from 1866 to 1876, were put in evidence. On nearly
all the stubs in these books I fmd defendant's vouchers, the great
bulk of which are unquestioned. I do not, in this connection, refer
to the red-line vouchers. Nearly one hundred orders drawn by the
recorder upon the treasurer of the city of Ann Arbor, and countersigned by defendant Douglas as mayor, were put in evidence by the
defendant Rose. There is also a large number of books and papers in
evidence, containing the genuine handwriting of both the defendants
Douglas and Rose.
I have made most careful examination and comparison of the
writing and signatures of defendant Douglas with the disputed
vouchers. I have also made a quite careful examination of defendant
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Rose's handwriting and signatures with the disputed vouchers. This
last, however, was not as careful as the first for two reasons: First, if
these disputed vouchers were the work of Rose, I would not expect
them to be in his ordinary and natural handwriting but rather as an
imitation of Douglas; and secondly, if I became satisfied they were
not made by defendant Douglas, it would not, for the purpose of
this case, become necessary to find by whom made, inasmuch as the
case would then be merely this, that defendant Rose had received
certain moneys for the payment over of which he had failed to produce vouchers. If I had confined my examination to defendant
Douglas' signature on the city orders referred to, and a comparison
thereof with the disputed vouchers, I should have no hesitation
whatever in saying that the latter were not genuine. The city orders,
however, were all countersigned in 1871-'2 and '3-most of them in
1872-while these disputed stubs are dated September, 1867. An examination of the previous stubs in the same book, number 2, running
from December, 1866, to the date of the disputed stubs, and of stubbook number 1, running from August 9, 1866, to December lOth of
the same year, would not tend to weaken but strengthen such opinion. Thus far there can scarcely be said to be any resemblance whatever between the disputed papers and those shown or admitted to be
genuine. No doubt, if all these I have mentioned, numbering about
four hundred, should be taken and compared, resemblances might be
pointed out between some which are disputed and some conceded
to be genuine, but some resemblance would be expected on any
theory of the case.
I encounter more difficulty when I come to the examination
of other stub-books, for there is unquestionable evidence in the signature and initials not disputed, that the handwriting of defendant
Douglas underwent some changes in the period covered by them,
which introduces an element of considerable embarrassment in the
attempt to test these disputed papers.
In addition to the examination thus made we have the expert
testimony, which cannot be overlooked but must receive such weight
as in our judgment it is fairly entitled to. I may not be able to agree
with the witness to the full extent of his theories, as in saying that
certain initials or signatures were not and could not have been made
by defendant Douglas, and yet there may be many things in his testimony that will aid us in arriving at a correct conclusion. Evidence as
to the genuineness of handwriting given by a witness possessing the
requisite experience and skill is admissible, and being so, must be
considered, and given, in the light of all the evidence bearing thereon,
just such weight as the court or jury may deem it reasonably entitled
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to. It cannot be rejected in toto, simply because expert testimony, in
passing, unheeded, the actions of the respective parties. I do not now
refer to opinions of witnesses based upon mere appearances, when
parties are questioned touching matters of this character; but to such
acts, conduct and utterances as evidently were made deliberately and
understandingly. Such acts and declarations have ever been considered competent evidence in civil cases, and are entitled to be
weighed and considered in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made.
Defendant Rose, when his attention was first called to the fact
that the account submitted by him or return made to defendant
Douglas was not complete, examined his books and admitted that
the names submitted to him were not included; others were presented
and like acknowledgments made. He then voluntarily offered to, and
did, prepare a list of delinquent accounts for 1874-5, entered it in defendant Douglas' "long-book," and certified to its correctness; said
he knew no better way than to fmd out how many were deficient,
and pay them, and did borrow the money and paid them. Afterwards a deficit for previous years was discovered, and on his attention being called thereto, while denying that he was aware of any
such deficit, yet he gave security to meet whatever might be found.
A list of delinquent accounts for 1873-4 was made out, amounting
to over eight hundred dollars, and on the 13th of November, 1875,
he certified thereon that, so far as he knew, it was correct according
to the examination of the books. He afterwards, on December 7,
asked leave to make a supplementary statement thereto on the same
paper, which not being permitted, a separate statement was made by
him, but which does not explicitly question the correctness of his
previous certificate. His admissions to President Angell and others
all bear directly upon this question.
Much has been said, in the briefs of counsel referred to, as to
the unfairness of the means resorted to for the purpose of procuring
these admissions, papers and securities. I cannot agree with counsel
in what they have said upon this subject. I certainly have heretofore
gone as far as any court has in denouncing attempts to encourage
men to commit crime in order to detect and punish them therefor,
because of their previous supposed criminal conduct, and I have no
desire to depart from what I then said: Saunders v. People 38 Mich.
221. But in this matter, in all that was done no effort was made to
have defendant Rose commit any wrong, but simply to acknowledge
that he had omitted to make proper returns. This is a very common
practice, and I certainly see no objections that can be urged against
such a course, unless undue means are resorted to, which I think
were not in this case, and I fully concur with the learned circuit judge
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in what he said in speaking of the trust deed given to secure the Regents against loss on account of delinquencies in former years:
"Douglas was not present upon this occasion or connected with the
transaction, and there certainly was nothing oppressive or over exacting in the conduct of the two Regents with whom the business was
done, or that should excite timidity on the part of Rose." But perhaps the very strongest reasons that can be shown against the charge
of undue influence to procure such written admission is the fact that
the commissioner, in stating the account, found, and the court below
approved his finding, that the list of delinquent accounts for 1874-5,
entered and certified upon the "long-book" by Rose as correct, and
the delinquent list for 18734, as certified to by him on November
13, 1875, already referred to, were in substances correct, and charged
him therewith, and with the decree thus rendered he had rested satisfied, having taken no steps to obtain a review thereof.
I have given due consideration to the argument found in the
briefs against these things, yet in view of the evidence of the men to
whom these statements were made, I cannot come to the conclusion
that any undue or improper advantage was sought or taken of defendant Rose, or that the circumstances would justify me in not giving due weight to such testimony. There was no illegal compulsion
used, nor was he imposed upon or under duress. Nor have I overlooked the argument that the first D vouchers are denied, and also
what is said in reference to the spelling of the word Dougles or
Dougled on stub number 44. Whether this word was so spelled intentionally to furnish an argument against the probability of one
familiar with a name thus misspelling it under such circumstances, I
pass, but in my opinion this name was not written by defendant
Douglas. Nor have I overlooked the offers that were made by defendant Rose asking for investigation. Much may be said in favor of
the apparent fairness of some of these propositions, and I have no desire to criticise them; they cannot overthrow or destroy the effect of
the evidence in the case, and they can take but very little from its
force and effect. There are still other facts and circumstances which
might be considered and discussed at considerable length, yet it is
deemed unnecessary in the present case.
In view of all the evidence I am of opinion it does not satisfactorily appear that the vouchers in stub book number 2 referred to
were written by defendant Douglas, and he should not therefore be
charged with the amounts represented thereby.
This still leaves a large number of delinquent deposit accounts
charged to defendant Douglas. I have examined and considered with
care the argument advanced by his counsel against the allowance of
any of these accounts, and acknowledge its force. Bearing in mind,
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however, the admitted fact that for all genuine deposit stub vouchers
unaccounted for he is responsible, and in view of the farther fact that
although called as a witness and thus having full opportunity to point
out all such vouchers as he did not believe were genuine, yet he did
not deny any others except inferentially. If he had been incapacitated or disqualified as a witness, then no such denial could have been
obtained, and the court must, from the other evidence in the case,
have passed upon the question. But when a party is living, has been
called as a witness, and does not specifically point out and designate
those which he claims to be spurious, the court is quite justified in
refusing to pay much heed to any elaborate argument by which it is
sought to establish their falsity. In the absence of such a denial specifically pointing out those considered not valid, where, as in the
present case, the great bulk of them are not questioned, all must be
considered prima facie valid.
For these reasons I am of opinion that all such delinquent deposit moneys must be charged to the defendant Douglas and that as
to these the decree will not be disturbed.
I have thus carefully considered all of appellant's objections to
the decree of the court below, except a question of costs. The appellant also insisted that the appeal brought up the whole case for review, and it was argued accordingly. Neither the Regents nor Rose or
his sureties appealed, and neither of them appeared by counsel or
otherwise in this court. This has been a source of great embarrassment to the court and has greatly increased our labor; and under such
circumstances I think we have a right to assume that all parties, except Douglas, are satisfied with the decree as it stands. It is a long
and well-settled rule that a decree appealed from by one party only,
cannot be changed in the appellate court in favor of the party not
appealing; and, as this rule is so well known and understood, it is expected that all parties will appeal who are dissatisfied with the conclusion of the circuit court, and desire to have the decree changed in
their favor. The fact of dissatisfaction courts can only know by an
appeal regularly taken according to the rules and practice of the
court. Nevertheless, as we held in Grant v. Merchants' etc. Bank 35
Mich. 515, if in a case of accounting we find occasion to change the
decree by allowing in favor of the appellant any items which were rejected in the court below, we will offset to these any other items
claimed by the party not appealing which in our opinion were improperly rejected. But when a party acquiesces in the disallowance
of any of his claims, and in this court neither by appeal nor otherwise complains of the disallowance, I think we have a right to assume
that he is satisfied with the action upon it, and that he does not expect or desire us to examine into it. There may be reasons for his not
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desiring it which we could not know without their being explained
to us, and it would be presumptuous on our part to treat the case in
such a way, or to force the re-opening of matters which the parties
concerned chose to leave where they were left in the court below. We
can give the appellant relief in so far as the decree may be found to
err against him; but where no one else complains or appears, I shall
follow the usual custom of courts and refuse to discuss such questions as in the case before us are mere abstractions, since the only
possible motive in the discussion would be to express opinions on
those parts of the decree below of which no one makes complaint.
The Court will assume, however, that any claim which is made
by the appellant in this court, is in issue, and will look through all
the evidence for any possible information which will show or tend
to show that he is or is not entitled to have it allowed in his favor.
I am of opinion that the decree below should be modified in
accordance with this opinion, and that appellant should recover
costs in this court.
My brethren concurring, it is so ordered, and a decree will be
entered in this court accordingly.
GRAVES, J., concurred.
COOLEY, J., concurring. In these cases it has seemed proper
to me, in view of facts with which the public is familiar, that I
should leave the examination of the record and the questions involved to be made by my associates without my presence or assistance. They have made their examination accordingly, and the result
is embodied in the opinion of the Chief Justice just flied. I have examined that opinion and compared it with the record without finding occasion to disagree.
CAMPBELL, J., being disqualified by relationship to appellants' bail, did not sit in this case.

Buehler v. University of Michigan

277 Mich. 648, 649-51; 270 N.W. 171 (1936)
POTTER, J. Plaintiff, employed at common labor at Martha
Cook building, University house, and Alpha Gamma Delta sorority
house, all in Ann Arbor, injured her hand while working at the
Martha Cook building October 16, 1934.
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The first two buildings are operated by the university. The
third is not so operated but is separate therefrom. Plaintiff earned at
the Martha Cook building $6.30 a week; at University house, $2.85 a
week; at Alpha Gamma Delta sorority house, $9 a week-a total of
$18.15. At 'the time of the hearing, plaintiff was earning at the
Martha Cook building $6.30 a week; at the University building,
$2.85; and at the Alpha Gamma Delta sorority house $4 a week-a
falling off in wages of $5 a week, 66-2/3 per cent. of which is
$3.33-1/3 a week which was the amount of the award made by the
department oflabor and industry.
Defendants appeal claiming the award is based upon earnings
in which the university is not interested; that earnings, remuneration
or income received by plaintiff from others than the insured employer were added to the wages received from the insured employer in
computing the average weekly wages of plaintiff. Appellants say this
should not be done because the statute, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8427,
provides compensation "shall fairly represent the proportionate extent of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in
which he was working at the time of the accident;" that this provision as construed in Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich.
298 (Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 724, 6 N.C. C. A. 807;Hirschkorn v. Fiege
Desk Co. 184 Mich. 239;Hartman v. Village of St. Qair Shores, 246
Mich. 603; Gallup v. Western Board & Paper Co., 252 Mich. 68;
Carothers v. City of Stanton, 257 Mich. 107; Laidlaw v. City of
Ludington, 272 Mich. 11, and other cases, limits plaintiff to recovering against the university and its insurer compensation based upon
her wages earned while employed by the university. Defendants insist to hold otherwise would be to render the operation of the workmen's compensation act uncertain, deprive insurers of the ability to
compute premiums on the basis of the wages of the employee, subject employers and insurers . to liability which they had not contracted against and which they could not anticipate, and is contrary
to the spirit of the statute.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends her earnings must be
based upon what she earned, on her capacity to earn, ::~ whaL she
might earn in all the various pursuits in which she wa::. engaged at the
time the accident occurred; that applied to this case, plaintiffs earnings before the accident \''ere $18.15 and after the accident $13.15
a week-a difference of .k;, 66-2/3 per cont. of which is $3.33-1/3,
the amount correctly awarded toter by lhe department of labor and
industry, and she r<:hs upon Miller v. S. Fair & Sons, 206 Mich. 360;
Foley v. Detrcit Uni.tPd Railway, 190 Mich. 507; Sargent v. A. B.
Know/son Co., 22.; Mich. 66o (30 A. L. R. 993).
There is a distinction in fact between the cases which defendants
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rely upon and those upon which plaintiff relies. Typical of the cases
upon which appellants rely are the cases of part-time firemen paid
upon a weekly basis a certain amount, though engaged in and receiving pay in other employment, in which cases it has been uniformly held the party injured was entitled to become compensated upon
the basis of the amount received from the particular source of employment as fireman. Typical of the cases relied upon by plaintiff is
the night-watchman case Sargent v. A. B. Know/son Co., supra, where
a watchman was employed to watch several buildings, but where it
was held plaintiffs employment was not seyeral as to each person
employing his services and the services performed at any particular
time were for the benefit of all persons employing him.
We have nothing to do with the policy of the law.* That is a
matter for the legislature. But, under the facts in this case, plaintiff
was not employed by one of these employers for the benefit of the
others. Her employment by each of her employers was separate and
distinct from her employment by the others and, under the law, the
university may not be held liable for compensation computed on
the basis of what plaintiff earned when not employed by the university, and the insurer may not be held liable for compensation based
upon earnings by the plaintiff while not on the payroll of the insured.
The award of the department of labor and industry is reversed
and the case remanded.
NORTH, C. J., and FEAD, WIEST, BUTZEL, BUSHNELL,
SHARPE, and TOY, JJ., concurred.

Draper v. Regents of The University of Michigan
195 Mich. 449, 450-56; 161 N.W. 956 (1917)
KUHN, C. J. The claimant's husband, Jay B. Draper, was, immediately prior to November 13, 1915, superintendent of the University hospitals at a salary of $2,500 a year. Mr. Draper frequently
was required, in the course of his employment, to go to the University campus, which is situated about a quarter of a mile southeast of
the University hospitals. In order to go to and from the campus it is
necessary to cross the street car tracks running along the north side
of the campus, on North University avenue. Mr. Draper's home was
*See 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq.- REPORTER.
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southeast of the campus, so that the campus was directly between
his home and the University hospitals.
It is claimed that it was Mr. Draper's universal custom to take
his noon and evening meals at the University hospitals, in the psychopathic ward, unless he was called home for some reason or unless
he had business down town which took him away from the hospitals.
On November 13, 1915, he called up his home about 5 o'clock
and said he would be home for the evening meal. Half an hour later
he was almost instantly killed by a street car as he was'about to enter the campus from the direction of the hospitals.
A claim was presented against the Regents of the University of
Michigan, and considerable testimony was taken at the hearing. The
arbitration committee and the industrial accident board held that the
accident which caused Mr. Draper's death did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment. We quote from the brief of counsel
as the best way to present the claimant's contention:
"Did the accident arise 'in the course of' the employment?
The answer to this question depends upon whether Mr. Draper was
on his way from the hospitals to the campus to transact some matter
of business there on his way home. If he was merely going home to
dinner when killed, the accident would not be one in the course of
his employment. But if he was intending to stop on the campus on a
business errand and then go on home to dinner, the accident would
be one in the course of his employment. We think the evidence shows
that he had business on the campus to transact before going home,
and that this evidence is undisputed and unimpeached.
"Mr. Draper had been superintendent of the hospitals for eight
years. Mrs. Draper testified that never during that time had Mr.
Draper left the hospital as late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon to come
home to dinner unless he had business to transact on the way. It was
seldom that he came home for the evening meal, sometimes not more
than once in two or three weeks. He took his evening meals at the
hospital unless busin~ss called him to the campus or down town, and
this was his 'universal practice.' * * *
"It must be held, therefore, that a uniform custom to go home
for his evening meal only when he had business to transact on the
way, is conclusively shown by the evidence.
"The campus was situated between the hospitals and the home
of the deceased; so that he could easily transact any business he
might have on the campus while on his way home. On the night when
he was killed it appears that he called up his home about 5 o'clock
and informed his family that he intended to come home for dinner.
No plans or arrangements at home required his presence; for his
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telephone call was the first intimation the family had that he would
come home that night. Hence, if he followed his custom, he must
have planned to go home for dinner because he had business to look
after on the campus, and since he was killed when about to enter the
campus from the direction of the hospitals, he must have been on his
way to look after that business when killed.
"Does the proof of a custom constitute prima facie evidence
that an act was done pursuant to such custom? In other words, will
evidence that deceased was accustomed to do a certain act be sufficient to show prima facie that he did it? The cases are very clear that
evidence of a custom is competent to show the doing of an act coming within the custom" -citing cases.
We think counsel is claiming more for the record than it will
justify.
Mrs. Draper was a witness. The following appeared in her testimony:

"Q. Did he ever come home to his noon or 6 o'clock meal?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. On what occasions?
"A. If he was having business down town or over on the campus at the noon hour or 6 o'clock he would come home.
"Q. Was that his universal practice as far as you know?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Were there any days he came home to any of those meals
unless he had business down town, at the bank, or at the campus
that you know of?
"A. When he was to a game, to a ball game.
"Q. When he would be off duty in the afternoon, where would
he have his meals? Would he come home? Suppose he had gone to a
ball game?
"A. He would have his meals at home unless there was something that he had to go back to the office for.
"Q. Were there any other times when he came home to his
meals other than when he had business at the campus or was down
town?
"A. Not that I know of."
On the cross-examination she said:

"Q. Was your husband in the habit of coming home every
Saturday afternoon?
"A. No, sir.
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"Q. He was not obliged to work on Saturday afternoon?
"A. Well, that depended on his work. If he had work to do, he
would work.
"Q. But usually he laid off Saturday afternoon to go to the ball
games?
"A. If there were games or he had business down town he
would go away; aside from that he would stay at the office and
work."
She also said he did not attend the ball game on the afternoon
when he was hurt.
Miss Burlingame testified in part:

"Q. Do you know where he had his 12 o'clock meal and his 6
o'clock meal?
"A. At psychopathic hospital.
"Q. Always?
"A. Not always. If called away, he went home to 6 o'clock dinner. During the football game season he would go home; also if he
had business on the campus. Sometimes they called him from his
residence, and then he would go home to the evening meal.
"Q. When he had business that called him away from the hospital and over to the campus, near his home, what was his custom?
"A. He had his meals at psychopathic hospital if his work kept
him there until meal time. * * *
"Q. Where was he going that afternoon?
"A. I think he was going home. He always took the same route
going home as he did when he had business at the secretary's office
or on the campus.
"Q. Did he have business that day?
"A. He was anxious to see President Hutchins and Secretary
Smith, and they did not come while I was there. * * *
"Q. If he had been going to see Secretary Smith or President
Hutchins he would have taken this same route?
"A. Yes."
Miss Draper, a daughter of the deceased, was a witness. She testified in part:
"Q. What was his custom in regard to taking meals at the hos-

pital?

"A. He had only two meals at the hospital, the noon meal and
the 6 o'clock meal. The only times he did not eat at the hospital was
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when he came home, when he went on business to the campus, when
he was called home, and when he might be attending some social engagement in the afternoon. That afternoon I do not know whether
he had business.
"Q. What was his practice when he came home to meals?
"A. His universal practice was to call up home when he was
coming home to a meal.

"By Mr. Cavanaugh:
"Q. On Saturdays if he worked at the hospital he had supper
there? If he left in the middle of the afternoon what was his custom?
"A. I would say that the meals he had on Saturdays were about
even at hospital and at home. He always took lunch at the hospital
with the exceptions named."
It was shown by the president and the secretary of the University that they had no engagement with Mr. Draper that afternoon,
and it was not shown that he had any appointment with the treasurer,
nor was it shown what the nature of business down town would be,
whether the private business of Mr. Draper or official business.
In McCoy v. Screw Co., 180 Mich., at page 458 (14 7 N. W., at
page 573, L. R. A. 1916A, 323), it is said:

"The burden of furnishing evidence from which the inference
can be legitimately drawn that the injury arose 'out of and in the
course of his employment' rests upon the claimant. Bryant v. Fissell,
84 N. J. Law, 72 (86 Atl. 458); 3 Negligence & Compensation Cases
Annotated, p. 585. Ruegg on Employers' Liability and Workmen's
Compensation, p. 343, says:

" 'If an inference favorable to the applicant can only be arrived at by a guess the applicant fails. The same thing happens where
two or more inferences equally consistent with the facts arise from
them.'"

In Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich., at page 25 (148 N. W., at page 245),
it is said:
"Under the provisions of this act only that employee is entitled to compensation who 'receives personal injuries arising out of
and in the course of his employment.' It is to be borne in mind that
the act does not provide insurance for the employed workman to
compensate any other kind of accident or injury which may befall
him. The language of the Michigan compensation law is adopted
from the English and Scotch acts on the same subject, and, in
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harmony with their interpretations, has been construed by this court,
in Rayner v. Furniture Co., 180 Mich. 168 [146 N. W. 665, L. R. A.
1916A, 22, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1916A, 386], as meaning that the
words 'out of' refer to the origin, or cause of the accident, and the
words 'in the course of' to the time, place and circumstances under
which it occurred.
"In Ayr Steam Shipping Co., Ltd., v. Lendrum, 6 B. W. C. C.
326, involving a fatal accident attended with uncertainty as to details, the court said:
" 'I think one may deduce from the decisions (1) that the burden is always upon the applicant to prove that death resulted from
an accident arising out of as well as in the course of the employment;
(2) that such proof need not be direct, but may be by circumstantial
evidence, but there must be facts from which an inference can be
drawn, as distinguished from mere conjecture, surmise, or probability; and (3) that an award by an arbiter cannot stand unless the facts
found are such as to entitle him reasonably to infer his conclusion
from them.'
"It is contended by appellants that the facts proven here do
not in reason support the inference of the board as to the manner in
which deceased met his death, but, on the contrary, conclusively
show that he was killed in an attempt to board or leave a moving
train, precluding any award under the ruling in Pope v. Hill's Plymouth Co., 5 B. W. C. C. 175, in which case a workman in a colliery
going home to his dinner on the premises of his employer was killed
in attempting to jump on a passing tram car. It is further urged as a
defense that, if it cannot be said as a matter of law a finding of fact
should have been made as appellants contend, it should at least be
held that the proven facts are equally consistent with either one of
the two alternatives, and no inferences can legitimately be drawn to
support an award.
"We are not prepared to hold that the findings of fact as to the
manner of the accident are entirely without evidential support either
direct or by inference. They are therefore to be taken as conclusive
under the statute. Accepting them as such, do they sustain the conclusion of law that Hills' death arose out of and in the course of his
employment?
"It is well settled that the burden rests upon the one claiming
compensation to show by competent testimony, direct or circumstantial, not only the fact of an injury, but that it occurred in connection with the alleged employment, and both arose out of and
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in the course of the service at which the injured party was employed."
We cannot say as a matter of law that claimant met the burden
of proof, and the findings of fact must therefore stand.
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, and
BROOKE, JJ., concurred. FELLOWS, J., did not sit.

Sittler v. Board of Control of the Michigan College of Mining
and Technology
333 Mich. 681, 683-88; 53 N W. 2d 681 ( 1952)
NORTH, C. J. This is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiff's suit entered in the Michigan court of claims. On December 13,
1950, Edward V. Sittler, plaintiff and appellant herein, filed a verified petition stating a claim against the board of control of the
Michigan college of mining and technology, a defendant and appellee
herein. The claim was based on an alleged contract of employment
as assistant professor of German for the school year September 19,
1949, to June 10, 1950, at a salary of $4,000. Plaintiff alleged that
this contract was executed by B. B. Bennett, who was head of the
department of languages; that Professor Bennett had authority to
make the contract on behalf of the board of control, and that the
contract was also ratified by the board of control. The petition
further alleged that plaintiff had performed his duties as assistant
professor of German from September 19, 1949, to November 10,
1949, at which time his employment was terminated without justification. Plaintiff claims damages of $3,186.60, this being the
amount he would have received if his employment had not been
terminated. The claimed contract which plaintiff relies upon for recovery is contained in a letter written to plaintiff by Professor Bennett, dated September 12, 1949, the pertinent portions of which we
quote:
"This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of September 1Oth.
"The position which you have accepted is an assistant professorship of German with a salary of $4,000 for the 3-term year
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approximately 9 months. As I indicated Saturday raising the salary
above the budgeted amount may make it impossible to grant you a
salary increase for the 1950-1951 academic year. I believe it was our
understanding that the appointment is for a 1-year period but will
become a permanent one if both you and the administration of the
college are quite satisfied at the end of the first year. * * *
"I am enclosing a formal application blank which you may
complete and return to me by mail. If you have available 2 small
gloss prints of yourself, please send them along. I shall send to you
within the next day or two copies of the texts that have been used in
the German work.
••perhaps some information concerning our payroll procedures
would help you in your personal planning. You will go on our payroll on September 19th. Our salary checks always have a 2-week lag.
That means that you will receive your first salary check on October
20th. Your checks thereafter you will receive at 2-week intervals.
The college pays salary over a full calendar year. That means that
you will continue to receive salary checks throughout the summer of
1950. The details of the various deductions we can clarify after you
arrive."
Defendants point out that by the statute which sets up the
board of control, the authority to enter into such contracts is vested
in the board of control. The statute provides:
"The government of the college of mining and technology, the
conduct of its affairs, and the control of its property shall be vested
in a board of 6 members, not less than 4 of whom shall be residents
of the upper peninsula of the State of Michigan, who shall be known
as the •board of control of the Michigan college of mining and technology.'" CL 1948, §390.352 (Stat Ann§ 15.1312).
"As soon as the means in its hands will permit, without incurring indebtedness, said board shall proceed to obtain a suitable location, and lease or erect such buildings, and procure such furniture,
apparatus, library, and implements, as may be necessary for the successful operation of said school, and to appoint a principal, and such
other teachers and assistants as the board may deem expedient, with
salaries, to be paid from time to time, as it may agree, and to regulate
their duties; but no agreement shall be valid whereby such board
shall be prevented from discharging any one in their employ upon 2
months previous notice.'' CL 1948, § 390.354 (Stat Ann §15.1314).
This statute vests the authority to appoint or hire teachers in
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statutory provision vesting in the board the power "to appoint a principal, and such other teachers and assistants as the board may deem
expedient, with salaries, to be paid from time to time, as it may agree,
and to regulate their duties" should be construed as applicable only
at the inception of the Michigan college of mining and technology,
as provided in section 4 of "the original act in 1885" (Act No 70). It
is sufficient to note that substantially the same words relating to the
hiring of teachers, et cetera, were originally embodied in PA 1861,
No 207, and again embodied in PA 1885, No 70. They are still a part
of the statute which presently governs the conduct of the affairs of
the Michigan college of mining and technology.
Plaintiff asserts that the power to contract with teachers may
be delegated, and in the instant case that it is at least a question
of fact if such power were not delegated by the board of control to
Professor Bennett. In asserting the board's right to delegate the power, which by statute is vested in the board, appellant cites People v.
Fournier, 175 Mich 364 (Ann Cas 1915A, 1015). However we think
the cited case is not in point. It involved only the right of delegating
the power of passing upon the right to be licensed as a stationary
engineer in the city of Saginaw, which was considered necessary to
proper administration of the police power. But the instant case involved the right by contract to bind the State in the operation of one
of its educational institutions over a period of time and to expend
public funds in greater or less amounts. Powers of the character
vested by the above statutory provisions in a board of control of an
educational institution maintained by the State cannot be delegated
to some subordinate or representative.
"The board of supervisors cannot delegate such powers as the
law requires to be submitted to their corporate discretion and judgment." People, ex rei. Chadwick, v. County Officers of St. Clair
(syllabus), 15 Mich 85.
"The statutory authority conferred upon boards of supervisors
to regulate the bridging of navigable streams is a trust that must be
executed by themselves; they cannot delegate it to others." Maxwell
v. Bay City Bridge Co. (syllabus), 41 Mich 453.
It follows that plaintiff did not possess a contract under which
he could assert rights. Even the letter written by Professor Bennett
does not purport on its face to be a contract. We are mindful that it
appears in plaintiffs opposition to the motion to dismiss that on
other occasions heads of departments have hired assistant teachers;
but such usage or custom, if it ever prevailed, cannot be availed of to
enlarge the statutory powers of the board of control so as to include
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or justify acts which are unauthorized and contrary to the applicable
statutory law. See annotations 65 ALR 811; which include Hoffa v.
Saupe, 199 Iowa 515 {202 NW 234).
"The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is
measured' by the statute from which they derive their authority, not
by their own acts and assumption of authority." Township of Lake
v.Millar, 257 Mich 135, 142.
See, also, Vincent v. Mecosta County Supervisors, 52 Mich 340;
Schneider v. City of Ann Arbor, 195 Mich 599.
In Roxborough v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
309 Mich 505, we quoted with approval the following from 59 CJ,
pp 172, 173:
" 'Public officers have and can exercise only such powers as are
conferred on them by law, and a State is not bound by contracts
made in its behalf by its officers or agents without previous authority
conferred by statute or the Constitution. * * * Nor is a State bound
by an implied contract made by a State officer where such officer
had no authority to make an express one. * * *
" 'The powers of State officers being fixed by law, all persons
dealing with such officers are charged with knowledge of the extent
of their authority or power to bind the State, and are bound, at their
peril, to ascertain whether the contemplated contract is within the
power conferred.' "
"Persons dealing with a municipal corporation through its officers must at their peril take notice of the authority of the particular officer to bind the corporation, and, if his act is beyond the limits of his authority, the municipality is not bound." Rens v. City of
Grand Rapids (syllabus), 73 Mich 237.
"But the law holds those dealing with a municipal corporation
to a knowledge of the extent of the authority conferred, and of the
mode of its exercise, and of all illegalities committed by its agents in
not pursuing the authority in the manner pointed out, and visits
upon them the consequences of violating the law by refusing to enforce such contract at their instance." McBrian v. City of Grand
Rapids, 56 Mich 95, 108.
Plaintiff did not have a contract with the board of control of
the Michigan college of mining and technology, nor were the negotiations between plaintiff and Professor Bennett such as to constitute
a contract binding upon the defendants in the instant case. Because
of an absolute lack of power vested in Professor Bennett to
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consummate a contract with plaintiff which would be binding upon
defendants, nothing appearing in this record would or could constitute ratification of an alleged contract as asserted by appellant. While
there are presented by the record some controverted issues of fact,
nonetheless there are presented questions of law herein considered
which are decisive of plaintiffs right to recover. We are of the opinion that the trial judge correctly granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Mfirmed, with costs to appellees.
DETHMERS, BUTZEL, CARR, BUSHNELL,
BOYLES, and REID, JJ., concurred.

SHARPE,

3. OATH OF COLLEGE FACULTY
P.A. 1935, No. 23, Imd. Eff. Apri119
AN ACT to require all teachers, instructors and professors
in educational institutions, junior colleges, colleges and universities to take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support
the constitution of the United States and the constitution of
the state of Michigan, to provide the manner for the taking of
such oath or affirmation, and to repeal all acts or parts of acts
in conflict with the provisions of this act. As amended P.A.
1939, No. 55, Eff. Sept. 29.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:

388.401 Oath of members of college faculty; filing
Sec. 1. From and after September 1, 1935, it shall be unlawful
for any citizen of the United States to serve as a teacher, instructor
or professor in any state educational institution or any educational institution supported in whole or in part by public funds, or in any
junior college, college or university of this state or any junior college,
college or university whose property, or any part thereof, is exempt
from taxation unless and until he or she shall have taken and subscribed the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or afftrm) that I will support the constitution of the United States of America and the constitution of the
state of Michigan, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of
my position, according to the best of my ability."
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The oath required by this section shall be notarized and transmitted to the superintendent of public instruction, who shall me it in
his office, where it shall be subject to public inspection. It shall be
unlawful for an officer, person or board having control of the employment, dismissal or suspension of teachers, instructors or professors in any such educational institution, junior college, college or
university to permit a person to serve in any such capacity therein in
violation of the provisions of this section. This section shall not be
construed to require a person to take such oath more than once during the time he or she is employed in the educational institutions in
this state, though there be a change in the title or duties of the position: Provided, however, That this requirement shall not be construed as prohibiting such officer, person or board from employing
for limited periods instructors or lecturers who are citizens of foreign
countries.
Constitution
Art. 11, § 1, provides: "All officers, legislative, executive and
judicial, before entering upon the duties of their respective offices,
shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of . . . according to the best
of my ability. No other oath, affirmation, or any religious test shall
be required as a qualification for any office or public trust."
388.402 Same; unlawful employment, penalties

Sec. 2. Any educational institution, junior college, college or
university which shall employ any such person in violation of the
terms of this act shall, during the continuance of such unlawful employment.
(a) If such be an institution supported wholly or in part by
state funds, not receive any state moneys for any purpose whatsoever.
(b) If such institution be a private, charitable and/or denominational college or university whose property, or any part thereof, is
exempt from taxation, immediately forfeit all right to such tax
exemption.
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4. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In his opinions concerning the faculty and employees of
state universities, the Attorney General has affirmed the principle that salaries and terms of employment are to be determined
by the governing boards. The first ruling on this subject was in
the year 1907. At that time the Attorney General ruled that a
statute whose terms applied to salaries at all state institutions
did not apply to the University of Michigan. 1 Again, in 193 7
the Attorney General construed the intent of the legislature as
excluding the University of Michigan and the then Michigan
State College-although not excluding the state teachers and
normal colleges which at that time did not have constitutional
status-from the coverage of the Civil Service Act. 2
The determinative effect of constitutional status on these
opinions is also illustrated by an opinion issued in 1905, before
Michigan State achieved constitutional autonomy, which held
that the college could not reimburse professors for travel expenses. 3 The same issue was litigated in the case of the Board of
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General in
which the court decided that reimbursement of members of the
faculty for travel expenses was a decision for the Board of Regents, not the Auditor General. See Chapter III.
Other opinions of the Attorney General have made the following rulings: veterans' preference laws do not apply to the
university;4 the governing boards may expend university funds
to pay for all, or part of, the premiums for group health and life
insurance;5 employees of state universities may, by complying
with the conditions of the statute, become or remain members
of the State Employees Retirement System;6 a University of
Michigan janitor is a state employee under a statute making state
employees ineligible for welfare payments from the county;7
students employed part-time by state universities are not covered
by the minimum wage provisions of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act;8 and, under a prior law, university employees
did not have to pay federal income tax. 9
Labor relations between the University of Michigan and
trade unions representing employees are the subject of litigation
at the time this book is being written. The amended Hutchinson
Act, in general, provides state employees with most of the same
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rights as those enjoyed by private employees under the National
Labor Relations Act. The chief exception is the explicit prohibition of public employee strikes, but the prohibition has not
deterred all such strikes. The State Labor Mediation Board under
the statute is assigned the functions of the National Labor Relations Board under the federal act. The University, in the course
of the current litigation, contends that the board labor relations
powers delegated to the Mediation Board by the amended
Hutchinson Act interfere with the constitutional power of the
Board of Regents over the general supervision of the University
and the control and direction of expenditures from its funds.
See Chapter III.
Before these issues had arisen, however, the Attorney General had made the following rulings concerning labor relations at
the state universities. The Board of Regents, under its constitutional authority, could deduct union dues from the employee's
paycheck. 10 The State Board of Agriculture, the old name for
the governing board at Michigan State University, was informed
that it could discuss conditions of employment with a labor
union, but that since any strike against the University would be
illegal, the University could not enter into a formal collective
bargaining agreement. 11 Before amendment of the Hutchinson
Act in 1965, the Attorney General ruled that the act did not apply to the University of Michigan, but, on policy grounds, he advised the University to comply with the general terms of the
act. 12
FOOTNOTES
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1. Chapter V, Bylaws of the Board of Regents, The University of Michigan.
Section 4- Opinions of Attorney General

1. 1908 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 95.
2. 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 382.
3. 1905 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 85.
4. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 475.
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5. 1961-62 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 194.
6. 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 234; 1955-56 [vol. 2] Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 127.
7. 1945-46 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 291.
8. Unpublished opinion, No. 3022, dated June 12, 1957.
9. 1913-14 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 543.
10. 1959-60 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. [vol. 2] 111.
11. Unpublished opinion, No. 05115, dated October 14, 1946.
12. 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 63.

CHAPTER XI
STUDENTS
l. INTRODUCTION

The three cases in this chapter have widely varied facts. The
first case, Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, is a classic
civil rights case. A private, profit-making school had admitted a
Negro student, but after encountering objections to his presence
from other students, the school refused to allow him to complete his course of study. The court recognized an implied contract made on the admission of students by the college that students would not be arbitrarily dismissed; but it refused to
enforce this right by mandamus.
The case of Tanton v. McKenney involved a young lady attending Michigan State Normal College in the 1920's. She was
refused re-admittance to the school because of her addiction to
smoking cigarettes in public and riding around town in an automobile on the lap of a young man. She was given a hearing and
was reprimanded for her acts by the school authorities. The
court agreed that such behavior was not appropriate for a future
teacher, and it denied her relief.
In a relatively recent case, In re Johnston, suit was brought
by a medical student to compel the University of Michigan to
grant him a medical degree. He argued that the University could
not require him to pass a nationally administered examination
because such a requirement would be an invalid delegation of
power to the national testing organization. The court did not
agree.
Three law students at the University of Michigan have recently filed suit in the federal district court to challenge the
validity of University regulations. The suit alleges that the plaintiffs have been denied the equal protection of the laws because
they are classified as non-residents for tuition purposes but as
residents for purposes of the state income tax.

325

326

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT

James A. Perkins, president of Cornell University, recently
outlined legal problems in the area of university and student relationships and contrasted past concepts with emerging doctrine.
His address was given in Boston, Massachusetts on December 8,
1967 at the Annual Meeting of the New England Association of
Colleges and Secondary Schools. It was published by the American Council of Education and was reprinted in A.G.B. Reports,
Vol. I 0, No. 6, March 1968. This is a publication of the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges which
has its principal office in Washington, D.C.
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College

156 Mich. 95, 96-97, 98-101; 120 N.W. 589 (1909)
OSTRANDER, J. The respondent is an institution incorporated
under chapter 218, 2 Comp. Laws. Its purposes, expressed in its articles of association, are to establish and operate a college for teaching
medicine and surgery, chemistry, dentistry, veterinary medicine and
surgery, and horseshoeing, and to grant degrees and issue diplomas in
various departments of the college in conformity with law, etc. Its
rules and prospectuses do not distinguish or specify, except by age,
character, and educational qualifications, the persons to whom instruction will be given. It has capital stock, is conducted for private
gain, and is supported by tuition fees paid by students. Relators are
citizens, respectively, of the States of Kansas and of Michigan, who
attended the college in the department of veterinary medicine and
surgery for one-the freshman-year, and were refused admission
therein the second year for the sole reason that they were negroes.
They applied to the circuit court for the county of Kent for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to admit them as students in
the college. An order to show cause was entered and an answer to
relators' petition was filed. Thereupon 30 issues of fact were proposed by relators, and an order was made that issues be framed as
proposed, and that they be submitted to the court for determination.
A hearing was had, a large amount of testimony was taken, and the
writ was issued. The respondent sued out a writ of certiorari, the
affidavit for the writ setting out the petition, the answer, the testimony, verbatim or by way of recital, the issues of fact which were
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proposed by relators, and the reasons relied upon for a reversal of
the order granting the writ. The return to the writ is, like the affidavit, voluminous, and sets out in full the testimony produced at
the hearing. It does not appear in what manner the court determined
any of the issues of fact, and the reasons given for the conclusion
which was reached are not found in the record. In certiorari proceedings this court considers questions of law only, and such questions of
law as are supposed to be presented in the particular case must be
raised in the affidavit for the writ.

***
While relators do contend that the facts set out in the petition
and supported by testimony establish contract relations between the
parties, they also assert that the statute imposes a duty, public in its
nature, upon the institution incorporated thereunder, to receive
them, to compel the performance of which duty the writ of mandamus is appropriate. In the absence of fmdings, we have examined the
record for evidence which will sustain the order of the court below.
It is plain that respondent is organized for the very purpose of giving
the instruction sought for by relators. The course of study adopted
cannot be fmished in one year. The statute requires at least two
years' study before candidates may be given a diploma. In fact, the
course is one of three years. It is empowered to grant diplomas and
degrees to students who fmish the course. The course of study
adopted is not pursued by students who attend the college for the
sole purpose of gaining instruction, but for the further purpose of
securing, at the end of the course, the diploma and degree which respondent is empowered to confer. By the laws of this and of other
States the diploma confers upon the possessor the right to a license
to practice the adopted profession. It is expressly provided in the act
that diplomas granted by the trustees shall entitle the possessor to all
the immunities which by usage or statute are allowed to possessors of
similar diplomas granted by any similar institution in the United
States. 2 Comp. laws, § 8143. Relators matriculated, attended the
college for one year, and have the standing necessary to continue the
course. They are obnoxious to no rule of the institution. There is
testimony tending to prove that during the year relators attended
college one and perhaps more than one student withdrew because
colored men were admitted, and that a considerable number of students threaten to withdraw if they are now allowed to attend.
The statute imposes no general public duty upon respondent
to admit as students any and all citizens to its capacity. There is no
specific duty imposed by law to admit relators. It seems clear that
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private institutions of learning, though incorporated, may select
those whom it will receive, and may discriminate by sex, age, proficiency in learning, and otherwise. Probably no reason need be given
for refusing in the first instance to admit any student. Relators have
been denied no privilege or immunity resting in positive law protected
or guaranteed by the Federal or the State Constitution. Such rights
as they have grow out of the relations they have established with respondent, and are no other or different than those of any citizen who
has established like relations with a similar institution. These relations, while in some respects peculiar, are, in fact, easily classified.
There is no agreement by the terms of which respondent undertakes
to bestow and they to receive and to pay for a three years' course of
study upon the conditions which the rules of the institution impose.
Relators are at liberty to terminate all relations at any time. It does
not follow that respondent has the same right. In fact, when one is
admitted to a college, there is an implied understanding that he shall
not be arbitrarily dismissed therefrom. The required fees may be
paid annually, and may be no more than fair fees for the advantages
received by the student during the year, and yet it is clear that the
fees for the first year are, in fact, paid and received with the understanding that the work of the year will not be made fruitless, a graduation and a degree made impossible, by an arbitrary refusal to permit further attendance. In this understanding there is no want of
mutuality. There is no want of good and valuable consideration.
There is written evidence of it in the articles of association and the
prospectuses of respondent and in the rolls of the college in which
relators' names are entered as matriculates. There is no good reason
why the law should not recognize, as growing out of these relations,
a right of relators resting in contract to be continued as students by
the respondent.
It is the general rule that mandamus does not lie to compel a
private corporation to perform its obligations resting in contract with
an individual. We are referred to no decision of this court recognizing
any other rule. A case in which the rule was enforced by denying the
writ to one who had completed a course in an incorporated college
and had been refused a diploma is State, ex rel Burg., v. Milwaukee
Medical College, 128 Wis. 7 (3 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1115). In the opinion
in that case and in the motion for a rehearing many authorities are
cited, among them Qarke v. Hill, 132 Mich. 434. The writ was held
to be the only adequate remedy in Baltimore University v. Colton,
98 Md. 623 (64 L. R. A.l08), and in People, ex rei. Cecil, v. Bellevue
Hospital Medical College, 60 Hun (N. Y.), 107, 128 N. Y. 621. It
cannot be said that relators are members of an incorporated society,
and have been wrongfully deprived of the privileges of members,
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which is the ground of decision in Baltimore University v. Colton,
supra. It may be said, perhaps, that the New York decision is rested
upon the notion that relator had acquired a status, evidence of which,
in the form of a degree, was arbitrarily refused. The court of appeals
delivered np opinion. If mere expedition in securing some remedy is
to be made the test, it may be said there is no other adequate remedy
for relators. And, if enforcement of the obligations of private corporations by mandamus is to be entered upon by the courts, we
know of no rule by which it can be determined in what cases the
writ should be refused. The apparent hardship of a particular situation is not a good reason for departing from the rule.
The order gra~ting the writ is reversed, with costs to plaintiff
in certiorari.
GRANT, MOORE, BROOKE, and McALVAY, JJ., concurred.

Tanton v. McKenney

226 Mich. 245, 246-53; 197 N.W. 510 (1924)
FELLOWS, J. The plaintiff, Alice Tanton, a young lady 18
years old, attended the Michigan State Normal College at Ypsilanti
during the fall term 1921 and the winter term 1922. She was refused
readmission for the spring term 1922. The refusal was based on an
investigation of plaintiffs conduct made by defendant Bessie Leach
Priddy, dean of women of the institution, and was approved by the
president, defendant Charles McKenney. Before taking such action
Mrs. Priddy called plaintiff in, fully apprised her of the information
which had come to her as dean of women, and gave her ample opportunity to explain her conduct. Shortly thereafter plaintiff instituted mandamus proceedings in the Washtenaw circuit court to
compel her reinstatement. Issues were framed and a trial had at
which considerable testimony was taken. The trial judge found the
facts to be with the defendants; that plaintiff had become addicted
to the smoking of cigarettes before coming to the institution and
continued their use there; that she smoked cigarettes on the public
streets of Ypsilanti; that she rode around the streets of Ypsilanti in
an automobile seated on the lap of a young man and was guilty of
other acts of indiscretion; and that she aired her grievances and her
defiance of disciplinary measures in the public press which tended
to prevent her return to the institution and the maintenance of
discipline there. He found as matter of law that defendants had
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acted within their power and that there had been no abuse of discretion, and denied the writ. This action is here reviewed on certiorari.
We may on certiorari examine the record to determine whether
there is any testimony to support the findings but not to weigh such
testimony. An examination of the record before us discloses an
abundance of testimony to sustain the fmdings in the instant case.
Indeed plaintiffs own testimony sustains them although she seeks to
minimize her acts.
Preliminary to the consideration of the main questions plaintiffs counsel insists that there was error in the rejection of certain
testimony offered by him. He apparently sought to show that some
of the male students and professors at the University smoked. This
testimony was rejected by the trial judge and correctly rejected. The
rules of discipline at the University might be entirely inappropriate
for an institution having as students over 1,400 girls of tender years.
This brings us to the meritorious questions of whether defendants
have the power here exercised and whether there has been an abuse
of such power.
As is well known, the Michigan State Normal College is maintained at the expense of the taxpayers to prepare teachers for our
public schools. The student body is made up almost entirely of
young women who have chosen teaching as their profession. They
are required to sign a "declaration of intention" couched in the following language:
"We, the subscribers, do hereby declare that it is our intention
to devote ourselves to the business of teaching in the schools of this
State, and that our sole object in resorting to this normal school is
the better to prepare ourselves for the discharge of this important
duty."
Inherently the managing officers have the power to maintain
such discipline as will effectuate the purposes of the institution.
Their powers are somewhat analogous to the powers of school boards
in our country schools and boards of education in our cities. In the
consideration of their powers we must also bear in mind that the
students at our normal schools are being fitted for a profession requiring the highest standard of personal conduct. The right to attend
our public schools is beyond question. That such right is tempered
by, and subject to, proper regulations in the furtherance of discipline
is likewise beyond question. That in the absence of an abuse of discretion the school authorities and not the courts shall prescribe proper disciplinary measures is, we think, settled by the textwriters and
the adjudicated cases.
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A few excerpts from the article on "Schools" in Ruling Case
Law will be helpful in determining the rule to be adopted. We quote
the following:
"There is no necessity that all the rules, orders and regulations
for the discipline, government and management of the schools shall
be made a matter of record by the school board, or that every act,
order or direction affecting the conduct of such schools shall be
authorized or confirmed by a formal vote. It is recognized that no
system of rules however carefully prepared can provide for every
emergency, or meet every requirement. In consequence, much must
necessarily be left to the individual members of the school boards,
and to the superintendents of and the teachers in the several schools.
It follows that any reasonable ru1e adopted by a superintendent, or a
teacher merely, not inconsistent with some statute or some other ru1e
prescribed by higher authority, is binding on the pupils." 24 R C. L.
p. 574.
"Control by Courts. The courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by school directors in matters confided by law to
their judgment, unless there is a clear abuse of the discretion, or a
violation of law. So the courts are usually disinclined to interfere
with regu1ations adopted by school boards, and they will not consider whether the regu1ations are wise or expedient, but merely
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion
of the board. Acting reasonably within the powers conferred, it is
the province of the board of education to determine what things are
detrimental to the successfu1 management, good order, and discipline
of the schools and the rules required to produce these conditions.
The presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness and propriety of a ru1e or regu1ation du1y made. The reasonableness of regulations is a question oflaw for the courts." 24 R. C. L. p. 575.
"Suspension or Expulsion by Directors. The enjoyment of the
right of attending the public schools is necessarily conditioned on
compliance by pupils with the reasonable rules, regu1ations, and requirements of the school authorities, breaches of which may be
punished by suspension or expu1sion. Ordinarily the school authorities have the right to define the offenses for which the punishment
of exclusion from school may be imposed, and to determine whether
the offense has been committed, the limitation on this authority
being that it must in both respects be reasonably exercised. The
power of expu1sion given to the directors is not limited to cases of
infraction of such rules as they may have therefore adopted, but
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extends to cases where they may have become satisfied that the interests of the school require the expulsion of a pupil on account of
his gross misbehavior, and the discretion vested in school authorities
in this respect is very broad, but they will not be permitted to be
arbitrary. In the school, as in the family, there exists on the part of
the pupils the obligation of obedience to lawful commands, subordination and civil deportment, respect for the rights of others, and
fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper school
system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school.
Every pupil is presumed to know this law, and is subject to it,
whether it has or has not been re-enacted by the district board in the
form of written rules and regulations." 24 R. C. L. p. 646.
In State, ex rel. Dresser, v. District Board, 135 Wis. 619 (116
N. W. 232, 16 L. R. A. [N. S.] 730, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1050), it was
said:
"It is clear, therefore, that a rule might have been adopted by
the school authorities to meet the situation here presented. This
court in the quotation already made from the opinion in the Burpee
Case recognizes certain obligations on the part of the pupil which
are inherent in any proper school system, and which constitute the
common law of the school, and which may be enforced without the
adoption in advance of any rules upon the subject.
"This court therefore holds that the school authorities have
the power to suspend a pupil for an offense committed outside of
school hours and not in the presence of the teacher which has a direct and immediate tendency to influence the conduct of other
pupils while in the school room, to set at naught the proper discipline
of the school, to impair the authority of the teachers, and to bring
them into ridicule and contempt. Such power is essential to the
preservation of order, decency, decorum, and good government in
the public schools."

And in Wilson v. Board of Education, 233 ill. 464 (84 N. E.
697, 15 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1136, 13 Ann. Cas. 330), it was said:
"The power of the board of education to control and manage
the schools and to adopt rules and regulations necessary for that purpose is ample and full. The rules and by-laws necessary to a proper
conduct and management of the schools are, and must necessarily
be, left to the discretion of the board, and its acts will not be interfered with nor set aside by the courts unless there is a clear abuse of
the power and discretion conferred. Acting reasonably within the
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powers conferred, it is the province of the board of education to determine what things are detrimental to the successful management,
good order and discipline of the schools and the rules required to
produce these conditions."
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247 (250 S. W. 538), cited by
plaintiffs c.ounsel on another point, is to the same effect. In that case
the petitioner had been expelled for violating a rule against the use of
cosmetics. In denying the writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement it was said:

"The question, therefore, is not whether we approve this rule
as one we would have made as directors of the district, nor are we
required to find whether it was essential to the maintenance of discipline. On the contrary, we must uphold the rule unless we find that
the directors have clearly abused their discretion, and that the rule is
not one reasonably calculated to effect the purpose intended, that is,
of promoting discipline in the school; and we do not so find. * * *
"Courts have other and more important functions to perform
than that of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the
public schools against rules and regulations promulgated by the
school boards for the government of the schools. The courts have
this right of review, for the reasonableness of such rule is a judicial
question, and the courts will not refuse to perform their functions in
determining the reasonableness of such rules, when the question is
presented. But, in doing so, it will be kept in mind that the directors
are elected by the patrons of the schools over which they preside,
and the election occurs annually. These directors are in close and intimate touch with the affairs of their respective districts, and know
the conditions with which they have to deal. It will be remembered
also that respect for constituted authority and obedience thereto is
an essential lesson to qualify one for the duties of citizenship, and
that the schoolroom is an appropriate place to teach that lesson; so
that the courts hesitate to substitute their will and judgment for
that of the school boards which are delegated by law as the agencies
to prescribe rules for the government of the public schools of the
State, which are supported at the public expense."
In the recent case of Finch v. School District, 225 Mich. 674,
this court having before it the fmality of the decision of the school
board finding the teacher guilty of gross immorality, speaking
through the present Chief Justice, said:

"The school board, a deliberative public body in the exercise
of a right, here reserved by contract, went to a hearing, quasi-judicial
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in character, and, having grounds to sustain its fmding, found that
plaintiff had been guilty of gross immorality and dismissed him.
Surely, the school district may not be required to accept the finding
of a jury upon this question rather than the finding of its school
board. If such finding by the school board may be reviewed and reversed by a jury, the government of our schools may be impaired and
the position of school boards in dealing with such cases will be precarious indeed. Such fmding and determination of the board are
conclusive unless the board acted corruptly, in bad faith, or in clear
abuse of its powers."
See, also, Covington Board of Education v. Booth, 110 Ky. 807
(62 S. W. 872, 53 L. R A. 181);Hysongv. School District, 164 Pa.
St. 629 (30 Atl. 482, 26 L. R A. 203, 44 Am. St. Rep. 632); O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 (77 N. E. 612, 7 L. R A. [N. S.]
402, 6 Ann. Cas. 43 2); State, ex rel. Andrew, v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31
(8 N. E. 708, 58 Am. Rep. 30); Kinzer v. School District, 129 Iowa,
441 (105 N. W. 686, 3 L. R A. [N. S.] 496, 6 Ann. Cas. 996); Creyhon v. Board of Education, 99 Kan. 824 (163 Pac. 145, L. R A.
1917C, 993);McCormick v. Burt, 95 m. 263 (35 Am. Rep. 163).
The contention of plaintiffs counsel that she was expelled
without a hearing is not supported by the record, which established
the contrary. Upon the question of how formal the hearing must be,
see Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 110 (110 N. W. 736, 15 Ann.
Cas. 401).
This record affirmatively establishes as found by the trial judge
that there has been no abuse of discretion, no arbitrary action on
the part of the defendants or either of them. The dean of women,
Mrs. Priddy, who primarily had the matter in charge, showed every
consideration for this plaintiff and displayed a motherly interest in
her. She urged upon plaintiffs older sister the imperative necessity
of getting plaintiff out of the rut she was traveling in and proffered
her assistance and aid. Instead of accepting, plaintiff after consulting
her older sister proceeded to air her defiance of discipline in the
public press. This of itself was sufficient grounds for refusing her readmission. Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441 (86 Pac. 642,7 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 352). Instead of condemning Mrs. Priddy she should be commended for upholding some old-fashioned ideals of young womanhood.
The writ of certiorari will be dismissed and the judgment of
the circuit court of Washtenaw county denying the writ of mandamus will be affirmed.
CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE,
STEERE, and WIEST, JJ., concurred.
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In re Johnston
365 Mich. 509, 509-10; 114 N.W. 2d 255 (1962)
SOURIS, J. Some time after plaintiff entered the medical
school of the University of Michigan, all senior students were required to take an examination sponsored by a national board of medical examiners. Upon failing portions of that examination, which
plaintiff took in April of 1958, he was required to submit himself for
comprehensive oral examinations by the faculty in each of the subjects he failed on the national board examination. Again, he failed at
least 1, and possibly 2, of the subjects on which he was orally examined. For these reasons, the plaintiff was not awarded his medical
degree in June of 1958 and, without that degree, could not take the
State board examination for license to practice medicine in Michigan
which he had been scheduled to take on June 9, 10, and 11, 1958.
Plaintiff seeks our writ of mandamus to compel defendants to
confer upon him a medical degree and to give plaintiff the State
board examination for license to practice medicine.
I concur in dismissal of this petition for want of merit in plaintiffs claims that he was deprived of a contractual right and that the
defendants unlawfully delegated their powers to a national board of
medical examiners. I would also award costs to the defendants.
DETHMERS, C. J., and CARR, KELLY, BLACK, KAVANAGH, and OTIS M. SMITH, JJ ., concurred
ADAMS, J ., took no part in the decision of this case.

3. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Tuition and fees charged by state universities have been
the subject of several opinions of the Attorney General. According to statutes still on the books the University may not cl:arge
tuition to residents of the state in general, or, to residents who
are the children of war veterans. 1 The Attorney General has, on
different occasions, ruled that both statutes are unconstitutional.2 Insofar as the Board of Regents itself creates a different tuition scale for residents and nonresidents, the Attorney General
has ruled that it is the function of the board to adopt regulations defining "residents." 3
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College fraternities have also raised questions which have
been ruled on by the Attorney General. In answer to an inquiry
from Michigan State University which seems to have been considering the outlawing of fraternities on its campus, the Attorney
General considered several out-of-state cases which had protected college fraternities from arbitrary actions by the college
authorities. 4 Over the years, however, Michigan State seems to
have changed its plans for fraternities, and asked the Attorney
General whether it could assist the fraternities in building houses
on the campus. The Attorney General vetoed this plan on the
grounds that it would be extending the credit of the state to a
private association in violation of the provisions of the Michigan
Constitution. 5 Very recently, it was reported that the Attorney
General again was presented with an issue concerning college
fraternities. This time, he ruled that it is illegal for college fraternities to discriminate against persons because of their race. 6
In miscellaneous matters which have involved students, the
Attorney General has issued the following rulings: state universities have the authority to accept funds to be used for student
loans; 7 a private college is not responsible for the debts of its
students;8 a statute which would have exempted student members of the National Guard from the requirement of Reserve Officers Training Corps is not valid ;9 a state college does have the
authority to regulate off-campus housing of its students. 10

FOOTNOTES
Section 3 - Opinions of Attorney General
1. Mich. Comp. Laws§§ 390.13, 35.111.
2. Unpublished opinion, No. M-541, dated June 3, 1959; 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y.
Gen. 29.
3. 1901 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 87.
4. 1912 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 93.

5. 1926-28 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 88.
6. Letter from Attorney General Kelley to Representative Del Rio, February 29,
1968.
7. 1931-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 293.
8. 1926-28 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 714.
9. 1949-50 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 405.
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APPENDIX I
CASES IN THE WASHTENAW CIRCUIT COURT
INVOLVING THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Since the University's founding in 1817, its governing board
has had the authority to sue and to be sued. The University was
moved from Detroit to Ann Arbor in 1837 and activated in
1841, and, since then, the Circuit Court for Washtenaw County
has served as the forum for many suits by and against the University. However, the Glass and Fox cases discussed in Chapter
VII may indicate that hereafter the Court of Claims, and not the
Circuit Court, will have exclusive jurisdiction over certain suits
against the University.
The Supreme Court cases included in this book reveal some
of the cases originally filed in the Circuit Court; but not all such
cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court. To discover
what kinds of cases were filed in the Circuit Court, but not appealed to the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court records were examined in the Washtenaw County Courthouse.
It is much harder to extract information from trial court
records than from the opinions of judges in appellate court reports for several reasons. In many cases, the records are simply
incomplete. Often, it is impossible to determine the ultimate
disposition of the case. In other cases, orders of dismissal entered on stipulation apparently indicate settlements, but there
is no way to discover the reasons for or the terms of the settlements. There is still another limitation on the use of trial court
records. The pleadings contain merely the unsubstantiated
charges made by the parties which may not have been proven.
Modern rules of procedure, in fact, permit these pleadings to be
amended at almost any time.
Nevertheless, with all their limitations, it may be useful to
review the records of these cases. 1 In all, 44 cases were found in
the records of the Circuit Court excluding those ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. In 17, the University was the
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plaintiff, and three of these were condemnation cases in which
the state was the nominal plaintiff. In 27 cases the University
was the defendant.
The 17 cases brought by the University as a plaintiff may
be broken down into the following categories: Four suits to
quiet title to land; three actions to condemn land for University
use; two mortgage foreclosures; three suits based upon promissory notes, two of which were given in consideration of hospital
services; three suits for the payment of goods and services; one
rather vague suit for "damages in assumpsit"; and one suit for
an injunction.
The 1907 suit for an injunction is probably the most interesting case in this series. According to the pleadings in this case,
the University sought the injunction against a publisher who was
advertising a series of lecture notes for courses offered in the
Law School. Since the Law School had recently discarded the
lecture method and had adopted the case method, the University
alleged that the advertising of lecture notes had damaged its
reputation; and that their sale to students would result in the
purchasers receiving an inferior education, also that class attendance would be discouraged. Attached to the bill of complaint is
a Law School catalogue describing the courses then offered and
the names of the members of the law faculty. Typically enough,
the case apparently was settled out of court, and it was dismissed on stipulation.
The 27 cases brought against the University are even more
varied. Seven cases are for alleged malpractice at the University
Hospital. There are also another five personal-injury cases filed
against the University: two of which involved University-owned
automobiles; one a University bus; the fourth, a University elementary school pupil allegedly injured while moving a piano
under the direction of a teacher; and the fifth, involving a dental
patient who fell down two steps which she alleged were located
"in an area where a reasonably prudent person would not anticipate their presence." One case involved property damage to an
automobile at a carport under construction, and three cases contain such vague allegations as "trespass," "negligence," "breach
of contract," "breach of warranty," and a "claim for $36,000."
In five cases it was claimed that the University owed money under contracts for railroad freight, for the repayment of certain
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money under dispute in the famous Rose 2 case of the 1870's,
for electricity and for construction services at University-owned
Willow Run Airport, and for a raccoon coat checked at the
Michigan Union. There were three suits filed during the depression under the State Moritorium Act extending the time for redemption under mortgage foreclosure proceedings. One suit,
apparently contemporaneous with Weinberg, 3 was instituted by
a supplier of an insolvent subcontractor for the construction of
University Hospital which had not been required by the University to furnish a bond. A more recent case was filed by the owner of a cemetery lot protesting the cemetery company's sale of
most of its land to the University. And, finally, a father won an
injunction against the University and his divorced wife forbidding the University Hospital to release a child to the wife who
had lost legal custody by the divorce decree.
FOOTNOTES
1. One pending case is entitled The Regents of the University of Michigan v. The La·
bor Mediation Board and is discussed in Chapter III.

2. See p. 294, supra.
3. Seep. 57, supra.

APPENDIXll
BYLAWS & REGULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY
The University of Michigan now conducts its affairs on
campuses in Ann Arbor, Flint and Dearborn. It instructs over
37,500 students. It employs thousands of teachers of different
academic rank and thousands of employees. It has a huge payroll
and the entire 1968-1969 budget is just shy of $234,000,000,
which is greater than the annual budget of many of our smaller
states. In short, it is a vast, throbbing, growing organization.
The internal affairs of the University, varied and complex,
are basically regulated under Bylaws adopted from time to time
by the Board of Regents. Presently they are being revised in an
updating process which is nearly completed. These laws set up
basic rules for government of the University in the following
areas as described below in the table of contents of the University's Bylaws:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTERS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

BOARD OF REGENTS
GENERAL UNIVERSITY OFFICERS
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, FINANCE AND
PROPERTY
THE UNIVERSITY SENATE
THE FACULTIES AND ACADEMIC STAFF.
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES-PROGRAM
DEFINITIONS
STUDENT AFFAIRS
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CHAPTERS
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.

ADMISSION AND REGISTRATION OF
STUDENTS
COMMENCEMENT AND DEGREES
FEES AND CHARGES
THE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES AND
AFFILIATED UNITS
THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
OTHER UNIVERSITY UNITS, AGENCIES
AND SERVICES
MISCELLANEOUS RULES AND REGULATIONS

Finally, it is thought that by reading the Preface to the
former Bylaws the reader will gain a good perspective of the
rule-making power within the University as exercised by the
Board of Regents and under their direction and control, by
other authorities of the University.
It is here set forth verbatim:

PREFACE
A brief explanation of the rule-making powers effective within ·
the University will serve the useful purpose of indicating the scope
of the Bylaws of the Board of Regents, drawing the line between the
legislative powers exercised directly by the Board and the sublegislative powers of the various subordinate University authorities.
Rule making within the University is divided three ways: (1)
Bylaws of the Board of Regents, (2) Rules initiated by subordinate
University authorities, which become effective only upon approval
by the Board of Regents, and (3) Rules adopted by subordinate
University authorities under delegated legislative powers, which will
become effective as provided by such subordinate authorities.

(1) The first class, the Bylaws of the Board of Regents, comprises the rules concerning the more important matters of general
University organization and policy, as distinguished from administrative details and specific technical requirements of the several
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fields of instruction. Moreover, these Bylaws include rules, regardless of importance, with respect to which it is desirable to afford positive notice to all interested persons. Bylaws are adopted directly by
the Board of Regents in the exercise of the Board's legislative powers, although they may and often do actually originate in the form
of recommendations from some University agency such as a school
or college, the University Senate, or other sublegislative forum.
(2) In the second class of rules are those initiated by subordinate University authorities, which become effective only upon approval by the Board of Regents but which are not of sufficient general importance or interest to warrant inclusion in the Bylaws. This
class embraces the more technical and detailed rules, such as those
relating to admission, graduation, and other educational matters
within the peculiar competence of the several school and college
faculties. Since such rules do not constitute a part of the Regents'
Bylaws, they may be modified without the formalities requisite to
the amendment of the Bylaws. For the sake of completeness of the
record, such rules are published in the Proceedings of the Board of
Regents after being approved.
(3) In the third class of rules are those concerning numerous
matters of even less general importance than those included under
the last preceding heading: for instance, grading regulations, committee organization, and other matters of internal management of
the several schools and colleges. With respect to these rules the
Board of Regents delegates plenary power to the several faculties of
the schools and colleges and other authorities, all subject, of course,
to the ultimate authority of the Board. These rules are adopted,
amended, or repealed according to the procedures established by the
several University authorities themselves. Power to adopt them may
either be expressly delegated in the Board's Bylaws, or be implied
from other powers conferred upon such authorities, or be implied
from general usage. Since such rules are not ftled with or approved
by the Board of Regents, they do not appear on record in the
Regents' Proceedings. They are recorded in the minute books of the
authorities adopting them and in such other record repositories at
are prescribed by the Bylaws of the Board.
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